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Abstract 
 
 This thesis argues that the bilingual literary oeuvre of Kahlil Gibran (Jubrān 
Khalil Jubrān), the Arab Mahjari (immigrant) writer (1883-1931), is marked by a 
singularity that is irreducible to biographical and culturalist approaches. This 
singularity, drawing on Derek Attridge, signifies the inexhaustible alterity and creative 
difference of his bilingual texts that my reading attempts to analyse and do justice to by 
focusing on their universal and national dimensions, complementary albeit not without 
tensions. This interpretation begins from the premise that Gibran’s anglophone works 
should be read as Arab world literature. This ethics of reading, and this methodological 
perspective, is adopted because the Gibranian text is marked and fissured by a bilingual 
movement that enabled the creative possibility of writing in English and obscured its 
textual visibility in (Euro)-America. My argument develops in four distinct but inter-
laced directions. First, I read Gibran’s poetic enterprise in both languages as a universal 
endeavour to reinvent the religious in and against modernity – and the Arab 
Nahḍa/Awakening. Second, I focus on the discursive chasm that his bilingual 
movement produces, which nevertheless binds the particular and the universal. Third, I 
highlight Gibran’s critical writings vis-à-vis the question of Syrian nationhood and the 
Arab Nahḍa, a crucial facet of his work as intellectual. And finally, I turn to the 
problematic reception of his anglophone works in the U.S. (especially) and in the Arab 
world, to underscore the conditions of this reception and interrogate what is rendered 
(in)visible by it. As an attempt to read Gibran’s bilingual texts hospitably and critically, 
this thesis performs – and proposes – an ethics of reading that attends to the distinctness 
of modern Arabic literature, with Gibran as illustrative example, in its creative and 
problematic movement between the nation and the world. 
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Note on Translation, Transliteration and Citation  
 
 All translations from the Arabic in this thesis are mine unless otherwise noted. 
Transliterations of titles, words or passages in Arabic follow the IJMES (International 
Journal for Middle Eastern Studies) Transliteration Guide. For the purpose of 
convenience and accessibility, names of authors in Arabic have been transliterated 
without following the IJMES guide. 
 I use the abbreviated forms of the primary sources below consistently 
throughout the thesis:  
CWs: Kahlil Gibran, The Collected Works (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2007). 
 
CWs in Arabic: Jubrān Khalil Jubrān, al-Majmūʿa al-Kāmila li Muʾallafāt Jubrān
 Khalīl Jubrān bil-ʿArabiyya [The Collected Works in Arabic] (Lebanon:
 Kitābuna li al-Nashr, 2014). 
  
CWs in Arabic O: Jubrān Khalil Jubrān, al-Majmūʿa al-Kāmila li Muʾallafāt Jubrān
 Khalīl Jubrān: Nuṣūs Khārij Majmūʿa [The Collected Works of Jubrān Khalil
 Jubrān: Texts Outside the Main Collection], ed. Antoine al-Qawwal (Beirut: Dār
 al-Jīl, 1994). 
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Introduction 
 
 
In Ghurbat al-Kātib al-ʿArabī [The Exile of the Arab Writer] (2013), Halim 
Barakat, the eminent Syrio-Lebanese novelist and scholar, laments the fact that Kahlil 
Gibran, one of the most prominent Arab Mahjari (immigrant) writers of the early 
twentieth century, lives in utter isolation in an unknown, solitary place in Washington, 
D.C., “an isolation which is not the one he loved and, inspired by it, he wrote, but a 
poor and stifling isolation that he has not chosen for himself but was, indeed, forced 
upon him.”1 Barakat is talking about a memorial of Gibran, located in an empty, non-
descript place between the centre of D.C. and its suburbs, which was made in 1989. 
“When one ventures to visit the memorial,” he writes, “one has to look in vain for a 
parking slot until one is driven away from the area and reluctantly decides not to pursue 
the venture.”2 Barakat admits that this situation has induced in him a feeling of “guilt 
mixed with sadness and anger,” because Gibran, the revolutionary writer who inspired 
and instigated Barakat’s literary energy and yearning for writing, has turned into a dead 
cultural monument established by a committee that barely knows a thing about the Arab 
Mahjari writer, except, perhaps, for his well-known book The Prophet (1923). What is 
at stake here, and this is the gist of Barakat’s polemic, is the institutional domestication 
and reduction of one of the pioneering figures in the modern Arab world of what he 
calls “counter-culture,” into a poet of “peace, understanding, reconciliation and 
consensus.”3 “I find Gibran solitary, isolated and incapable to liberate himself from the 
memorial to which he is confined,” he adds. “He loved the solitude of Kadisha valley4 
that liberated his soul from all confinement. In his death, however, how could he relish 
 
1 Halim Barakat, Ghurbat al-Kātib al-ʿArabī (London: Saqi books, 2011), 123.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 126. 
4 This famous valley crosses the village of Bsharri in North Lebanon, where Gibran was born.  
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an aloneness that is teeming with the incessant flow of cars and from which man is 
absent?”5 Barakat extends his criticism to “the ritualistic celebrations of Gibran,” in 
Lebanon and the Arab world, that are “at the service of the very institutions, forces and 
trends against which he rebelled in the name of individuation and struggle, not 
consensus, meekness and compliance.”6 The domestication of a counter-cultural figure 
such as Gibran is not an exceptional case, Barakat insists, but an institutional practise 
that the dominant elite everywhere adopts. I take this problem as the underlying impetus 
for this introduction and for the thesis as a whole, which attempts to revisit Gibran’s 
work and do justice to it due, partly, to this tendency to domesticate and/or abate its 
creative and critical spirit.    
This introduction will proceed as follows: First, I will stress the importance of 
Gibran as a modern Arab writer, going on to foreground and explain the need to engage 
with his work today. Second, I will spell out the premise of the thesis, the argument it 
puts forward and the approach it follows. Third, I will demarcate and justify the 
selection of texts that will be focused upon, followed by a detailed outline of the thesis. 
Fourth, I will give a review of the literature relevant to the topic by discussing the most 
pertinent to it in order to demonstrate how and why the argument and approach of this 
thesis, along with the kind of reading it sets out to perform, diverge from the existing 
scholarly work on Gibran. Fifth, I will give a brief historical account of the Mahjar 
school of Arabic literature and of the Arab Nahḍa (Awakening). This is crucial because 
a critical (re)consideration of Gibran’s work must be cognizant of the latter’s specific 
historical and discursive context. Sixth, I will elaborate on the conceptual apparatus of 
this thesis and discuss some crucial theoretical problems relevant to the question of how 
to approach Gibran’s work and Arabic literature today. Then I will end by 
 
5 Ibid., 127. 
6 Ibid.  
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acknowledging the (inevitable) limitations of this study. This introduction will be 
relatively and inevitably long. This is due to the nature of my argument and the 
methodology it entails, which warrant, in order to avoid any confusion later, an 
extensive contextual and conceptual elucidation. 
Kahlil Gibran (1883-1931), or Jubrān Khalil Jubrān as he is known in the Arab 
world, is the most prominent of the Arab Mahjari writers and poets who lived in the 
United States in the early twentieth century. The rebelliousness that Barakat 
emphatically regards as the central impulse of Gibran’s literary endeavour, his 
“idealism” notwithstanding, constitutes the impetus and thrust of his writings. This is 
most exemplified in his book al-ʿAwāṣif [The Tempests] (1920), in one essay of which, 
entitled “Slavery,” he writes:  
Everywhere I saw slavery being carried in processions toward the altars and 
being called ‘god’. They poured libations of wine and perfume at its feet and 
called it ‘angel’. They burned incense before its images and called it ‘prophet’. 
They fell down prostrate before it and called it the ‘holy law’. They fought and 
killed for it and called it ‘patriotism’. They submitted to its will and called it ‘the 
shadow of God on earth’. They burned their houses and razed their buildings at 
its will and called ‘fraternity’ and ‘equality’. They strove then and made every 
effort for it, calling it ‘wealth’ and ‘trade’. Indeed, it has many names but one 
reality, many manifestations of a single substance. It is a single disease, eternal 
without beginning, without end, appearing with many contradictory symptoms 
and differing sores, inherited from the fathers by the sons as they inherit the 
breath of life. The ages receive its seeds in the soil of the ages, just as the 
seasons reap what the seasons have sown.7  
 
No wonder that Gibran is deemed by many notable Arab critics and writers – Barakat 
himself, Adunis (Ali Ahmad Said Esber), Kamal Abu-Deeb and Boutros Hallaq, to 
mention but a few8 – as a discursive turn in, if not the inaugural eruption of, Arab 
literary modernity. Adunis, for instance, sees Gibran as the founder of modernity as 
vision [al-ḥadātha al-ruʾyā] in Arabic literature and the pioneer of its articulation, in 
 
7 Gibran, The Strom, trans. John Wallbridge (Santa Cruz, CA: White Cloud Press, 1993), 40-41. 
8 See Adunis, al-Thābit wa al-Mutaḥawwil: Baḥth fī al-Ittibāʿ wa al-Ibdāʿ ʿinda al-ʿArab: Ṣadmat al-
Ḥadātha [The Fixed and the Changing in Arabic Poetics, vol. 3] (Beirut: Dār al-ʿAwda, 1978), 158-211; 
Kamal Abdel-Malek and Wael Hallaq, ed. Tradition, Modernity, and Postmodernity in Arabic Literature 
(Leiden: Brill, 2000), 315-20, 342; Boutros Hallaq, Gibran et la refondation littéraire arabe: 
Bildungsroman, écriture prophétique, transgénérisme (Arles: Sindibad: Actes sud, 2008).  
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that his innovative mode of writing made possible a new horizon of literary expression. 
He writes,  
[T]he primary significance of Gibran resides in the fact that he took a trajectory 
hitherto unknown in Arab writing, in that he destroyed memory and constructed 
the sign. In this sense, he represents a beginning…. Arab writing, starting from 
him, has ceased to contemplate itself in the mirrors of expression, but has begun, 
instead, to submerge itself in anguish, search and yearning – and hence its 
energization; the readers who previously fed on words now feed on the power of 
renewal and transformation.9 
 
This emphasis on the specificity of Gibran as a turning point in Arab literary 
modernity should not be read in Romantic terms as the creative spirit of a solitary and 
mad genius who, alone and isolated, revolutionized Arabic literature. One should 
expose and resist the institutional attempts to domesticate, isolate and/or abate his 
critical-creative spirit without falling prey, nevertheless, to fetishization and adulation. 
Adopting this double critical attitude with respect to Gibran is more than necessary. 
Why? As a bilingual writer, or, perhaps more accurately, as an Arab writer in Arabic 
and in English, Gibran has been subject to divergent modes of reception that mystified 
his literary legacy and the value of his work in ways that are extremely perplexing and 
at times disturbing. For how can one reconcile the huge scholarly and literary interest in 
Gibran in the Arab discursive universe with the dearth of criticism devoted to his work 
in Anglo-American scholarship, exceptions notwithstanding? What is more, Gibran has 
been at times disparagingly treated in some pseudo-critical essays on his work in the 
U.S., which dismiss him, because of the enormous popular appeal of The Prophet 
(1923) since its publication and especially in the New Age movement, as a popular poet 
whose inauthentic prophecy and Oriental (spiritual) wisdom are signs of his work’s 
“low” cultural status. This profound chasm in literary and cultural reception, which is 
visible in his name itself – on the one hand, the American and global Kahlil Gibran, the 
 
9 Adunis, al-Thābit wa al-Mutaḥawwil, 210. [emphasis in the original] 
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name that was imposed on him at school in the U.S.,10 and the Arab Jubrān Khalil 
Jubrān on the other – is what initially prompted this research, as I attempted to grapple 
with the historical, discursive and translational forces in and beyond Gibran and his own 
writings. It is the bilingual singularity of his text, however, that constitutes the primary, 
though by no means the sole, focus of my critical reconsideration of the Arab-American 
poet here. 
I, a native speaker of Arabic, encountered Gibran with passion and enthusiasm, 
as many Arab readers do, early in my life, devouring most of his writings before going 
to university. One later discovers that the unique lyrical flow of his words and his 
“rebellious” and liberating spirit consolidated Gibran as a Romantic poet and writer 
whose canonical status in the Arab literary universe is unshakable, notwithstanding the 
waning attention to his work in recent years.11 So when I read him in English I did so 
with view of him as an Arab writer, and through that implicitly orienting lens, I 
experienced his English works as an extension of his creativity in Arabic, despite the 
discernible difference in the mode of writing between his anglophone and Arabic works 
and, consequently, in the reading experience they engender. This observation is not 
merely a subjective one; it is meant to accentuate that what is fundamentally at stake 
here is “language experience,”12 the unique experience of words in a text as a 
 
10 For a historical account of the Americanization of his name as Kahlil Gibran, see Francesco Medici, 
“Tracing Gibran’s Footsteps: Unpublished and Rare Material,” in Gibran in the 21st Century: Lebanon's 
Message to the World, ed. H. Zoghaib and M. Rihani, (Beirut: Centre for Lebanese Heritage, LAU, 
2018), 93-145. In this thesis, I shall use the name Kahlil Gibran in order to avoid confusion and make it 
easy for the non-Arab reader, since this thesis is written in English, to understand whom I am talking 
about.  
11 This is due to the numerous studies that appeared on Gibran in Arabic on the one hand, and to the rich, 
varied and enormous body of Arabic literary writing that has emerged since Gibran’s demise (1931).  
12 Here, I draw on Ayman A. El-Desouky’s emphasis on the irreducible specificity of the Qur’anic Nazm 
or voice as a language experience particular to Arabic and, by extension, on the language experience of 
non-European literary and theoretical traditions as that which anchors, hermeneutically, “the line of 
conceptual negotiation of difference in textual traditions and their histories of reception.” This leads El-
Desouky to propose as “critical method” in world literature the “possibilities of abstracting method from 
concepts naming specific practices in non-European literary, intellectual and aesthetic traditions,” where 
“untranslatability … is not only that irreducible of difference in acts of understanding, translation and 
circulation that allows for the imaginative [, but] also theorizable as that which allows to emerge, through 
critical hermeneutical rigour, the conceptual on the other side of Western metaphysics, beginning with the 
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(dis)continuum within a certain language, whose impact, effect and affect are 
necessarily different from one language to another, and thereby from one literary sphere 
to another, overlaps, similarities and communalities notwithstanding. From a bilingual 
point of view, however, my reading experience of Gibran’s English writings ineluctably 
carries the trace of my reading experience of his Arabic works, and it is this invisible 
and inescapable trace – across one language and culture to another, without privileging 
one or the other – that I am attempting to understand in this study beyond my subjective 
experience of it; the subjective here being the locus where the bigger historical, 
discursive and cultural (trans)formations manifest themselves, but in an unexhaustive 
manner that allows for the possibility of critique, of uncovering and interrogating – in 
order to lay the ground for the possibility of historically transforming – the unequal or 
mystified conditions of writing, reading and criticism. 
Premise and Argument of the Thesis  
 
This thesis begins with the assumption that Gibran is an Arab writer in his 
Arabic and English writings, and that it is as an Arab Mahjari writer, furthermore, that 
he becomes an anglophone one, which means that his English work is seen as Arabic 
literature in English. This is by no means a claim to cultural “authenticity” – that Gibran 
has become Arab-American is undeniable. Rather, this is an emphasis on the ethical 
necessity of understanding, approaching and probing the bilingual literary enterprise of 
Gibran without the perils of reductive de-contextualization. More specifically, one of 
the central critical premises of this study is to avoid “distant” and culturalist readings or 
domestications that highlight particular readerly experiences and histories of reception 
in particular and dominant epistemic locations by forgetting what is invisible and 
 
danger in the dialogue.” See Ayman A. El-Desouky, “Theorizing the Local and Untranslatability as 
Comparative Critical Method,” in Joachim Küpper, ed. Approaches to World Literature, Volume 1, 
WeltLiteraturen/World Literatures Series. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2013), 59-86. [emphasis in the 
original] 
13 
 
seemingly untransferable in translation and self-translation, in the travelling from one 
language to another in the historical and double discursive context in which Gibran’s 
work was produced and received. As my reading and analysis in this study endeavour to 
demonstrate, Gibran’s English writing can be best appreciated, not only as American, 
but, most importantly, as Arabic literature in English 
Gibran, I argue in this thesis, is an Arab, anglophone writer whose multi-faceted 
literary oeuvre in both languages is marked by a singularity that is irreducible to 
biographical and culturalist criticism. This singularity, drawing on Derek Attridge, 
signifies the inexhaustible alterity and creative difference13 of his bilingual texts that my 
reading attempts to analyse and do justice to by focusing on their universal and national 
dimensions, complementary albeit not without tensions. Gibran moves from one 
language to another invisibly,14 as it were, yet by no means unproblematically as 
evinced in the history of his work’s reception in both the U.S. and the Arab world. 
While this study, therefore, attempts to critically address this bilingualism and the 
attendant problematic reception of his work, it crucially sets out to demonstrate and 
discuss that which is made possible by, through and beyond this bilingualism, namely, 
the national and the universal in their singular configurations in Gibran’s text. The 
national or the particular and the universal or the poetic15 in Gibran, I submit, are inter-
related and at times complementary, not irreconcilable or mutually exclusive, despite 
the inevitable tensions between the two.  
 
13 The singularity of a literary work, according to Derek Attridge, consists in the difference or alterity that 
the invention/creation of the work introduces, that which is at once different, unique and creative in it, the 
otherness that makes it possible and that it, in turn, introduces. This alterity is ultimately accommodated 
by the existing culture(s) in a way that alters, however minimally, existing aesthetic and ethical norms. 
More precisely, this singularity is that “act-event” which “opens new possibilities of meaning and feeling 
(understood as verbs),” realized or enacted in the creative act of reading, which is obviously, like the 
invention of the work, historically and culturally situated. See Attridge, The Singularity of Literature 
(London: Routledge, 2004), 59, 63-64.  
14 That is to say, no métissage, hybridization or any visible foreignization of the same by the other as 
exercised and privileged in some “postmodern” and “postcolonial” writings and criticism are the case in 
Gibran. 
15 Gibran, as I show later, correlates poetry with the universal. I explain what I mean by “the universal” in 
the last part of this introduction (The Conceptual Apparatus). 
14 
 
Put differently, this study is an endeavour to interpret the Gibranian text 
hospitably and critically, at once enacting and doing justice to its singularity. This is 
because his bilingual oeuvre is marked and fissured by a bilingual movement that at 
once enabled the creative possibility of writing in the second language – English – and 
obscured its textual visibility in (Euro)-America. The aim is to go beyond, while 
exposing and interrogating, the modes of reading and reception that confined Gibran 
and his work to specific and reductive categorizations – the prophet of the New Age or 
the Romantic and sentimentalist poet. This should not be understood as a reclamation of 
an “authentic” Gibran. Rather, this is an attempt to look at his text afresh by critically 
foregrounding its universal and national dimensions within its worldly context of 
emergence and reception, but beyond the biographical and culturalist trends of criticism 
through which his work has been mostly filtered and understood.  
From the point of view of reception, Gibran’s literary singularity may be 
regarded as a discontinuous one. In other words, if we follow Attridge in positing that a 
literary work is creative when it brings into being something other, that is, hitherto un-
thought, un-imagined or un-formulated, and becomes inventive when it alters the 
literary sphere in which it is accommodated,16 then Gibran’s work is both creative and 
inventive in Arabic, while creative and not sufficiently inventive in English, given its 
tepid reception in American literary criticism despite, or because of, its popular 
celebration. But if approached as bilingual Arabic literature, or, as I construe it, as Arab 
world literature, this discontinuity would cease to appear this way, for his English work 
has been also translated into Arabic (or “Arabized”) – and into many other languages – 
and accommodated as part of its modern literature.17 While keeping in mind the 
 
16 Attridge, The Singularity, 42.  
17 By “world literature,” following David Damrosch, is meant any literary work that travelled in the 
original or translation beyond its linguistic and cultural “origin.” Damrosch, What is World Literature? 
(Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2004), 5. Gibran’s case, however, complicates this definition, 
because, first, of his bilingualism, that is, the initial enunciation and situatedness of his work in two 
 
15 
 
importance of Gibran’s work as “Arab American,” therefore, I read his bilingual text in 
its multifariousness as “the emergent” that “persistently and repeatedly undermines the 
definitive tendency of the dominant [in the Arab world and particularly in the U.S.] to 
appropriate [it],”18 as a text that remains, as Attridge suggests, “a stranger, even and 
perhaps especially when the reader knows it intimately,”19 without losing sight of its 
worldly situatedness.  
The General Approach of the Thesis 
 
Proceeding this way, Gibran is approached in this study as a worldly writer 
whose texts cannot be dissociated from the modern emergence of “literature” as a 
relatively autonomous domain20; from the transformation of “religion” in modernity and 
the Arab Nahḍa or Awakening; from the traveling, circulation, domestication and 
transformation of ideas, concepts and ideologies on a global scale in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries; and from the interconnected locations – geographical, 
symbolic and imaginative – of enunciation and reception that shaped the status of his 
work and its value in multiple and discordant ways. In other words, Gibran’s work 
cannot be dissociated from what Edward Said calls “the historical experience of empire 
as a common one,” the separation between Europeans and non-Europeans 
notwithstanding.21 Engaging with the singularity of Gibran’s texts by situating them 
within this nexus without reducing them to it is, generally speaking, my method in this 
thesis. Arriving at this method came after realizing that reading and doing justice to 
 
literary and cultural spheres, and, second, the travelling of his work in translation between these two 
distinct spheres, which are unevenly related in terms of power differentials, and, third, the translation of 
his work into more than a hundred languages and the reception that ensued, which is beyond the scope of 
this research. 
18 Gayatri Spivak, Death of a Discipline (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 100.  
19 See Attridge, “Innovation, Literature, Ethics: Relating to the Other,” PMLA 114, no. 1 (January 1999): 
26.  
20 See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: 
Vintage, 1973), 299-300; see also, Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, 
revised ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 183-88.  
21 Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1994), xxiv. [emphasis added] 
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Gibran’s works as creative products – whatever their limitations – entails attending to 
them, first, in their literary singularity and, second, as entangled in the constellation of 
the worldly forces and conditions that made their emergence, inscription and longevity 
in the world possible.        
The worldliness that I am emphasizing, following Said, is inherent to the being 
of the text itself: “It is not only that any text, if it is not immediately destroyed, is a 
network of often colliding forces, but also that a text in its actually being a text is a 
being in the world.”22 The text is brought into being and becomes a text in the world – 
how so is another question that does not so much interest me here – in that it is the 
reading of it as a published work by multiple subjectivities in one or more cultural 
locations that makes it possible as a text beyond the control of the author. But what is 
equally important here are the worldly conditions that make a particular text, a set of 
texts or an oeuvre possible, the historical, discursive and cultural conditions of writing 
against which writers as agents produce their work, the latter being the manifestation of 
that which either reinforces and reasserts or reformulates and reworks, with varying 
degrees that remain open to contestation and negotiation, existing norms, practices and 
habits of meaning, feeling, sensing, doing and so on. It is the bilingualism of Gibran – 
his “dwelling”23 in two linguistic and cultural spheres – at a particular juncture in 
history that is at once modern, imperial and colonial, in the sense in which these three 
inter-relate in ways that are not always accounted for in terms of dominant-subordinate 
structure, and the intriguing (after)-life of his texts in the twentieth and the beginning of 
the twenty first centuries, that render his case particularly complex and difficult to 
approach – hence the discontinuous singularity. The task is therefore to avoid, as much 
as possible, any sort of interpretative reductionism, which could be countered by being 
 
22 Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (New York: Vintage, 1982), 33. [emphasis in the original]  
23 “Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells.” See Martin Heidegger, “Letter on 
Humanism,” in Basic Writings, ed. D. F. Krell (London: Routledge: 1978), 217.  
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at once hermeneutically careful/hospitable and historically critical when engaging with 
his texts. Not an easy task, indeed, but one that I hope this study will not divert from in 
any conspicuous way, unavoidable limitations notwithstanding.  
Reading Approach: Two Planes of Analysis 
 
Attending to the singularity of the Gibranian text in its bilingual (in)visibility 
and in its multifariousness will be carried out by demarcating planes of analysis which, 
however inter-related, should not be confused with one another. This is, of course, in 
addition to the inevitable thematic division. What I mean by planes of analysis has to do 
with my approach in this thesis, which consists, I should repeat, of rendering visible the 
Gibranian text in its necessarily polysemic nature – which is not the same as semantic 
indeterminacy – by taking into account its worldly situatedness, but without 
determining its ultimate “value” by subduing it to such discursive or contextual 
overdeterminations as the East-West cultural(ist) dichotomy or the biography of the 
author. What is at stake here, however, is how one understands these cultural, discursive 
and biographical elements – or, in short, the “context” – in relation or in their manner of 
relating to the text and vice versa.24 We know after Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida 
that the text has more to say than what its author meant or intended to, that the text 
always exceeds the author-as-cause. This should not mean, however, that the text 
becomes the new god, as it were. For the text, as I emphasized earlier, is a being in the 
world. We read it, that is, in the world and in relation to the world, and the more we 
know about the world(s) in which it is enunciated and received the more enriched our 
reading becomes, provided that this reading attempts to enact that which is singular in 
or about this text. What I mean by “world(s)” are the worldly conditions – which 
 
24 Of course, one cannot completely do away with certain biographical elements, which remain essential 
to the extent that they are not used as indices to explain (away) certain features in the text. This will be 
clear when I touch on Gibran’s experience of bilingualism in Chapter Two, which I analyse in reference 
to what he reveals in his letters, but whose textual embodiment exceeds his bilingual experience as an 
author. 
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include writing, reading, (re)-appropriation, domestication, foreignization, consecration, 
valorisation, marginalization – that enabled the emergence of Gibran’s texts and, most 
importantly, occasioned their persistence – conditions that resist any monocultural or 
monolinguistic understanding. The history and modality of this persistence is very 
problematic, as indicated in Halim Barakat’s critical comments with which I began this 
introduction. To give another example, The Prophet is the most popularly visible of 
Gibran’s books but the least inviting of critical attention, at the expense, at least in the 
U.S., of his other works in both languages, which suffer both popular and critical 
attention.25  
This is why it is crucial to delineate two planes of analysis: the first has to do 
with what the literary text says and how it does so in connection to its general context of 
emergence – and, of course, to the actual context of reading – and how it intervenes in it 
as a text; and the second pertains to the location(s) of and the degree to which this 
changing context of enunciation and reception bears on the manner in which the text is 
or has been read, evaluated and valued. Both planes inevitably overlap, but it is the 
topical concern that entails the prioritizing of one over the other. Even though my 
argument would logically require the first plane of analysis, the second will be also 
crucial when the question of reception is addressed or, at least, is relevant to the 
discussion. Confusing these two planes, which are distinct but inter-connected, has led, 
for instance, to the tendency of accounting for the intriguingly popular appeal of The 
Prophet by returning, explicitly or not, to the author-as-cause, whereas Gibran had 
nothing to do with the huge celebration of the book in the New Age movement and 
beyond. It is the text that has survived, not its author or any implied authorial intention, 
 
25 “Popular” and “critical” are not mutually exclusive here, as I hope to show in this study.  
19 
 
despite the writer’s inventiveness having brought the book into existence.26 That this 
thesis is not solely concerned with reading but with particular (problematic) modes of 
reading/reception and with what they reveal and conceal would lend, I hope, more 
importance to the way I engage with the texts I purport to read and, more importantly, 
to the validity and purpose of my own argument. 
Selection of Texts 
 
Gibran began his literary career by publishing a long poetic essay in Arabic al-
Mūsīqā [On Music] (1905), which demonstrates an experimentally audacious use of 
language marked by lyricism, simplicity and emotionalism. This stylistic uniqueness 
was combined with a thematic rebellious and anti-authoritarian spirit in his collections 
of short stories ʿArāʾis al-Murūj (1906) [Nymphs of the Valley] and al-Arwāḥ al-
Mutamarrida (1908) [Spirits Rebellious], as well as in his short novel al-Ajniḥa al-
Mutakassira (1912) [Broken Wings]. All of these stories are set in Lebanon against a 
backdrop of ecclesiastical tyranny and social injustice in the face of which his 
protagonists – like Kahlil the heretic or Yuhanna the mad, mouthpieces of his poet-
prophetic activism – hyperbolically revolt and romantically subvert the social order, 
without reforming or positing an alternative social vision. Despite the occasional 
didacticism and sentimentality that characterize these writings, as well as their 
simplicity of plot and characterization, they bumped, by virtue of their unique 
subjective tone, lyrical flow, vivid imagery and rebellious tenor, a new energy in 
modern Arabic literature. This first stage of Gibran’s writings ends with a publication of 
a collection of essays and poetic prose, which he wrote for the Arab press over the years 
preceding the publication, under the title of Damʿa wa Ibtisāma [A Tear and a Smile] 
 
26 Attridge speaks about the sense in which readers always assume that behind the words of a work they 
read there is an author, or someone whose inventiveness has brought into being, or is embodied, in the 
work, which he calls “authordness,” but which he acutely differentiates from the assumption that the 
meaning or the singularity of the text being read lies in uncovering the intention of its producer. See 
Attridge, The Singularity, 100-03.  
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(1914). The second and more mature stage begins with the publication of The Madman: 
His Parables and Poems (1918) and al-ʿAwāṣif [The Tempests] (1920), a collection of 
writings across many genres: the essay, the short story, poetic prose and the play. What 
characterizes these works is an acute sense of social and religious revolt marked by an 
unmistakable Nietzschean spirit that satirizes and exposes the contradictions inherent in 
existing norms and moral values, both in the Arab world and in the U.S. Even though 
the voice of the Romantic Gibran continues to be heard in this stage, especially in The 
Forerunner (1920), The Prophet (1923) and Jesus the Son of Man (1928), what 
distinguishes these writings is a (post)-Nietzschean impulse in which Gibran and his 
poets are thinking in the horizon of thought that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra made possible: 
exposing the nihilism behind certain values which survived by dint of what Gibran calls 
“the power of continuity,”27 and re-imagining God, the self and the world, or the 
universal re-invention of the religious, by way of reclaiming prophetic speech. 
Furthermore, Gibran wrote many essays and plays for the Arab Mahjar press, 
particularly in the 1910s and the first half of the 1920s, most of which are collected by 
Antoine al-Qawwal and John Daye.28 These texts are important because they reveal 
another crucial facet of Gibran, that of the Arab writer who is committed nationally and 
civilizationally to the Nahḍa (or Awakening) of the Syrian nation and the Arab East, 
respectively. The second phase of Gibran’s writings and the nationally-civilizationally 
committed essays and plays will occupy a good deal of my attention in this thesis. This 
is due, on the one hand, to the relative continuity in the second phase of Gibran’s 
literary writings of the thematic concern which I go on to highlight in Chapter One – the 
 
27 Kahlil Gibran, “al-ʿUbūdiyya” [Slavery] in al-Majmūʿa al-Kāmila li Muʾallafāt Jubrān Khalīl Jubrān 
bil-ʿArabiyya [The Collected Works in Arabic] (Lebanon: Kitābuna li al-Nashr, 2014), 215. I will refer to 
this collection as CWs in Arabic whenever I cite anything from it. 
28 See John Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān [The Doctrine of Gibran] (London: Dār Surāqia, 1988) and al-Majmūʿa 
al-Kāmila li Muʾallafāt Jubrān Khalīl Jubrān: Nusūs Khārij Majmūʿa [The Collected Works of Jubrān 
Khalil Jubrān: Texts outside the Main Collection], ed. Antoine al-Qawwal (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1994), 
referred to from now on as CWs in Arabic O. 
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poetic reinvention of the religious – and, on the other hand, to the argument and scope 
of this thesis, to which the national facet of Gibran’s enterprise elicits a critical attention 
that requires a whole chapter (Chapter Three). Still, the aesthetics of two of Gibran’s 
early pieces of poetic prose will invite close readings in Chapter Two, and I explain 
why in my delineation of the thesis’s outline below.   
Essential Points: The Poetic, the Prophetic and the Abrahamic 
 
It is essential to remember that Gibran writes as a poet, even and particularly in 
his prose. That is to say, it is the poetic – the inventive force by which a language lives 
and survives29 – that constitutes the driving force of his writings, beyond the 
conventional division of genres or of prose and poetry. What is more, poetry is often 
identified, explicitly or tacitly, with the universal in Gibran, in that the true poet in his 
text is not only indicative of the “power of invention”30 in a certain language, but 
emerges as existentially exiled,31 necessarily singing and manifesting life as such – what 
he refers to as “world-consciousness.”32 So the prophetic in his writings is essentially 
poetic; which is to say that his post-religious prophet, as I show in Chapter One, speaks 
primarily as a poet. This is a fundamental point that must be underlined time and again, 
even as far as Gibran’s national, critical writings are concerned. In addition, when I 
speak of the prophetic, I not only refer to the modern Romantic notion of the poet-
prophet, but, most importantly, to the Abrahamic as that mythic-discursive condition 
that allows for the Romantic appropriation of the poet as a prophet, and for Gibran and 
 
29 See Kahlil Gibran, “The Future of the Arabic Language (Excerpt),” trans. Adnan Haydar, in Tablet & 
Pen: Literary Landscapes from the Modern Middle East, ed. Reza Aslan (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Co., 2011). 6-11. 
30 Ibid. 
31 In The Tempests, he writes, “A Poet am I. I bring together in verse what life scattered in prose, and I 
strew in lines of prose what life has rendered in verse. Wherefore I shall ever be the stranger, and an exile 
I shall remain until death snatches me away and whisks me back to my homeland.” Kahlil Gibran: An 
Illustrated Anthology, trans., ed. Ayman A. El-Desouky (London: Spruce, 2010), 210. 
32 After meeting Rabindranath Tagore in New York, Gibran wrote to Mary Haskell, “Tagore speaks 
against nationalism while his work does not show or express a world-consciousness.” KG to MH, Jan. 3, 
1917, in Beloved Prophet: The Love Letters of Kahlil Gibran and Mary Haskell, ed. Virginia Hilu 
(London: A. Knopf Inc., 1972), 283. Throughout this study, I shall refer to the date of the letter or of 
Haskell’s journal entry whenever I cite a quote from this book. 
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the Mahjar school to embrace the same notion.33 And since the Abrahamic points to that 
which simultaneously unites and divides the three monotheistic religions, of which 
Christianity and Islam are particularly pertinent to Gibran, it precedes and exceeds not 
only the Romantic embrace of the trope of the poet-prophet, which is marked by the 
imprint of Islam and Islamic Sufism as far as Gibran and the Mahjar Romantic poets are 
concerned.34 It also precedes, exceeds and destabilizes the reductive culturalist logic of 
symbolic geography (East and West). Furthermore, Gibran’s case is particularly 
interesting here, because despite his early profound awareness of Greek mythology, he 
“wrote no Greek mythological poetry,” which means that “[h]e had a clear idea of what 
he was doing, that is, of the reason he was not writing such poetry.”35 The Greeks, as 
Maurice Blanchot points out, had not known the nabis (prophets)36; the prophetic, in 
other words, is essentially Abrahamic. 
Detailed Outline of the Thesis 
 
I begin in Chapter One, “Reinventing the Religious in and against Modernity: 
The Poet as a Post-religious Prophet,” by highlighting what I call the post-religious 
 
33 The influential Mahjar literary society, Al-Rābiṭa al-Qalamiyya (The Pen Bond) – which was formed 
by expatriate Arab writers and poets in the U.S., led by Gibran himself, to rejuvenate Arabic literature – 
had in the centre of its logotype a hadith (saying) attributed to Prophet Mohammad: “How wonderful the 
treasures beneath God’s throne which poets’ tongue can unlock.” See Jean Gibran and Kahlil G Gibran, 
Kahlil Gibran: His Life and World (New York: Interlink Books, 1998), 339.  
34 In his remarkable study on Arabic Romantic poetry, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Hayy writes, “The Christian 
émigrés used it [the Sufi diction] extensively; and, indeed, it was due to them that it reached the degree of 
aesthetic transformation and poetic transparency that made it part of the language of Arabic romantic 
poetry.” He gives Gibran’s poem “Sukūtī Inshād” [my silence is a hymn], which resonates with one of the 
poems of the Sufi legendary poet Ibn al-Fāriḍ, as an illustrative example. He goes on to stress that “[i]t is 
this close and vital proximity to the traditional language of Sufism that gives the language of Arabic 
romantic poetry curves and tones characteristic to it when compared to English romantic poetry. In 
Arabic, Sufism is not an occult; it is a living tradition.” See Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Hayy, Tradition and 
English and Romantic Influence in Arabic Romantic Poetry: A Study in Comparative Literature (London: 
Ithaca, 1982), 110-11. 
35 ʿAbd al-Hayy adds, “In a letter to Mary Haskell in 1913, he [Gibran] expresses his idea of the 
difference between the Greeks and the ancient people of the Middle East as far as their artistic creations 
are concerned. For him, Greek art is visual, the other is visionary. The Greek artist lacked the ‘third eye’, 
which the Chaldean or the Phoenician or the Egyptian artist possessed. Michelangelo’s David 
overpowers Dionysius and Apollo; and Astarte or Isis are certainly more powerful than Venus or 
Minerva.” Ibid., 146. [emphasis added]. See, also, Tawfiq Sayigh, Aḍwāʾ Jadīda ʿalā Jubrān [Gibran 
under New Spotlights] (London: Riad el-Rayyes, 1990), 250-51. 
36 Maurice Blanchot, “Prophetic Speech,” in The Book to Come, trans. Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), 79. 
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aspect of Gibran’s poetic text. I argue that what we see in this text is an attempt to re-
invent the religious in – and against – modernity. This re-invention is post-religious in 
that it resumes the Abrahamic mode of prophetic speech, which is appropriated as a 
poetic form of writing, while breaking with monotheism’s vertical metaphysics of 
creation and morality and with its after-life eschatology, in short, by de-theologizing it. 
This poetic reinvention is mediated or enabled, on the one side, by Darwinian 
evolutionism in its Gibranian metaphysical interpretation – possible mainly after the 
domestication of Darwinism in the Nahḍa discourse – and, on the other, by the horizon 
of thought that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra opened up. Thus, in the discursive and historical 
context of modernity (and the Nahḍa) in which religion loses its pre-modern 
epistemological authority, Gibran attempts to reinvent the religious by horizontally re-
orienting the transcendental experience; by re-claiming Sufi motifs in post-religious and 
evolutionist terms; and by positing the impossible, the “Greater Self,” as the condition 
of possibility for an alternative, poetic dwelling in the world. I focus in this chapter on 
Gibran’s letters to Mary Haskell and her journals and, more extensively, on many texts 
from The Madman, al-ʿAwāṣif, The Forerunner and The Prophet, as well as his one-act 
play Iram Dhāt al-ʿImād [Iram, the City of Lofty Pillars]. Those letters, qua texts, are 
important because they reveal an endeavour to posit an original evolutionary worldview, 
which finds its echoes in his poetry. My reading, nevertheless, does not try to find out 
how this vision is manifested in his poetry. Rather, it sets out to show precisely how his 
poetic texts echo what one finds in those letters, while paying a much-focused attention 
to what his post-religious, post-Nietzschean poets37 – his characters – are saying. Those 
figures – the madman, the forerunner, Almustafa and Āmina al-ʿAlawiyya, in particular 
– reclaim and re-activate the Abrahamic pre-institutional force of religion as disruption, 
 
37 Post-Nietzschean in the sense that these poets are thinking in the horizon of thought that Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra made possible. 
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migration and event – hence the prophetic as Abrahamic – in and against modernity. In 
modernity insofar as it cannot be discursively severed from this modern context and 
what it enables; and against modernity insofar as his poets interrogate its new secular 
gods, namely, rationalism, calculative reason and identitarianism. The kind of reading I 
perform in this chapter pertains to the first plane of analysis, as introduced and 
explained above, that of paying attention to what the text says and how it does so – its 
singularity – in relation to its general context of enunciation.    
While Chapter One endeavours to render visible Gibran’s texts from a specific 
thematic perspective, Chapter Two, “The Bilingual Chasm,” tries to render visible 
Gibran’s bilingualism, or what I call the bilingual chasm, partly because it has obscured 
the visibility of his texts, particularly in the U.S., and partly because it is itself almost 
invisible. I explore this bilingualism both directly and, mostly, indirectly as it were, that 
is, by bringing together several, seemingly distinct but arguably interlaced, aspects and 
specific moments in Gibran’s literary and intellectual career. This is to show what is 
continuous and discontinuous in the shift from one language to another or in the 
concurrent use of the two, despite the gap, of which Gibran himself was initially 
cognizant, between his Arabic and English writings. These elements include the 
aesthetics of his early Arabic writings, of which two pieces of poetic prose are 
particularly illustrative, and the poetics of the universal in another important one. I 
highlight these elements to demonstrate that Gibran’s switch to English carries the 
universal and effaces the particular – the aesthetic inventiveness of his Arabic work. 
This shift is one of uneasy self-translation, as revealed in his letters, and this self-
translation is textually manifested in his conscious adoption of the biblical style that 
bears the trace of the Syriac Bible. I also analyse this shift phenomenologically by 
arguing that the originary openness or hospitality of that which is foreign to him – 
English – occasions his inscription into the host(ile) culture that appropriates both the 
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language and the foreign writer in its own terms. This is where the chasm occurs, where 
the Orient as Outside becomes the identitarian entity that veils the textuality of his 
English writings. In this shift, furthermore, I show that writing in the second language 
depends, for the late bilingual Gibran, on the active preservation of the first, as evinced 
in his essay “The Future of the Arabic Language” and other late critical writings, that 
the universal, in other words, is dependent on and indissociable from the particular. 
Thus, this bilingual chasm creates different and seemingly irreconcilable incarnations or 
functions of Gibran, yet only a close attention to his text, as my reading of his prose 
poem “My Friend” hopes to illustrate, would render what this (in)visible chasm makes 
invisible, namely, the text itself: the interpretative horizon of the text that is irreducible 
to – albeit inseparable from – the writer’s identity and the culture of the foreign 
language he writes in. My discussion in this chapter combines the two planes of analysis 
that I delineated above, as warranted by the topic itself, but in way that attempts to 
retain the primacy of the first. 
In Chapter three, “Gibran as a Nationalist and (Post)-Nahḍawī,” I focus on the 
national and civilizational concern in Gibran’s Arabic writings as warranted by, but also 
beyond, the question of bilingualism. This important facet of Gibran is one that 
demands a detailed critical examination, as the quest for Syrian nationhood was 
consonant, for him, with the Nahḍa (Awakening) of both Syria and the Arab East. I 
show that Gibran’s nationalism is imagined and defined territorially, that is, it is the 
territory of Greater Syria as a pre-national, pre-state waṭan (homeland or, even, 
dwelling) that grounds his nationalism, not sect, religion or ethnicity. The formation of 
the Syrian nation, in Gibran, is inextricably bound with liberation – from the Ottoman 
Empire until its collapse, from Western colonialism, but also from what he deems the 
“maladies of taqālid [old customs and traditions] and taqlīd [imitation, of the past or the 
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West]”38 that, for him, plagued Syria and the Arab East. The specificity of Gibran lies in 
his wariness of assimilationism into Euro-America as the civilizational telos of history, 
while clinging to an Eastern originality of ibtikār (innovation/creation) seen as the pre-
requisite of a true Nahḍa, as yet lacking or “dormant” in the Syrian/Eastern subject. He 
is a (post)-Nahḍawī, thus, in the sense that his political and cultural concern pursues that 
of the Nahḍa, while breaking with some of its intellectual and teleological orientations. 
The texts with which I am concerned in this chapter include a number of one-act plays 
and critical essays which he wrote for the Arab press in the 1910s and the early 1920s, 
some of which were published posthumously. One short story, “The Tempest,” will also 
draw my attention in connection to his stance vis-à-vis modern civilization. My reading 
highlights the textual intricacies, the recurrent motifs and the significatory paradoxes 
that mark this Gibranian national/Nahḍawī discourse, while locating it within its proper 
historical and discursive context. The question of the universal and the particular in its 
relation to this national-civilizational concern will crop up in this context, and my close 
reading of one his short texts will show how and why. My discussion in this chapter 
naturally entails the first plane of analysis, since what is at stake here is what the text 
enunciates as it intervenes in its immediate historical, political and cultural context.   
Chapter Four, “Multiple Horizons of Expectations, Multiple Gibrans, Or Gibran 
as World Literature,” explores the reception of Gibran’s anglophone work both in the 
U.S. and the Arab world. This is because I take this work to be essentially bilingual, 
simultaneously but differently belonging, that is, to American and Arabic literatures, 
which is why I conceive of it as Arab world literature.39 My critical concern in this 
chapter is a necessary supplement to Chapter Two, since I probe, in two-thirds of it, the 
early and later reception of Gibran’s English-language books in the U.S., which is 
 
38 This is quoted from a letter that Gibran wrote to Al-Khoury al-Kufuri in 1913, in which he calls for “an 
enormous intellectual tornado” as the sole remedy to those maladies. See Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 367.  
39 That is, as Arabic literature in English, enunciated and received in the U.S., his work is also inevitably 
“American” or “Arab-American.”  
27 
 
relevant to the bilingual chasm on which I focus in Chapter Two. I demonstrate that 
Gibran’s books were mostly received as essentially and monolithically “Oriental” and 
“spiritual” in the U.S, designations that saturate and flatten his text and pre-determine 
its value within that specific cultural and normative location. I extend my examination 
and interrogation of this reception, by which I mean the conditions of reading and the 
horizons of expectations that shaped the status and value of his works, to the problem of 
The Prophet in American literature and culture. Here, I foreground the ways in which 
cultural translation and exoticism bear on the production of the symbolic value of 
Gibran’s text in America, and how this value-coding has de-contextualized it, obscuring 
both its polysemy and the visibility of works other than The Prophet. Yet since I look at 
Gibran’s anglophone texts as Arabic literature in English, the re-contextualization and 
“Arabization” of these texts in the Arab cultural geography are no less important, 
because these same texts have been subject to another regime of value and other 
conditions of reading, interpretation and valorisation. For reasons of space, I discuss 
two engagements with Gibran’s anglophone text in the Arab world, one theatrical and 
the other philosophical, both of which are illustrative of a different mode of reading in 
which Gibran’s text is de-exoticized but re-appropriated in Arabic. This movement is 
important because it disrupts the putative correlation between “English” and “world 
literature” in the recent rise and consolidation of the concept in Anglo-Saxon academy, 
one that compels us to de-privilege the Euro-American epistemic location – which 
means unforgetting but not privileging other locations – as far as literary and aesthetic 
valuation is concerned. While my reading in this chapter obviously requires the second 
plane of analysis – the location(s) of and the degree to which the changing context of 
enunciation and reception bears on the way the text is or has been read and valorised – 
the significance of what the text says in comparison to specific modes of reception is 
ineluctably foregrounded.  
28 
 
Review of the Literature 
 
In reviewing the existing critical work on Gibran, I will evidence my argument 
that the work of Gibran should be read in its singularity, that is, in its bilingual visibility 
and invisibility as (anglophone) Arabic literature. A great deal has been written on 
Gibran in Arabic scholarship, and not as much in English. One striking element that 
straddles both, however, is the emphasis on Gibran’s life in a way that makes it 
indissociable from his writings. In other words, one discerns that some of the most 
important books on Gibran are biographies, and I should, in this respect, mention Robin 
Waterfield’s Prophet: The Life and Times of Kahlil Gibran (1998) and Suheil Bushrui 
and Joe Jenkins’s Kahlil Gibran: Man and Poet; A New Biography (1998). Both 
biographies appeared because of the dearth of “serious” biographical and scholarly 
works on Gibran in English, and both attempt to do justice to the writer of The Prophet 
by laying bare the development of the personality behind the celebrated book and 
drawing attention to the fact that he wrote more than a dozen books in both languages.40 
Waterfield appears to be more critical of Gibran than Bushrui and Jenkins, in that he 
hones in on the psychology of Gibran as an immigrant writer with “multiple 
personalities”41 striving for recognition in order to show that his creativity owes its 
success to his being a “troubled man,” who was “crucified” on the dichotomies of “East 
and West” and “Man and Myth.”42 Waterfield’s is a valuable contribution given that he 
takes pains, while exposing Gibran’s troubled personality, to demonstrate the value of 
his English work – wrongly underestimated, in his assessment – whilst revealing the 
paucity of critical studies on Gibran in the Anglo-Saxon world. Nevertheless, his 
 
40 I should draw attention to another important biography, Jean and Kahlil Gibran’s Kahlil Gibran: His 
Life and World, first published in 1974, as one of the first critical biographies that appeared on Gibran in 
English. I do not discuss it here because it is concerned less with Gibran’s works than with his life, 
illuminating many aspects of Gibran the man in detail. I selected the above-mentioned biographies for 
discussion because they give some critical attention to Gibran’s writings, but from the inevitable 
perspective of biographical criticism with which this thesis breaks. 
41 Robin Waterfield, Prophet: The Life and Times of Kahlil Gibran (London: Allan Lane, 1998), 238. 
42 Ibid., 293.  
29 
 
occasional judgmental tone at times dissipates the critical impulse of his biography, 
with his exaggerated emphasis on Gibran’s confession to Mikhail Naimy that he was “a 
false alarm,”43 that he did not, that is, practice and what he preached in his writings. But 
this is, of course, what we should expect in critical biographies, and demystification is a 
necessary condition if we wish to revisit the work of Gibran with “fresh, uncynical 
eyes.”44 
Bushrui and Jenkins’s biography, however, while also critical, is one that 
celebrates the Arab Mahjari writer. Bushrui has immensely contributed to Gibran’s 
studies in Arabic and specifically in English, and his biography is the acme of his life-
long preoccupation with Gibran. The biography traces all the phases of Gibran’s life and 
writing career, finding in Gibran that figure who, despite his ambivalence, reconciled 
“East” and “West.” Inspired by the beauty of his homeland, by the richness of its 
religious, poetic and philosophical past – from the Christian Bible to the Muslim 
Qur’an, from Islamic Sufism to classical Arabic poetry – and by the prophetic 
imagination of Blake and Nietzsche in particular, Gibran, the biographers foreground, is 
a bilingual writer whose contribution to modern Arabic literature and to American and 
world literatures must be remembered and valorised. Overemphasized in the biography 
is the “spiritual” source and value of Gibran’s work, which, in a century that witnessed 
the intensification of the East-West collision and of local, imperial and world wars, 
remains relevant and important. This importance is testified by the popular celebration 
of Gibran in the U.S., the Arab world and beyond. One observes, however, despite the 
breadth and depth of the biography, a tendency to read Gibran’s texts via a spiritualist 
lens that somehow obscures their polysemic textuality, and East and West become poles 
of cultural and civilizational disparity that are susceptible to encounter, reconciliation 
 
43 Ibid., 3-5, 147-48, 249.  
44 Ibid., 284.  
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and bridging, to which the poetic and creative energy of Gibran attests. While 
acknowledging the immense contribution and value of these two biographies, this thesis 
departs from reading Gibran’s text in direct reference to the life of its “author,” or as 
essentially torn between or bridging East and West, in the attempt to regain the visibility 
of this text that is overwhelmingly overshadowed by these two reading orientations.  
  Another significant contribution to the scholarship on Gibran in English is 
Khalil Hawi’s Kahlil Gibran: His Background, Character and Works (1972). Hawi 
shows that Gibran is steeped in what he calls the Christian literary tradition in Lebanon 
and its role in reviving Arabic literature, a tradition that nevertheless enabled him to 
develop “a literary style which was quite unprecedented in Arabic.”45 As can be evinced 
in the title, Hawi’s is a biographical and critical study. In his insightful reading of 
almost all of Gibran’s works in Arabic and English, which cogently demonstrates the 
formative influence of the Romantics and Blake on Gibran and the inventive 
particularity of his style, Hawi concludes that “it was [his] personal experience which 
guided him more than anything else,”46 an experience to which his works ultimately 
owe their value. As a work of biographical criticism, Hawi’s study is invaluable because 
of its critical impulse which exposed the limitations and biases found in such works of 
Gibran’s friends as Mikhail Naimy’s Kahlil Gibran: A Biography (1950), written in a 
fictional fashion unsuited for a biography, and Barbara Young’s This Man from 
Lebanon (1956), a hagiography that reveals not so much facts about Gibran as Young’s 
fascination with him.47 Nevertheless, I depart from Hawi’s approach to Gibran’s texts as 
essentially inseparable from the life of their author, and my close reading will evidently 
produce a different interpretation based on what I see as undeniable connections or 
recurrent motifs in his work, which I locate in the discursive and historical context of 
 
45 Khalil Hawi, Kahlil Gibran: His Background, Character and Works (Beirut: The Arab Institute for 
Research and Publishing, 1972), 35. 
46 Ibid., 278.  
47 Hawi, “Previous Accounts of his Life,” in Kahlil Gibran, 67-81.  
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modernity and the Nahḍa. That the corpus of Gibran’s letters which he exchanged with 
Mary Haskell and the latter’s journals were not available to Hawi at the time he 
conducted his study, I must note, is one major element that makes my reading quite 
different from his. 
As far as the scholarship on Gibran in Arabic is concerned, the first strand of 
interpretation is one that highlights the bearing of Sufism and Romanticism on the 
intellectual and aesthetic formation of the Mahjari poet and his ability to transform 
them in his own distinctive way. In Jubrān fī Athārihi al-Kitābiyya [Gibran in His 
Writings] (1969), Rose Ghurayyib casts a focused light on the Romanticism that so 
profoundly inspired Gibran, with specific reference to Rousseau and the English 
Romantics, and to Sufism and its fundamental tenets. She concludes that Gibran’s 
doctrine could be described as an “emancipatory mysticism.”48 This Gibranian 
mysticism is rebellious against rigid traditions and creeds, and does not call, 
furthermore, for the isolation of oneself in the caverns of asceticism and self-austerity. 
Along the same line of interpretation, but in a rather comparative fashion, Radwa 
Ashour’s Gibran and Blake: A Comparative Study (1978) explores the affinities 
between Gibran and Blake by emphasizing the influence of the latter on the former and 
the way Gibran transformed this influence. The latter was possible, Ashour argues, 
thanks to common sources like the Bible, Platonism, Neo-Platonism, the mystic 
tradition, as well as a shared fascination with the figure of Jesus. Ashour concludes that 
Blake was a greater writer than Gibran, in that he had a consistent philosophical outlook 
and a rich symbolic repertoire that Gibran did not.49 Nadhir Al-Azmeh also employs a 
comparative approach in his reading of Gibran’s writings “in the light of foreign 
 
48 Rose Ghurayyib, Jubrān fī Āthārihi al-Kitābīya (Beirout: Dār El-Makshūf, 1969), 126.  
49 Radwa Ashour, Gibran and Blake: A Comparative Study (Cairo: The Associated Institution for the 
Study and Presentation of Arab Cultural Values, 1978), 117-119. 
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influences,”50 probing the Romantic and mystical features of Gibran’s work with a 
special comparative reference to Blake and his notion of madness. As far as Gibran’s 
Sufi leanings, Ghassan Khaled in Jubrān al-Faylasūf [Gibran the Philosopher] (1983), 
while underscoring the influence of Sufism on Gibran’s thought, maintains that his 
belief in the oneness of body and soul diverges from the Sufi notion that the “soul is a 
divine spiritual torch that descended to be worn by the body.”51 Nadhir Al-Azmeh, on 
the other hand, argues that Gibran was neither a Sufi nor a philosopher, in that he was a 
“writer who was subject to his poetical moods and the influences of certain 
philosophical notions and idealist mystical visions about the world, life and death.”52 
While I highlight, especially in Chapter One, the Sufi motifs that permeate Gibran’s 
work, I move beyond questions of influence – be it that of Romanticism or Sufism – in 
my endeavour to account for Gibran’s literary enterprise as a post-religious one, that is, 
as one that attempts to re-invent the religious in the context of modernity and the 
Nahḍa, or, more specifically, in the interpretative horizon enabled by Nietzsche and 
Darwin. In this context, I show that Sufi motifs are re-claimed by Gibran in post-
Nietzschean and evolutionist terms.  
 The other strand of interpretation is one that places Gibran’s work under the 
scrutinizing eye of psychoanalysis and philosophy, of which Ghassan Khaled’s Jubrān 
al-Faylasūf [Gibran the Philosopher] (1983) is illustrative.53 Khaled foregrounds the 
philosophical nature of Gibran’s work and endeavours to piece together what he 
considers the fragmentary philosophical thought of the émigré poet and writer. The 
 
50 Nadhir Al-Azmeh, Jubrān Khalīl Jubrān fī Ḍawʾ al-Muʾathirāt al-Ajnabīyya: Dirāsa Muqārana 
[Gibran in the Light of Foreign Influences: A Comparative Study] (Damascus: Dār Tạlās, 1987).  
51 Khaled Ghassan, Jubrān al-Faylasūf (Beirut: Nawfel, 1983), 330.  
52 Al-Azmeh, Jubrān, 230. 
53 Another significant contribution in this regard is Ghazi Fouad Braks’ Jubrān Khalil Jubrān fī Dirāsah 
Taḥlīliyya - Tarkībiyya li Adabihī wa Rasmihī wa Shakhṣiyyatihī [Gibran Khalil Gibran: A Study of His 
Literature, Art and Personality] (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnāni, 2002). Ground-breaking in its approach 
and analytical rigour, as well as in its focus on Gibran’s drawings and paintings, the study is nevertheless 
one that ultimately ties Gibran’s life to his literary and artistic works.     
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study is original and revealing, depending almost exclusively on Freudian 
psychoanalysis to elucidate Gibran’s adoption of and belief in self-transcendence, unity 
of being, freedom, rebellion against patriarchy as well as pantheism. Nevertheless, 
Khaled sometimes reduces the tenets of Gibran’s worldview to mere reactions forged by 
the Oedipus complex’s impact upon his character. He argues, furthermore, that 
Nietzsche had influenced Gibran only insofar as “form” is concerned, particularly in 
The Prophet, a contention that is rather premised on an interpretation of Nietzsche that 
sees in him nothing more than an anti-moral, nihilist philosopher.54 A similar stance is 
also adopted by Stephan Wild in his essay “Nietzsche and Gibran,”55 in which he 
argues, more cogently, that the presumed influence of Nietzsche upon Gibran was 
indirect, because Gibran was neither familiar with German nor cognizant of Nietzsche’s 
works besides Thus Spoke Zarathustra. My reading, however, will fundamentally 
diverge from looking at Gibran’s encounter with Nietzsche in terms of “influence” or 
degree of influence, in that it will rather attempt to approach it by underlining Gibran’s 
poetic thinking with and after Nietzsche. In this respect, Fethi Meskini’s essay in 
Arabic, “Gibran in front of Nietzsche, or the Arabic Version of Nihilism,”56 in which he 
closely reads Gibran’s poetic short story “Ḥaffār al-Qubūr” [The Grave Digger] in 
conjunction with the thought of the German philosopher (in whose work Meskini is 
well-versed), inspires and partly informs my reading of Gibran’s literary enterprise as a 
post-religious, post-Nietzschean one. The originality and insightfulness of Meskini’s 
essay lie in demonstrating how the Mahjari writer’s text reveals a fruitful engagement 
with Nietzsche in the Arab context, attested, for instance, by the fact that Gibran’s god, 
unlike the European one, does not die but rather goes mad.57  
 
54 Ghassan, Jubrān, 281-82. 
55 This essay is published in Suheil Bushrui and Paul Gotch, eds. Gibran of Lebanon: New Papers 
(Beirut: Librairie de Liban, 1975), 59-77. 
56 Fethi Meskini, “Jubrān amāma Nietzsche, aw al-Nuskha al-ʿArabiyya mina al-ʿAdamiyya,” in Falsafat 
al-Nawābit [Philosophy of Nawabit] (Beirut: Dār al-Ṭaliʿa, 1997), 33-47. 
57 Ibid., 46-47. 
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 Gibran’s work has been also subject to critical examinations in many articles 
and essays whose focus is largely placed on his metaphysics of transcendence, the 
development and specificity of his thought and mode of writing as well as the impact of 
his work. Nadeem Naimy’s “Kahlil Gibran: His Poetry and Thought” briefly explores 
all the works of the Mahjari writer by analysing the underlying thought that informs and 
animates them. Naimy deems this thought “a state of being in poetry,” which is 
different from thought as “a subject matter for the understanding.”58 His essay homes in 
on the fundamental social and metaphysical alienation of Gibran’s character, which is 
ultimately emblematic of Gibran’s “triple longing: a longing for the country of his birth, 
for a utopic human society of the imagination in which he feels at home, and for a 
higher world of metaphysical truth.”59 In “Gibran: His Aesthetic, and His Moral 
Universe,” John Walbridge argues that Gibran was primarily a painter in that he wrote 
the same way he painted. By elaborating on what he calls the “painterly aesthetic” of 
Gibran’s early short stories in particular, Walbridge explains their limitations as far as 
structure, characterization and plot are concerned. Another crucial argument that 
Walbridge puts forward is that Gibran’s aesthetic is essentially Arabic, not American or 
English. What he writes is worth quoting at some length here because it dovetails with 
one of the essential premises of this thesis:  
The style and content of his [Gibran’s] English works do not differ noticeably from 
the earlier Arabic works, apart from being more didactic and less fresh. Books like 
The Prophet are Arabic literature written in English. The literary standards of 
twentieth century English literature are extreme in their demand for cool authorial 
detachment. Extended metaphor, elaborate rhetorical devices, earnest intensity – if 
they are used at all in modern English literature – tend to be ironic or political. It is 
not an aesthetic ideal that Gibran shared. He was not writing bad English books; he 
was writing good, extremely original Arabic books. It is a distinction that readers 
understood far better than critics.60  
 
 
58 Naimy, “Kahlil Gibran: His Poetry and Thought,” in Gibran of Lebanon, ed. Bushrui and Gotch, 32.  
59 Naimy, “Kahlil Gibran: His Poetry and Thought,” 36.  
60 John Walbridge, “Gibran: His Aesthetic, and His Moral Universe,” Al-Hikamat 21 (2001): 52. 
[emphasis added] 
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In contrast to Walbridge, Eugene Paul Nassar, in his article “Cultural Discontinuity in 
the Works of Kahlil Gibran,” argues that Gibran should be placed more within the 
Western sphere than within the Eastern wisdom tradition, namely, with the company of 
Blake, Emerson and Whitman. The crux of his argument lies in regarding Gibran as “a 
tragic dualist whose exultation is fixed only in the idea of an-ever-upwards-striving 
human experience,”61 beneath the lyric expression of which one finds alienation, 
melancholy and an unrelenting struggle for unity, a human drama of an émigré’s talent 
at home neither in the Arab sphere nor in the American.62 All of these essays constitute 
and enact a genuine attempt at understanding and evaluating the works of Gibran in 
their singularity as literary works. My own study is in a way a continuation of this 
strand, and although I share Walbridge’s argument that Gibran’s aesthetic is Arabic in 
his bilingual works, my reading of his texts underlines the prophetic imagination 
articulated in them as a poetic reinvention of Abrahamic prophetic speech in the context 
of modernity, which enables this reinvention, beyond or rather because of Gibran’s 
cultural or bilingual discontinuity, one of the concerns I also highlight and 
problematize.  
As far as the reception of Gibran in the U.S. is concerned, two essayistic 
engagements must be mentioned and discussed at some length given their direct 
relevance to one of my central concerns in this thesis – the reception of Gibran’s work 
in the U.S. First, Wail S. Hassan’s “The Gibran Phenomenon”63 is an important 
contribution. Hassan examines Gibran’s status and legacy in the U.S. as an Arab-
American “minor” writer with a pivotal emphasis on his role as a “cultural translator,” 
that is, as an interpreter of his own culture to the foreign audience his work addresses. 
 
61 Eugene Pau Nassar, “Cultural Discontinuity in the Works of Kahlil Gibran,” MELUS 7, no. 2 (Summer, 
1980): pages? 24. 
62 Ibid., 35.  
63 Wail S. Hassan, “The Gibran Phenomenon,” in Immigrant Narratives: Orientalism and Cultural 
Translation in Arab American and Arab British Literature (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 59-77.  
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According to Hassan, Gibran failed at this task because the popularity of his work – The 
Prophet in particular – in a country whose Orientalist discourse denigrates his own 
culture, boils down to the prophetic posture embraced by Gibran in his English writings. 
This posture is one that Hassan reduces to the stereotype of the Oriental sage in 
American Orientalist discourse, but which is nevertheless embraced in a way that raises 
the Orient out of its inferiority on the Orientalist civilizational scale; in other words, 
Gibran’s is an “anti-Orientalist Orientalism.”64 Although Hassan takes pains to show 
that Gibran was no cynical manipulator of stereotypes – given his “shift to the prophetic 
mode” in his late Arabic works65 – but that he rather gradually acquiesced to the role 
determined by “Orientalist typology,”66 he fails to discern, on the one hand, that 
Gibran’s prophetic imagination is a central impulse of his whole enterprise, that is, that 
the prophetic emerges as an essential motif in his early Arabic writings, and that The 
Prophet has not been received, on the other hand, as “offensive” by Arab readers (since 
Hassan supposes that that must have been the case67), a point on which I elaborate in the 
last chapter of this thesis. It is Hassan’s emphasis, in his approach, on Orientalist 
discourse as a political overdetermination in the writings of any Arab-American writer 
that, in my view, leads him to read Gibran in a way that foregrounds the “phenomenon” 
of the latter in the U.S. at the expense of his texts, which, in Hassan’s dismissive 
judgement, “do not reward rigorous analysis.”68 My own analysis departs from reading 
Gibran in these terms, in that it sets out to pay a close attention to his texts in a manner 
that attends to their very textuality, and in so doing critiques Hassan’s approach. At the 
same time, it partly relies on Said’s monumental critique of Orientalism – which I read 
in a way that is different from Hassan’s69 – in my engagement with Gibran’s shift from 
 
64 Ibid., 73. 
65 Ibid., 69. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 70. 
68 Ibid., 62. 
69 I discuss this element towards the end of the introduction. 
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one language to another (Chapter Two) and, especially, in the reception of his work in 
the U.S. (Chapter Four).70   
 Another significant contribution to the issue of Gibran’s reception is Irfan 
Shahid’s “Gibran and the American Literary Canon: The Problem of The Prophet.”71 
Irfan argues that Gibran has been unfairly left out of the American literary canon. His 
argument is laid out by presenting what he regards as the legitimate reservations of the 
American literary establishment vis-à-vis Gibran’s work, going on to lay bare their 
limitations, refuting them and making the case for Gibran’s canonization or, at least, 
inclusion in American literary anthologies. The problem of The Prophet, Shahid asserts, 
resides in its difficult literary categorization, religious tenor, Romantic spirit and 
uninventive language – if judged within the Anglo-Saxon poetic tradition. By 
comparing The Prophet to the form of Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra and the 
religious spirit of Milton’s Paradise Lost, and by evaluating Gibran’s biblical style as 
unique in its literary deployment, Shahid refutes the arguments usually invoked against 
The Prophet. Another element that Shahid underscores is the American critic’s 
ignorance of Gibran’s Arabic writings – hitherto subject to English translations that 
undermined their aesthetic value – and of the Arab literary heritage without which any 
understanding of Gibran’s work cannot stand. Shahid’s contextualization of the problem 
and his comparative approach are remarkable, yet what is absent in his account is that 
 
70 A similar, more complex argument is put forth by Richard E. Hishmeh. According to Hishmeh, Gibran 
strategically embraces the essentialist stereotype of the Eastern mystic in the U.S. to “survive” as a 
minority writer by foregrounding his “cultural uniqueness,” while simultaneously situating himself within 
the Western tradition of the Romantic visionary to resist the dominant discourse. Thus, he is at once 
strategically essentialist and anti-essentialist. Hishmeh’s reading lends visibility to Gibran’s English 
writings and stresses the merits of The Prophet that are, by dint of its popularity, unnecessarily dismissed. 
The absence of any discussion of Gibran’s Arabic work and of secondary literature in Arabic, however, 
makes his reading somewhat monocultural, that is, it privileges the (Euro)-American context and culture 
in its appraisal of Gibran and his legacy, a gesture I attempt to distance myself from in this thesis. 
However, Hishmeh’s discussion of what he calls “the burden of The Prophet” on subsequent Arab-
American poets and their negotiation of subjective position vis-à-vis the dominant culture is fruitful and 
illuminating. See Richard E. Hishmeh, “Strategic Genius, Disidentification, and the Burden of The 
Prophet in Arab-American Poetry,” in Arab Voices in Diaspora, Critical Perspectives on Anglophone 
Arab Literature, ed. Layla Al Maleh (Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi, 2009), 93-119. 
71 The essay is published in Tradition, Modernity and Postmodernity in Arabic Literature, 321-34. 
38 
 
the logic by which a canon includes and excludes is institutionally grounded and 
socially and economically mediated in ways that operate implicitly but effectively. 
More specifically, the problematic cultural status of The Prophet as an inspirational 
book of Oriental, spiritual wisdom in the U.S. and its popular appeal assigned it a “low” 
symbolic value, which made it illegible for literary consecration and legitimation in the 
American literary field, as Chapter Four demonstrates by drawing on Pierre Bourdieu.    
 To finish this survey, I should draw attention to two recent books that shed new 
light on Gibran’s work, one in French and the other in Arabic. First, Boutrus Hallaq’s 
Gibran et la refondation littéraire Arabe [Gibran and the Re-modelling of Arabic 
Literature] (2008) is an important contribution to the modern history of Arabic 
literature. Its reason for highlighting the work of Gibran as a rupture with the adab of 
the Nahḍa and a new beginning in Arabic literature lies in the entrenched tendency, in 
Arabic and Arabist scholarship and historiography, of taking literary Realism as an 
absolute criterion in accounting for the birth of the Arabic novel. Hallaq finds no 
epistemological or normative grounding for the unquestioned privileging of Realism 
over Romanticism, both of which are equally concerned with the emergence of the 
individual in modernity, in the historiography of the Arabic novel. Thus, he turns to 
Gibran in this respect because he was the first to proclaim and practice “the autonomy 
of literary creation,”72 in that the literary, for Gibran, is the product of “the imagination” 
and “the sentiments,” that is, of “individual faculties par excellence,”73 with his novel 
al-Ajniḥa al-Mutakassira as a case in point. Hallaq’s study, therefore, proceeds to 
expound on what he calls the dynamics of the Gibranian literary vision as it manifests 
itself in its three fundamental aspects: the writing of the self [écriture du moi], prophetic 
writing [l’écriture prophétique] and an open trans-generic practice, transgénérisme, an 
 
72 Hallaq, Gibran, 40-41. 
73 Ibid., 41. 
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experimental writing in and across many genres. Particularly relevant here is Hallaq’s 
assertion that prophetic writing in Gibran’s Arabic text is one whose aim is to reveal 
man to himself not only in his social condition, but in his “ontological status” and 
“metaphysical rootedness” as well.74 If didactic, this mode of writing is distinct from the 
Nahḍa’s in that “it manifests itself in a quest of prophetic time whose fulcrum is the 
here-and-now.”75 Hallaq cogently demonstrates that these three interconnected modes of 
writing in Gibran’s Arabic works constitute a unique experience of literary creation in 
the Arab literary field, one that paved the way for further literary developments in the 
twentieth century. He does not focus, however, on Gibran’s anglophone works, which 
occupy a great deal of attention in this thesis. Yet his reading of Gibran’s texts in their 
literary singularity is something I pursue here, but from a bilingual point of view, and 
what he calls l’écriture prophétique will be further explored and discussed, albeit from 
a different perspective as I hope to show in Chapter One.  
 On the other hand, Fatima Qandil’s al-Rāwī al-Shabaḥ: Shiʿriyyat al-Kitāba fī 
Nuṣūs Jubrān Khalil Jubrān [The Spectral Narrator: The Poetics of Writing in the Texts 
of Kahlil Gibran] (2015), another significant contribution to the Gibran studies in 
Arabic, offers a fresh, critical reading of Gibran’s Arabic works. As the title indicates, 
its main concern is to probe the poetics of writing in the Gibranian text, writing here 
understood in post-structuralist terms as a manifold texture or tissue, beyond the duality 
of poetry/prose or the strict division of genres. What emerges, thus, is a textual reading 
whose multiple “strategies” reveal writing as a space of “silence between language and 
speech, life and death, a tacit silence, a space of tension and fear …etc.”76 In other 
words, she is concerned with what the text itself reveals and conceals, with silence in its 
multiple metaphors in the text and, ultimately, with writing in Gibran’s text as “a space 
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that celebrates the signifier that defers its signified in the attempt to pose questions of 
the present on the past, and to grasp that instant from which is born the permanence in 
the movement of texts across time.”77 The significance of this kind of reading is that it 
severs the text from the author and the biography of the author as “original” semantic 
points of reference in the construction of the text’s meaning. This thesis shares this 
critical orientation, while its reading is one which is not strictly post-structuralist or 
deconstructive, for reasons I mentioned above.      
Gibran, the Mahjar School and the Arab Nahḍa 
 
I stressed earlier that one should not approach Gibran as a mad genius who, 
alone and isolated, revolutionized Arabic literature, despite, or perhaps because of, the 
singularity of his texts. Further contextual elaborations are therefore warranted here, 
especially as far as the Mahjar school of Arabic literature and the Arab Nahḍa in 
general are concerned, influential literary and intellectual movements to which I 
frequently refer – the Nahḍa in particular – in the thesis. Along with other influential 
writers and poets such as Amin Rihani, Mikhail Naimy and Ilia Abu Madi, Gibran was 
part of an Arab literary movement in the U.S. that consolidated al-adab al-mahjari 
(immigrant literature) as a crucial episode in the modern experience of Arabic literature. 
These figures formed in 1920 al-Rābiṭa al-Qalamiyya (the Pen Bond), known as 
Arrabitah, a literary society whose aim was to infuse a new creative spirit in Arabic 
literature. Gibran was elected the president of Arrabitah and remained so until his 
demise in 1931. His work, as a Mahjari writer, reflects the stance of Arrabitah in its 
self-conscious literary activity of “breaking with the past,” yet this orientation, as 
Naimy stresses, embodies not so much a complete rupture with “the ancients” – what 
has become known as turāth or heritage – as an interdiction of “imitation”: 
For there be some among them [the ancients] who will remain to us and to those 
who follow a source of inspiration for many ages to come. To revere them is a 
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great honour. To imitate them is a deadly shame. For our life, our needs, our 
circumstances are far different from theirs. We must be true to ourselves if we 
would be true to our ancestors.78 
 
Problems of the present and the past and of how to conceive of the pastness of the past 
in the present, were thus central concerns for the Mahjari movement’s call for the 
rejuvenation and rekindling of creativity in Arabic literature. Crucially, the movement, 
which was remarkable in its influence on literary expression and decisive in the 
horizontal change it generated in the Arab literary domain, cannot be dissociated from 
the Arab Nahḍa or Awakening that had begun in the nineteenth century.  
The Nahḍa was essentially a reform movement, institutionally, culturally and 
economically. Its initiation is usually associated with Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 
1798, even though the so-called “modernization” process had already begun in the reign 
of Sultan Salim III (1789-1809).79 The need to reform was fundamental to its 
articulation as a modernizing process by various thinkers, intellectuals and literati and to 
its bureaucratic, institutional and educational enaction in the Ottoman Empire, under the 
immense pressure of imperial Britain and France. The Arab encounter with Europe 
generated, on the one hand, an intense curiosity in the Western other,80 seen as 
advanced scientifically, culturally and civilizationally – “culture” and “civilization” 
being concepts that emerged in eighteenth century European discourse and deemed, in 
the nineteenth century, at once universal categories and objects of analysis – and partly 
produced, on the other, the discursive conditions for Arabism, Arab nationalism and the 
discourse of revival to emerge and spread (pertinent to my discussion in the Chapter 
Three). In terms of literary activity, the Nahḍa witnessed the revival (iḥyāʾ) of the 
premodern genres of the maqāma (with al-Ibrahim al-Yajizi and Muhammad al-
Muwaylihi) and the pastiche (muʿāraḍa) of the Abbasid poetry of al-Buhturi and al-
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80 The travel narratives of Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīs Ibrīz fī Talkhīs Pāriz (1834) and Ahmad Fāris 
al-Shidyāq’s al-Sāq ʿalā al-Sāq fīma Huwa al-Firyāq (1855) are illustrative examples.  
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Mutanabbi (with such important poets as Ahmad Shawqi and Mahmud Sami al-Barudi), 
both of which signalled, according to Adunis, “a return to the values of the pre-Islamic 
orality.”81 Putting aside the rise of the modern, now universal, category of “literature” as 
a putative equivalent, if not the substitution, of the Arab notion of adab, the literature of 
the Nahḍa was essentially reformist and didactic, with a clearly demarcated social 
function. Hence the rise, for instance, of the social novel with Salim Bustani and the 
historical novel with Jurji Zaydan. Yet the Nahḍa was premised on the assumption that 
the now and the recent past are marked by inḥiṭāt (decadence), projecting the Abbasid 
period as a “Golden age” to be resurrected and looking up to the West as the modern 
incarnation of civilization and progress.82 This oscillation between the so-called 
glorious past and the advanced West was reflected in the literary production of the 
Nahḍa, which nevertheless saw the gradual introduction of literary genres – the play, the 
essay, the short story and the novel – hitherto alien to Arabic literature or adab.83 My 
account here is regrettably too schematic and too limited, but the scope of the 
introduction and of the study itself does not permit me to be more specific here. The 
contextual importance of the Nahḍa lies in the fact that the Mahjari literary movement 
was, in a very important sense, enabled by and a response to it. Its distinctive Romantic 
orientation should be partly understood as occasioned by the Nahḍa’s rationalist 
reformist project, which exhibited an infatuation with the West as an advanced scientific 
civilization whose cultural authority went, most of the time, unquestioned.84 More 
pertinent to this study is the fact that Gibran’s critical standpoint with respect to the 
 
81 Adunis, An Introduction to Arab Poetics (London: Saqi Books, 1990), 79. 
82 Sheehi, Foundations, 37. 
83 For a reading of the Nahḍa that combines historical materialism with post-structuralist analysis, see 
Stephen Sheehi, “Towards a Critical Theory of al-Nahdha: Epistemology, Ideology and Capital,” Journal 
of Arabic Literature 43, no. 2/3 (2012): 269-98.  
84 Sheehi, Foundations, 98-100. The label “Romanticism,” however, cannot exhaustively account for this 
innovative and enabling episode in Arab literary modernity. Some aspects of the writings of the Mahjaris, 
which pertain to the language experience of Arabic and its cultural memory, do not lend themselves to the 
concept of Romanticism as it is understood in Europe, the influence of the latter on the Mahjaris 
notwithstanding. 
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Nahḍa, discussed in Chapter Three, enabled him to be creative in ways that were not 
thinkable in the nineteenth century. As Boutrus Hallaq puts it, “Gibran took a complete 
rupture with the dynamics of the Nahḍa, all the while proclaiming it in all forms.”85  
Intellectually and philosophically speaking, the Nahḍa witnessed an active 
movement of travelling ideas and concepts – mostly of European provenance – that 
were appropriated and hybridized in the Arab cultural discourse.86 Chief among these 
concepts are nationalism, Darwinism (especially in its social and metaphysical 
variations) and socialism.87 The domestication of Darwinism and nationalism in the 
Nahḍa are importantly relevant to Gibran’s enterprise here, as I show in Chapter One 
and Three. Essentially literary but broadly national and civilizational in its commitment, 
thus, the literary school of the Mahjar was part and parcel of this history of the Nahḍa, 
and the work of influential bilingual writers such as Gibran cannot be adequately 
examined and appreciated in Arabic or in English without a cognizance of the Nahḍa’s 
discursive field and the worldly forces that enabled its emergence and what it itself 
enabled, beyond the polarity of either local agency or foreign presence as instigators. 
The Nahḍa, that is, is understood as at once a local and imperial manifestation of 
modernity beyond Europe. Situating Gibran in this historical-discursive context is a 
necessary step towards a better understanding of his literary enterprise and its legacy. 
The Conceptual Apparatus: Necessary Clarifications 
 
Gibran’s peculiarity lies in the fact that he wrote in both Arabic and English, that 
he wrote, that is, as an Arab writer in English. This bilingual and bicultural feature is 
often articulated through the frame of the Orient-Occident dichotomy, one which 
therefore necessitates some critical comments here. This is not the space to discuss this 
 
85 Hallaq, Gibran, 31. [translation mine]  
86 See Albert Hourani’s classic, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983). 
87 See Marwa Elshakry, Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860-1950 (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2013), and Dyala Hamzah, ed. The Making of the Arab Intellectual (1880-1960): Empire, Public 
Sphere and the Colonial Coordinates of Selfhood (London: Routledge, 2013).  
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problem in detail, yet this identitarian division, which is inseparable from both 
modernity and Orientalism – themselves indissociable – is crucially pertinent to Gibran 
and his historical, discursive and imaginative universe. My concern is with why and 
how, precisely, this is pertinent here. In the introduction to his highly celebrated and 
highly controversial book Orientalism (1978), Said begins by giving three definitions to 
Orientalism, the first academic, the second imaginative and the third historical and 
material. It is the second definition that interests me here:  
Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological 
distinction made between “the Orient” and (most of the time) “the Occident.” 
Thus a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, 
philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, have 
accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for 
elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts 
concerning the Orient, its people, customs, “minds,” destiny, and so on.88 
 
This style of thought, thus, divides the world into two distinct categories of 
identification, both ontologically and epistemologically. In other words, this style 
projects trans-historical and unchanging essences onto the identitarian categories in 
question, and based on this essentialist distinction, knowledge about the other is 
produced by – and bears on the definition of – the same. But Said’s concern is with 
writers from the Western hemisphere, with, that is, representations of the Orient by 
Occidental writers. Considering what Said, in Culture and Imperialism (1993), calls the 
common experience of empire, what was the impact of this “style of thought” on Arab 
“Oriental” writers in and after the Nahḍa for instance? In what ways did they react to or 
interact with it? How did they think about or represent themselves? These questions are 
beyond the scope of Said’s book, whose contours and limitations he clearly demarcates 
in Orientalism’s introduction.89 They are also beyond the scope of this study. Yet since 
 
88 Said, Orientalism, 2-3. [emphasis mine] 
89 I am aware of the several critiques that Said’s book elicited, but it is neither my interest nor my aim to 
go through them here or debate Said’s thesis in detail. For a brief and critical overview of these critiques, 
see Wael Hallaq, Restating Orientalism: A Critique of Modern Knowledge (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2018), 5-8. Hallaq’s book – or at least part of it – is the most recent engagement with 
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this issue pertains to Gibran as an Arab Oriental writer in the American Occident, some 
clarifications need to be made.  
While the division of the world into two identitarian – articulated in 
civilizational and cultural terms – spheres was commonplace and went largely 
unquestioned in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the distinction between 
Orient and Occident has not always been an ontological and epistemological one. This 
is evidenced in the Nahḍa itself and what became known in late nineteenth century as 
“the Eastern question” [al-masʾala al-sharqiyya], which unsurprisingly coincided, as 
Marwa Elshakry points out, with the pervasiveness of evolutionist thought in the same 
period, where discourses about “civilization” and progress gained unprecedented 
currency.90 In this context, civilizations and cultures were understood as subject to the 
law of the evolution, which entails that “identity” is a variable, not a stable, entity, the 
division of “us” and them” notwithstanding. Yet since identity, insofar as it is produced 
by narratives that define the same in opposition to the other, functions as that which 
anchors subjectivity in an imagined stability or continuity in changing time and space, it 
invites less a complex and open than a static understanding of it. And because of the 
modern, imperial ubiquity of the concepts of “civilization” and “culture,”91 the 
identification of the self and the other took on an essentially civilizational and cultural 
designation. This identification, thus, would pre-determine and constitute subjecthood 
 
Said’s Orientalism, but one that does not so much focus on the latter as it points to its limitations in order 
to target what Hallaq calls the larger and “deeper thought structure” of the modern (colonial) project, of 
which Orientalism is but one manifestation.  
90  “Indeed, for many popularizers [of Darwin in Arabic], evolution was understood as the preeminent 
doctrine of empire (which also helps to explain the later eclipse of Darwin—particularly by Marx—in the 
age of decolonization). After all, the most intense phase of the debate over Darwin in Arabic coincided 
precisely with the intensification of the Eastern Question after 1876 and the British occupation of Egypt 
in 1882. It was at this time that the laws of evolution—from natural selection to the struggle for 
survival—made their way into discussions of contemporary affairs.” Eshakry, Reading Darwin, 10.  
91 These concepts emerged and gained currency in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See 
Raymond Williams, Keywords, 87-93. For a critical engagement that draws on Williams’s historicization 
of “culture” as both a category and an object of analysis and relates it to Orientalism, the colonial juncture 
and the Arab Nahḍa, see Joseph Massad, Desiring Arabs (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2007), 1-5 (especially).  
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itself; identity, that is, would precede and define the self a priori. The problem, 
however, was that because the Occident was materially more advanced than – which 
was one potent factor that led it to rule territorially and epistemologically over – the 
Orient, this identification was fundamentally hierarchical and oppositional. Said shows 
how “European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the 
Orient as sort of surrogate and even underground self.”92 What is intriguing, however, is 
that most of the Arab Oriental writers in the Nahḍa and the post-Nahḍa would refute 
Orientalist claims about Oriental cultural and civilizational inferiority – European 
civilization/culture being the normative yardstick here – without questioning the 
civilizational nature of the distinction and its underpinning epistemology, that is, even if 
they interrogated or repudiated certain ontological features attributed to the Arab 
Orient.93 In other words, the Occident-Orient division of the world was – and is – a 
modern, imperial phenomenon shared by both “Occidentals” and Arab “Orientals.” 
What is meant by Oriental or Occidental outside Europe, however, complicates the 
distinction and the way it is employed, which entails closer attention to who uses these 
entities as identitarian markers, how, why and in what context. The importance of this 
observation lies in the fact that an Arab Oriental writer in the nineteenth or early 
twentieth century was an active agent in a specific cultural and social milieu, however 
limited the effectiveness of his/her text on the ground, and not simply the European’s 
“other.”  
Thus, while Said’s critique of Orientalism has laid bare the consequences and 
dangers of adopting that essentialist style of thought, the persistence of entities like the 
West and the East, however, indicates the persistence of modern identitarian reason, 
which confuses inherited and narrated identity with subjecthood. National and/or 
 
92 Said, Orientalism, 3.  
93 Massad, Desiring Arabs, 3-6. See also his discussion of the Arab intellectual debates about “sex” that 
the Nahḍa spawned, which were mostly framed in civilizational terms, in the chapter “Anxiety in 
Civilization,” 51-98.  
47 
 
civilizational identity is something that emerged in and with modernity, with the 
scientific, economic and imperial ascendency of Europe in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries – Europe taking on the name of “the West” in the nineteenth94– and 
the concurrent colonial conquering of the world, and of what became known, more 
specifically, as “the Orient.” Identitarian reason, thus, cannot be dissociated from the 
rise of modern forms of knowledge and sovereignty, of which the nation-state is the 
most powerful institutional incarnation. That it still lends power and persistence to 
entities like the West and the East, the former obviously more potently consolidated and 
used in public and academic discourse than the latter – which is now referred to, more 
or less euphemistically, as “the non-West” or “the global South” – is something we 
should heed with caution. Despite the globality of the Earth that renders such entities 
geographically relative or even invalid, their continuance should be critiqued but not 
easily dismissed, precisely because they are a human invention rather than an inert fact 
of nature. The West and the East are signifiers whose usage is problematic but, alas, at 
times unavoidable, which is to say that one should be aware that these loose identitarian 
poles – which saturate geography with symbolic and imaginative significations – are 
necessarily marked by semantic instability, despite the fictional homogeneity and 
opposition that essentialist discourse, whether Orientalist or not, imputes to them. This 
depends, I should reiterate, on who uses, claims and questions them, and how, why, 
when and where – that is, on the set of conditions and power relations that underpin 
 
94 For a brief but remarkable account of the complex history of the idea of the “west” as “heritage and 
object of study,” which “doesn’t really emerge until the 1890s, during a heated era of imperialism,” see 
Kwame Anthony Appiah, “There is no such thing as Western Civilisation,” The Guardian, 9 Nov 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/09/western-civilisation-appiah-reith-lecture 
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their usage95 –  beyond or because of the fact of their being “an invention,”96 and this is 
particularly relevant to my analysis in Chapters Two, Three and Four. It bears 
reminding, however, that my analysis begins with the Gibranian text, not with the 
Orient-Occident polarity as a starting point of analysis or object of critique. For this 
text, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, is irreducible to such general entities, and the 
anti-identitarian impulse that animates it disrupts such vacuous generalities. Yet Gibran 
could not escape this entrenched identitarian reason, and I also try to show how and 
why.  
 A historically critical reading of Arab (anglophone) literature, therefore, should 
pay attention to the fact that the role and influence of Orientalism as a form of 
identitarian reason in the modern, imperial juncture on, in particular, “Oriental” 
subjects, is necessarily different from the way it operates in a “postcolonial” one, 
especially after the publication of Said’s Orientalism and the institutionalization of 
postcolonial studies in the Anglo-Saxon academy. This vital historical shift means that 
one should not be quick in making retrospective historical-critical judgements on Arab, 
Oriental writers at that particular point in history – which should not mean absolving 
them of criticism – while forgetting the privileged historical and institutional vantage 
point – post-colonial and post-Orientalism, respectively – from which the judgement is 
made. More specifically, the task is not so much to reduce what they write to culturalist 
readings that interpret texts through the sole lens of colonial discourse analysis in a 
retrospectively evaluative or judgmental manner, as to better understand what is 
 
95 Since imperially and materially speaking, the Occident dominated and ruled over the Orient, the 
meaning and performativity of the latter as an identitarian marker for an Oriental writer or reformer in the 
Nahḍa, for instance, are not the same for an Occidental or an Orientalist using the same marker to 
designate or study the other – whether in negative or positive terms. The disparate material and discursive 
conditions that undergird the way one claims and uses those markers very often determine their semantic 
and performative content.  
96 I follow Said’s insistence, who draws on Vico, that men make and invent their own history, and that the 
Occident or the Orient, therefore, are “not merely there,” but are indeed man-made. Said, Orientalism, 4-
5. [emphasis in the original] 
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textually produced through, within or beyond Orientalist imagination as we understand 
it today. For there are so many aesthetic, cultural, political and religious concerns in 
modern Arabic literature that do not lend themselves to postcolonialist readings.97 
Hence the kind of reading I try to perform in this study, that of attending to the 
Gibranian text in its bilingual singularity as it intervenes in, and is affected by, its 
context of emergence and reception, while keeping in mind the modern experience of 
empire in which “all cultures are involved in one another; none is single and pure, all 
are hybrid, heterogenous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic.”98 My point, 
to put it differently, is not to look at Arab (anglophone) literature, and Gibran’s text in 
particular, from a strictly postcolonial, culturalist lens, which at times runs the risk of 
falling (unwittingly) into the sort of reductionism that Said himself warned against.99 
This leads me to foreground the problem “difference” in a modern world in 
which cultures and traditions are imperially and translationally inter-related, but 
unevenly and unequally visible and influential. Hosam Aboul-Ela crucially reminds us 
that “contemporary Arabic poetry presents a challenge for postcolonial studies, which is 
far more comfortable with novels, especially ones written in English,” and that, most 
importantly, “non-European poetics raises issues of difference that are not easily 
understood through the frame of colonialism.”100 This is why I demarcated, earlier, two 
planes of analysis which, however interconnected, should not be confused with one 
another. For to start with the awareness of the text’s own difference that calls for the 
reader’s ethical responsibility of reading, which consists in attending at once to its own 
textual alterity/singularity and its worldly situatedness, is not the same as starting with 
 
97 See Mohamed-Salah Omro, “Notes on the Traffic between Theory and Arabic Literature,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 4 (November 2011): 731-733; and Hosam Aboul-
Ela, “Is There an Arab (Yet) in This Field?: Postcolonialism, Comparative Literature, and middle Eastern 
Horizon of Said’s Discourse Analysis,” MFS Modern Fiction Studies 56, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 729-750. 
98 Said, Culture and Imperialism, xxix.  
99 Said, Orientalism, 46.  
100 Hosam Aboul-Ela, “Is There an Arab (Yet) in This Field?,” 744-45.  
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an a priori notion of cultural difference that interprets/appropriates the text by flattening 
– unwittingly or not – its own singularity in the name of “context.”  
It is essential, therefore, to point out that the concept of “the other” in my critical 
orientation is primarily understood as the ontologically universal other whose essence – 
if there is any – is inaccessible and whose singularity is inexhaustible and 
inappropriable, and in that sense “transcendental,” that is, unobjectifiable and unfixable. 
This means that the other has an infinite ethical claim on the same as Levinas would 
say.101 This notion of otherness precedes, exceeds and therefore resists – as opposed to 
negating the existence of – the culturally, racially and socially constructed notion of 
otherness in which the other is another term for the exotic, the inferior, the backward, 
the barbarian, the colonized, the infidel and so on, which is unfortunately not waning. 
Textual difference is of course not the same as, though it overlaps with, human and 
cultural difference, yet both are equally important and relevant to this study. In this 
respect, I follow Attridge’s conception of literature as “the reader’s other,” which he 
sharply distinguishes from reader-response criticism. The other, in this conception, is “a 
relating”:  
[I]t is not the text “itself” but my singular and active relation to the particular 
configuration of possibilities represented by the text that is the site of alterity. 
However old the text, however familiar to me, it can always strike me with the 
force of novelty if, by means of a creative reading that strives to respond fully to 
the singularity of the work in a new time and place, I open myself to its potential 
challenge. Rather than the familiar model of the literary work as friend and 
companion, sharing with the reader its secrets, I propose the work as stranger, 
even and perhaps especially when the reader knows it intimately.102  
 
 One last thing must be mentioned regarding my theoretical orientation in this 
thesis. When I refer to identitarian reason, I rely mostly on Fethi Meskini’s critique of 
this modern kind of reason (naqd al-ʿaql al-hawawī). According to the Tunisian 
 
101 See Emmanuel Levinas, “Ethics as First Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, ed. Sean Hand (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1989), 75-87.  
102 Attridge, “Innovation, Literature, Ethics: Relating to the Other,” 26. 
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philosopher, the modern notion of national and cultural “identity,” or al-hawiyya, 
displaces the classical ontological notion of al-huwiyya or ipseity, as understood in 
Greek and medieval Arabic philosophy. His critique of identitarian reason is a critique 
of, on the one side, the modern paradigm of sovereign subjectivity, in which the world 
turns from a divine “sign” into an “object” for domination by the transcendental subject 
(that is, modernity as a new form of monotheism),103 and, on the other, of the 
anthropological/cultural concept of “identity,” which generated the post-modern and 
post-colonial obsession with cultural “authenticity” and identitarian narratives. This 
obsession with identity, thus, has obscured the fundamental question that must concern 
the post-Kantian subject everywhere: freedom, or the horizon of a self without/before 
identity.104 This critique orients the debate towards a phenomenological probing of 
ipseity, that is, of the question “who?” that precedes and informs any sense of 
subjecthood and “identity,” from both a classical Arab and post-modern philosophical 
perspectives.105 His complex argument has been necessarily simplified for usage here. 
His philosophical and theoretical work, however, is particularly important here for two 
reasons. The first is that Meskini is steeped in Arabic literature and philosophy, and 
Gibran is no exception (I critically highlight Meskini’s reading of Gibran’s parable 
“How I became a Madman” in Chapter Four as an instance of reception). The second 
because he thinks in the horizon of global, contemporary philosophy but from an Arab 
vantage point, that is, he is thinking universally in Arabic. Thus, philosophizing and 
theorizing in Arabic for him should interrupt the kind of reason that bears the stamp of 
symbolic geography, whether “Western” or “Eastern,” all the while acknowledging the 
 
103 See Fethi Meskini, Al-Hawiyya wa al-Ḥurriya: Naḥwa Anwār Jadīda [Identity and Freedom: Towards 
a New Aufklärung]] (Beirut: Dār Jadāwil, 2011), 208-10. 
104 “Modern philosophy from Hegel to Ricoeur,” Meskini argues, “has failed to realize this promise, in 
that it only displaced the foundation of the self to found a host of [implicit] narratives of identity.” Ibid., 
12.  
105 See Meskini, al-Huwiyya wa al-Zamān: Taʾwīlāt Fīnuminulujia li Masʾalat al-Naḥn [Ipseity and 
Time: Phenomenological Interpretations of the “We” Question] (Beirut: Dār al-Taliʿa, 2001), 7-12; see 
also his al-Hawiyya wa al-Ḥurriya, 9-19.  
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particular “hermeneutical situation” of contemporary Arab thought, where “the sources 
of the self”106 – the Qur’an, classical poetry and the extremely large repertoire of 
theological, jurisprudent, philosophical and Sufi heritage – inevitably belong to, and 
ought to be creatively and universally re-claimed by, the modern Arabs. His critique of 
identitarian reason, thus, is both a local and universal critique,107 hence its pertinence 
here.  
The universal, crucially, is understood as that “pluriversal,”108 global or world 
horizon of knowing, sensing and believing in which are shared various local ways of 
thinking across the globe, which are inevitably steeped in a certain form of life or 
tradition. A shared normative multiplicity, thus, not relativism, is the horizon of the 
universal, which nevertheless always carries a certain contextual, symbolic, 
perspectival, linguistic …etc. signature.109 This is the sense in which I use “the 
universal” in this thesis, especially in relation to the religious, the poetic or the spiritual 
in Gibran’s text. I rely and draw, of course, on various theoretical sources and 
reflections throughout my work, both Arab and Euro-American, with particular 
attention to Derrida – whose works on ethical issues such as giving, hospitality and 
language (as unpossessable) have been instructive and inspiring. I am especially 
indebted to Meskini, however, and the kind of nuanced thinking that his work displays, 
in ways that I had not been able to imagine before I embarked on this research project. 
 
106 Meskini adopts this term from Charles Taylor as “quiet substitute” for various, fragile categories like 
turāth, religion, origin, foundation …etc. See his al-Hawiyya wa al-Ḥurriya, 21. 
107 I briefly sketch out his critical orientation in the last section of Chapter Four. 
108 See Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs, xiv, xxii.   
109 Meskini differentiates between al-kawnī and al-kullī, both of which translate as “universal” in 
European languages. Al-kullī is the Arab translation of the Greek notion of “to katholou,” or the one of 
science, while al-kawnī refers to the normative multiplicity of the universal which is precariously but 
necessarily shared by humanity. See Meskini, “al-Kawnī wa al-Kullī, aw fī Hashāshat al-Mushtarak,” in 
al-Hawiyya wa al-Ḥurriya, 159-76. 
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Acknowledged Limitations of the Thesis 
 
 I should remind my readers that this thesis does not perform an exhaustive 
reading of Gibran’s texts, an aim which is just not possible. As stressed earlier, my 
reading, for thematic and methodological reasons, is inevitably selective. This 
selectiveness is also necessitated by the kind of close reading I attempt to perform, 
which seeks to lend more visibility to the Gibranian text, be it in its poetic, post-
religious and post-Nietzschean incarnation – as my interpretative engagement in 
Chapter One tries to show – or its national and civilizational orientation – as part of 
Chapter Two as well as Chapter three endeavour to demonstrate. My focus on these two 
central aspects of Gibran’s literary and intellectual enterprise aims to strike a balance 
between the national and the universal in Gibran, as part of my argument consists in the 
contention that these concerns do not contradict, but rather complement, each other, but 
not without issues however, as discussed in Chapter Two and Three. What is left out of 
the picture is the early Arabic work of Gibran, and particularly his collections of short 
stories ʿArāʾis al-Murūj (1906) and al-Arwāḥ al-Mutamarrida (1908), as well as in his 
short novel al-Ajniḥa al-Mutakassira (1912). An engagement with these texts, which 
received a lot of scholarly attention in the Arab world, would fall outside the scope and 
concern of this thesis. And since some of the Arabic texts with which I engage in 
Chapter Three are mostly overlooked or under-studied, highlighting them would lend 
more significance, I hope, to the argument and aim of the study. Furthermore, Gibran’s 
late works – Sand and Foam (1926), Jesus the Son of Man (1928), The Earth Gods 
(1931), not to mention the posthumously published books, The Wanderer (1932), The 
Garden of The Prophet (1932) and Lazarus and His Beloved and The Blind (1981) – do 
not receive much attention in this study, passing references notwithstanding. This is 
because neither space permits it nor is it my primary concern to pay as much attention 
to them as I do to earlier works, The Madman, al-ʿAwāṣif, The Forerunner and The 
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Prophet in particular, an attention partly justified by the thematic focus in Chapter One, 
which I see as a thread that connects those works – The Prophet being perhaps the most 
important in terms of the appeal it has generated and the mixed critical appraisals it has 
elicited. Also neglected in this thesis is Gibran’s art, which consists of numerous 
drawings and paintings, simply because I do not have the requisite expertise to engage 
critically with it – and I assume that it merits a separate study. Another limitation is my 
unavoidable inattention to the reception of Gibran’s work outside the Arab world and 
the U.S., since it has been translated into many languages and received by many other 
cultures. This is because the American reception occupies a good deal of my analysis in 
Chapter Four – a problematic reception that warrants such an attention – not to mention 
the “Arabization” of his anglophone works, which is an essential and overlooked aspect 
that must be brought to the fore as my argument in Chapter Four entails. I hope that 
these recognized – and the inevitably unrecognized – limitations would not undermine 
the argument and the purpose of this thesis, which is ultimately an attempt to offer a 
fresh, critical and rounded picture of Gibran by making visible that which has been so 
far kept or rendered invisible by various ways of reading, modes of reception and 
practices of (e)valuation.
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Chapter One: 
Reinventing the Religious in and against Modernity: The Poet as a Post-religious 
Prophet 
 
 
Everything still remains open after Nietzsche. 
  Paul Ricoeur.1 
 
The prophet is a normative device of an exceptional kind. It is the last of the 
Abrahamic inventions, after those of Adam, God the Creator, the Created World, 
the Sacred Books and the Thereafter …etc. This is not merely a question of 
religion. Rather, it concerns a wide-ranging spiritual apparatus of legislation 
invented by peoples of the ancient Middle East who were, by virtue of it, 
transformed into nomadic and open spiritual groups. The descendants of 
Abraham insist that the normative validity of this apparatus is universalizable, 
because it is a form of life that remains habitable. 
 Fethi Meskini.2 
 
 “When speech becomes prophetic,” writes Maurice Blanchot, “it is not the 
future that is given, it is the present that is given away, and with it the possibility of a 
firm, stable, lasting presence.”3 This prophetic speech is essentially Abrahamic. The 
Abrahamic as a concept names the “unifying and divisive” root of the three 
monotheistic religions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – without collapsing their 
marked differences into a monolithic notion of religion.4 Abraham is the spiritual and 
pioneering Father to whom each monotheism differently traces its origin, “the true 
Urmonotheismus.”5 What interests me in this chapter is not the Abrahamic per se, nor 
the communalities or differences between the three monotheistic religions, but the 
prophetic mode of speech as a modern literary trope, in Gibran, that bears the indelible 
 
1 Ricoeur, “Religion, Atheism, and Faith,” trans. Charles Freilich, in The Conflict of Interpretations: 
Essays in Hermeneutics, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 447. 
2 Meskini, “al-Nabiyy al-Mustaḥīl [The Impossible Prophet],” in al-Īmān al-Ḥurr aw Mā Baʿda al-Milla: 
Mabāḥith fī Falsafat al-Dīn [Free Faith, or Post-Milla: Studies in the Philosophy of Religion] (Rabat: 
Mominoun Without Borders, 2018), 395-96. al-Milla is not religion, but the theologico-political 
community based on a certain religion. 
3 Blanchot, “Prophetic Speech,” 79.  
4 I use this category, following Carol Bakhos, as a critical alternative to “Western,” “elective” and 
“Semitic” monotheism. The Abrahamic is a modern concept, and it gained academic currency thanks, 
mainly, to French scholar and Orientalist Louis Massignon in the mid-twentieth century. See Bakhos, The 
Family of Abraham: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Interpretations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2014), 1-5. 
5 Ibid., 1.  
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stamp of the Abrahamic. “The word “prophet” – borrowed from the Greek to designate 
a condition foreign to Greek culture – would deceive us if it invited us to make the nabi 
the one who speaks the future,” Blanchot reminds us.6 The prophetic, thus, announces 
an impossible future, but it also, crucially, opens up a space of transcendence arguably 
unknown to the Greeks: God, the Infinite, Absolute transcendence, the wholly Other, 
and so on. The literary and philosophical reinvention of this space in modernity, 
therefore, should not be confused with ideas of the persistence or degeneracy of “the 
sacred,” of desacralization and disenchantment, to which the Abrahamic “holy,” as 
Levinas emphasizes, is irreducible.7 Gibran, as a post-religious poet, should be 
understood in this context of Abrahamic prophecy, of the religious, more specifically, as 
it manifests itself aesthetically in modernity, that is, in a specific historical and worldly 
context where the religious is not dead, but reinvented. 
In this chapter, I set out to address this question of the religious in Gibran. I 
argue that Gibran reinvents the religious in and against Modernity by espousing an 
Abrahamic prophetic trope that is de-theologized and aestheticized. More precisely, 
Gibran’s poetic reinvention of the religious dissociates the latter from monotheistic 
theology, eschatology and morality, while clinging to several Islamic-Sufi concepts by 
re-claiming and inscribing them in an evolutionary worldview. In this worldview, God 
becomes an ever-evolving force and ceases to be the prime mover and the god of 
authority and morality. This reinvention is also conditioned by the epistemic force of 
modernity that rendered obsolete religion’s epistemological authority, but not its 
 
6 Blanchot, “Prophetic Speech,” 79. 
7 Levinas draws an important distinction between the Abrahamic “holy” and the pagan, ancient or 
modern, “sacred.” The former, linked to “Revelation,” to the Absolute and the Infinite as such, cannot be 
reduced to the “sorcery” of the latter, to “[t]he “other side,” the reverse or obverse of the Real, 
Nothingness condensed to Mystery, bubbles of Nothing in things,” in short, to “the desacralization of the 
sacred,” the latter being merely an “image” of the Absolute. For him “a truly desacralized society would 
be … a society in which the impure stratagem of sorcery, spreading everywhere, bringing the sacred to 
life rather than alienating it, comes to an end. Real desacralization would attempt positively to separate 
the true from appearance, maybe even to separate the true from the appearance essentially mixed with the 
true.” Emmanuel Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), 140-41, 147. [emphasis in the original].  
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existential, hermeneutical and experiential power and affect.8 Moreover, Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra, as a post-religious poet-prophet, provided a horizon for Gibran to think the 
religious anew in this context of modernity. This is not merely a question of influence – 
in terms of which the Gibran-Nietzsche relationship has been often discussed – but of 
the thinking-with-Nietzsche that Gibran was able to perform from an Arab vantage 
point.9 I am interested in Gibran, therefore, as a post-Nietzschean poet whose literary 
enterprise consists in annihilating or breaking with certain values and creating or 
reinventing others. I show that this creative encounter with Nietzsche is one that 
allowed Gibran to nurture and expand his prophetic imagination beyond Nietzsche.  
I will start in section one by demonstrating how Gibran re-inscribes certain Sufi 
motifs in an evolutionary worldview where Life is all there is, “a fascinating 
cosmology”10 where everything incessantly evolves. The Sufi notion of desire or 
longing (al-shawq or al-tashawwuq), as fundamentally existential and metaphysical, 
takes centre stage in his re-thinking of God, the self and the world. I show that this re-
thinking is discursively and hermeneutically mediated by evolutionism, a mediation 
occasioned by the domestication of this notion in the Nahḍa discourse. This 
evolutionism is transformed by Gibran in a strikingly original way. My reading in this 
section is primarily based on the corpus of letters Gibran exchanged with Mary Haskell 
and her journals, which are read as texts, and not as biographical data. I then move on, 
in section two, to discuss how Gibran’s post-religious vision, as expounded in the 
 
8 After Copernicus, Newton, Kant, Hegel, the Romantics, Nietzsche, Darwin and Freud – to name but a 
few “founders of discursivity,” as Foucault would say – the premodern cosmological worldview in which 
the three fundamental notions of God, the self and the world were articulated and experienced no longer 
held sway. This does not mean, of course, that the religious was brushed aside in modernity. The 
religious, rather, is reinvented, transformed and articulated anew and multifariously within a modern 
secular space that compels this reinvention, but with no complete rupture with the premodern past, now 
conceived as “mythic.” It is important to underscore in this context that under the discursive relative 
autonomy of what the moderns call “literature,” the religious is experienced as at once religious and 
secular. See Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 8-9.  
9 For an excellent discussion of this encounter from a philosophical perspective, see Meskini, “Gibran in 
front of Nietzsche, or the Arab Version of Nihilism,” in Falsafat al-Nawābit, 33-47.  
10 Waterfield, Prophet, 190.  
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letters, manifests itself in his prose poetry. This is not merely an attempt to tease it out, 
but a discussion that is essentially framed around these two fundamental questions: how 
does Gibran reimagine God, the self and the world poetically? And what does it mean to 
speak prophetically as a poet in the context of modernity? I demonstrate that the 
Gibranian post-religious poet – in The Madman and “Ḥaffār al-Qubūr” – interrogates 
the rationalist and calculative order of modern life by embracing a nocturnal mode of 
poetic thinking that aims to destroy or “bury” certain dead values in order to create the 
possibility of new life. God here is reinvented as a form of horizontal transcendence, as 
a “mad god” who becomes the thinking horizon in the night of the modern, Arab poet, 
and as a trace of an Outside that is invoked in order to interrupt modernity’s calculative 
reason. In section three, I extend my discussion in section two by focusing on the 
prophetic – in The Forerunner, The Prophet and Iram Dhāt al-ʿImād – as that which 
announces a dwelling in the world that takes the impossible, the Greater Self, as its 
condition of possibility. More specifically, I discuss the forerunner as a mode of 
beginning without origin; the Mist as a post-religious name of God; faith and freedom 
as paradoxical movements that are experienced beyond rationalism and attainability, 
respectively; “religion” as a worldly mode of being; giving as being, or the de-
transcendentalizing of ethics; and the spiritual – the “veiled city” of Iram Dhāt al-ʿImād 
– as an ethics of belonging that expands the body’s vision in and of the world beyond 
place – the modern city or the nation. My reading in this chapter, and the perspective 
from which it is carried out, aims to show and discuss that which is singular about 
Gibran’s poetic texts in both languages, in a manner that situates them within, and 
therefore demonstrates their important relevance to, the general context in which they 
intervene as texts. That Gibran is thinking universally as a bilingual poet in this context 
is necessarily underlined. 
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1. Re-imagining God, the Self and the World 
By the beginning of World War One, Gibran’s own conception of God begins to 
manifest itself clearly in his letters to Mary Haskell; he writes, “If God the Power, God 
the force, God the mind, God the subconsciousness of Life, is in all the struggles that 
take place on this planet, He must be in this war of nations. He is this war.”11 To think 
of God in these terms is to radicalize and repudiate the notion of God as a Perfect 
Being, even as agape in Christian and Islamic Sufi traditions, the profound bearing of 
both upon his intellectual formation and work notwithstanding. Gibran speculates that 
“the Mind [God] of this world is not free from its body [the Earth] – and as long as the 
body is struggling for more life, the mind will go on struggling for more life, more 
mind. There is no such thing as struggle for death.”12 God, the subconsciousness of 
Life, is not, in this case, separate from Life, as He is the struggle itself. Gibran goes on 
to assert that “there is nothing on this planet but a struggle for Life,” which 
characterizes “every physical or mental movement, every wave of the sea and every 
thought or dream.”13 This radical understanding of Life as an eternal struggle renders 
man “elemental,” a part of nature where “the elements declare war on each other,”14 and 
this is how Gibran justifies the act of war, conceiving of violence, albeit implicitly, as 
natural as the struggle for Life itself, and reducing man to a mere element in nature, 
albeit one whose soul is endowed, unlike the elements, with “the desire for more of 
itself, hunger for that which is beyond itself.”15 This emphasis on the struggle for Life is 
an evidently evolutionist notion, and has its echoes in Gibran’s Arabic work as I will 
show.  
 
11 KG to MH, Oct. 14, 1914. [Emphasis in the original]  
12 Ibid. [Emphasis in the original] 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Gibran conceives of the universe as a hierarchy, and man, though below God in this hierarchy, is above 
Earth and the elements. Yet they are all interconnected in a way, constituting what he calls Life, which 
signifies all there is.  
60 
 
Situating Gibran within the Nahḍa discourse will help us illuminate this social 
and metaphysical interpretation of evolutionism. The latter was so prevalent a notion 
during the Nahḍa that “evolution [for Arab readers of Darwin] was about much more 
than biology and more even that history: the new universal history for which it provided 
the blueprint was one with the power to recast the future.”16 In the Nahḍa discourse, 
thus,  
discussions of religion were also increasingly attached to notions of the 
evolution of the “idea of God” and assigned a “social function” that could be 
considered and compared across a universal timeline. The coming of Darwin 
was thus accompanied by reconceptualizations of the meaning of “religion” 
itself.17  
 
Evolutionism, Marwa Elshakry has shown, gained currency in the Nahḍa thanks largely 
to al-Muqtaṭaf, a popular scientific journal whose role in disseminating European 
scientific theories and discoveries from 1870s onwards was widely influential. This 
induced a host of debates and discussions around the interpretation and validity of 
evolutionism in the Arab East.18Shibli Shumayyil, an influential Nahḍa intellectual and 
one of the pioneering proponents of Darwinism, translates and reflects on evolutionism 
as Falsafat al-Nushūʾ wa al-Irtiqāʾ [Philosophy of Evolution and Progress], the title of 
one of his books that was published in 1910. Shumayyil’s interpretation of evolutionism 
is strictly materialist, albeit with mystical and pantheistic overtones to it.19 In a one-act 
play published by Gibran in al-Funūn in 1913 and signed, intriguingly, “One of the 
Grave-Digger’s Disciples,”20 Shumayyil is included as a character in it. In the play, 
 
16 Elshakry, Reading Darwin, 12. 
17 Ibid, 15-16.   
18 “The journal was novel and expensive and attracted contributions from renowned literary and public 
figures such as Ali Mubarak, Mahmud al-Falaki, Riaz Pasha, Shibli Shumayyil, Salama Musa, and Jurji 
Zaydan—Egyptian and Syrian intellectuals, technocrats, and politicians. It quickly became a prominent 
forum for what the historical novelist and popular intellectual Zaydan and others termed al-nahda al-
ʿilmiya (the renaissance of knowledge or science).” Ibid., 31. 
19 Shumayyil begins his book by citing the twelfth century Sufi-philosopher Ibn Arabi: “See Him in a 
tree, see Him in a stone, and see Him in everything, that is God.” His materialism, thus, was monistic and 
pantheistic. Ibid., 99.  
20 See Gibran, “Mudāʿaba,” in Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 238-42. I discuss the metaphor of the grave digger 
in section two.  
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Gibran, Shumayyil, Amin Rihani and Sheikh Iskandar al-ʿAzar (a Lebanese poet), 
sitting in a café in Lebanon, are discussing a medley of topics that revolve around 
Darwinism (natural selection), Turner, Keats and Nietzsche – in relation to the nature of 
religion, poetry and imagination – each of whom represents a particular way that seeks 
or reveals “truth.” This discussion is joined by an ordinary man speaking in the dialect 
(al-ʿāmmī),21 who ultimately deems himself in a better existential status than they are. 
What is pertinent to my discussion here is that Gibran, in a response to Shumayyil’s 
espousal of natural selection as a principle of social reality, asserts: 
Your reason, Doctor [in reference to Shumayyil], moves between the teachings 
of Darwin and the principles of Nietzsche, and I share this conviction with you. 
However, were Darwin or Nietzsche able to truly demonstrate what is the best or 
the fittest? For what Nietzsche deems full of will and nobility may actually bring 
about weakness and abjectness. Who can say with absolute confidence that the 
distant visions that visit the soul of a Sufi is not one of the elements that nature 
selects as a mechanism to preserve the fittest and maintain the best? I am a 
worshipper of Power [al-quwwa], but I love all the manifestations of Power, not 
one of them only.22 
 
In “al-Jabābira” [The Giants], furthermore, an Arabic prose piece published in 
The Tempests, Gibran explicitly expresses his belief in evolutionism. He writes:  
I am an advocate of the law of evolution and progress [sunnat al-nushū’ wa al-
irtiqā’], which, to me, applies to both immaterial and material (sensory) living 
entities, for it transforms religions and nations to the better as much as it 
transforms all creatures from the fitting to the fittest. Hence, there is only 
retrogression in appearance and decadence in the superficial. 
The law of evolution has diverse channels that are at bottom unified. Its 
manifestations, which are adverse, dark and unfair, are repudiated by limited 
thoughts and renounced by weak hearts. Its invisible force, however, is just and 
enlightening, for it embraces a right that is higher to the rights of individuals, 
aims for an end that is loftier than the goal of the group, and listens to a voice 
that overwhelms, in its immensity and pleasantness, the sighs of the ill-fated and 
the agonies of the tormented.23 
 
 
21 This is perhaps one of the earlier texts in modern Arabic literature that includes whole passages in the 
Syrian dialect. Gibran, also, does that in an anecdote entitled “al-Majnūn” [The Madman], who is 
represented as an old man speaking in the Syrian dialect, published in al-Sāʾiḥ periodical (23 September 
1918). The anecdote is included in Daye, Lakum Jubrānukum wa lia Jubrāni [You Have Your Gibran and 
I Have Mine] (Beirut: Qub Elias Press, 2009), 338-41. Interestingly, in the same year this anecdote was 
published, Gibran’s first book in English, The Madman, was also published. 
22 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 240.  
23 CWs in Arabic, 248.  
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For Gibran, thus, evolutionism is not only a philosophy but a historical, social and 
metaphysical law [sunna], but the expression itself (al-nushū’ wa al-irtiqā’) is 
Shumayyil’s. In another context, that of the future of the Arabic language, Gibran 
asserts that “languages, like everything else, are subject to the law of the survival of the 
fittest.”24 My contention is that Gibran’s espousal of evolutionism as a law was the 
offshoot of the Nahḍa, the Arab manifestation of modernity. In this context, Herbert 
Spenser was another celebrated figure, and the Spenserian interpretation of 
evolutionism was embraced to account for what became known as “the Eastern 
question” [al-masʾala al-sharqiyya].25 Thus, “[c]ivilizational progress—like 
evolution—was … seen as a law of nature in the age of Darwin and Spencer, and 
commentators who seemed to offer scientific insights into this process were seized upon 
by those seeking to promote their particular policies of social reform.”26 Gibran cannot 
be dissociated from this particular historical and intellectual context.27 His writings in 
the Arab press demonstrate that he was acutely aware of the Nahḍa’s intellectual and 
cultural enterprise and actively interacting with it. His re-thinking of God, the self and 
the world, in Arabic or in English, was therefore primarily occasioned by this 
intellectual context, where evolutionism was at times subject to transcendental 
interpretations that made it religiously acceptable. What is peculiar about Gibran is that 
he went as far as re-thinking the idea of God itself, pushing it beyond the confines of 
orthodox religion. It was, in other words, his own idea of God, with all the weight, and 
perhaps the weakness, that accompanies this reinvention. 
Gibran’s conception of God as an ever-evolving absolute reflective of all 
struggles in and for Life is nevertheless tinged with ambiguity. The relationship 
between God and Life is left unexplained (apart from God being the subconsciousness 
 
24 CWs in Arabic, 320.  
25 See Elshakry, “Evolution and the Eastern Question,” in Reading Darwin, 73-88. 
26 Ibid., 90.  
27 See Chapter Three.  
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of life in the instance of war), and this organic, and implicit, justification and 
purification of the violence ensued by wars and struggles reduces man to a passive 
element in nature who is impotent in face of the will to Life imputed to God. Gibran’s 
encounter with Nietzsche may elucidate this re-imagining of God.28 Gibran, like 
Nietzsche, glorifies Life as such, Life as all there is, Life, that is, as Being. As Nietzsche 
once declared, “Being – we have no idea of it other than ‘living’. – How can anything 
dead be?”29 Moreover, while Zarathustra despises “the preachers of death,”30 Gibran 
hails true poets as preachers of Life:   
The saints and the sages of the past ages were seldom in the presence of the God 
of this world, because they never gave themselves to life but simply gazed at it. 
The great poets of the past were always one with Life. They did not seek a point 
in it nor did they wish to find its secrets. They simply allowed their souls to be 
governed, moved, played upon by it. The wise man and the good man are always 
seeking safety – but safety is an end and Life is endless.31   
 
In another context, Gibran scorns the desire for peace and the “tiresome, illogical, flat, 
and insipid” insistence on universal and international Peace. “Why should man speak of 
Peace when there is much ill-at-easeness in his system that must go out one way or 
another? Was it not Peace disease that crept into the Oriental nations and caused their 
downfall?”32 Gibran was in favour of a Syrian revolution against the Ottoman empire, a 
disposition that few nationalists advocated at the time. This political context aside, what 
is interesting here is that Gibran speaks of war in evolutionist terms: “Peace is the desire 
 
28 This encounter is well-known in the Gibran Studies. Gibran once declared to Mikhail Naimy: “What a 
man [Nietzsche]! What a man! Alone he fought the whole world in the name of his Superman; and 
though the world forced him out of his reason in the end, yet he did whip it well. He died a Superman 
among pygmies, a sane madman in the midst of a world too decorously insane to be mad … And What a 
pen! With one stroke it would create a new world, and with one stroke it would efface old one, the while 
dripping beauty charm and power.” Naimy, Kahlil Gibran, 119.  
29 See Martin Heidegger, “What are Poets for?” Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 101. 
30 Fredrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1966), 44-
46.  
31 In the same letter, he writes, “Beloved Mary, You and I and all those who are born with a hunger for 
Life, are not trying to touch the outer edges of other worlds by deep thinking and deep feeling – our sole 
desire is to discover this world and to become with its spirit. And the Spirit of this world, though ever 
changing and ever growing, is the Absolute.” KG to MH, July 17, 1915. [emphasis in the original] 
32 KG to MH, May. 16, 1912. 
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of old age, and the world is still too young to have such a desire. I say, let there be wars; 
let the Children of the Earth fight one another until the last drop of impure, animal 
blood is shed.”33 He then goes on to stress that “those who live, those who know what it 
is to be, those who have knowledge in the Life-in-Death do not preach Peace: They 
Preach Life … There is no Peace in the art of Being.”34 The evolutionist struggle for 
Life is thus transformed into a Nietzschean, aesthetic affirmation and celebration of 
Life. God does not die in this picture; rather, “He, the mighty one, is fighting for a 
mightier self, a clearer self, a self of higher life.”35 
God for Gibran, thus, ceases to be the prime mover, the necessary Being, the 
God of morality and monotheistic eschatology, the God who simultaneously loves and 
judges,36 or the God of what Heidegger calls “onto-theology.”37 Yet this God dies 
silently in Gibran. And this silent, quiet death – for “when gods die, they die several 
kinds of death”38 – gives way to another God, an ever-evolving God, an absolute 
seeking more absolution and crystallization, as he would say. “How many new gods are 
still possible!” wrote Nietzsche once.39 This new conception of God gives way to a 
space of transcendence which is horizontally re-imagined, that is, conceived within, not 
beyond, Life. Is such a transcendence possible? Or is Gibran’s God an immanent 
pantheistic God whose immanence is Life itself? How does Gibran conceive of the 
human self after the silent death of the transcendent god of morality? And what kind of 
temporality is possible after the silent death of this transcendent god of monotheistic 
eschatology and messianism? To begin with, Gibran tackles the absence of eschatology 
 
33 Ibid. [Emphasis in the original]  
34 Ibid. [Emphasis in the original] 
35 KG to MH, Oct. 14, 1914. 
36 “Whoever praises him as a god of love does not have a high enough opinion of love itself. Did this god 
not want to be a judge too? But the lover beyond reward and retribution.” Nietzsche, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, 261. 
37 See Mark A. Wrathall, “Introduction: Metaphysics and Onto-theology,” in Religion after Metaphysics, 
ed. Mark A. Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-3.  
38 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 261. 
39 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage 
books, 1967), 534.  
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by embracing reincarnation.40 His concept of the human is not that of the finite being, 
but of the being whose existence is infinite by virtue of reincarnation. The latter can be 
thought of in terms of ontological and narrative return (as in the figure of the prophet). 
In the Abrahamic monotheisms, death does not designate finitude; it is a passage, a step, 
a bridge to the afterlife. This conception of death as passage is the crux of the notion of 
reincarnation too, espoused by Gibran after breaking, quietly, with the Abrahamic 
notion of the after-world.  
In an important letter to Mary Haskell, Gibran posits his new perception of God: 
God is not the creator of man. God is not the creator of the earth. God is not the 
ruler of man nor of earth. God desires man and earth to be like Him, and a part 
of Him. God is growing through His desire, and man and earth, and all there is 
upon the earth, rise towards God by the power of desire. And desire is the 
inherent power that changes all things. It is the law of all matter and all life.41 
 
The universe of Gibran, where Life is all there is, is hierarchical. Every element in this 
hierarchy strives for what is higher than it. Which means that pantheism is not the 
proper qualifier for this cosmology. By conceiving of God as a desiring force, a force 
that grows by virtue of desire and to which the lower elements, including the soul, rise, 
or long to rise, by virtue of the same power of desire, Gibran reinvents the Sufi notion 
of longing or al-shawq by inscribing it in an evolutionary cosmology. Desire/longing, 
thus, comes to assume a fundamental ontological importance in a cosmology in which 
all the elements are willy-nilly evolving. It becomes “the law of all matter and all life.” 
This desire is not born out of lack or need; it is an originary ontological force. In this 
worldview, there is no transcendent realm beyond Life, but this does not mean that there 
is no transcendental experience. For God, being the higher and most refined element in 
 
40 For more on Gibran’s belief in reincarnation and the possible Durzi, Sufi and Christian sources that 
might have influenced him, see Bushrui and Jenkins, Kahlil Gibran: Man and Poet, 76-78 
41 KG to MH, Jan. 30, 1916.  
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this universe, “the furthest form of life,”42 is reinvented as a Beyond within Being, as it 
were. How does this understanding of God bear upon the notion of the human self?  
The soul is, for Gibran, compared to God, “a newly developed element in 
Nature,”43 a refined form of matter whose inherent properties – for it has its own 
inherent properties like other elements in nature – are “the desire for more of itself” and 
“the hunger for that which is beyond itself”44; Gibran sums up these properties in one 
word: consciousness. Other equally significant properties of the soul include “the power 
… and the desire to seek” God, “even as heat seeks height or water seeks the sea.”45 
Thus, a primordial and impersonal metaphysical desire is attributed to the soul – and 
this impersonality is an essential element in Gibran’s worldview – for “it [the soul] 
never loses its path, anymore than water runs upwards.”46 Gibran articulates this 
constitutive impersonality as follows: “That which is more than we think and know is 
always seeking and adding to itself while we are doing nothing – or think we are doing 
nothing.”47 Furthermore, echoing the Sufi highest stations of annihilation, fanāʾ, and 
persistence (or subsistence), baqāʾ, in God (the ultimate Desirer), “the soul,” speculates 
Gibran, “never loses its inherent properties when it reaches God. Salt does not lose its 
saltness in the sea; its properties are inherent and eternal.”48 Although the potentiality of 
the soul to “be in God” is attainable, it does not mean that the soul becomes God; it 
becomes in God, annihilates in His Infinity, while retaining its above-mentioned 
properties, persisting in God, as in Sufism.49 This insight resonates with the distinction 
 
42 “Some believe God made the world. To me it seems more likely that God has grown from the world 
because He is the furthest form of Life. Of course, the possibility of God was present before God 
himself.” MH journal, Apr. 18, 1920.  
43 KG to MH, Feb. 10, 1916. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid.  
47 KG to MH, Mar. 1. 1916. 
48 KG to MH, Feb. 10, 1916. 
49 “Inasmuch as human beings are not He, they are annihilated, and inasmuch as human beings are He, 
they subsist.” William Chittick, Imaginal Worlds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 
89.   
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that al-Ḥallaj, the famous Sufi poet, also known as the Martyr of Divine Love, makes 
between nāsut, human nature, and lāhut, the Divine. As Reynold Alleyne Nicholson 
remarks, “though mystically united, they [nāsut and lāhut] are not essentially identical 
and interchangeable. Personality survives even in union: water does not become wine, 
though wine be mixed with it.”50  
For Gibran, however, “the absolute seeks more absoluteness, more 
crystallization,” and “God too is growing and seeking and crystallizing,”51 whereas God 
in Islam and Islamic Sufism is the Perfect Being, that which, in His incomparability, is 
beyond conceptualization, the unknowable essence, Being as such. Apart from that, 
Gibran asserts that “we cannot fully understand the nature of God because we are not 
God, but we can make ready our consciousness to understand, and grow through, the 
visible expressions of God.”52  This is, in other words, an understanding of God as both 
immanence and transcendence, which echoes the Sufi philosophy of Ibn Arabi in which 
God is He/not He. As William C. Chittick explains: ““Where can I find God?” 
Wherever He is present, which is everywhere, since all things are His acts. But no act is 
identical with God, who encompasses all things and all acts, all worlds and all 
presences. Though he can be found everywhere, He is also nowhere to be found. He/not 
He.”53 
The acts and attributes of God in Islamic Sufism, that is, God in His similarity 
and knowability, turn into the visible expressions of God in Gibran. But God as such, as 
an essence, remains inaccessible and beyond conceptualization. If Gibran abstains from 
 
50 See Reynold Alleyne Nicholson, Studies in Islamic Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1921), 81. 
51 KG to MH, Feb. 10, 1916. 
52 KG to MH, Jan. 6, 1916. [emphasis in the original] 
53 Chittick, Ibn Arabi’s Metaphysics of Imagination: The Sufi Path of Knowledge (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1989), 6.  
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speaking of God as such54 – “because we are not God”55 – then his statement that “God 
is everything and everywhere”56 is best interpreted, in his own words, as “the visual 
expressions of God,” that is to say, God as not He. Gibran, however, is not interested in 
creatio ex nihilo, nor is he concerned with God as He, that is, with the transcendent 
essence of God who is Being itself. Breaking with the narrative of God as Father and 
Creator, Gibran re-thinks God’s transcendence horizontally and temporally, that is, as 
the impossible horizon – not non-possible, but that which is possible, paradoxically, 
precisely in its unattainability – of being as becoming. Put differently, God as such is 
temporally reinvented as the impossible future of the human self, the “Greater Self” that 
comes to us from the future, not from above. No longer spatially imagined or locatable, 
except for his immanence, God as such is no longer the transcendent vertical Being who 
loves and commands obedience from above, a point to which I shall return in my 
discussion of Gibran’s prose poem “God” in the next section.  
In Gibran’s worldview, thus, there is no authority of a Supreme Being over the 
cosmos or beings; “God and the universe are two universes occupying the same space. 
They are but one universe.”57  In this cosmology, desire constitutes the primordial 
impetus or determinant of the way in which every element (from low to high) grows and 
evolves. The soul is the highest form of matter, endowed with this intrinsic craving to 
reach God, and God is the furthest form of Life, who wants man and the earth to 
become like Him and a part of Him. These speculations, however, are not elaborated on, 
but one can discern a genuine and assiduous endeavour to reinvent God and the human 
self without a radical transcendence at once separating and bonding them. There can be 
 
54 “God can’t be demonstrated. I never tried to prove His existence. The idea of God is different in every 
man, and one can never give another his own religion.” MH Journal, Sept. 14, 1920.  
55 In The Garden of the Prophet, he writes, “it were wiser to speak less of God, whom we cannot 
understand, and more of each other, whom we may understand. Yet I would have you know that we are 
the breath and the fragrance of God. We are God, in leaf, in flower, and oftentimes in fruit.” Gibran, The 
Collected Works (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2007), 540.  
56 MH Journal 26 and 28 Dec 1922.  
57 MH Journal, May. 22, 1920. 
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no radical transcendence if Life is all there is; transcendence, rather, becomes horizontal 
and temporal. While Gibran reconfigures Sufi-Islamic concepts by re-appropriating 
them in a reinvented, evolutionist fashion, his vision of God, the self and the world 
breaks with the fundamental pillars of Abrahamic monotheism: God as Prime Mover, as 
Creator and/or as a Father, eschatology and the transcendental discourses of values, of 
good and evil and of reward and punishment. His conception that perfection is 
limitation led him to purge God of any conceptual and ontological perfection, 
espousing, instead, an evolutionist notion of God who becomes at once the utmost 
temporal (im)possibility of the human self to dwell anew in this world and the 
immanent God who manifests himself everywhere spatially. Even more radical is the 
notion of the soul as the highest form of matter, which is part of Gibran’s own version 
of the Unity of Being/Life, where all the old dualities, such as body/soul, mind/matter, 
immanence/transcendence, are radically, and at times loosely, rethought and reconciled, 
albeit not completely abolished.     
My attempt to piece together a certain Weltanschauung out of Gibran’s 
fragments of thought is an interpretative, not a strictly philosophical or religious, one. 
Gibran never endeavoured to put together a coherent picture of it. Yet, as discussed 
above, some elements in this worldview are evidently recurrent and bespeak an attempt 
to forge an original vision, however limited or conceptually undeveloped. What is 
crucial to my discussion here is that this evolutionist vision reconfigures some Sufi 
existential concepts – metaphysical longing/desire, the interplay of fanāʾ (annihilation) 
and baqāʾ (subsistence) and, as I shall later demonstrate, being as giving – in a modern 
context where religion and the fundamental notions of God, the self and the world were 
undergoing a radical transformation. Gibran’s literary enterprise should be situated in 
this context of modernity as a whole and the Arab Nahḍa in particular. His poetic prose, 
poems and parables, both in Arabic and English, are not merely symbolic and mystical. 
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There is a vision that underpins and informs his writings and a worldly context of 
travelling ideas and concepts within which it ought to be located. To this literary output 
I now turn.  
2. The Poet as a Post-religious Prophet in the Modern Times 
How does Gibran re-imagine God, the self and the world poetically? What does 
it mean to speak prophetically as a poet in the context of modernity? And why poetry as 
that which articulates the prophetic? Let us begin with “God,” a prose poem published 
in The Madman, in which Gibran speaks of God as neither Creator nor Father, echoing 
his afore-mentioned speculations. In the poem, the speaker tells us that when he 
“ascended the holy mountain and spoke unto God, saying, “Master, I am thy slave. Thy 
hidden will is my law and I shall obey thee for ever more,” God made no answer. And 
God made no answer when, a thousand years later, the speaker ascended the mountain 
calling unto God, “Creator, I am thy creation. Out of clay thou fashioned me and to thee 
I owe mine all.” Still God made no answer when, after another thousand years, the 
speaker called unto him, saying, “Father, I am thy son. In pity and love thou hast given 
me birth, and through love and worship I shall inherit thy kingdom.”58 In other words, 
God as Master, Creator and Father has died, and this death, to reiterate what I said in the 
previous section, is a quiet, silent death. A noiseless death: God simply made no 
answer. What dies in Gibran is the conception of God as Creator and Father, not God as 
such. More precisely, what dies is the consciousness of God as Creator and Father 
inside the speaker, in the mind of the speaker, in the history of the speaker as a human 
self (let us remember that this speaker is the madman, this post-religious poet who takes 
it upon himself to reinvent his own notion of God). Yet this death is implicit, not even 
announced or spoken about but only hinted at, for God simply made no answer. What 
dies is the past of God, the history of God as Creator, Father, Master, Commander, the 
 
58 CWs, 6. 
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god of love, pity and worship. Which means that the speaker is no longer the “slave,” 
the “creation” and the “son” of God; what is more, the intimation here is that he has 
never been, for all this transpired “in the ancient days, when the quiver of speech came 
to [his] lips.”59 The poem, however, written against the backdrop of the specific worldly 
and historical context of modernity, is an attempt to re-write a certain past from the 
standpoint of the present of its emergence, where the fundamental notions of God, the 
self and the world were being radically questioned/transformed. In this context, the poet 
is re-inventing his own God, that is, his own values, by quietly destroying the Master-
slave, Creator-created, Father-son relational structure. What kind of structure does this 
relationship take then?   
That a certain notion and history of God die in Gibran means that he was not 
merely “influenced” by Nietzsche but was thinking with and “after” Nietzsche, in that 
he was writing poetically in the horizon of thought that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra opened 
up: the radical rethinking of the religious by way of reclaiming its prophetic mode of 
speech. In other words, he was, as a poet, thinking with, not reacting to, appropriating or 
instrumentalizing Nietzsche. Towards the end of the poem, the speaker tells us that he 
climbed the mountain again, this time uttering the following words: “My God, my aim 
and my fulfilment; I am thy yesterday and thou art my tomorrow. I am thy root in the 
earth and thou art my flower in the sky, and together we grow before the face of the 
sun.” It is only then that “God leaned over [him], and in [his] ears whispered words of 
sweetness, and even as the sea that enfoldeth a brook that runneth down to her, he 
enfolded [him].”60 Purged of absolute authority and of radical and vertical 
transcendence, God no longer signifies a divine Fatherhood nor is He, for Gibran, a 
divine Creator. Rather, God is one’s tomorrow insofar as one is God’s yesterday: this is 
 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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the form that one’s relationship with God now takes. As one’s “aim and fulfilment,” 
that is, one’s Beyond, God names the future as a form of horizontal transcendence that 
is temporally (un)fulfillable. Coming from the future, becoming the impossible future, 
“a future never future enough” to borrow a phrase from Levinas,61 God as such is 
reinvented as a transcendental condition of being qua becoming for the human self. 
After Nietzsche and Darwin – or a certain interpretative horizon that Nietzsche and 
Darwin made possible – Gibran re-imagines God as an ever-evolving desiring force the 
mystical yearning for which has not died. Rather, this mystical yearning, finding its 
roots in Sufi embodied concept of al-shawq, is re-invented in a post-religious fashion. 
This God, furthermore, is not only horizontally transcendent, but spatially immanent as 
well: “And when I descended to the valleys and the plains,” the speaker tells us, “God 
was there also.”62 This “also” means that God is both the tomorrow of the human self – 
God as a horizontal form of transcendence – and that which is “there,” that is, 
everywhere – God as a “visual expression,” Gibran would say, God as immanence.  
The madman, who announces this new relationship with God, is one of many 
other figures in whose name Gibran’s prophetic imagination is articulated. The 
madman, the forerunner, Almustafa (the prophet) and Āmina (the principal Sufi 
character of his one-act play Iram Dhāt al-ʿImād) are Abrahamic post-religious figures 
who name and reclaim the radicality of religion in its fundamental and pre-institutional 
sense of rupture, migration and event. In reclaiming this Abrahamic heritage of 
prophecy in a modern context, these figures name the (im)possibility of repeating 
“religion without religion,”63 as it were, of religion without any theological foundation. 
 
61 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingiss (The 
Hague; London: Nijhoff, 1979), 254.  
62 CWs, 6. [Emphasis added] 
63 That is to say, “a thought-provoking genealogy of the possibility and essence of the religious that 
doesn’t amount to an article of faith… a non-dogmatic doublet of dogma…” Jacques Derrida, The Gift of 
Death & Literature in Secret, trans. David Wills (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 
2008), 50.  
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As my discussion below demonstrates, religion here is restated as a disruptive force that 
seeks to demolish the new idols or masks of modernity. Speaking in the name of these 
prophetic figures, who name an Abrahamic ethical horizon whose universal validity has 
not been exhausted,64 Gibran rejuvenates the prophetic as a powerful poetic and 
aesthetic motif through which the religious and the ethical are radically re-thought in 
and against modernity.  
The madman, residing “outside” the predominant modes of reason, morality, 
identity and value – for the prophetic speaks always from an Outside65 – begins his 
discourse by relating to us how he became a madman: one day he wakes up to find out 
that all his masks, the self-fashioned masks he wore in the past seven lives, were stolen. 
Walking around the crowded streets and looking for the thieves who stole his masks, he 
is identified by “a youth standing in a house-top” as a madman. As soon as he looks up, 
however, “the sun kiss[es] [his] own naked face for the first time.”66 Thus, he discovers 
the nakedness of his face for the first time. Thus he becomes a madman, in that he 
discovers the capacity to belong to himself without any veiling masks, the capacity to 
reside and be “outside” the reigning social institutions of reason and identity: madness 
as event.67 This event is tantamount to what the Sufis call kashf (disclosure) or 
“unconcealment” in the Heideggerian sense of truth as aletheia.68 This event of 
madness, the discovery of the face that exists beneath and beyond all identitarian and 
normative veils, epitomises Gibran’s predominant concern in The Madman: belonging 
to oneself with no prior identifications or designations. In this respect, the “Seventh 
 
64 Meskini, al-Īmān al-Ḥurr, 204.  
65 Blanchot, “Prophetic Speech,” 79-80.  
66 CWs, 5.  
67 See my discussion of Meskini’s insightful reading of the parable in section three of Chapter Four.  
68 This is the ancient Greek word on whose etymology Heidegger draws in his re-thinking of the concept 
of “truth” as “unconcealement.” See Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,” in Pathmarks, ed. William 
MacNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 146.   
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Self” of the madman, reacting against his other six selves that wish to rebel against him 
with a pre-conceived intention and purpose, declares:  
How strange that you all would rebel against this man, because each and every 
one of you has a pre-ordained fate to fulfil. Ah! could I be but one of you, a self 
with a determined lot! But I have none, I am the do-nothing self, the one who 
sits in the dumb, empty nowhere and nowhen, while you are busy re-creating 
life. Is it you or I, neighbours, who should rebel?69   
 
No wonder that the second piece in The Madman is the one in which God is re-
imagined beyond the vertical metaphysics of creation, fatherhood and morality. For 
only a madman, speaking “in the ancient days” and “before many gods were born,” 
could intervene from the “outside” of history, as it were, from below or behind the 
history of the gods of morality, authority and value, to announce the arrival of his own 
God. Retrieving and resuscitating the prophetic as a mode of poetic and ethical 
intervention, this madman is what Fethi Meskini would call an “impossible believer,” 
“the other believer who reinvents the notion of God from within and does not consume 
it from without, nor does s/he borrow it from anyone.”70 The madman, furthermore, is 
one who laughingly buries his “dead selves,”71 and this grave-digging, which is a 
recurring metaphor in Gibran, is the pre-requisite condition to overcome the history and 
concept of “man” – as Nietzsche would say – and create new values. 
This metaphor of grave-digging is usually coupled with the metaphors of the 
night and the tempest, all of which are used by Gibran to designate or announce a new 
mode of thinking, being and dwelling in the world. It is as a poet that Gibran thinks, as a 
post-religious poet for whom the poetic is synonymous with the creative. The creative 
here is understood in the fundamental sense of (self)-creation beyond poetry as an 
aesthetic form.72 This radical poetic thinking usually takes place in the night, the night 
 
69 “The Seven Selves,” CWs. 14-15. [emphasis mine] 
70 Meskini, al-Īmān al-Ḥurr, 204. [emphasis mine] 
71 “The Grave Digger,” CWs, 27. 
72 See “Mustaqbal al-Lugha al-ʿArabiyya [The Future of the Arabic Language],” in CWs in Arabic, 317-
22.   
75 
 
which becomes thought’s condition of possibility and the enabling nothingness where 
the “ghost of the mad god” becomes the thinking horizon of the poet.73 This is the gist 
of Gibran’s short story “the Grave Digger.” In it, the poet is walking alone at night, “in 
the valley of life’s shadow that is lined up with bones and skulls.” Whilst standing “on 
the banks of the river of blood and tears which flows like a speckled serpent …, gazing 
at the nothingness,” the poet is suddenly visited by “a giant, august ghost.”74 Frightened, 
the poet shouts, “what do you want from me?” Whereupon the ghost declares that he 
wants nothing and everything from the poet, that he is “aloneness itself” and that which 
the poet fears and fears to fear, a “double fear,”75 that is, that the poet must confront and 
overcome in order to think. What emerges here is a dialogue between the poet and the 
ghost that essentially revolves around the poet’s name, his job, his marital status and his 
religion. It is the discourse of the giant ghost that makes “the Grave Digger” such a 
powerful piece and a pioneering reflection “through and against nihilism” in modern 
Arab thought.76 The ghost begins by unravelling what lies beneath the name of the poet, 
“Abdallah” (God’s servant). The poet says that this name was given to him by his 
father, to which the ghost responds, “The misfortune of children lies in the gifts of their 
parents, and those who do not deprive themselves from the gifts of their parents and 
ancestors remain slaves to the dead until they die.”77 The ghost, in other words, is laying 
bare that which is concealed by the act of naming itself: the metaphysics of the name 
 
73 CWs in Arabic, 210-13. See also his poem “al-Jabbār al-Riʾbāl” [The Lonely Giant], written in a 
classical metric form, but with a distinct rhyme for each couplet of verses. This giant is another version of 
the mad god of “The Grave Digger”: he is “the shadow of destiny,” “the terrifying death,” “the secret that 
sways between body and soul,” Love itself and, most importantly, the elusive reflection of the poet 
himself: “Concealed, he said: You are I, so do not ask the earth about me or the sky/ And should you wish 
to know who am I, keep your eyes upon the mirror day and night,” declares the giant to the poet before 
disappearing, leaving the poet’s thought wandering in the night. Ibid., 345-46. 
74 Ibid., 210. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Meskini, Falsafat al-Nawābit, 36. Meskini talks about the Arab thinker, not the poet, as far as “The 
Grave Digger” is concerned. His reading, a la Heidegger, is a philosophical reflection that takes poetry as 
that which can open and expand thought’s horizon. For him, the ghost or the mad god is the utmost 
condition of thought itself. My reading, however, places premium on the poet insofar as s/he is a thinking 
poet, for the poet is one who is relating this short allegorical story to us.  
77 CWs in Arabic, 210.  
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that absents the named, the poet himself, by perpetuating the presence of the absent and 
absenting name, which implicitly bears the father’s heritage.78 The possibility of life 
itself, thus, is predicated on the will and courage to say “No” to the father’s gift, a gift 
that creates and necessitates, whether the child is aware of it or not, a feeling of 
indebtedness to the father, a gift that perpetuates the values of the father and thereby 
obscures the creative “Yes” of the child.  
The ghost, then, goes on to devalue the poet’s “job,” which consists in writing 
poetry and poetic prose, by considering it to be “an old, deserted vocation that is neither 
useful nor harmful.”79 When the poet wonders what he could do to be useful to people, 
the ghost urges him to become a “grave digger” so “he could relieve the living from the 
piled corpses of the dead around their houses, courts and temples.”80 In other words, he 
is asking him to bury the dead values of the self, the law and the holy, which he cannot 
see because he looks with a “deluded eye” that “sees people shivering in the tempest of 
life, thinking that they are alive while dead they have been since birth.”81 Which is to 
say that life for them is still lived according to the dead and the values of the dead, not 
according to themselves, still shivering as they are in front of life’s tempest. It is crucial 
to point out that it is not the destruction of the self, the law and the holy that is called for 
here, but the burying of what is dead “around” them, the burying of that which lost the 
ethical, normative and spiritual capacity to orient the living. A new life, therefore, must 
be re-invented and created. The tempest, crucially, is not merely a metaphor of 
destruction, rupture, radical change and transformation. The tempest is life itself in that 
it represents the antithesis of death: “The dead shiver in the tempest, while the living 
march with it running and only halt when it does,”82 declares the ghost. This is the 
 
78 Meskini, Falsafat al-Nawābit, 38-39. 
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thinking destiny of the poet then: to preach life as a relentless tempest, to create the 
possibility of life by digging graves for that which is dead around people’s houses, 
courts and temples, to be and think only as a tempest, which is the condition of being in 
the world insofar as it means thinking it anew and creating it again every time.                 
“What is your religion?” is the last question that the ghost asks. The poet 
answers, “I believe in God, I honour his prophets, I love virtue and I have hope in a 
thereafter.”83 The ghost’s response is worth quoting here:  
You are only saying these words, which were laid out by ancient generations, by 
a mere act of borrowing that placed them upon your lips. The naked truth, 
however, is that you believe only in yourself, you honour none other than it, you 
love nothing save what it desires, and you hope only for its immortality. Man 
has worshipped himself since time immemorial, yet this worshipped self has 
taken on as many names as his wishes and desires: at times he called it Lord or 
Jupiter, at others he called it God.84 
 
With irony, however, he adds, “but how strange are those who worship themselves, and 
their selves are nothing but rancid corpses.”85 This ghost turns out to be the “mad god” 
who, averse to wisdom which he deems a sign of human weakness, is the god of his 
own self, born in every place and in every time. How can such a god – a god who curses 
the sun and the humans, mocks nature and kneels in front of himself and worships it, a 
god who, along with time and the sea, does not sleep but eats the corpses of people, 
drinks their blood and desserts with their gasps86 – be the thinking horizon of the poet? 
How can this thinking horizon, the nocturnal horizon of the tempest, be a positive 
breakthrough for the poet?  
This god, being a mad god, points to the utmost possibility of self-creation in an 
age in which the regnant modes of reason, authority and value are no longer alive. The 
mad god bespeaks a different direction of thought – that is, a different direction of 
reason and not the opposite of reason – that the poet must have the courage and will to 
 
83 Ibid., 212. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid.   
86 Ibid., 213. 
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take: the direction of self-creation that must begin by gravedigging, that is to say, by 
burying his dead selves, laws and values – not the self, the law, and values as such. The 
poet can no longer be a crafter of poetry in this age. The poet must face the nihilism that 
lies behind it and overcome it. The poet must sing life as a tempest that destroys what is 
no longer alive – what is no longer capable of inspiring and orienting a creative life, 
otherwise he will remain a slave to the dead, a mere repetition of the past that is 
embodied in his name, his poetry and his religion, unable to bear the possibility of life 
as a new creation of values. The poet, in other words, must reinvent the possibility of 
life itself. He must reinvent himself, his law and his religion. Thus, unlike the Christian 
god of morality that dies in Nietzsche, Gibran’s god becomes a mad god, the terrible 
thinking horizon in the night of the poet, the madness that can make possible a new kind 
of reason, attained only if the poet overcomes his “double fear” of this radical 
(im)possibility of thinking and being in the world.  
The night itself becomes the madman’s unattainable self-image in “Night and 
the Madman.”87 “I am like three, O, Night,” declares the madman time and again. Yet 
the speaking Night denies him this resemblance and identification, pointing to that 
which he must yet become and/or overcome. For he, the Night reminds him, still looks 
backwards at his own large footsteps, shudders before pain and the terrifying song of 
the abyss, unable as he is to befriend his “monster-self” and become a law unto himself. 
Gibran’s celebration and fascination with the night as a metaphor of overcoming, self-
becoming and – as evinced in his Arabic prose poem “O Night”88 – mystical self-
 
87 CWs, 33-34.  
88 “There I saw you, O Night, and you saw me. You have been, with your enormity, a father to me, and I, 
with my dreams, a son to you. Removed are all the blinds of forms between us and torn are all the veils of 
doubt and conjecture over our faces. Thus, you divulged your secrets to me, and your intentions, and I 
disclosed my wishes to you, and my hopes … You lifted me up to you, placed me upon your shoulders, 
and you taught my eyes to see and my ears to hear and my lips to speak, and you taught my heart to love 
what people hate and to hate what they love. Then you touched my thoughts with your fingers whereupon 
they flowed like a running, chanting river rubbing off the withering grass, and you kissed my soul with 
your lips whereupon it glittered like a burning flame that devoured all the ruins of the earth.” CWs in 
Arabic, 221-22.  
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disclosure, should be located, hermeneutically, in the context of modernity. To be more 
precise, it is against a particular modern regime of reason and identity, where one’s 
personhood is predetermined and plainly demarcated in the light of the modern day, so 
to speak, that the madman conjures up the night as the abyss whose terrifying song the 
moderns are unable to bear and listen to. In the “destitute time” of modernity, as 
Heidegger writes in relation to Hölderlin,89 the abyss of the night – the night as a 
revealing abyss – consists in the unbearable ordeal of giving oneself one’s law and of 
building a throne “upon the heaps of the fallen Gods.”90 The madman, this post-
religious poet, is the one who, building this throne, strives to think the “untamed 
thoughts” of the night and speak its “vast language.”91 This is the poet of destitute times 
who, as Heidegger would say, “attend[s], singing, to the trace of the fugitive gods.”92 
Only in the night of the modern day can one retrieve the vastness of language and the 
abyssal, transformative power of thought, which have been tamed, as Gibran’s powerful 
prose poem ““The Perfect World”” suggests, by modernity’s calculative and 
instrumental reason. The madman is a poet who, against the flattening order of the 
modern day, invokes the night’s immeasurable capacity to reveal space, that is to say, to 
reveal his irreducible and immeasurable soul:93 the soul that cannot be reduced to or 
measured by “recording” and “cataloguing.”94   
In ““The Perfect World”,” the madman laments and castigates the mathematical 
and rationalist order by which human life is preordained, regulated and experienced in 
modernity. What is initially intriguing here is that the madman’s discourse is addressed 
to “the God of lost souls … who [is] lost amongst the gods.”95 What are these gods? 
 
89 “In the age of the world’s night, the abyss of the world must be experienced and endured.” Heidegger, 
Poetry, 92.  
90 CWs, 34.  
91 Ibid., 35. 
92 Heidegger, Poetry, 94.  
93 CWs, 35. 
94 Ibid., 47. 
95 Ibid. 
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And why is God lost amongst these gods? “Hear me,” the madman says to this “Gentle 
Destiny that watchest over us, mad, wandering spirits.”96 “Hear me”: thus is addressed 
God in the modern times, thus addresses the madman, who “dwell[s] in the midst of a 
perfect race, [he] the most imperfect,” his lost God. The madman, the post-religious 
poet, is the one who addresses God amidst the proliferation of the gods, the new idols of 
modernity: order, perfection and calculative reason. In other words, God becomes the 
addressee of the post-religious poet, the madman who speaks from the Outside, who is 
an outsider to this “perfect world,” the regulated world of the moderns. Because this 
poet is aware of the abundance of the new, secular gods of modernity, following which 
this “perfect race” dwells in the world, he has no addressee but God, who, albeit lost 
amongst those gods, can still be addressed. Yet God can still be addressed insofar as He, 
in these destitute times, can only be addressed. Prophetic speech, as reclaimed by this 
post-religious poet, is addressed to God, not the other way around. Prophetic speech, to 
put it differently, no longer comes from the Outside, but speaks to the Outside in that it 
is – and can only be – a summoning of the trace of this Outside. “Hear me,” says the 
madman to “the God of lost souls”:  
I, a human chaos, a nebula of confused elements, I move amongst finished 
worlds – peoples of complete laws and pure order, whose thoughts are assorted, 
whose dreams are arranged, and whose visions are enrolled and registered. 
Their virtues, O God, are measured, their sins are weighed, and even the 
countless things that pass in the dim twilight of neither sin nor virtue are 
recorded and catalogued. 
Here days and nights are divided into seasons of conduct and governed by rules 
of blameless accuracy. 
…. 
It is a perfect world, a world of consummate excellence, a world of supreme 
wonders, the ripest fruit in God’s garden, the master-thought of the universe.97 
 
The madman’s speech betrays an acute disillusionment with what Heidegger calls 
Gestell, the (en)framing that structures modern technological Being.98 This calculative 
 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 See Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (London; New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 3-35.  
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and technological regulation of modern life erases any empowering possibility of 
imperfection, being the essential condition for Life as a “never-finished building.”99 For 
to be human, Gibran firmly believes, is to long insatiably for a Greater Self – at once 
desiring more of the self and striving to go beyond it. To long presupposes 
imperfection, an enabling imperfection, because perfection, according to him, is nothing 
but a limitation. This is not solely reflective of the primordial longing that defines the 
human as a potentiality that lies ahead – a longing for “the Greater Sea” that always lies 
beyond the other seas, the absolute desiring Other.100 It concerns the fundamental 
manner of dwelling in the world: one cannot dwell perfectly; one can truly dwell, to 
draw on Heidegger again, insofar as one dwells poetically, poetry here being that 
dwelling which lets dwelling itself be,101 an opening up of Being that cannot frame or 
measure (in calculative terms).102  
The madman, this outsider who, being an outsider, speaks to the Outside, ends 
his speech with a rhetorical question that announces the impossible character of being in 
the modern, “perfect world”: “But why should I be here, O God, I a green seed of 
unfulfilled passion, a mad tempest that seeketh neither east nor west, a bewildered 
fragment from a burnt planet? Why am I here, O God of lost souls, thou who art lost 
amongst the gods?”103 God becomes, in this “perfect world,” the addressee – and the 
sole addressee – of the post-religious poet. Albeit lost amongst the many new gods that 
emerged in the modern world, God is invoked as a trace of an Outside that could be 
reached by way of questioning. This questioning is much more than rhetorical. It points 
to the fundamental question of being itself: the mode of being that befits the human in 
 
99 This is Mary Haskell’s phrase, in a reply to a letter of Gibran. MH journal. Feb. 2, 1915. 
100 “The Greater Sea,” CWs, 37-38. 
101 Heidegger, Poetry, 215. 
102 Let us remember that the word “verse” in Arabic – in the sense of poetic verse – is bayt, a word that 
also means a house or a dwelling. One reads poetry – one experiences the poetic – by inhabiting it, so to 
speak.  
103 CWs, 48. 
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this modern world where everything, as the madman bitterly points out, is pre-
determined, arranged, demarcated, pigeonholed, catalogued, recorded and numbered. 
This God, who can only be addressed, is the trace of the Outside whose invocation aims 
to question and disrupt this modern mode of being. This interrogatory invocation 
beckons to that which lies outside these “finished worlds,” to a world where one can 
never be reduced to a calculative, rationalist order in which the irreducible, inaccessible 
and incalculable essence of being human is eclipsed, even erased. This essence, lost 
with the abundant emergence of the new idols of modernity, is still recoverable and, 
therefore, must be recovered. It is the post-religious poet who attends to the retrieval of 
this essence, of that which remains ungraspable and unknowable as such – and in this 
sense transcendent – in the human being. This poetic retrieval – for only poetry can 
retrieve the ungraspable and sing it – is possible by way of invoking the lost trace of 
God insofar as it allows for a mode of being and dwelling in the world that is beyond 
calculation and “pure order.”  
The madman, this “impossible prophet”104 who must become a law unto himself, 
also sets out to reclaim and reinvent “crucifixion” as a necessary condition for an 
“exaltedness” without atonement. By dissociating the name from the named, or the 
signifier from the signified, Gibran attempts to re-activate the radical, disruptive force 
of religion itself – a religion that announces itself only by, as it were, effacing itself – 
such that its name or the names that point towards it are taken beyond the history of 
meaning, value and authority that saturate them. Thus, crucifixion, stripped of its 
essential meaning in Christianity, that is, of the elements of sin and retribution that lend 
it its Christian particularity, is transformed into a metaphor of overcoming divorced 
from any discourse of good and evil or reward and punishment: 
 I cried to men, “I would be crucified!” 
 And they said, “Why should your blood be upon our heads?! 
 
104 Meskini, “al-Nabiyy al-Mustaḥīl [The Impossible Prophet]” in al-Īmān al-Ḥurr, 381-410.  
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 And I answered, “How else shall you be exalted except by crucifying madmen? 
 and they heeded and I was crucified. And the crucifixion appeased me.105 
 
Crucifixion becomes a metaphor of re-birth and self-creation, beyond original sin and 
salvation. This is another element that places Gibran in proximity with – because 
thinking after – Nietzsche, who “had at times signed himself “Dionysus” and at others 
“Der Gekreuzigte [“The Crucified One”], likewise extending these aliases beyond good 
and evil.”106 The smiling madman, arousing the perplexity of the crowd who is unable 
to fathom out this act of crucifixion, asserts, 
“Remember only that I smile. I do not atone – nor sacrifice – nor wish for glory; 
and I have nothing to forgive. I thirsted – and I besought you to give my blood 
to drink. For what is there to quench a madman’s thirst but his own blood? I was 
dumb – and I asked wounds of you for mouths. I was imprisoned in your days 
and nights – and I sought a door into larger days and nights. 
“And now I go – as others already crucified have gone. And think not we are 
weary of crucifixion. For we must be crucified by larger and larger men, 
between greater earths and greater heavens.”107  
 
This motif, that of seeking “larger” and “greater” selves, will feature again and again in 
Gibran’s writings. It is not difficult to discern in this longing for a Greater Self the 
Nietzschean echoes of overcoming as redemption: “To redeem those who lived in the 
past and to recreate all ‘it was’ into a “thus I willed it’ – that alone should I call 
redemption,”108 says Zarathustra. Gibran’s specificity here lies in reclaiming crucifixion 
as an act of self-redemption delinked from the discourse of good and evil and the after-
world eschatology of reward and punishment, from any messianism except that of the 
larger self of this world, of this Life. Like grave-digging – burying that which is dead 
but still directing the being of the self – crucifixion is reconfigured as a post-religious 
metaphor of tireless self-fashioning, whose horizon is the future of the self as a Greater 
Self. This crucifixion does not need any transcendent vertical morality that bestows 
 
105 CWs, 39. 
106 Raymond Schwab, “The Iran of Nietzsche,” in The Oriental Renaissance, trans. Gene Patterson-Black 
and Victor Reinking (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 346.  
107 CWs, 39.  
108 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 139.  
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meaning on it and accord it a certain teleology. It is rather turned into a Nietzschean 
“thus I willed it,” so to speak, but without any Nietzschean resentment towards 
Christianity.109  
3. The Greater Self, or the Prophetic as the Impossible  
The Greater Self, which is sought by the self-crucified madman, is prophetically 
celebrated in the “The Forerunner” as a “giant-self” that one builds towers for its 
foundation, until it becomes itself a foundation: “Always have we been our own 
forerunners, and always shall we be. And all that we have gathered and shall gather 
shall be but seeds for fields yet unploughed. We are the fields and the ploughmen, the 
gatherers and the gathered.”110 The forerunner’s self is re-cast as a beginning whose 
destination – that which it yearns for – will become itself a beginning. This ontological 
conception of the self implies a fundamental infinitude, an essential unendingness to its 
quest of becoming: Being is becoming, and vice versa. This embrace of beginning is 
posited against the notion of “origin.” The forerunner is a beginning without origin. Yet 
even when Gibran breaks with the Abrahamic story of creation (creatio ex nihilo) – in 
its three different versions in Judaism, Christianity and Islam – a trace of this narrative, 
as interpreted by Ibn Arabi, can still be discerned here, a secularized trace that is 
inevitably ambiguous:  
When you were a wandering desire in the mist, I too was there, a wandering 
desire … And when you were a silent word upon Life’s quivering lips, I too was 
there, another silent word. Then Life uttered us and we came down the years 
throbbing with memories of yesterday and with longing for tomorrow, for 
yesterday was death conquered and tomorrow a birth pursued.111 
 
Gibran uses Life in the sense of Being, through whose “quivering lips” one is “uttered” 
into existence. Life, in other words, is the force that lets beings be and enables their 
 
109 Paul Ricoeur notes that “[Nietzsche’s] aggression towards Christianity remains caught up in the 
attitude of resentment … Nietzsche’s work remains an accusation of accusation and hence falls short of a 
pure affirmation of Life.” Ricoeur, “Religion, Atheism, and Faith,” 447.  
110 CWs, 53. 
111 Ibid. 
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presence. But being a silent word that awaits Life’s utterance presupposes what Ibn 
Arabi calls the “eternal individuality”112 of the self. In one of his early Arabic pieces of 
poetic prose, “The Hymn of Man,” Gibran writes, “I Was, from before time!/ And, 
behold me now, I AM! And I SHALL BE [sic] till the end of time! And my being shall 
be without end!”113 This piece, interestingly, begins with a quote from the Qur’an: “and 
you were dead and He [Allah] gave you life, then He shall make you dead, then He shall 
give you life, then unto Him you shall be returned.”114 The Qur’anic verse 
notwithstanding, Gibran dissociates this eternal individuality of the self from the 
metaphysics of creation. What we observe in the “The Forerunner,” however, is 
something similar to – yet by no means as sophisticated as – the notion of “genesis” in 
Ibn Arabi, which is not exactly a creatio ex nihilo but a complex “process of increasing 
illumination, gradually raising the possibilities eternally latent in the original Divine 
Being to a state of luminescence.”115 All beings, that is, exist as possible or latent beings 
[mumkināt] in God’s eternal knowledge; their coming into actual existence lies in their 
being revealed or manifested, and not in being stricto senso created from nothingness.  
This notion of manifestness is one that frequently recurs in Gibran, but without 
reference to God as Creator or to any metaphysics of creation. It is rather articulated 
through the image of the Mist, the primordial Mist which is the ground of all beings: 
“Life, and all that lives, is conceived in the Mist and not in the crystal.”116The Mist is 
therefore Life in its hiddenness, not manifestness. It articulates the fundamental 
ambiguous space at the heart of Being, that from which all beings as “wandering 
desires” emerge or manifest themselves – since desire for him is “the inherent power 
 
112 Henry Corbin, Alone with the Alone: Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn Arabi (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), 173. 
113 Kahlil Gibran: An Illustrated Anthology, 157.  
114 The Koran Interpreted, trans. A. J. Arberry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 2:26.  
115 Corbin, Alone, 217.  
116 CWs, 159.  
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that changes all things [and] the law of all matter and all life”117 – and to which they 
shall also return as Almustafa says in The Garden of the Prophet: “O Mist, my sister, 
white breath not yet held in a mould,/ I return to You, a breath white and voiceless, a 
word not yet uttered.”118This image, thus, is not merely figural. It is central to Gibran’s 
reinvention of the self and the world. Its particularity, being at once phenomenal and 
symbolic, is strangely reminiscent of the ontological status accorded to “the creative 
Active Imagination” in the metaphysics of Ibn Arabi, “the Primordial Cloud” exhaled 
by the Divine Breathing (Nafas al-Raḥmān), which “receives all forms and at the same 
time gives beings their forms.”119 Yet, while for Ibn Arabi this Primordial Cloud – 
which is at once hidden in the Creator (bāṭin) and revealed as creature (ẓāhir), or the 
“Creator-Creature”120 – is inseparable from the Divine Being, for Gibran the Mist is 
devoid of any metaphysical conceptual density or narrative of creation. The Mist 
becomes a post-religious name of God that alludes to Him without naming Him, 
because it – the Mist – still carries the Abrahamic structural signification that the name 
of God evokes: that from which one emerges or is revealed into Life and to which one 
returns until Life’s second day. The Mist for Gibran becomes the destiny of the self that 
renders it once more a beginning: the “greater freedom” of the self.121 As such, it is the 
necessary transition from one life to another, the passage to another reincarnation:  
O Mist, my sister, my sister Mist,  
I am one with you now.  
No longer am I a self.  
The walls have fallen,  
And the chains have broken; 
I rise to you, a mist, 
And together we shall float upon the sea until life’s second day,  
When dawn shall lay you, dewdrops in a garden, 
And me a babe upon the breast of a woman.122  
 
 
117 KG to MH, Jan. 30, 1916.  
118 CWs, 556. 
119 Corbin, Alone, 185. [emphasis added] 
120 Ibid, 186. 
121 CWs, 517-18.  
122 Ibid., 557. 
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In a worldview where the Abrahamic afterworld (the eschatological narrative of 
the judgment day, heaven and hell and so on) is abandoned, death remains a passage but 
to another life; and one does not die but returns to the primordial Mist. Drawing on the 
Sufi tradition and breaking with its dense metaphysics of creation, Gibran’s vision is 
aesthetically creative but metaphysically and ontologically weak, for the Mist remains 
an ambiguous image with no specific content save its fogginess – in the literal and 
figural sense. The death of the moral and vertical god of Abrahamic metaphysics gives 
way to an empty space filled only by the Mist, the promise of “our greater freedom”123 
and of the mystical union with a post-religious God who no longer bears (to bear) his 
name – the image of the Mist repeats the possibility of God without God, so to speak. 
This is, perhaps, what a prophetic post-religious poet – this preacher of Life – can offer 
us in the destitute times of modernity.     
The faith of this post-religious poet, however, even after reinventing his 
Abrahamic God, remains essentially Abrahamic. In his parable “The Two Learned 
Men,” the madman casts his irony over the futility of rationally debating the existence 
of the gods. We are told that two men, “who hated and belittled each other’s learning,” 
met one day in the marketplace and argued for hours “about the existence and non-
existence of the gods.” In the evening, “the unbeliever [amongst the two learned men] 
went to the temple and prostrated himself before the altar and prayed the gods to forgive 
his wayward past,” whereas the other learned man, “the believer,” “burned his sacred 
books” and became an unbeliever.124 The madman suggests that a rationally validated or 
nullified faith is a false and untenable kind of faith, for what matters here is not the 
actual existence or non-existence of the gods and whether their existence can be proved 
or refuted with rational arguments. Rather, faith as such is an experience of the 
 
123 “Did I not speak of freedom, and of the mist which is our greater freedom?” Ibid., 518.  
124 Ibid., 44.  
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visionary imagination – what Gibran calls “the Eye”125 or al-baṣīra – that goes beyond 
this mode of reason in that it is located on a supra-rational level of human experience. 
This experience is not reducible to statements or arguments that correspond (or not) to 
certain “objective” facts in the outside world. It is, as he writes in The Forerunner, a 
“skyward” movement of a bird rising out of the forerunner’s “deeper heart” and growing 
higher and larger – “at first it was but like a swallow, then a lark, then an eagle, then as 
vast as a spring cloud”126 – eventually filling “the starry heavens,” without, however, 
leaving his heart. This paradoxical movement is one that the forerunner, another name 
of the Gibranian post-religious poet, describes in these terms, yet without referring 
explicitly to “God”:  
Out of my heart a bird flew skywards. And it waxed larger as it flew. Yet it left 
not my heart. 
O my faith, my untamed knowledge, how shall I fly to your height and see with 
you man’s larger self pencilled upon the sky?  
How shall I turn this sea within me into mist, and move with you in space 
immeasurable?  
How can a prisoner within the temple behold its golden domes? 
How shall the heart of a fruit be stretched to envelop the fruit also?127  
 
This paradoxical movement is the movement of faith, and it is one that simultaneously 
bewilders and frustrates, perplexes and stupefies, going beyond the heart without 
leaving it. This faith cannot be a lazy answer but is lived as a paradoxical movement 
that generates questions. This is the kind of faith that can be solely experienced, to 
invoke Ibn Arabi, as “neither/nor” or “both/and,”128 one that is irreducible to the Greek 
rationalist principle of the excluded middle – which does not mean it is “irrational.” In 
other words, this faith, even in its post-religious configuration, remains at bottom 
 
125 Ibid., 43. 
126 Ibid., 73. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 71-72. 
89 
 
Abrahamic, since it can only happen “by virtue of the absurd.”129 Gibran, pursuing this 
Abrahamic legacy, was aware of this fundamental and necessary paradox of faith.  
This faith, nevertheless, is no longer directed towards the Abrahamic, moral God 
whose authority revolves around accusation, consolation, condemnation and 
protection.130 It is a post-religious faith that entails breaking with the form of religion 
that is based on prohibition and punishment,131 yet not with religion as such. This faith, 
Paul Ricoeur argues, is still possible after the death of ontotheology’s god:  
Only a preacher, or, I should say, a prophetic preacher, with the power and 
freedom of  Nietzsche’s Zarathustra would be able to make a radical return to 
the origins of Jewish and Christian [I would say Abrahamic] faith and, at the 
same time, make of this return an event which speaks to our own time. Such 
preaching would be both originary and post-religious.132   
 
Ricoeur’s emphasis on a “radical return” to the “Judeo-Christian” tradition is perhaps 
understandable given the European intellectual context in which he speaks. This 
European Judeo-Christian element remains, nevertheless, an implicit identitarian 
component incompatible with the universality of the (post)-religious. Gibran, however, 
could be said to represent that modern Abrahamic figure who draws from both 
Christianity and Islam in a way that universally reinvents the religious, disrupting any 
discursive divides across real and symbolic geography (Euro-America and the Arab 
East). His Almustafa is a prophetic post-religious preacher of Life who “would speak 
only of freedom but would never utter a word of prohibition and condemnation.”133 This 
 
129 Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Sylvia Walsh (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 39-42. Kierkegaard’s fascinating reading of the Abrahamic story of sacrifice offers us a 
remarkable way of understanding Abrahamic faith as such, which he describes as the impossible 
movement of faith.  
130 Ricoeur, “Religion, Atheism, and Faith,” 445. In this essay, Ricoeur dwells on the dialectic of religion 
and faith that is mediated by a “liberating and destructive” atheism. He discusses the themes of religious 
accusation and consolation and the death of the moral God of Christianity (with reference to Nietzsche’s 
and Freud’s hermeneutics of suspicion), going on to posit the possibility of a post-religious faith that goes 
beyond accusation and protection. His insights, albeit informed by a European “Judeo-Christian” 
conception of religion, are very pertinent and illuminating as far as Gibran’s post-religious enterprise is 
concerned here.  
131 Ibid., 442. 
132 Ibid., 447-48.   
133 Ibid., 448. 
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freedom goes beyond the confines of an a priori belonging to a particular tradition, as 
implied in Ricoeur, for Gibran writes in English as an Arab writer and reinvents Islamic 
and Christian concepts by reclaiming them beyond their discursive and cultural 
contours, and this important particularity has been obfuscated by the appropriative 
reception of his work as “Oriental spirituality” in Euro-America.134  
Almustafa, whose name is the most prophetic amongst Gibran’s post-religious 
figures,135 would go as far as announcing an impossible dwelling in the world. This 
impossibility has been readily interpreted as idealism. Yet an Abrahamic, post-religious 
prophet cannot be a realist. He must herald, he must preach the impossible as the 
ultimate possibility of freedom. Let us attend to his words:  
At the city gate and by your fireside I have seen you prostrate yourself and 
worship   your own freedom, … 
And my heart bled within me; for you can only be free when even the desire of 
seeking freedom becomes a harness to you, and when you cease to speak of 
freedom as a goal and fulfilment.  
… 
And how shall you rise beyond your days and nights unless you break the chains 
which you at the dawn of your understanding have fastened around your noon 
hour? 
In truth that which you call freedom is the strongest of these chains, though its 
links glitter in the sun and dazzle your eyes.136  
 
Only a radical freedom that tirelessly questions itself as it enacts itself can combat its 
modern fetishization and trivialization. Almustafa is drawing attention to the conditions 
of freedom rather than freedom itself. For freedom not to turn into “a yoke” and “a 
handcuff” worn by the “freest among you,” these conditions must be radically and 
constantly interrogated and unchained, to use his metaphor. That is to say, alertness to 
the conditions of freedom is the primary condition of freedom as such, what he calls 
“greater freedom.” The latter remains a deferred possibility and can never be an attained 
 
134 See Chapter Four. 
135 Almustafa, meaning “the chosen one,” is one of the attributes of prophet Muhammad. This reclamation 
of the name attests to a vision that does not merely break with the past but aims to reinvent it in the 
context of the present.  
136 CWs, 127. 
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actuality; it is realized insofar as it is hopelessly yearned for, a yearning whose 
hopelessness lies in relentless self-interrogation. Like faith, freedom is experienced as a 
paradox, at once a chain and a breaking-free from the chain, an impossible movement 
whose condition of possibility is the persistent awareness of this very paradox. For it 
must never turn, Almustafa suggests, into a doctrine or an idol that people worship, into 
something other than itself, in allusion to its idolization and instrumentalization in 
modern politics.     
The qualifier “greater” is much more than a qualifier here; it represents the 
kernel of Gibran’s thought: conquering oneself constantly, slaying one’s “burdened 
selves”137 in longing to attain larger and freer selves, themselves the premise of yet 
larger and freer selves: “And what is it but fragments of your own self you would 
discard that you may become free.”138 The passage ends by pointing out, in a charming 
poetic style, that the dialectical relationship between freedom and greater freedom is 
characteristic of “all things [which] move within your being in constant half embrace, 
the desired and the dreaded, the repugnant and the cherished, the pursued and that which 
you would escape.”139 This post-religious poet articulates his idea by resorting to the 
image of light/shadow:  
These things move within you as lights and shadows in pairs that cling.   
And when the shadow fades and is no more, the light that lingers becomes a 
shadow to another light. 
And thus your freedom when it loses its fetters becomes itself the fetter of a 
greater freedom.140  
 
Thus spoke Almustafa, preaching the always already “not yet”141 of one’s freedom, its 
utmost potentiality that should not be confused with an “ideal freedom.” Prophetic 
speech does not preach ideals: it points to that horizontal space beyond the self that 
 
137 “Beyond My Solitude,” CWs, 86.  
138 CWs, 127.  
139 Ibid., 128 
140 Ibid. 
141 I borrow this phrase from Levinas, who uses it to describe the insatiability of the primordial strive 
towards un unnameable Beyond. See Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 254, 256.  
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should be the condition of its being and dwelling in the world. Prophetic speech 
radically questions the present and its conditions, shaking it up by pronouncing and 
heralding an impossible future. This is what The Prophet, in its twenty-six passages, is 
fundamentally announcing.  
The “positive ontology”142 of The Prophet resides in a vision that de-
transcendentalizes ethics, that is to say, that divorces ethics from the sphere of morality 
and the horizon of reward and punishment. Almustafa, in this respect, could be 
described as what Nietzsche’s Zarathustra calls “an esteemer,” one who gives himself 
his own good and evil and creates his own values.143 The Prophet, seen from this 
perspective, is a logical sequel to The Tempests, The Madman and The Forerunner, 
whose parables and prose poems radically place into question so many old values by 
way of laying bare the inherent contradictions that inhabit them. In those works, one 
discerns a glimpse of the post-religious poet’s capacity to reclaim and reinvent the 
religious and create his own values. Yet it is in The Prophet that this post-religious poet 
fully assumes this prophetic role of value-creation, now that the destructive forces of 
grave-digging and the slaying of one’s burdened selves have been exhausted in the 
discourses of the poet’s mad god, the madman and the forerunner. In other words, there 
is no discontinuity here. To be thinking fruitfully as a poet in the horizon of thought that 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra made possible, means that one not only annihilates but creates 
values. And Gibran does so, as we have seen, with no vengeance or resentment against 
the god of morality or theology – who either goes mad or dies quietly without anyone 
reporting the news, so to speak – because the notion of God itself does not die but is 
reinvented as a horizontal form of transcendence whose name is the greater, larger and 
 
142 “Our critique of metaphysics and its search of rational reconciliation must give way to a positive 
ontology, beyond resentment and accusation. Such a positive ontology consists in an entirely nonethical 
vision, or what Nietzsche described as “the innocence of becoming” (die Unschuld des Werdens). The 
latter is another name for “beyond good and evil.” Of course, this kind of ontology can never become 
dogmatic, or it will risk falling under its own criticisms.” Ricoeur, “Religion, Atheism, and Faith,” 457.  
143 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 59. 
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freer self. What further distinguishes The Prophet is that there is no antipathy towards 
the “last men” or “the herd” that Zarathustra loathes. For Almustafa is not Zarathustra, 
albeit thinking with and after him. Almustafa, rather, celebrates Life insofar as it is a 
“longing for your giant self [wherein] lies your goodness: and that longing is in all of 
you.”144 
Almustafa, moreover, reclaims “religion” as “all deeds and all reflection,” 
conceiving of it in “your daily life” where “you take with you your all.”145 In other 
words, he is re-naming religion by un-naming it, as it were: un-naming religion insofar 
as it represents, on the one hand, a differentiated social sphere – in a presumably secular 
society – and insofar as it refers, on the other, to a theologico-political community – al-
milla, not religion146 – where morality is vertically imposed.147 This un-naming of 
religion by worlding148 it beyond the modern secular-religious binary does not mean 
that it loses its transcendental particularity, for it is also “that which is neither deed nor 
reflection, but a wonder and a surprise springing in the soul, even while the hands hew 
the stone or tend the loom.”149 This wonder and surprise of the soul is that 
transcendental element of the religious which is horizontally experienced in one’s daily 
life, that which remains, that is, transcendental about the religious – the perplexity of 
faith. As a horizontal kind of transcendence, it is one that springs from the soul and does 
not necessarily refer to a transcendent realm that commands, from above, the being of 
the religious self. This is what Meskini has recently called “free faith,” which 
 
144 CWs, 140.  
145 Ibid., 148. 
146 Meskini, al-Īmān al-Ḥurr, 189-91.  
147 “He who wears his morality but as his best garment were better naked./ The wind and the sun will tear 
no holes in his skin./ And he who defines his conduct by ethics imprisons his songbird in a cage./ The 
freest song comes not through bars and wires./ And to whom worshipping is a window, to open but also 
to shut, has not yet visited the house of his soul whose windows are from dawn to dawn.” CWs, 148.  
148 I am drawing on the Arabic words dunya, which means world, and more precisely, the opposite of the 
after-world (al-ākhira) and dīn (religion), to which it is usually used in contrast, such that the worlding of 
religion would entail an understanding of dīn without an after-world, one that would accommodate dunya 
without being synonymous with or radically transcendent from it. 
149 CWs, 148. [emphasis added] 
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“expresses an ancient actuality that pertains to the Abrahamic experiences of the holy: 
that faith, unlike pagan belief, is the art of acquiring the space of transcendence that 
exists in the crux of the self’s relationship to itself.”150 Almustafa, un-naming and 
renaming religion, is preaching this (im)possibility of free faith by re-orienting the 
transcendental experience.   
The de-transcendentalizing of ethics is most apparent in Almustafa’s discourse 
on giving. Preaching Life as giving, Almustafa dissociates giving from the authority of 
the giver, much the same way he dissociates God from the absolute authority of vertical 
transcendence. The ethical here is severed from any transcendental moral discourse. The 
ethical as such becomes, paradoxically, a non-ethical mode of being that consists in 
giving as being or being as giving. Almustafa, in response to a rich a man who asked 
him to “speak to us of Giving,” begins by foregrounding self-giving as authentic giving: 
“It is when you give of yourself that you truly give.”151 He then proceeds to declare that 
“those have little and give it all” are “believers in life and the bounty of life.”152 Yet, 
most importantly, he asserts: 
There are those who give and know not pain in giving, nor do they seek joy, nor 
give      
with mindfulness of virtue; 
They give as in yonder valley the myrtle breathes its fragrance into space. 
Through the hands of such as these God speaks, and from behind their eyes  
He smiles upon the earth.153 
 
This is giving in its impossible embodiment, or, to draw on Derrida, the gift as the 
impossible,154 in that it is possible as a gift, paradoxically, only when the giver ceases to 
 
150 Meskini, al-Īmān al-Ḥurr, 21.  
151 CWs, 109. 
152 Ibid.  
153 Ibid.  
154 “If there is a gift, the given of the gift (that which one gives, that which is given, the gift as given thing 
or an act of donation) must not come back to the giving (let us not already say to the subject, to the 
donor). It must not circulate, it must not be exchanged, it must not in any case be exhausted as a gift, by 
the process of exchange, by the movement of the circulation of the circle in the form of return to the point 
of departure …. It is perhaps in this sense that the gift is the impossible.” Derrida, Giving Time: I. 
Counterfeit Money, tr. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 7. 
[emphasis in the original] 
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be a source of giving, when the giver is not recognized as giver and the given or the gift 
are not identified as gift: “See first that you yourself deserve to be giver, and an 
instrument of giving. For in truth it is life that gives unto life–while you, who deem 
yourself a giver, are but a witness,”155 writes Gibran. No giver means no authority – the 
authority of the subject who gives – and the centrality of this giving subject is de-
centred here, as the giver becomes merely an instrument of giving, a sort of 
Heideggerian “clearing” through which Life as bountiful Giving manifests itself. In 
other words, the ethical as such is conceived beyond any circuit of exchange, beyond 
any transcendental discourse of good and evil and reward and punishment. The ethical 
becomes ontological – to give is to be insofar as being is living. This prophetic speech is 
thereby announcing an impossible ethicality, one that can only enact itself by effacing 
itself: “They give as in yonder valley the myrtle breathes its fragrance into space.” In 
this configuration, God speaks through the hands of those who give unmindful of virtue. 
Which is to say that one does not ask God to be: God is the giving itself. God does not 
command but manifests Himself in and as impossible giving: God is giving as such. 
This view of giving is strikingly reminiscent of Ibn Arabi’s equation of giving with 
Being: “ʿan al-jūd ṣadr al-wujūd [in bountiful giving (al-jūd) lies the essence of Being 
(al-wujūd)],” he famously wrote.156 Almustafa, echoing Ibn Arabi, affirms that the 
essence of Life/Being is giving: “You often say, “I would give, but only to the 
deserving.”/ The trees in your orchard say not so, nor the flocks in your pasture./ They 
give that they may live, for to withhold is to perish.”157  
            Yet Almustafa goes as far as reversing the logic of giving and receiving, because 
“you are all receivers,” emphasizing the “courage and confidence, nay the charity, of 
 
155 CWs, 110. [emphasis added] 
156 Muhy al-Din Ibn Arabi, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya [The Meccan Openings] vol 3, ed. Ahmad Shams al-
Din (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1999), 268-69. 
157 CWs, 110. [emphasis added] 
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receiving.”158 Gibran shifts attention from the giver, from the possible hostility and 
oppression of the giver – his/her self-consciousness as a giver – to the impossible 
hospitality (openness) of the receiver (being a host) towards the incomprehensibly 
bountiful Other that is Life. “Assume no weight of gratitude, lest you lay a yoke upon 
yourself and upon him who gives,”159 says Almustafa, preaching the impersonality of 
Life as the source of all personal giving, preaching, that is, the self-effacement of the 
ethical subject if it is to be truly ethical. It is the prophetic nature of this speech that 
makes possible the announcement of this impossible ethicality.  
             The impossibility of this prophetic vision lies also in the unhomeliness it 
preaches. This unhomeliness does not imply alienation, nor does it suggest what Freud 
calls the Unheimlich (the uncanny).160 Rather, it designates a necessary detachment 
from place, familiarity, repetition, habit, sameness and limitation, emphasizing the 
spiritual as the imaginative horizon that allows for a mode of dwelling that shakes any 
stable relationship with place. This unhomeliness, the condition of a dwelling that 
attends to space rather than place, is essentially prophetic. As Blanchot points out: 
“Prophetic speech is a wandering speech that returns to the original demand of 
movement by opposing all stillness, all settling, any taking root that would be rest.”161 
The spiritual is that which names this movement. As such, it should not be understood 
as the antithesis of the earthly or the bodily. The spiritual, for Gibran, names the unity 
of Being/Life, the unity of body and soul, the unity of sight (al-baṣar) and insight (al-
baṣīra). It names the disclosure of Being in this Life and in this world. The word 
 
158 This resonates with Gibran’s Arabic piece of poetic prose “How Bountiful is Life [Mā Akrama al- 
Ḥayāt],” in which he poignantly exalts the incomprehensible bounty of Life and laments his incapacity to 
be comprehensively receptive of and attentive to its magnitude. See CWs in Arabic O, 35-39.  
159 CWs, 110. 
160 “The uncanny is that class of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long 
familiar.” Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works Volume XVII, trans. Alix Strachey et al. (New York: Norton, 1961), 220. 
161 Blanchot, “Prophetic Speech,” 79.  
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“spiritual” does not occur in Gibran’s English works162; it does, however, in his Arabic 
writings, and particularly in his one-act play Iram Dhāt al-ʿImād (Iram, City of Lofty 
Pillars), published in 1921. The title of the play is taken from the Qur’an, in which it is 
described as a city the like of which was never created,163 to signify a place or, rather, a 
space of spiritual disclosure. My reflections on the spiritual here, which is reclaimed 
beyond any facile connotation of it, are primarily based on this play. 
            The main character of Iram Dhāt al-ʿImād, Āmina al-ʿAlawiyya, a name whose 
Islamic resonance is unmistakable,164 is a female spiritual figure whom Najeeb, the 
Lebanese writer, is searching for and seeking her knowledge. That this Sufi figure is a 
female should not go unnoticed. Āmina is a prophetic figure that has attained the 
knowledge – in the sense of gnosis – that her father, who “was the imam of his time in 
spiritual and esoteric matters,”165 did not. That is, her “gender” does not matter here, 
and the masculinist monopoly of knowledge production and attainment is tacitly 
destroyed and overcome – let us remember that the play, published in 1921, is set in 
1883. Zain al-ʿĀbidīn of Nahavand, the Persian character who is known as the Sufi, 
tells Najeeb that when Āmina turned twenty-five, she set out with her father to Mecca to 
fulfil the duty of pilgrimage. On their way, however, her father caught a fever and 
passed away. Āmina buried him on a foot of a mountain and stayed by his grave for 
 
162 “Spirit,” however, does occur. My point is that Gibran never expounds on the spiritual and never 
mentions the word “spirituality” in his English-language writings, the name under whose rubric these 
writings have been mostly received in Euro-America. He rather speaks about the greater, larger and giant 
self, and does not separate body and soul.  
163 “Hast thou not seen how thy Lord did with Ad, Iram of the pillars, the like of which was never created 
in the land.” The Koran Interpreted, 89:7-9. In a short prologue to the play, Gibran cites the 
aforementioned verse from the Qur’an, a Hadith (saying) believed to be Prophet Muhammad’s –
“yadkhuluhā baʿḍu ummatī [some of my people shall enter it]” and a long quote that describes the 
fabulous process of constructing the city of Iram, taken from Siyasatnama [the Book of Government], 
known in Arabic as Siyar al-Mulūk [The Lives of Kings], by the eleventh century Persian scholar Nizam 
al-Mulk. In the Qur’an, Iram, believed to have been located the southern part of the Arab peninsula, is the 
magnificent city of the people of Ad and their prophet Hud. Gibran, however, makes of Iram a city or a 
space of Sufi disclosure or gnosis. In other words, he is reinventing the meaning of Iram in the light of 
Sufism, practicing a kind of free taʾwīl (esoteric interpretation) upon which the play is aesthetically and 
religiously based.  
164 Āmina is the name of prophet Muhammad’s mother.   
165 CWs in Arabic, 330.  
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seven nights, “calling unto his soul and seeking to discover the secrets of the unseen 
world and what lies beyond the veil.”166 On the seventh night, the soul of her father 
inspired her to head to the heart of the Arab peninsula, the Rubʿ al-Khali desert. The 
desert, indeed: “not time, or space, but a space without place and a time without 
production … this outside, where one cannot remain, since to be there is to be always 
already outside, and prophetic speech is that speech in which the bare relation with the 
Outside could be expressed.”167 This relation is essentially one of disclosure or 
unveiling (kashf). Āmina confronts this bare Outside on her own and reveals it. Āmina 
is the prophetic figure of a post-religious Iram Dhāt al-ʿImād, where Being as such is 
disclosed to her – insofar as her vision reveals it – in the bare desert of Arabia. After 
five years of disappearance, Āmina was seen in Mosul, where her emergence was 
“something akin to the falling of a meteor from space.”168 In the circles of Ulama 
(religious scholars), she spoke about divine matters and described what she saw in Iram 
Dhāt al-ʿImād with a unique eloquence hitherto unknown to the people of Mosul. 
Because her followers increased and her name became a threat to the city’s Ulama, the 
governor of Mosul summoned her, offered her a packet of gold and asked her to leave 
the city. Disappointed, she left without taking the gold. The same thing happened to her 
in Istanbul, Aleppo, Damascus, Homs and Tripoli, where her knowledge did not please 
the imams and the religious jurists. As a result, she decided to lead a reclusive life in 
north-east Lebanon, where she is sought by Najeeb, the Lebanese writer.   
            Āmina appears at some point and both Najeeb and Zain are enraptured by her, 
“as though they were in the presence of one of God’s prophets.”169 The dialogue that 
unfolds between Āmina and Najeeb reveals in an unambiguous fashion most of 
Gibran’s central ideas as far as the religious is concerned, which are basically drawn 
 
166 Ibid. 
167 Blanchot, “Prophetic Speech,” 80. 
168 CWs in Arabic, 331. 
169 Ibid., 332.  
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from Sufism: truth as kashf or disclosure, Longing (al-shawq) as the arduous bridge 
towards the witnessing (mushāhdat) of the self, understood as the microcosm of 
Being,170 the Unity of Being, imagination as a disclosing insight (baṣīra)171and the 
transcendent unity of religions.172 Āmina tells Najeeb that she “entered the veiled city 
with her body, which is [her] visible soul, and with [her] soul, which is her invisible 
body. And whoever tires to separate the particles of the body has been plainly led astray 
[kāna fī ḍalālin mubīn]. For the flower and its fragrance are one.”173 This notion of the 
Unity of Being and its imaginal disclosure is one that finds its roots in Sufism.174 This 
Unity of Being, insofar as it is a Unity of Life, is nevertheless devoid from any 
reference to good and evil and reward and punishment or to any eschatological after-
world. Āmina is not a moral preacher of the after-life; she preaches the infinitude of the 
human self insofar as it is a microcosm in this Life, which is essentially endless, since 
“every existent shall remain, and the being of the existent is proof of its eternal 
subsistence.”175  
            What deserves attention here is the Sufi idea of primordial displacement or 
estrangement (ghurba) as a necessary condition of being in the world. Both Āmina and 
Zain were nomadic and migrant before settling in a small forest in north-east Lebanon. 
 
170 Āmina asserts that “Man is able to long [yatashawwaq] and long until longing uncovers the veil of 
phenomena over his sight so that he can contemplate or witness [yushāhid] his self [dhātahu]. Whoever is 
able to see his self sees the bare essence of Life.” [emphasis mine] Ibid., 333. Gibran deliberately 
employs the verb yushāhid here, which is reminiscent of the Sufi maqām or station of mushāhada, 
contemplation or witnessing of the Real. The idea that “everything that exists resides inside you and all 
that resides inside you exists in Being” (Ibid., 334) resonates with the notion of the “Perfect Man” in 
Islamic Sufism, “who is the miniature of Reality; he is the microcosm, in whom are reflected all the 
perfect attributes of the macrocosm.” A.J Arberry, Sufism, An Account of the Mystics of Islam (London: 
Unwin Brothers, 1972), 101.  
171 CWs in Arabic, 337. 
172 “Say there is no God but Allah and there is nothing but Allah and you may remain a Christian.” Ibid., 
334.  
173 Ibid., 333.  
174 The Imaginal is Henry Corbin’s translation of what Ibn Arabi calls al-barzakh or al-barzakhi, the 
realm in which the “corporealization of the spirits” (tajassud al-arwāḥ) and the “spiritualization of the 
corporeal bodies” (tarawḥun al-ajsām) occur. The imaginal world is the world of both/and, hence the 
realm of the unveiling of Being. See Chittick, Ibn Arabi’s Metaphysics of Imagination, 15. Gibran’s 
emphasis on the unity of body and soul and the Unity of Being cannot be understood without reference to 
Sufism, and this play reveals like none of his other texts the powerful Sufi motifs that permeate his work.  
175 CWs in Arabic, 335.  
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Zain tells Najeeb that he was born in Nahavand (modern-day Iran). After growing up in 
Shiraz and being educated in Nishapur, he went on to travel the world east and west, 
only to find out that he is everywhere a stranger (gharīb). When Najeeb responds by 
saying that “all of us are strangers to all places,” Zain demurs: “No! I have met and 
conversed with thousands of people and I have only seen those who are content with 
their environs, finding warmth and familiarity in their limited corner of the world by 
turning their backs to the world.”176 This estrangement is not a negative one. It is not an 
estrangement vis-à-vis the nation – we should not forget, however, that the play was set 
in the late nineteenth century where the nation-state was increasingly becoming the sole 
horizon of belonging in the modern world. Nor is it an estrangement in the sense of 
being uprooted and not able to belong to the “mother country” after immigrating or 
being forced to exile. Rather, it is a primordial estrangement or exile imposed by the 
originary inability to be content with place, which is necessarily limited and demarcated 
as a territory in the world, that is, by the inability to feel a sense of belonging anywhere 
insofar as this where is a place. When Najeeb asserts that “people are naturally inclined 
to be attached to their place of birth,” Zain retorts: “Only those who are limited in vision 
are naturally inclined to be attached to that which is limited in life. The short-sighted 
can see no more than a cubit on the track upon which they tread and a cubit on the wall 
upon which they support their backs.”177 In other words, the limits of one’s vision 
(ruʾyā) are the limits of one’s world. The spiritual here is that which denotes the 
possibility of the body to go beyond itself and the regime of life into which it was 
thrown. It does not signify a transcendent realm beyond Being, but a disclosure of 
Being that allows for an expanded experience of the world in the here and the now. 
Iram Dhāt al-ʿImād, the “veiled city” which is “a spiritual state [ḥāla rūḥiyya],” comes 
 
176 Ibid., 329.  
177 Ibid. 
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to designate a universal promise for the stranger (al-gharīb) to transcend place – the 
modern city or the nation – not a to a transcendent realm, but to an internal space of 
vision that stretches the limits of the stranger’s world. In other words, the spiritual is not 
that which rises above the body, but the language of the body that widens the limits of 
its world. It is in this sense that we ought to understand Gibran’s reclamation of Sufism 
as a post-religious and supra-national mode of being in the world, whether in Arabic or 
in English. For Almustafa, like Āmina, affirms a mode of living where space precedes 
and expands place:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
But you, children of space, you restless in rest, you shall not be trapped or 
tamed. 
Your house shall be not an anchor but a mast. 
It shall not be a glistening film that covers a wound, but an eyelid that guards the 
eye. 
… 
You shall not dwell in tombs made by the dead for the living.  
And though of magnificence and splendour, your house shall not hold your 
secret nor shelter your longing. 
For that which is boundless in you abides in the mansion of the sky, whose door 
is the morning mist, and whose windows are the songs and the silences of the 
night.178 
 
            Gibran’s prophetic imagination, as I have attempted to demonstrate in this 
chapter, resumes the Abrahamic mode of prophetic speech in a modern context that 
compels a poetic reinvention of the religious. This reinvention, occasioned by both 
evolutionism – especially in its travelling to the Arab world in the Nahḍa –and 
Nietzsche, at once breaks with monotheism’s vertical metaphysics and morality and re-
claims some of its central motifs, particularly in Sufism, in post-religious, evolutionist 
terms. The religious that this poetic prophecy articulates is divorced from the ethical 
realm of good and evil and reward and punishment. By simultaneously “burying” the 
dead values that preclude the possibility of a new life and reinventing God as the 
horizon of a new, open and radical form of subjectification – the Greater Self – the 
 
178 CWs, 118. 
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Gibranian post-religious poet embodies a modern Abrahamic figure who insists upon 
the pre-institutional energy of religion to question and disrupt modernity’s calculative 
and identitarian reason. The prophetic, that which announces the impossible as the 
horizon of dwelling anew in the world, is thus embraced by Gibran to re-direct the 
moderns’ attention towards an alternative possibility – and not a ready-made answer – 
of being in the world, one that reinvents the past – but does not “return to” it – in order 
to broaden the limits of one’s world that are willy-nilly imposed on us as veiling 
“masks” since birth. Gibran’s, thus, is a genuine attempt to unveil and herald this 
alternative (im)possibility. Yet, his bilingualism – dwelling in two linguistic and 
cultural geographies in the modern, colonial period – has obscured and complicated his 
literary, post-religious enterprise, particularly in Euro-America. His switch from Arabic 
into English is both creative and problematic, and it is to this switch that I will turn my 
attention in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Two: 
The Bilingual Chasm 
 
I spend my days and nights, my friend, in two worlds that are separated by a 
massive, bottomless abyss. What happens to me in one world, the other does not 
know. I live in two divergent civilizations [madaniyyatayn]: The Eastern that is 
my mother; and the Western that has adopted me. And what I don’t fathom, my 
friend, is that people in these two divergent civilizations do not agree on any 
aspect of this small self [dhāt] I call “me” [anā]. I find myself lost, therefore, 
occupied less with life-thinking [al-tafkīr bil- ḥayāt] – and this is the vocation 
that suits me – than with self-thinking [al-tafkīr bil- nafs], a vocation from 
which I seek to absolve myself.  
From Gibran’s posthumously published manuscripts.1 
 
We only ever speak one language – and, since it returns to the other, it exists 
asymmetrically, always for the other, from the other, kept by the other. Coming 
from the other, remaining with the other, and returning to the other. 
 Jacques Derrida.2  
 
 
“The gulf between the Syrian work and my own work has to be crossed every 
day, and that is the thing that tires me,”3 wrote Khalil Gibran to Mary Haskell in 1918, 
the year he published his first book in English, The Madman. Is the gulf attendant on 
writing in and between two languages, the native and the adopted, so massive that it 
becomes almost impossible to bridge, or is the bilingual literary enterprise of the Arab-
American poet and essayist one in which the two languages, to invoke Abdelkebir 
Khatibi’s Amour bilingue (1983), occupy a space of eroticism, of mutual enrichment 
and exchange? Gibran’s bilingualism was definitive to his social, literary and 
intellectual life. A panoramic and close look at his bilingual work and letters testifies to 
the fact his bilingual experience as a writer was a strenuous and, at times, an angst-
ridden one. In this chapter, I probe this bilingualism by looking at and bringing together 
 
1 Gibran, Iqlib al-Ṣafḥa yā Fatā: Makhṭūṭāt lam Tunshar [Turn the Page: Hitherto Unpublished 
Manuscripts], (Lebanon: Gibran’s National Committee, 2010), 20. [emphasis mine]. The friend to whom 
Gibran is speaking here is not specified.  
2 Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, 40. [emphasis in the original] 
3 KG to MH, June 21, 1918.  
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several, seemingly distinct but arguably interlaced, aspects and specific moments in his 
literary and intellectual career. By bilingualism, not only do I mean the fact of dwelling 
and writing in two languages, but also the attendant straddling of two or more cultures 
at a specific juncture in history.  
This oscillation between two linguistic and cultural geographies is both creative 
and problematic. Gibran alternates between the urge to rejuvenate Arabic literature and 
the desire to gain literary cosmopolitan appeal in the United States as an Arab writer in 
English. His situatedness in the U.S. at that specific historical point entailed 
representing, willy-nilly, the Orient. This imposed Oriental identity – that is, a fixed and 
a priori notion of subjectivity – created a chasm that produced different incarnations of 
Gibran. His shift from Arabic into English generated, therefore, a discursive 
multiplication of functions: an Arab revolutionary writer, on the one hand, whose 
creative output signalled a discursive turn in Arab literary modernity, and an Arab 
writer in English, on the other hand, whose texts were filtered through the vessel of the 
hostile cultural discourse on the xenos. In this double linguistic and cultural texture, I 
trace what is (dis)continuous in Gibran’s movement from one language to another. I 
hope to show that while this bilingualism is culturally disjunctive, attending to Gibran’s 
manifold writings in both languages reveals that the chasm at once separates and 
connects, that is, that the hostility of rigid cultural division could be addressed by the 
hospitality of critical interpretation, and that the universal in Gibran’s case begins from 
the local and, while going beyond it, still depends on it.  
In section one, I attempt to tease out, by closely reading two of Gibran’s early 
pieces of poetic prose in Arabic, how his modernist vision (ruʾyā ḥadāthiyya), in the 
non-temporal sense that Adunis gives to the concept of poetic modernity,4 is 
 
4 Adunis does not posit the ‘modern’ against the ‘ancient’. For him, ‘modern’ poets such as Gibran and 
al-Sayyab (1926-64), “share a poetic house with the ‘ancients’ Imruʾl-Qays and Tarafa Ibn al-ʿAbd (538-
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aesthetically staged in writing, in relation to his engagement in rejuvenating Arabic 
literature. This is to show that this vision is embodied in his “romantic break with the 
past”5 as much as in the aesthetics of the literary text – that is, in his endeavour to write 
“poetic prose” that “disperses” (yanthur) signifiers by way of an excess of metaphor and 
imagery – blurring the line between content and form. In section two, I probe this ruʾyā 
(vision) in his essay “Ṣawt al-Shāʿir” [The Voice of the Poet] by shedding light on his 
poetics of “cosmopolitan patriotism,” universal hospitality as well as Love [maḥabba], 
conceived of as justice. I focus on the textual creativity and universal orientation of 
Gibran’s early Arabic work not only to point out its significance vis-à-vis Arab literary 
modernity, but, most importantly, to foreground its importance in connection to his 
bilingualism as a writer: the later switch into English would carry this universal element 
and efface the aesthetic particularity of his Arabic writings. Then I move on, in section 
three, to underscore the anxieties attendant on his decision to begin writing in English. I 
address this bilingual anxiety by analysing this movement as one in which English, 
bearing the “Syriac” trace of the Bible, represses and displaces, rather than replaces, the 
“language of the mother.” In section four, I extend my discussion of Gibran’s bilingual 
experience by looking at it phenomenologically. Drawing on Derrida and Levinas, I 
posit that language as such is inherently hospitable to the other. The originary openness 
of English as a foreign language occasions Gibran’s inscription into the host(ile) 
cultural discourse that appropriates both the language and the foreign writer in its own 
terms. In the last section, by way of discussing his Arabic essay “The Future of the 
Arabic Language,” I demonstrate that the mother tongue for the late bilingual Gibran 
 
64), and with Abu Nawas and Abu Tamam who were ‘modern’ in relation to the pre-Islamic poets but are 
today considered ‘ancients’ when judged in terms of chronological time. All of these poets come together, 
beyond the simple categories of modern and ancient, in the single melting pot of poetic creativity, to form 
what I call the entirety of authentic Arabic poetry, or, from a historical point of view, ‘the second 
modernity.’” In other words, the modern, within a particular literary tradition, is essentially creative, 
irrespective of chronological time. See Adunis, An Introduction to Arab Poetics, 98-102.  
5  See Sabry Hafez, The Genesis of Arabic Narrative Discourse: A study in the Sociology of Modern 
Arabic Literature (London: Saqi Books, 1993), 170. 
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becomes the locus of his civilizational commitment to the Arab East, arguing that 
writing in English as an adopted language entails the active preservation of the mother 
tongue and its universal potentiality. By adopting English as a language of writing, 
however, Gibran is adopted by the (Euro)-American culture in a way that masks his 
English-language texts by the identitarian veil of the Orient. I finish this chapter, 
therefore, with a reflective reading of his prose poem “My Friend,” in which I 
demonstrate that between “seeming” and “being,” there lies a gulf that gives rise to an 
interpretative horizon which is not reducible to the “identity” of the writer or to the 
“culture” of the language in which the text is written. By highlighting and 
problematizing Gibran’s literary bilingualism, this chapter aims to demonstrate that 
while “all expatriations remain singular,”6 the literary and intellectual experience of 
Gibran’s expatriation offers a fertile ground for universal reflections.     
1. Gibran’s Ruʾyā Ḥadāthiyya (Modernist Vision) in Arabic: Writing as a 
“Coincidence of Opposites”  
 
In this section, I focus on vision (ruʾyā) in Gibran’s Arabic work insofar as it is 
emblematic of literary modernity (ḥadātha); vision as an indicator of poetic and literary 
innovation (iḥdāth) staged in writing itself: writing as the stage in which vision as event 
(ḥadath) takes place. This ḥadath is marked by disclosure or unveiling (kashf), itself 
wedded with innovation iḥdāth. Writing occasions vision (ruʾyā); it is that which 
enables his vision to materialize. As such, it is the terrain of linguistic and aesthetic 
experimentation/innovation (iḥdāth). I will confine my reading to two pieces of poetic 
prose – which exhibit what came to be known as the Gibranian style in Arabic 
literature.7 This field of vision engages and plays with the senses in the text; vision 
becomes an open field of playful interactions between the senses, especially vision 
 
6 Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, 58. 
7 This is one of his most valuable and enduring contributions to modern Arabic Literature. See Salma 
Khadra Jayyusi, Modern Arabic Poetry: An Anthology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 4-
5. 
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(sight) and voice (or sound), signifiers that are unstable and always merging into one 
another in the body of the Gibranian text. The visible here is always at the mercy of the 
invisible, but the invisible, what is seen beyond the senses, that towards8 which Gibran 
was vehemently driven and with which he was creatively obsessed, is itself enabled and 
conditioned – in the domain of writing – by the visible, ruʾyā [vision - insight] as ruʾya 
[vision - sight] in its metaphoric play with other sensorial signifiers, or, more generally, 
with the bodily/the material. It is in and through writing – writing as material signs – 
that the infinite becomes finite, that is, materially circumscribed, only to become infinite 
again in the play of signs – their difference and deferral9 (of meaning) by way of 
metaphor. Gibran’s ruʾyā as ruʾya, vision as materialized in writing, can be described, 
to borrow a formula from Levinas, as “the idea of infinity in the finite,”10 since the 
space of writing is that which opens the “eruption of this infinity in the finite” (of signs 
infinitely made to refer to each other by way of metaphor, and of vision itself as it lies at 
once in and beyond the senses). It could also be apprehended and approached through 
the prism of the imaginal, a Sufi concept to which I referred in the previous chapter, 
summoned here vis-à-vis the Gibranian text insofar as it embodies the space of writing, 
the ‘isthmus’ [al-barzakh], so to speak, where the invisible (the immaterial, the infinite) 
 
8 I emphasize “towards” because the “unseen” here is not merely understood as a world beyond the 
senses. The invisible, for Gibran, is associated with the infinite insofar as it is a “beyond” – the unknown, 
the future, or the infinite as an impetus not only to go beyond but to extend the visible; the invisible as the 
ultimate condition of the visible. This is what led Adunis to describe Gibran’s enterprise as “Modernity as 
Vision.”  
9 Derrida has famously coined the term différance, which “is not a word or concept,” but the “the 
possibility of conceptuality,” the difference and deferral of signification that disrupts the 
signifier/signified duality, whereby the signifier is secondary to the signified (the referent, the concept), 
and erupts writing, écriture (the Latin verb differre, in French différer, has two distinct words in English, 
to defer and to differ). It is here understood as embedded in Gibran’s literary text by way of metaphor, 
that is, the signifiers are made different and deferred by means of an excess of metaphor and imagery. See 
Jacques Derrida, “Différance” in The Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Brighton: Harvester Press, 
1982), 1-29.    
10  The original context in which this formula appears is different from mine. Levinas is re-defining 
metaphysics as “ethics or first philosophy, as opposed to ontology” in his reflection on the relation with 
the other: “because it opens itself to – so as to welcome – the irruption of the idea of infinity in the finite, 
this metaphysics is an experience of hospitality,” Derrida comments. It is this reading of hospitality that I 
will draw upon later in my reading of (Gibran’s) bilingualism. See Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel 
Levinas, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michel Naas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 46. 
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and the visible (the material, the sensorial, the finite) coincide. The seeming opposites 
(finite/infinite, corporal/spiritual) coincide in the space of writing by simultaneously 
negating and affirming each other; in Derridean terms, they coincide by differing from 
and deferring to each other in writing.   
I demonstrate this dynamic, first, through a reading of “Vision” [ruʾyā], a piece 
of poetic prose in Damʿa wa Ibtisāma (1914) [A Tear and A Smile].11 In this vision, the 
narrator tells us that “in the midst of a field by the bank of a crystalline stream [he] saw 
a cage whose ribs were crocheted by a cunning hand,” in one corner of which is a dead 
bird and in the other a “vessel whose water dried up and a plate empty of seeds.”12 We 
are later told that the cage has turned into “a translucent human skeleton” and that “the 
dead bird has metamorphosed into a human heart, and in the heart lies a deep bleeding 
wound, dribbling crimson blood, whose edges bear resemblance [ḥākat] to a grieving 
woman’s lips.”13 The Gibranian narrator often tells us what he sees by emphasizing that 
he sees [yarā] and hears what transpires in his vision [ruʾyā], describing what he 
sees/hears – the line between vision and hearing becomes blurry – in a metaphorical 
language: “I heard a voice coming with the drops of blood out of the wound saying: I 
am the human heart, prisoner of matter and victim of the laws of earthly man.”14 There 
are some words in the passage that I want to stop at, such as the emphasized one, hākat; 
words that, when translated, are necessarily purged of their untranslatable semantic 
 
11 This essay was originally written in 1907, the first essay Gibran had written for a newspaper. See 
Masʿud Habib, Jubrān Ḥayyan wa Mayyitan [Gibran in his Life and Death] (Beirut, Dār al-Rihāni, 1966), 
31. 
12 CWs in Arabic, 141 [emphasis mine]. All translations from Arabic are mine, but I sometimes depart 
from H. M. Nahmad’s translation of Damʿa wa Ibtisāma into English only to adjust and refine it, a 
translation in which the Arabic is made to resemble, as much as possible, Gibran’s English writings. This 
is an approach with which I take issue, because Gibran’s mode of writing in Arabic differs from his 
English one. The poetic nature of Gibran’s Arabic prose – untranslatable – is often replaced, in 
translation, by a prose poetry whose English is made to sound like Gibran’s other English writings. This 
is an attempt to be “faithful” to Gibran’s English texts and readers by being “unfaithful” to the 
particularity of his Arabic mode of writing.  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. [emphasis added] 
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particularity and etymological history.15 The verb ḥākat, from ḥākā, yuḥākī, which 
translates as “to resemble,” is very close in its etymology to ḥakā, yaḥkī, to tell or 
recount (a story), to narrate – both words share the same root. Thus, embedded in the 
resemblance that the wound bears to the grieving woman’s lips is the act of narration 
insofar as it consists of speaking and uttering words that disclose a vision.  
Vision (ruʾyā) is the horizon in which vision (ruʾya, sight) and voice (and what 
is seen and heard) are coupled within the realm of language. It is within language that 
vision as ruʾyā materially takes place. Vision is unthinkable without a language into 
which it is inscribed and disclosed; without language, it remains immaterial, 
unembodied, non-literary. The signs of language, of writing, disclose the content of 
vision and determine its (unstable) semantic sphere. “I heard these words [uttered out of 
the bleeding wounds of the human heart] and I saw them coming out with the drops of 
blood from the wounded heart, whereupon I no longer saw anything, nor did I hear a 
sound, so I returned to my reality.”16 As the heart bleeds, the words are simultaneously 
heard and seen in this vision. The words are heard and seen because and as the heart is 
bleeding (not metaphorically); in other words, the words are produced with the bleeding 
of the heart. Is it by coincidence that the Arabic word kalima, which means “word,” 
shares its etymological root with kalm, wound? Words [kalimāt] are the traces of 
wounds [kilām] as Chaouki Zine’s ‘hermeneutymology’ (a combination of hermeneutics 
and etymology) has shown in another context.17 This Gibranian vision/insight brings 
vision/sight and voice together in the scene of the bleeding heart which, as it bleeds, 
 
15 I am not arguing for the “purity” and “exceptionality” of the original in the context of translation, but 
one should be aware of Abdelfattah Kilito’s injunction “Thou Shalt Not Translate Me,” that is, that the 
untranslatable is that which, defying translation, demands an inexhaustible translational effort. See Kilito, 
Je parle toutes les langues, mais en arabe [I Speak all Languages, but in Arabic] (Arles: Sindibad-Actes 
Sud 2013), 53-55.  
16 CWs in Arabic, 141 [emphasis mine] 
17 See Mohammad Chaouki Zine, “Tafkīkiyyat Ibn ʿArabī: al-Taʾwīl, al-Ikhtilāf, al-Kitāba” [Ibn Arabi’s 
Deconstruction: Hermeneutics, Difference, Writing]. Kitābāt Muʿāṣira [Contemporary Writings] 36, no. 
9 (March 1999): 53-59.  
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utters visible words; a scene that betrays, coincidently or not, the etymological history 
of the Arabic words kalima (word), kalām (speech), kalm (wound) and kilām (wounds). 
The wounding body of the word is seen and heard, a body whose history is linked with 
kalm, wound. The materiality of language, the sensorial effects of words – words seen 
and heard – disclose, paradoxically, the immateriality of vision (vision, in Ibn Arabi’s 
definition, is disclosure/unconcealment). This is also reminiscent, as mentioned earlier, 
of Ibn Arabi’s imaginal world, which corporealizes the spiritual and spiritualizes the 
corporeal: vision as the site where the corporeal and the spiritual (that which is ‘supra-
sensory’) coincide. 
This dynamic can be also seen in Gibran’s long poetic essay al-Musīqa [On 
Music], published as a pamphlet in 1905, which was his first published work. In it, 
Gibran embarks on a poetic and Romantic description and veneration of music. What 
interests me here is the textuality and rich imagery of the text. Gibran’s vision of music 
is imbued with metaphors and images that engage the senses – music here is always 
described analogically, in a fashion that is melodramatic or overtly imaginative.18 As 
such, it attests to what it essentially is, a phenomenon that is only accessible, to speak 
phenomenologically, through what Edmund Husserl calls appresentation,19 that is, it 
could be only apprehended through analogy. The latter is this case is exaggerated, 
amplified and dramatized by virtue of the estranging and defamiliarizing of the literary 
text. Let us not forget that this vision of music is materialized in writing: what matters 
here is not music itself or what the text presumably refers to outside it, but how the text 
discloses what it refers to, that is, its very textuality. What is at play in this vision is the 
 
18 Gibran, writing about music as seen in Greek and Roman mythology, recognizes that what had been 
said and believed about music in ancient times is now deemed “myths created by illusions.” Yet he, in a 
patently Romantic gesture, wonders rhetorically: “what would harm us if we called those [ancient] stories 
a poetic exaggeration created by the subtlety of emotions and the love [maḥabba] of Beauty. Is this not, 
in the custom [‘urf] of poets, poetry itself?” CWs in Arabic, 12. [emphasis mine]      
19 The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology, ed. Donn Welton 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 146.  
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way it fuses sound and sight, so much so that music becomes seen by what Gibran calls 
“my hearing eye” (ʿayn samʿī): “I saw the effects of my beloved’s heart with my 
hearing eye, whereupon I became distracted to the content of her speech by the 
substance of her emotions, which was embodied in music, the voice of the self.”20 Not 
only does he hear music when his beloved sighs, but he also sees it with his “hearing 
eye” as his beloved’s emotions are now embodied in and through music such that music 
itself becomes “the language of the soul.”21 Again, the immaterial is made material, the 
emotional is embodied and becomes simultaneously seen and heard. No signifier is 
stable in the body of the Gibranian text, as Fatima Qandil has also shown.22 The 
signifiers of the senses, especially voice and sight (and what is heard and seen), embody 
one another in the space of writing. The essence of music, if there is any, becomes 
dispersed in the body of the text, in the play of the senses, signifiers that are made 
volatile and spectral, to use Qandil’s description of the Gibranian texts, as they freely 
wander and embody one another by way of analogy, metaphor and metonymy. Here is a 
passage that illustrates this spectrality: “Music is akin to a lamp […] and the melodies in 
my space are the spectres of the true self or the shadows [akhīla] of animated feelings. 
And reflected in the self, which resembles a mirror standing before the events of Being 
and its affects, are the drawings of those spectres and the images of those shadows.”23  
Music is light, that is, is it understood – or rather imagined – as illumination. 
The melodies it produces are spectres and shadows which spring from the “true self” 
and “animated feelings” whose “drawings” and “images” are reflected in the “soul,” 
that which is (like) a mirror. The melodies, in short, turn into images, (in)-visible, 
spectral images, only because they are now subject to language, language as writing. 
The field of hearing and listening merges into the field of vision and seeing, and this 
 
20 CWs in Arabic, 10. [emphasis mine] 
21 Ibid. 
22 See Qandīl, al-Rāwī al-Shabaḥ, 13. 
23 CWs in Arabic, 10. 
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fusion is encapsulated in what Gibran describes as the “hearing eye.” The (literary) text 
metamorphoses the melodies, so to speak, into spectres and images. One is therefore 
lost in signifiers that ceaselessly refer – or, rather, that are made to refer – to other 
signifiers by means of metaphors and similes such that imagery at once supplements 
and supplants, following the Derridean logic of the supplement,24 that which it 
describes: music becomes everything which it is not in the body of the text. It is even 
“the tongue of all the nations of the Earth,”25 which in its invocation of Kilito’s question 
about the tongue of Adam,26 creates ambiguity as to whether it is the tongue as language 
or the tongue as organ. This metaphor suggests that music is a universal language by 
virtue of everyone’s ability to taste it, as the double meaning of the tongue indicates. 
The essay abounds in such metaphors and imagery that revolve around a centre (music) 
whose essence is dispersed or fragmented throughout the text; it is a centre insofar as it 
is de-centred, and it is an essence insofar as it is dispersed, a dispersion (nathr, which 
also means ‘prose’) that is essentially metaphoric and poetic: poetic prose. 
By writing a prose that is poetic, Gibran seeks to blur the lines between form 
and content, prose and poetry, because (Arabic) language for him should not be 
hampered by the “laws of poetry” and should even incorporate colloquial expressions in 
its liberating and liberated flow, as he avers in his late essay “Lakum Lughatukum w lia 
Lughatī” [You have your language and I have mine]. It is interesting to note that poetry 
in Arabic is associated with naẓm, that is, with versing. In classical Arabic poetry, 
which is still very much alive today, one verses poetry, so to speak, but does not write 
it. The etymology of naẓm, as Kilito observes, suggests “order, arrangement, harmony” 
and so on. The opposite of naẓm is nathr, which literally means prose, but whose 
 
24 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (London: The Athlone Press: 1981), especially 
53.    
25 CWs in Arabic, 12.  
26 Kilito, The Tongue of Adam, trans. Robyn Creswell (New York: New Directions Paperwork: 2016), 3. 
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etymology suggests “dispersion, separation, division, fragmentation.”27 Many of 
Gibran’s early lyric essays are marked by this poetic dispersion, as it were – not prose 
poetry, but a prose that is poetic. The poetic dispersion of his (literary) text does not 
mean that poetry precedes prose or vice versa, that in the beginning there was either 
poetry or prose; these questions of “origin” do not matter for Gibran. I have highlighted 
this specific aspect of his writing to demonstrate that the aesthetics of the text – its 
“form” – is intertwined with its “content” – both reflect a relentless hostility towards 
any restraining “laws” whether in the textual, aesthetic or social domains. This poetic 
dispersion, therefore, is itself an act of “rebellion” against the political, social or 
religious modes of thought and action that perpetuate obsolete modes of literary 
expression.   
Indeed, Jayyusi asserts that this kind of “poetry-in-prose” experiments, at least 
as I have attempted to show in the two examples above, led by Gibran and Rihani, 
another influential Arab émigré writer in America, prompted “the gradual disintegration 
of traditional formal concepts in Arabic poetry.”28 Bearing immensely on the Arab 
literary generations of the twenties and thirties, “[Gibran’s] experiment was initially 
offered to an audience devoted to the inherited, balanced metrics of Arabic poetry, and 
this would have created the greatest resistance were it not for the positive outlook 
Jibran (and al-Rayhani) had towards their homeland.”29 I have emphasized the last 
statement because the experiment did generate a staunch resistance despite the émigré 
writers’ attachment to their homeland. In the case of Gibran, the “positive outlook” 
towards his homeland manifested itself in an idealized version of Lebanon which, as 
apparent in his essay “Lakum Lubnānukum wa lia Lubnāni” [You Have Your Lebanon 
and I have Mine], serves to denounce the politics of identity and westernization in 
 
27 Ibid., 53. 
28 See Jayyusi, “Modernist Poetry in Arabic,” in Modern Arabic Literature, ed. by M.M. Badawi 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1992), 143. 
29 Ibid. [emphasis mine]. 
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Greater Syria.30 Suffice it to foreground for now, as Jayyusi reminds us, that thanks to 
these experiments “Jibran [sic] laid one cornerstone for the modernist poetry of a much 
later period [1940s and1950’s].”31     
No wonder that Adunis refers to Gibran as a visionary writer [kātib ruʾyawī] 
whose work was seminal in the experience of modern Arabic poetry and vital in 
“erecting the concept modernity in Arabic literature.”32 This vision is innovative insofar 
as it invents by investing in the literary/spiritual sources of the Arab self: ḥadātha 
(modernity) as iḥdāth or ibtikār (innovation) of the self and its “old sources,” to the 
extent that these sources carry a spiritually and philosophically rich heritage, often 
truncated by supressing and marginalizing what is deemed transgressive, subversive 
and, to use Gibran’s preferred word, “rebellious” in it.33 Thus, being and belonging, for 
Gibran, are no longer defined or imagined as the inscription, by birth, into a certain 
“tradition” and “culture”– belonging as a historical given within a nation into which one 
is thrown by chance34– but to belong insofar as belonging entails a laborious effort of 
cultivating and carving out a new self out its old sources35; in other words, modernity as 
a practical vision whose horizon, to invoke Adunis again, is by necessity the future, the 
unknown – understood as the ultimate possibility of knowledge – and the infinite. 
 
30 See Chapter three, especially sections one and two.   
31 Ibid.  
32 See Adunis, al-Thābit wa al-Mutaḥawwil, 156. 
33 Gibran celebrates in some of his short essays what he deems “rebellious” figures in the history of 
Arabic poetry and thought, such as al-Maʿarri, the author of Risālat al-Ghufrān (The Epistle of 
Forgiveness), and Abu Nawas, the poet who is often described as “decadent” (mājin). See CWs in Arabic 
O, 40-45 and 66-68.  
34 I borrow this concept of “thrownness” from Heidegger. See his Being and Time, trans. John Macqurrie 
and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 174.  
35 I am here drawing on Meskini who, in a radical gesture, ponders the horizon of a “post-identarian self” 
liberated from identity as an “a priori apparatus of belonging inherited without any personal experience, 
[as] every individual has become less a person than an identitarian product.” This “identarian liberation” 
is predicated on his “organic critique of identitarian reason [al-naqd ḥayawī li al-ʿaql al-hawawī].” 
Because national identity is an invention of modernity, he argues, it remains merely “one of the legal 
terms of belonging, and not an existential problem.” So the answer to an “identity without a self” is not “a 
self without identity,” but a “self before identity,” Meskini argues, or, as I read it in relation to Gibran, a 
self that relates to its identity insofar as it invents by investing in its old (forgotten) sources, and thus re-
defining and broadening identity itself by liberating it from any adherence to its “façade,” on the one 
hand, and from any imitative and selective inheritance of “tradition,” on the other. See Meskini, al-
Hawiyya wa al-Ḥurriyya, 10-16. 
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Albeit not conceptually elaborated or crystallized in Gibran, this is a vision of 
modernity that emerged, crucially, in the Mahjar, away from the Arab world which it 
affected. I now wish to show how this ruʾyā, in addition to its linguistic and aesthetic 
embodiment, is additionally reflected in an Arab cosmopolitan disposition that disrupts 
the nexus of language, nation and culture, despite or perhaps because of the fact that 
Gibran was not a citizen of an autonomous nation-state at the time.  
2. Ṣawt al-Shāʿir [The Voice of the Poet]: An Arabic Voice of a Universal 
Vision 
 
In “The Voice of the Poet,” a short piece of poetic prose published in Damʿa wa 
Ibtisāma, we may discern how the vision of the poet is embodied in his voice; a voice 
whose silence is supplemented and supplanted, in the body of the text, by the vision that 
the poet holds, one in which patriotism and cosmopolitanism become complementary 
rather than contradictory.36 The title is, nevertheless, somewhat puzzling: does the poet 
belong to the world as such, a belonging to which his voice testifies? Why the voice and 
not, for instance, the words? As discussed earlier, Gibran’s ruʾyā is marked by this 
tendency to engage the senses, sight and voice in particular. This is by destabilizing and 
dispersing, by way of metaphor, imagery and analogy, the signifiers of voice and sight 
such that one signifier – since ruʾyā is necessarily staged in a written (literary) text – is 
almost always made to refer to something other than itself, deconstructing itself, as it 
were, in its literary, linguistic embodiment. In this section, I am rather concerned with 
the content of this ruʾyā because it is relevant to my critical concern in this chapter and 
in the thesis as a whole: is the voice of the poet – and should it be – at once local and 
universal, patriotic and cosmopolitan? If so, how? And what is implied in the poet as 
metaphor? Gibran begins the essay by invoking the notion of giving as being that he 
 
36 See Pauline Kleinmgeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of a World Citizenship 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 26.  
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underscores elsewhere, as discussed in Chapter One.37 The poet is the one who “reaps” 
what the invisible force “sows” inside him, the one who lights up the lamp that Heaven 
has filled up with oil. In other words, the poet, as poet, gives expression to the force of 
giving itself: “I do these things because I live by them, and if the days were to thwart me 
and the nights were to shackle my hands, then death would be better for a prophet cast 
out in his nation and a poet exiled amongst his own people.”38 
What is significant to my discussion here is that the poet-prophet, in contrast to 
“people [al-bashar39] who are divided into sects and tribes and belong to countries and 
regions,” is everywhere a stranger and an outsider. “All the earth is my homeland and 
the human family is my tribe,” he declares, “because I have realized that man is weak 
and is further weakened by dividing upon himself. It is therefore a folly that the earth, 
which is too narrow, is partitioned into kingdoms and states.”40 Thus, Gibran proclaims 
his belonging to the world as such, espousing the Romantic view that the poet, unique 
and exceptional, is by necessity a hopeless exile. As he goes on to lament humankind’s 
“destruction of the shrines of the spirit” and “construction of the temples of the body,” a 
motif prevalent in his early writings – that of championing the spiritual and the platonic 
and dismissing the bodily and the earthly – he, “standing alone in mourning,” “hear[s] a 
voice of hope from within saying: as love [maḥabba]41 revives the human heart by 
means of pains, so does folly show it the ways of knowledge. Pains and folly create a 
pleasure that is great and a knowledge that is perfect, because perennial wisdom has 
created no thing in vain under the sun.”42 The voice of the poet, the voice heard from 
 
37 I discussed the notion of giving as being (living) in the first chapter, particularly in The Prophet. 
38 CWs in Arabic, 192. [emphasis mine] 
39 There is no English equivalent to the Arabic word al-bashar, whose etymology – it is derived from 
bashara (skin) – suggests those whose skin is visible, that is, human beings.  
40 Ibid. [emphasis mine] 
41 It must be noted that Gibran often uses the word maḥabba in Arabic, which, in comparison to ḥubb 
(often used to connote sentimental or erotic love), suggests universal or non-sentimental love. We could 
also understand ḥubb as Eros and maḥabba as Agape, as far as Gibran is concerned at least.  
42 Ibid., 192-93. 
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within, heard by the poet from within himself, is a voice of hope, the voice of a poet 
whose prophetic vision it invokes, a voice that carries words of hope in what he deems a 
cynical world. A voice of an optimistic vision. This Romantic vision by virtue of which, 
its idealism and magnifying of the exceptional role of the poet notwithstanding, the poet 
is a prophet, the poet whose voice, the voice heard from within the poet, is prophetic, 
leads to a declaration of what we may call, after a certain reading of Kant, a 
“cosmopolitan patriotism”43:  
I long for my country because of its beauty and I love the people of my country 
for their misery, but if my people, motivated by what they call patriotism, fell 
upon the country of my neighbour, plundered its goods, murdered its men, 
orphaned its children, widowed its women, watered its soil with the blood of its 
people and fed the flesh of its youth to its prowling beasts, then I would hate my 
country and the people of my country.44 
 
In this passage one can evidently observe how patriotism – or national belonging 
in general – are important for Gibran insofar as the land of one’s nation45 is one’s place 
of birth, the home that witnessed one’s up-bringing. One’s love of one’s country, should 
it become a pretext – under the banner of nationalism, patriotism or jingoism – to 
invade other countries and conquer other territories, turns into hate, hatred of one’s 
country. This is Gibran espousing patriotism to the extent that it is not, or does not 
become, transgressive and imperialist, to the extent that it holds other nations and 
territories in respect in that all nations belong to the world, to the extent that one’s 
allegiance and loyalty is to one’s nation as much as it is to the world – that is, to the 
world of my nation but also to the world, the world as other nations, the world of other 
nations. Thus, patriotism and cosmopolitanism – which seem incompatible at face value 
– become necessarily complementary. Gibran is not concerned with the relationship 
 
43 Kleinmgeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, 26. 
44 CWs in Arabic, 193. 
45 I am not unaware of the semantic and political nuances between terms such as “land” and “nation”: 
land or territory as one of the modern nation-state’s foundational tenets. What is interesting here is that 
Gibran speaks of his “country” insofar as it means his “homeland,” and not of “the nation-state.” I focus 
on Gibran’s national(ist) writings at length in Chapter Three.  
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between the state and its own citizens. Rather he is interested in the relationship 
between one nation and its inhabitants (presumably its citizens) on the one hand, with 
other nations and their inhabitants, on the other. Also, as the title of the essay indicates, 
this is (still) “the voice of the poet,” the voice heard from within the poet, and not the 
reflections of a political philosopher.  
Gibran goes on to bring up another crucial matter in this regard, that of 
hospitality:  
I sing eulogies for the place of my birth and I yearn for a house wherein I was 
raised, but if a wayfarer passes by, seeking shelter in that house and ailment 
from its inhabitants, and is turned away, then I would substitute mourning for 
eulogy and consolation for longing, and I would say in myself, ‘the house that 
refuses bread to the needy and a bed to the seeker is most meriting of destruction 
and ruin’.46 
 
This passage is reminiscent of Kant’s “cosmopolitan right” of hospitality, that one 
should be hospitable, not hostile, to the stranger and the foreigner, the xenos, that the 
latter have the right to hospitality “by virtue of their common possession of the surface 
of the earth, where, as a globe, they cannot infinitely disperse and hence must finally 
tolerate the presence of each other.”47 The way in which Gibran associates hospitality 
with one’s love for one’s country, interestingly, is such that the failure to be hospitable, 
that is, hostility towards the stranger, entails hatred towards one’s country: “the house 
that refuses bread to the needy and a bed to the seeker is most meriting of destruction 
and ruin.” This is “the voice of the poet” that has now become, as the formulation of 
this statement suggests, the source of a law. To put it otherwise, and let me invoke Kant 
again, hospitality is not a matter of philanthropy, but a (matter of) right, and if this right 
is not received (by the stranger) and not given (by the inhabitant), then the house of the 
inhabitant had better be destroyed, according to Gibran. This right is also beyond the 
 
46 Ibid., 193. [emphasis mine] 
47 Quoted in Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 27. 
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law here in its unconditionality, at once within and beyond the law, to invoke Derrida’s 
reflections on hospitality.48 What is particularly interesting here is that Gibran speaks of 
the house, not its inhabitants; such a house whose inhabitants are hostile to the stranger 
should be destroyed, Gibran says, but why the house in particular? As Levinas and 
Derrida remind us, it is in the nature of a house to be hospitable49: should its inhabitants 
deny the foreigner who seeks shelter in that house the right to hospitality, the house is 
denied its essence too; the inhabitants would be acting in such a way that the house is 
stripped of its essence, “its essence without essence,” that of hospitality, because “the 
hôte [the host, the inhabitant, who is also a guest in his own house] offers the hospitality 
that he receives in his home; he receives it from his own home – which, in the end, does 
not belong to him,”50 hence Gibran’s assertion that such a house “is most meriting of 
destruction and ruin.”51  
Again, this is the voice of the poet that oscillates between love and hatred, praise 
and elegy, longing and consolation for his country, depending on the treatment of his 
country and its people towards other countries and their people on the one hand, and 
towards the stranger and the foreigner who come to his land and seek shelter in it, on 
the other. A voice of an exilic poet – an originary exile – whose longing for his place of 
birth is far from being blinding in that the longing itself is not (only) subject to the 
poet’s emotional and existential state but (also) to the manner in which his country, the 
 
48 Anne Dufourmantelle and Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality, trans. Rachal Bowlby (California: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), 23-27. 
49 I am here referring to Derrida’s reading of Levinas regarding hospitality: “The implacable law of 
hospitality: the hôte who receives (the host), the one who welcomes the invited or the received hôte (the 
guest), the welcoming hôte who considers himself the owner of the place, is in truth a hôte received in his 
own home. He receives the hospitality that he offers in his home; he receives it from his own home – 
which, in the end, does not belong to him. The hôte as host is a guest. The dwelling opens itself to itself, 
to its “essence” without essence, as a “land of asylum or refuge”.” Derrida, Adieu, 41. 
50 Ibid. [emphasis in the original] The French hôte is the word for both host and guest. 
51 I must note that the imperative of hospitality towards the guest as traveller is steeped in Islam as 
religion, tradition and culture, and Gibran must have been aware of that. As Mona Siddiqui points out, 
“Islam holds hospitality as a virtue that lies at the very basis of Islamic ethical system, a concept rooted in 
the pre-Islamic Bedouin virtues of welcome and generosity in the harsh desert environment. The concept 
can be found in the Arabic root ḍayāfa. The Prophet is reported to have said, ‘There is no good in the one 
who is not hospitable.’” Siddiqui, Hospitality and Islam: Welcoming in God’s name (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2015), 10-11.     
120 
 
country of his place of birth, acts towards other countries and people of other countries 
stopping by his own. Or, perhaps, a voice of an exilic poet whose blindness, the 
Romantic obsession with the poet as essentially solitary, exceptional and exilic, is that 
which preconditions and enables his insight, to invoke Paul De Man.52 Gibran, in “The 
Voice of the Poet,” proceeds: “I love the place of my birth with some of my love for my 
country, and I love my country with a portion of my love for the land of my country. 
And I love the Earth with my all because it is the pastureland of humanity….”53 This 
passage is testimony to the cosmopolitan patriotism I mentioned above. Love of Earth, 
of the world, for Gibran, outweighs, but does not erase – in fact it corroborates – love of 
one’s place of birth and love of one’s country and land. Being cosmopolitan, thus, 
requires one to be patriotic, but patriotic in the strict sense that Gibran attributes to it: to 
love one’s country insofar as the land of one’s country and one’s place of birth belong 
to the Earth; to love the latter is to necessarily love the former (and vice versa), in such 
a way that the latter takes precedence over, but does not eliminate or eclipse, the former.  
In the third part of the short essay, Gibran abruptly shifts attention to address the 
other, his “brother” in humanity: “You are my brother and we are both the children of 
one universal holy Spirit … You are a human being, and I have loved you, my 
brother.”54 Gibran goes on to assert that whatever “you may say of me,” “take from me” 
or “do with me,” “you are my brother and I love you,” but not before pointing to the 
limits of transgression that the other, his brother, can inflict upon him, reminding him 
that “you are unable to touch my essence … [and] incapable of jailing my thought, 
because it is as free as a breeze in a space boundless and measureless.”55 “I love you 
when you prostrate yourself in your mosque, when you kneel in your synagogue and 
 
52 Paul De Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1976).  
53 CWs in Arabic, 193. 
54 Ibid., 193.  
55 Ibid. 
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when you pray in your church,” he continues, in what we may deem a Romantic, 
humanist manifesto, evinced in its belief in a higher indeterminate “Spirit” that unites 
humankind irrespective of religious and ethnic divergences – this is the early Gibran 
whose post-religious vision is articulated in Romantic, pre-Nietzschean terms. We 
should not forget that this is “the voice of the poet,” an Arabic voice that speaks in a 
historical period of transformation and turmoil in the Middle East, the poet who takes it 
upon himself to voice his cosmopolitan and universal ideals of Love and justice – and 
we shall see why justice is aligned with Love – in a world of constant unrest and 
enormous promises and threats.  
“You are my brother and I love you, but why do you fight me?” wonders 
Gibran, “why do you come to my country striving to subjugate me in order to satisfy 
leaders who seek glory in your words and joy in your labouring?”56 in reference to 
colonialism (Ottoman in the Middle East before World War One, and Western all over 
the world). Protecting the rights of the other, Gibran emphasizes, is “the noblest and 
finest of man’s acts,” and “should my survival entail the annihilation of another, then 
death would be better and sweeter to me [than life]”.57 The voice of the poet, crucially, 
is not reactionary or defensive here. Rather, it is one that radically interrogates the 
universal obsession with the same by foregrounding the responsibility for the other. It is 
a voice that, in addressing the other in the name of Love, maḥabba, seeks to transcend 
the obsession with the individual or collective self, the self that is nevertheless 
subjected, in his case, to the oppression and subordination of this other. This maḥabba, 
interestingly, is solely realizable if conceived of as justice, such that it becomes the 
opposite of selfishness in its primary responsibility for the other: “I love you and you 
are my brother, and Love is justice in its highest manifestations,” Gibran writes towards 
 
56 Ibid., 194. 
57 Ibid. 
122 
 
the end of the essay, “and if I were not just in my love for you everywhere [fī kulli al-
mawāṭin], then I would be a deceiver who conceals the monstrosity of selfishness 
beneath love’s fine raiment.”58 Gibran’s cosmopolitan and universal vision, thus, is 
fundamentally ethical is its equation of maḥabba and justice, in its very emphasis on 
Love qua justice, whose universality entails that it must be enacted anywhere on Earth, 
“in all lands,” not within the boundaries or in the sole interest of one’s own nation or 
country, in allusion to colonialism and the crimes committed and justified in the name 
of patriotism or national interest. To put it otherwise, justice is not conditional on place 
(nations), time, circumstance, interest …etc.; justice as maḥabba, justice as such, is 
unconditional or else it is not justice: “Where is the justice of authority if it slays the 
slayer and imprisons the robber then falls upon a neighbouring country to kill thousands 
of its people and rob many of its goods? What say the zealots of killers who punish 
murderers and robbers who reward plunderers?”59 
It should be remembered that this essay is written in Arabic, in one of Gibran’s 
early works, at a time when he was still a monolingual writer. Gibran voices his 
universal vision in an unambiguous fashion, in a style that is not tersely symbolic or 
allegorical as is the case with his later work in English. My reading has shown that the 
text, however “exhaustedly” the oeuvre of its writer has been read, always escapes 
prejudice, categorization and pigeonholing, that the text challenges – the presumptions 
we have about – Gibran as a bilingual writer. Gibran’s (later) work in English does not 
fully break from his (early) work in Arabic, especially in terms of its prophetic register, 
as the voice of the poet anticipates the multi-lingual expansion of his universal, 
prophetic imagination: “I came to be for all [lil-kul] and with all [wa bil-kul] … and 
what I say with one tongue now will be uttered by many tongues to come.”60 His vision 
 
58 Ibid., 195. [emphasis added] 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid. 
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in this particular essay – which also testifies to the singularity of a single text that 
disrupts the supposed homogeneity and is at odds with the imagined totality of the 
oeuvre to which it belongs – interrupts the bond of nation, language and culture such 
that language becomes disruptive of the bond itself. Having said that, I should highlight 
that the language of writing bears, prospectively speaking, not solely on the mode of 
writing, on language as a terrain of aesthetic experimentation, but also on language as 
that which bears a horizon of promise and threat in its embeddedness in a specific 
cultural milieu. As Gibran turns to English as a language of writing, as he becomes a 
bilingual writer, the second language is the one that will most visibly carry his universal 
vision, which would be understood, ironically and paradoxically, as essentially Oriental 
in the (Euro)-American culture that hosted him. If language disrupts the bond of 
language-nation-culture, it is culture – in its appropriation of language, in its discursive 
capacity to absorb and contain the different and the subversive – that reaffirms it, but it 
does so only insufficiently and ineffectually. The bilingual fissure that marks Gibran’s 
literary and intellectual enterprise therefore commands further probing. The rift is 
created, as I now hope to demonstrate, as soon as Gibran embarks on the endeavour to 
write poetry in English in the mid-1910s. The switch for him was by no means an easy 
one, accompanied as it was with some self-interrogatory moments that are particularly 
relevant and revealing here.   
3. The Decision to Write in English: The Bilingual Anxiety  
Gibran’s bilingualism cannot be probed without considering his status as an 
Arab émigré writer in America. His decision to begin writing in English, after 
producing works in Arabic – works short in length but wide and influential in terms of 
their immediate impact on and lasting appeal in Arabic literature – was one that dwelled 
on him a great deal. This is due to his self-consciousness of being a poet who wishes to 
write in a language that is not his native or “mother tongue,” with the enormous 
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linguistic and cultural challenge that this enterprise entails. It is worth noting that 
Gibran continued to write in Arabic after publishing his first book in English, The 
Madman (1918). Al-Mawākib [The Processions], his first serious attempt of writing 
metric and rhythmic poetry (in Arabic) was published in 1919, followed by al-ʿAwāṣif 
in 1920 and al-Badāʾiʿ wa al-Ṭarāʾif in 1923. In the same period, Gibran published The 
Forerunner (1920) and The Prophet (1923), going on to write Sand and Form (1926), a 
short book of aphorisms, and Jesus the Son of Man (1928). He continued to write non-
fiction essays for the Arab press, however, an aspect of Gibran’s writings that is often 
overlooked in Arabic and English scholarship despite its significant contribution to 
debates that concern the Arab Nahḍa and Arab literary modernity.  
I now dwell on Gibran’s decision to write in English, a decision haunted by 
intermittent anxieties and (self)-doubt. Jean Gibran and Kahlil G. Gibran (a cousin of 
Gibran), in their biography of the Arab-American poet, reveal how unsettling it was for 
him to write in English, wondering, “what led him to compose in English?”   
When Mary showed him a copy of Light of Dawn, the recently published poetry 
of Aristides Phoutrides, he was still questioning whether any poet could 
successfully use a second language. He was “much interested in Phoutrides’ 
book,” she wrote, “… but … he said, ‘He’s word ridden – But after all, 
foreigners can’t write English poetry …. Yet I keep on trying.’61 
 
What Gibran was questioning is not uncommon. W.B Yeats, for instance, lambasted 
Tagore for translating his own poetry into English, wondering rather condescendingly, 
“Tagore does not know English, no Indian knows English.”62 In a similar vein, T.S Eliot 
contended that one cannot be a bilingual poet, asserting his unawareness “of any case in 
which a man wrote great poetry or even fine poems equally well in two languages,”63 a 
reminder of his own failure at writing poetry in French. These dispositions, coming 
from canonical figures of Western modernism, are not merely personal but may 
 
61 Jean and G Gibran, Khalil Gibran: His Life and World, 313. [Emphasis added] 
62 Steven G. Kellman, The Translingual Imagination (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 
2000), x. 
63 Ibid.  
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function as taste-makers and gate-keepers. One is reminded, however, of the 
extraordinarily successful attempts of Vladimir Nabokov and Samuel Becket at writing 
“equally well” in two languages, to mention but two towering literary figures that led 
George Steiner to dwell on what he named the “exterritoriality” of (exilic) twentieth 
century literature.64  
But if “foreigners can’t write English poetry?” why was Gibran insistent on 
doing so? Is it the urge to be recognized as an Arab cosmopolitan writer in America? 
Will this bear on his writings in Arabic, and if so, how? The aforementioned 
biographers attach Gibran’s decision to write exclusively in English to the scathing 
criticism heaped on the form and language of al-Mawākib, his long Arabic poem 
written in classical form but somewhat experimentally. The criticism, they claim, “did 
inhibit his Arabic production, and finally ended it.”65 We read: 
His last truly creative poem had been The Procession, and this work, so 
important to him, was attacked not only for its “corrupt images” but for its 
linguistic and metrical weaknesses. Faced with the choice of continuing to 
struggle for acceptance by the Arabic world of letters or of confining himself to 
expression in English, he took the latter course. With this decision he resolved 
the last major dichotomy in his life.66 
  
The point is well taken, but to ascribe Gibran’s late exclusive espousal of English as a 
language of writing poetry to the supposed failure of his Arabic poem is slightly 
reductive and unconvincing. After all, the poem, for all its weaknesses, was not a 
failure, but an experimental attempt that helped loosen the then rigid and unquestionable 
form of classical Arabic poetry, and the scope of this chapter prevents me from going 
into further detail in this regard.67But to go as far as claiming that his decision to write – 
 
64 Ibid., 16. 
65 Jean and G. Gibran, Kahlil Gibran: His Life and World, 370. 
66 Ibid. 
67 The poem’s structure and its Rousseausian celebration of the primordial goodness of nature are at the 
centre of many critical accounts of it, especially that of Mustafa Mahmud al-ʿAqqad. For a very brief 
survey of the early criticism and interpretation that the poem invited as well as a critical reading of it in 
relation to William Blake, see Hawi, Kahlil Gibran, 219-22. Some critics, like Nazik Saba Yard in her 
introduction to the 1992 edition of the poem, argues that Gibran was poetic in his prose, not his poetry – a 
point that Jayyuzi has also emphasizes.  
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and the fact that he wrote –almost exclusively in English after al-Mawākib “resolved the 
last dichotomy of his life” is to undermine his status as a foreigner who adopted 
English, his adopted language, as a language of writing. It is, furthermore, to turn a 
blind eye to the anxieties that often accompany the bilingual writer who lives in a 
country and writes in a language that is not his native. For Gibran did struggle to be 
recognized in the U.S. as a writer of poetry in English, and his insistence on improving 
his use of English attests to his stubborn and strenuous endeavour to challenge his own 
assumption that “foreigners can’t write English poetry.”  
This self-awareness of being a foreigner and a bilingual who inhabits two 
linguistic and cultural worlds – without fully inhabiting them – deepened his sense of 
exile, as both realms represented terrains of continuous challenge and incessant struggle 
for him. Forging a new literary mode of writing in Arabic poetics that would gain 
recognition and break with the outdated modes of expression was no less laborious than 
the endeavour to write poetry in a language which was not his native and in a culture 
that deemed him an outsider. The first enterprise, however, has undeniably left its 
indelible mark in the history of modern Arabic literature, while he is hitherto 
uncanonized in American literature despite, or because of, the popular appeal of his 
work, mainly The Prophet.68 I am aware of the fact that breaking with a certain tradition 
of writing or thought often triggers sharp counter-reactions, especially in a historical 
juncture where traditional modes of writing and thought were highly venerated and 
perpetuated by the political and religious institutional authorities, and that the struggle 
to revive the Arab literary scene, therefore, was one that he must have anticipated.  
That Arabic was his native tongue, however, is a vital element whose role and 
impact on his English writing – and the decision to do so – should be taken seriously as 
 
68 I touch on this issue in section two of Chapter Four. 
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far as his bilingualism is concerned. His anxieties about his own English haunted him 
for years. In 1918, he wrote to Mary Haskell, 
English still fetters me. I don’t think without looking for words. In Arabic I can 
always say what I want to say. I have coined words and phrases in the Arabic – 
to say what I wanted in the way I wanted – in my way. When I was a boy it was 
my desire to write Arabic as well as anybody ever wrote in Arabic. And in all 
these years, even from the time I first began at sixteen to publish or to be known 
– with all that has been said and written against my ideas – no one has ever 
criticized the way I said it or called it poorly said.69  
 
Until 1918, Gibran claims that no one had criticized the way he writes in Arabic; it was 
the what that had been subject to criticism, not the how. He wants to achieve the same in 
English, but, alas, English “fetters” him. But why this strong insistence and 
determination to write in English? Is it to do with his creative urge to be acknowledged 
as a universal poet in the U.S.? Or is it the realization that any recognition of the work 
he produces in the language of the host country would guarantee him the trans-national 
appeal that would make his work reachable to the Arab world through translation, a 
reminder of Abdelfatah Kilito’s rather poignant remark that “to be [for an Arab writer] 
is to be translated [from Arabic to a Western language or the other way around, as the 
recognition would always involve the West]?”70 This disquieting question should 
remain an open one, its rhetorical nature notwithstanding. Now the second language for 
Gibran, the adopted language which he wants to adopt as a language of writing, 
“fetters” him. Yet he insists on unfettering himself, so to speak, by way of naturalizing 
it, of making it akin to his native language and the way he dwells in it, by way of ‘de-
foreignizing’ it, in short.  
Dwelling – speaking and writing – in two languages is not as liberating as one 
might think, especially if the adopted language is the language of the adopted country 
whose literary history goes beyond the U.S. (Euro-America), and whose (then) current 
 
69 MH Journal, May. 6, 1918. [emphasis mine] 
70 Kilito, Je Parle toutes les langues, 50. 
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poetic usage he was not (perhaps) profoundly aware of, as his confession to Mary 
Haskell in 1922 reveals, 
I have a fear about my English. For years I have wondered about this, but I have 
not said it to you. Is my English, modern English, Mary, or is it the English of 
the past? For English is still to me a foreign language. I still think in Arabic 
only. And I know English only from Shakespeare and the Bible and you.71 
 
Arabic implacably lurks in the background, devouring, as it were, his second language, 
to use the metaphor of bestiality that Abdelfattah Kilito employs to describe the 
experience of bilingualism: “When two languages live side by side, one or the other will 
always appear bestial. If you do not speak as I do, you are an animal. The “I” in this 
case must occupy the dominant position; if I am the weaker party, it is I who am the 
animal.”72 Yet Gibran’s initial experience of bilingualism is not essentially explainable 
in terms of power. Rather, it is one in which the adopted language would never 
outweigh the native or “mother tongue” – even if it appears to do so –  but would 
hopelessly occupy a secondary importance in relation to the first, such that the latter 
will invariably, often unbeknownst to its user, tinge or haunt, as it were, the adopted. 
Kilito’s metaphor of bestiality, so far as bilingualism is concerned, is challenged by 
Abdelkebir Khatibi’s metaphor of eroticism in his Amour bilingue (1983): the two 
languages that live side by side in the same tongue inhabit a space of eroticism, of 
mutual exchange and enrichment.73 This creative mutual enrichment, however, takes 
place somewhere, that is, in a specific cultural, historical and social context where the 
text is culturally translated in accordance with the mode of reason and ways of reading 
dominant in that cultural milieu. More specifically, by adopting the host language as a 
language of writing, the culture in which Gibran’s text is produced would adopt the text 
itself according to its own discursive codes, a point to which I shall return later. Gibran, 
 
71 Jean and G Gibran, Kahlil Gibran: His Life and World, 363-64. [emphasis added] 
72 Kilito, The Author and His Doubles, trans. Michael Cooperson (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 2001), 108.   
73 See Wail Hassan, “Introduction” in Kilito, Thou Shalt Not Speak my Language, trans. Wail Hassan 
(Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2017), xiv, xviii, xix.  
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furthermore, is in a muddle as to whether his English is “modern” or that “of the past.” 
One is inevitably driven to wonder why it was the case that “[he knew] English only 
through Shakespeare and the Bible and [Mary]” in the cosmopolitan climate of the early 
twentieth century New York. Was he not also acquainted with Blake, Keats, Shelley, 
Carlyle and Whitman as his letters and writings demonstrate? Or did he confine himself 
to the heated literary and intellectual debates that captured the Arab scene at the time? 
The latter case seems to be more plausible, as his various articles and essays on Arab 
literature, language and writing reveal. I shall come back to one of these essays later, 
which is significant in its contribution to those debates and relevant to my concern in 
this chapter.      
Gibran’s bilingualism warrants further attention and invites me, partly because it 
has been deemed secondary or left unnoticed in critical appraisals of his work, to raise 
more disturbing questions. I am raising these questions to disturb, more precisely, the 
tendency to either “resolve” or “politicize” Gibran’s bilingual experience, this shift from 
one language to another that is either taken granted by forgetting the question of power 
on the one hand, or accounted for in terms of discursive acquiescence to the dominant 
culture by over-emphasizing the question of power, on the other. If language, following 
Derrida, bears the structure of promise and/or threat,74 even before it reveals itself, 
before the disclosure of its content, then, to push Derrida’s formulation a bit further, 
was the literary adoption of the adopted language in Gibran one that held the promise of 
what the mother tongue could not offer, namely, trans-national literary recognition and 
appeal? Did it not offer, also, the promise of coming to terms with the worldly 
experience of immigration and exile, of the (painful) pleasure that exile affords the 
bilingual writer whose concern with his native language and culture is confined to his 
country or place of birth – Syria and, more broadly, the Arab East? Did this adoption 
 
74 Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, 21-22. 
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signify a kind of threat to the mother tongue, not because the latter was replaced, but 
because it was repressed and, thereby perhaps, culturally mis-translated, as the text of 
the adopted language becomes identified with the vague “civilizational” other – the 
Orient – that the repressed mother tongue represents? Or, was this adoption a betrayal, 
in the double sense of the word, of his origin, his being an Arab and an Oriental, that is, 
no longer Arab but only an Oriental when writing in English?  
“The irreplaceable uniqueness of the mother tongue,”75 its untranslatability, to 
summon Derrida again, is precisely what renders it replaceable. It is replaceable 
because it is untranslatable; untranslatable, incomprehensible, in the host(ile) country, 
translatable only by way of replacement, which would not completely replace it in 
Gibran’s case – the mother, the unique, the “place of madness itself.”76 Rather, English 
would repress and displace his mother tongue, as I show below; it would not replace it. 
It must be remembered that it is Gibran’s own displacement that entailed the adoption 
of his second language, the language of the host country, as a language of writing 
poetry. The style of this poetry, however, is one which is conspicuously biblical and 
parabolic; in other words, it is out of touch with the radical transformation of poetic 
sensibility in the U.S. in the first two decades of the twentieth century. This style, 
nevertheless, is not merely a “belated” one. The Bible, for Gibran, “is Syriac literature 
in English words … the child of a sort of marriage.”77 Adopting the biblical style in 
English is an assertion, in other words, that his writings bear the trace of “Syriac 
literature,” that what he writes in English remains “Syriac,” with which he identifies, 
remains, that is, a trace of the imagined collective self. “There is nothing in any other 
tongue to correspond to the English Bible. And the Chaldo-Syriac is the most beautiful 
language that man has made – though it is no longer used.”78 English has repressed his 
 
75 Ibid., 86-88.  
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77 Jean and G Gibran, Kahlil Gibran: His Life and World, 313. 
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mother tongue because the style he would adopt in it is invocative of the Bible, of 
Syriac literature in English, which is to say that English is secondarily important here, 
that it does not have the power, because of its secondary importance, to replace. It can 
only repress his first language because it bears the trace of Syriac literature, the 
literature of the dead mother tongue – can one have two mothers, two “mother tongues,” 
one dead, but not forgotten, the other alive, but repressed? English, thus, by being 
associated with a dead mother tongue, would not be entirely alien to him. Nevertheless, 
this dead mother tongue, “Syriac,” remains dead, invoked only as an imagined old 
source of the self that is retained, by way of translation, in the English Bible. 
Hence, what is forgotten here is not Syriac but translation; what is lost, 
forgotten, eclipsed, buried or unnoticed is not that which is translated but translation 
itself. Gibran’s adoption of the parable and the biblical style is thus a self-translation 
that invokes what is dead by forgetting itself, by forgetting the movement from Arabic 
into English and what this movement entails. One should highlight, in this respect, two 
essential things. The first is that some of the texts he published in The Madman were 
written and published in Arabic first79; and the second is the paramount role that Mary 
Haskell, the woman who was his close friend and financial supporter for a great number 
of years, in editing his English work before publication, and the evidence suggests that 
she was a consistent and meticulous editor.80 We should not forget, furthermore, that his 
adoption of the parable and the biblical style also boils down to the post-religious nature 
of his literary enterprise – one reinvents the religious by adopting a somewhat religious 
 
79 These texts, which were published in al-Funūn, include: “al-Layl wa al-Majnūn [Night and the 
Madman]” (July 1916, 97), “al-Falakī [The Astronomer]” (Dec. 1917, 673), “al-Namlāt al-Thalāth [The 
Three Ants]” (Feb. 1917, 781), “al-Ḥakīmān [The Two Learned Men]” (Nov. 1917, 275) and “Bayna Faṣl 
wa Faṣl [Said a Blade of Grass]” (Nov. 1917, 275). See Hawi, Kahlil Gibran, 179.  
80 See, for instance, MH to KG, Oct. 20, 1917; KG to MH, Feb. 5, 1918; MH to KG, Feb. 10, 1918; KG 
to MH, May 29, 1918; MH to KG May 31, 1918; KG to MH June 5, 1918; MH to KG, June 9, 1918; KG 
to MH June 11, 1918; and KG to MH July 11, 1918. Gibran famously dedicated his al-Ajniḥa al-
Mutakassira (1912) [Broken Wings] to Mary Haskell: “TO THE ONE who stares at the sun with glazed 
eyes and grasps the fire with untrembling fingers and hears the spiritual time of Eternity I dedicate this 
book. – Gibran. Kahlil Gibran, dedication in The Broken Wings, trans. A. R. Ferris (London: Heinemann, 
1959).  
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language. Nor should we deem language only a means, a tool of expression, severed 
from the culture that appropriates it and that it, in turn, articulates. This would lead me 
to foreground the question of hospitality, of the hospes (the host, the master, the guest 
and the stranger) and a whole “chain of significations” that links hospitality to hostility 
in relation to language. It would also lead me to underline the possibility of ḍiyāfa 
(hospitality) and istiḍāfa (hosting, receiving) as iḍāfa (addition or contribution), as far 
as Gibran’s bilingual movement is concerned.            
4. Bilingualism between Hospitality and Hostility 
In this section, I wish once again to ask, and discuss the important question 
raised by the afore-mentioned biographers: What led Gibran to compose in English? If 
the last part of the previous section was an at attempt to account for the choice of 
Gibran’s style in his English writings, here I discuss what drove him to write in English 
in the first place. This entails that the question be tackled phenomenologically, but 
within the worldly context of immigration, exile and foreignness. Drawing on Derrida’s 
reading of Levinas, I address the question of language and bilingualism through the 
prism of hospitality and hostility. By way of ethicizing phenomenology, so to speak, 
Emmanuel Levinas postulates that the other is always already hospitable, passively 
hospitable, because the face of the other always already signals a yes: “there is no face 
without a welcome.”81 The originary yes of the other, therefore, is necessarily a 
welcoming; the face, in its intentionality, receives and welcomes the other, and hence, it 
is essentially hospitable. If the face of the other is inherently hospitable, so is the 
language of the other, I would suggest, which does not, crucially, belong to him/her. 
Writing in the language of the other is a “yes to the Other,” the responsible yes that not 
only “precedes the yes of the Other,”82 as is the case with the face, but does not even 
 
81 Derrida, Adieu, 24. 
82 Ibid. [emphasis in the original] 
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depend on it. The language of the other, like the face of the other, is inherently 
hospitable, yet language, unlike the face, does not belong (to the other). As the other 
which does not belong, language does not lend itself to possession. In its connection to 
the face, however, language is appropriated, not possessed, as native. Hence its 
foreignness, and openness, to those for whom it is not native. The openness of the host – 
the face of the other, the language as other – necessitates the openness of the guest, and 
this (double) openness is perhaps what the French word hôte seems to encapsulate, as it 
is the word for both the host and the guest. This originary linguistic hospitality, 
however, does not always occasion cultural hospitality – in fact it may entail the 
opposite, that is, cultural hostility. Language, albeit essentially hospitable, that is, 
inherently open to the other, is necessarily appropriated in and by (a certain) culture. 
The foreigner, therefore, would be subject(ed) at once to hospitality and hostility, as 
s/he is not only foreign to the language, but to the culture in which this language is 
appropriated as the culture’s “own” language.   
I am here thinking about hospitality, openness, foreignness and hostility in 
relation to language – and the experience of writing in a language which is not 
“maternal” as a foreigner, a xenos, an outsider – this “house of Being”83 that one 
inhabits but never possesses, a house for all, by nativity or adoption, a house that 
receives and hosts its guests in a hospitality offered by language, language as such. And 
since in every hospitality lies an addition, a contribution of some sort, writing in the 
adopted language bespeaks that which lies in every hospitality, namely, that the guest is 
fundamentally (bringing) an addition (to the host language, country, culture, etc.), a 
contribution captured by the lexical/etymological proximity between the two Arabic 
words ḍiyāfa (hospitality) and iḍāfa (addition), and even between the latter and istiḍāfa 
 
83 See Heidegger, “Letter to Humanism,” in Basic Writings, 217.  
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(hosting, receiving).84 “What is added to Being is that which is hosted from addition 
itself [mā yuḍāf fil-wujūd huwa mā yustaḍāf mina al-iḍāfa nafsihā],”85 writes Chaouki 
Zine. He goes on to note that “immigration, translation and language are the 
manifestations that attest to hospitality as addition [ḍiyāfa as iḍāfa].”86 It follows that 
writing in the adopted language is not an act of (self)-betrayal, because one is inherently 
and unwittingly hospitable and open to the other. This is the case even if one betrays 
hostility to the guest, since what preconditions hostility is intentionality, a movement 
towards the other that is essentially hospitable as it moves to, receives and hosts the 
other. For Gibran – and many other exilic/émigrés, bilingual writers – writing in two 
languages reflects and materializes, as it were, the welcoming response to the 
welcoming yes (of language) that “begins” and “commands.”87  
This might explain why Gibran was so insistently keen on writing in English, his 
self-awareness of his status as xenos notwithstanding. Did he feel bound to answer to 
the hospitality of the host country and its language by writing – and insisting to do so – 
in that very language, the strenuous endeavor that might have led him to capitalize on 
his status of an Oriental xenos as a strategy of appeal, even of “survival” as Richard E. 
Hishmeh argues88? One is indeed reminded of his struggle to gain literary recognition in 
the U.S. and his decision to write parables in English despite his awareness that 
“English is not the language for parables.”89 This decision could be seen as a 
‘foreignization’ of English, as that which testifies to ḍiyāfa as iḍāfa (hospitality as – that 
which entails – addition). In other words, unable to write in English as a native could, 
 
84 See Mohammad Chaouki Zine, “al-Hijra, al-Maskūnia, al-Manzil al-Mafqūd: ʿAnāsir fī Hājis al-
Gharāba,” [Migration, Habitability and the Lost Home: Elements in the Apprehension of Heimlich]. 
Majallat Yatafakkarūn [Yatafakkarun Journal], no. 11 (2017): 14-31. 
85 Ibid., 20. 
86 Ibid. 
87 “But since everything must begin by some yes, the response begins, the response commands.” Derrida, 
Adieu, 240. [emphasis in the original] 
88 Hishmeh, “Strategic Genius, Disidentification, and the Burden of The Prophet in Arab-American 
Poetry,” 65-92. 
89 “English is not the language for parables, but one is apt to find faults with his tools when he cannot use 
them well. The fault lies within me. But I will learn how write in English.” KG to MH, May. 16, 1916.  
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he would nevertheless write in it as an Arab Syrian to whom English still carries a 
“Syriac” trace, an English tinged with an imagined trace of the same, insofar as the 
same includes the old sources of self. His shift into English would therefore efface the 
aesthetic particularity of his Arabic mode of writing, for he could not be as linguistically 
creative in English as he was in Arabic. This does not mean that his English work is not 
creative; it means that he was not able, in the second language, to be as stylistically 
inventive as he was in the first.  
His literary contribution in English, thus, would not be evaluated on its own 
terms, that is, by considering both its limitations and merits in a manner that does not 
eclipse the latter by the former. His English mode of writing, prophetically staged and 
ethically and universally oriented, would be deemed “belated” and “Oriental,”90 for 
better or worse, in the imaginary and discursive universe of the metropolitan culture. 
Hospitality, thus, becomes entwined with hostility, a rather subtle and invisible one, and 
therein lies its discursive potency. This subtle hostility forces the foreign, Arab writer 
and his English text onto the identitarian category imposed on him in the host(ile) 
culture. It forces the foreign, Arab writer to be a representative of the Orient in the 
Occident, and as a representative of the Orient, his text would become nothing more 
than an emanation of that Oriental essence, which he and his text thereby cannot escape. 
One might be inclined, however, to view Gibran’s English work in light of what 
Srinivas Aravamudan has termed “Guru English,” the cosmopolitanization of south 
Indian religion through English. Following Aravamudan, we could hazard the 
contention that Gibran’s English work reveals an “underground religiosity without 
fully-fledged religion, self-orientalization without colonialist orientalism, and 
 
90 The Orient as an identitarian category here precedes and pre-determines the literary value of the text. 
See my discussion and interrogation, in Chapter Four, of the early reception of Gibran’s works in the 
U.S.; in particular, The Nation’s review of The Madman and Poetry’s reviews of The Forerunner and The 
Prophet. See also, Waterfield, Prophet, 216.  
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transidiomatic universalism without the need for a foundational universalism.”91 But 
this would obscure, on the one hand, Gibran’s prophetic imagination and the post-
religious force – at once Nietzschean and Abrahamic – of his writings in both languages 
and, on the other hand, the important intellectual and worldly context that enabled their 
emergence and enunciation, as discussed in Chapter One. 
The originary hospitality of language, this universal hospitality of language as a 
house of Being, is that which conditions, in Gibran’s case, both the contribution (al-
iḍāfa) and its hostile, albeit subtle, domestication in the host culture, the appropriative 
culture that separates the same and the other, that identifies, by way of discursive 
strategies and rules, what falls within and without.92 To be more specific, by writing in 
the second language, the language of the host(ile) culture, Gibran’s English text is 
identified as essentially “Oriental,” and this identification is one that Gibran took for 
granted because the civilizational separation of the world into Orient and Occident had 
been discursively ossified in modernity and the Nahḍa. But as to what the signifier 
“Oriental” – or, for that matter, “Occidental” – signifies, the signified becomes so many 
things at once. I deliberately avoid, therefore, using the term “self-Orientalization” in 
this specific context, because it presupposes, on the one side, an agential condition, or a 
set of conditions, where the Oriental can evade being an Oriental in that cultural 
location at that specific point in history but chooses not to – which was not the case.93 It 
also presupposes, on the other side, that the Oriental can refer to one and only one thing, 
an essentialist Orient that is ontologically distinct from and inferior to the Occident – 
which was not, also, the case. Self-Orientalization becomes, in this respect, nothing 
more than a political judgement or a culturalist assumption based on a monosemic and 
 
91 See Srinivas Aravamudan, South Asian Religion in a Cosmopolitan Language (Princeton; Oxford, 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 264.  
92 Every culture, as culture, does that, but it becomes problematic when it is carried out in essentialist, 
racialist and hierarchical terms.  
93 Which does not mean, crucially, the s/he was/is not able to question it, directly or indirectly. The point 
is that the identification, because ubiquitous, was almost impossible to avoid. 
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unchanging notion of symbolic geography, which forgets the discursive and historical 
conditions in which “Orient” and “Occident,” as entrenched identitarian categories that 
often went unquestioned in the modern, colonial period, held specific and varied 
designations and generated different performative acts depending on who uses them, 
where and for what purpose.94  
In this context, Gibran speaks Abrahamically but as an Oriental, and the 
Abrahamic – more specifically, the prophetic – cannot be reduced to the Oriental. The 
anti-identitarian impulse of his anglophone text, which is generated in modernity and 
against its identitarian reason, attests to the fact that what mattered for him was neither 
Orient nor Occident – nor, for that matter, the “bridging” of the two – but the 
identitarian veils that mask our faces everywhere, which was my concern in Chapter 
One. But because he speaks as an Oriental, because of that pervasive identitarian reason, 
the post-religious thrust of his writings is filtered through that discursive prism of 
identity. The agential space within which he could act as an Arab writer in English was 
therefore very limited. In other words, he could only speak as an Oriental, as an 
outsider, and this Orient as Outside would supplement and, alas, often supplant the 
Abrahamic as Outside – the impossible/the future as the horizon of being and dwelling 
in the world.95 The Outside, in this context, becomes therefore undecidable.96   
 
94 Gibran did identify as an Oriental, but not as a stereotypically fashioned Oriental in the imaginary of 
the Occident. One, therefore, should not look at his English text from a culturalist perspective that sees it 
as nothing more than an acquiescence to the Orientalist distinction between a “mystical” East and a 
“materialist” West. This is partly because any textual engagement with his texts from a bilingual and 
worldly perspective would inevitably show a complex texture occasioned by the travelling of ideas across 
time and space on a global scale in modernity and the Nahḍa, and across which the prophetic as an 
aesthetic and ethical motif is a consistent element.   
95 See sections two and three of Chapter One. 
96 I am here drawing on Derrida’s notions of the “supplement” and the “undecidable.” The latter refers to 
the fundamental and irreducible semantic ambivalence/instability that at once inheres in and destabilizes 
hierarchical oppositions – such as presence/absence, speech/writing – of which Plato’s “pharmakon” in 
Phaedrus is an illustrative example. See Derrida, “The Pharmakon,” in Dissemination, 95-117. In this 
case, the aesthetics of Gibran’s text is inevitably confused with – and obscured by – the politics of its 
reception in the U.S. See sections one and two of Chapter Four.  
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The chasm that Gibran wanted to cross between his Syrian and English work is 
perhaps unbridgeable. But this chasm goes beyond his own writings, which, as I tried to 
show in Chapter One, disrupt and transcend identitarian reason. This gulf is therefore 
the by-product of his bifurcating experience as an émigré bilingual writer in the worldly 
and cultural context in which he lived. Both here and there, neither here nor there, but 
seeking no “third space,” his bilingual experience is one in which the two languages in 
question depend on one another (as I show in the next section), but in such a way that 
one, Arabic, overwhelms the other, English, which resulted, for him, ironically, in 
continuing to write poetry in the second despite the entrenched and overwhelming 
presence of the first. His attachment to Arabic therefore never withered, and it 
manifested itself, not in his English work – which afforded him with the possibility of 
literary recognition as an Arab cosmopolitan writer in the U.S. – but in his engagement 
with debates concerning Arab literary and cultural modernity, the Arab Nahḍa and, 
more specifically, the Arabic language.  
5. Arabic, Bilingualism and the Orient as Identitarian Veil 
Gibran’s attachment to Greater Syria – the geographical space that includes, 
nowadays, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine/Israel – was unwavering even though 
he lived in the U.S. for almost thirty years.97 English never outweighed his deeply 
intellectual and cultural attachment to the Arabic language. The alien tongue, to put it 
otherwise, was not tempting enough for him, but was tempting all the same, strongly 
and persistently preoccupied as he was with the linguistic, cultural and civilizational 
status of Syria and the Arab world at the time. Not only is this evinced in his literary 
and poetic writings, but it is voiced, most importantly, in the numerous articles and one-
act plays that he wrote for active Arab press in the Mahjar over the years. I will focus 
 
97 He emigrated to the United States in 1895, returned to Lebanon in 1898 to study Arabic, and in 1902 he 
went back to America where he lived until his demise in 1931.  
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on the national orientation of his literary and intellectual enterprise at length in the next 
chapter. Since I am, in this chapter, interested in Gibran as a bilingual writer, I now turn 
to his late Arabic writings, and particularly to his essay “Mustaqbal al-Lugha al-
ʿArabiya [The Future of Arabic Language].” This essay testifies to and exemplifies his 
relentless preoccupation with the Arab East as a civilizational space, even when he was 
writing poetry exclusively in English in the 1920s. But I highlight this aspect in relation 
to his bilingualism: namely, what each language represented and meant for him as a 
bilingual writer.  
In “The Future of Arabic Language” – first published in 1920 in al-Hilāl 
periodical,  republished in al-Badāʾiʿ wa al-Tarāʾif (1923)98 and later translated into 
English, but not entirely, by Adnan Haydar in 201099 – Gibran lends the utmost 
significance to what he calls the “the power of invention,” which stands, for him, as that 
upon which the future of the Arabic language is ultimately contingent. “Language is one 
manifestation of the power of invention in a nation’s totality or public self,” he writes. 
“But if this power slumbers,” he goes on, “language will stop in its tracks, and to stop is 
to regress, and regression leads to death and extinction.”100 Gibran warns that unless 
invention is present “in all the nations that speak Arabic, the future [of Arabic] will be 
like the present of its two sisters – Syriac and Classical Hebrew.”101 He predicates his 
argument on the poet as at once an epitome and a metaphor for ibtikār (invention) and 
 
98 This was originally an interview with Gibran and that was later turned into an essay when republished 
in al-Badāʾiʿ wa al-Tarāʾif. 
99 Haydar avoided the translation of two sections, entitled, in the form of questions, as follows: “Will the 
spread of Arabic be propagated at higher and lower levels of education, and will all of the sciences be 
taught in it?”; and “Will al-fusḥa [the standard] triumph over the different dialects and unite them?” I 
speculate that the translator abstained from translating these two sections because of the controversial and 
sensitive nature of the issues discussed therein – the problem of education and the issue of 
standard/dialect – not to mention Gibran’s defence of the dialect in the essay and his advocacy for its 
creative integration into the standard.   
See Kahlil Gibran, “The Future of the Arabic Language (Excerpt),” in Tablet & Pen: Literary Landscapes 
from the Modern Middle East, ed. Reza Aslan (New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 2011). 6-11. 
All the following quotes in my discussion of this essay are cited from Haydar’s translation unless 
otherwise noted.  
100 Ibid., 6. 
101 Ibid. 
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ibdāʿ (creativity) such the figure of the poet becomes everything which an imitator is 
not. The poet, for him, is “the father and mother of the language”; and if so, he argues, 
“the imitator is the weaver of its shroud and the digger of its grave.” The poet is, by 
definition, “every inventor, be he big or small, every discoverer, be he strong or weak, 
every creator, be he great or humble, every lover of pure life, be he a master or a pauper 
and everyone who stands in awe before the day and the night, be he a philosopher or a 
guard at a vineyard.”102 The life and revival of the language and, by extension, the 
countries103 in which this language is spoken, are contingent upon the poetic – that is, in 
Gibran’s logic, the inventive as opposed to the imitative – energy and rigour of its 
speakers, not solely in poetry or writing but, as Gibran’s stretched metaphor of the poet 
indicates, in every domain of life. Language, for Gibran, is understood as Life, that is, 
as Being, and since Life for Gibran is “a formidable procession” that “forever moves 
forward,” language, whose survival hinges on the inventive urge of its speakers or lack 
thereof, would therefore either move forward or lag behind. Language is the Life/Being 
of its own speakers. The absence of invention means imitation, that is, death. Gibran’s 
modernist vision (ruʾyā ḥadāthiyya) in this essay is premised upon invention (ibtikār) as 
the event (ḥadath) that would guarantee the innovation (iḥdāth) of language and its own 
speakers. The “power of innovation,” as “hunger, thirst, and longing for the 
unknown,”104 is that which would liberate the Arab self from sterility, from being 
hostage to its own identitarian closure, that is, to its past as the sole horizon for its 
raison d’être. Language should never cease to be regenerated by the creativity of its 
 
102 Ibid., 9.  
103 As far as Arabic is concerned, we cannot speak of “national” literature in the modern European sense 
of the term. Arabic literature (adab), which predates modernity – Arabic as a language has not witnessed 
a dramatic transformation in and after modernity; the Qur’an or any premodern “text” in Arabic is legible 
and comprehensible to the modern Arabic reader, although with some difficulty – cannot be understood 
as strictly “national,” that is, as confined to one particular national state. It is, in a sense, already trans-
national; or, perhaps more accurately, the “colonial” birth of the modern nation-state in the Arab world 
has transformed Arabic from a pre-national cosmopolitan language into a trans-national one, whose 
literature is thereby necessarily trans-national and diverse.   
104 Gibran, “The Future of the Arabic Language,” 6. 
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speakers, who are incumbent with the task of opening up language to its potentiality of 
ibtikār and iḥdāth because, to quote Yacine Nourani in his analysis of the national 
ideology of language as self-generating in the reformist project of the Nahḍa, “if the 
language fails to grow, it reflects the passivity, the internal moral failure of its 
speakers.”105 To put it in Heideggerian terms, Gibran, by bestowing upon the poet the 
role of reviving the language, calls for a radically “poetic dwelling” in the world, insofar 
as “poetic” designates that which invariably sets out to liberate language from its 
orthodox spectrum of expression, that which enables us to experience Being in novel 
and innovative ways, as Gibran’s metaphor of the poet powerfully suggests.  
Gibran, furthermore, employs the image of the poet, so steeped in Arab culture, 
by extending it to encompass every domain of social, cultural and economic life, with 
the underlying aim of “reviving” the Arab “civilization.” In this regard Gibran must be 
seen as a pursuing the Arab Nahḍa’s intellectual trajectory. Although he does not 
embrace the positivist and rationalist paradigm that some of the prominent Nahḍa 
intellectuals and reformers espoused,106 he cannot but consider the West, as did the 
Nahḍa reformers, to be leading the “procession” of history which the Arabs had led in 
the past, and in whose “rear” they now “march.” This historical universalism is 
employed here, as indeed it had been adopted in the Nahḍa,107 to justify the Arab 
“civilizational retardation” and accentuate its entanglement in modern history. Unlike 
the Nahḍa reformers, however, Gibran does not regard the West as the model of 
civilization and progress. In other words, the civilizational trajectory that the Arabs 
would carve out for themselves, Gibran argues, should not take as its model that of the 
West. The revival of this civilization should rather spring from within, from the Arabic 
 
105 See Yaseen Noorani. “‘Hard and Soft Multilingualism.” Critical Multilingualism Studies 1:2 (2013): 
24. 
106 See Sheehi, Foundations, 24-25. 
107 Sheehi refers to a “nomenclature of reform” whose telos is modern civilisation (tamaddun and hadara) 
that prevailed almost amongst all Arab reform discourses throughout the nineteenth century. Ibid. 24-25.  
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language itself as the locus of its speakers’ “power of invention.” Any borrowing from 
the West or the Arabo-Islamic past is inevitable, but this inevitability entails an alert, 
critical attitude. This is an Arab, Gibranian vision that is at odds with the Nahḍa’s 
positivist and rationalist epistemology of “civilization and progress,” which embroiled 
modern Arab subjectivity in a strained Hegelian interaction with West and its colonial 
modernity.108 Yet Gibran’s essay, it must be remembered, was written when Greater 
Syria fell into the hands of colonial France and Britain, which resulted in the well-
known partition of the area whose effects are still felt today. His concern for the future 
of the Arabic language is not only reflective of the primacy of Arabic for him, but it is, 
most importantly, part of a resistance movement that sought to ward off the colonial and 
cultural influence of the West on the Arabs, who must preserve their particularity – not 
particularism, but an emphasis on the universal potentiality that this particular form of 
life still possesses – by generating the power of invention necessary for their 
civilizational survival. 
Gibran goes as far as defending the dialects and foresees, albeit soberly, their 
integration into the “body of al-fusḥa [the standard]” by drawing on the example of the 
creative use of Italian by Dante, Petrarch and St Francis of Assisi, and its decisive role, 
as he sees it, in transforming Italian from a vernacular into a standard language. 
Towards the end of the essay, Gibran makes a plea for an Eastern authenticity and 
originality in Arabic literature that breaks with the outdated modes of poetics that are no 
longer able to answer to the (then) Arab social, political and cultural status quo:  
Let your self-esteem prevent you from composing eulogies, elegies, and 
occasional poems, for it is better for you and for the Arabic language to die 
despised and cast out than to burn the incense of your hearts before the idols and 
the monuments. Let your national zeal spur you to depict the mysteries of pain 
and the miracles of joy that characterize life in the East, for it is better for you 
and for the Arabic language to adopt the simplest events in your surroundings 
 
108 Ibid., 33-36. 
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and clothe them with the fabric of your imagination, than to translate the most 
beautiful and the most respected of what the Westerners have written.109 
 
I wish to stress two points here. First: “national zeal” for Gibran becomes a strategic 
incentive for rejuvenating Arabic literature in that its subject matter should derive from 
the local “imagination” and “surroundings” of the Arab subject. To put it otherwise, 
“national zeal” should encourage an ibtikār of national language rooted in the local 
“imagination,” itself contingent upon the material conditions of the present and 
detached from the past, that is, from tradition insofar as it perpetuates modes of 
expression that are unable to articulate the present of the Arab subject in its yearning for 
a better future; in short, tradition as traditionalism. Second: this national literature, 
however modest, becomes, according to Gibran, better than any translation of Western 
literature, however great. Gibran might be alluding to Lutfi al-Manfaluti, whose rather 
“unfaithful” and “domesticating” adaptations of French literature110 marked the Arab 
literary scene at the time. But why is Gibran, arguably one of the pioneers of Arab 
literary modernity whose work in Arabic exhibits many “Western” influences, 
astonishingly dismissive of translation and supportive of a notion of Arabic literature 
that is premised, albeit strategically, on an Arab national spirit? Was the kind of 
literature he wrote possible at all without the influence of modern Western literature? 
Gibran is not referring to modern forms of literature whose provenance is undeniably 
European, but to literature’s capacity to articulate the local reality and imagination of 
the Arab subject. This capacity would potentially preserve the Arab cultural and social 
particularity but in a literary form whose “universality” is taken for granted. In a 
 
109 Gibran, “The Future of the Arabic Language,” 11. [emphasis added] 
110 Most of the works of Mustafa Lutfi al-Manfaluti (1876-1924), except al-Nadharāt, are Arabized or 
adapted, rather than translated, versions of French texts, which render them faithful to the Arab literary 
tradition by being unfaithful to the original French language and cultural, literary context. Al-Manfaluti, 
after all, did not speak any European language. On the impact of al-Manfaluti’s work on modern Arabic 
literature, see Kilito, Thou Shalt Not Speak My Language, 3-5. 
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response to a question regarding the influence of Western civilization on the Arabic 
language, Gibran writes:  
The Western Spirit is at once our friend and our enemy. It is a friend if we can 
vanquish it and an enemy if it can vanquish us, a friend if we can open our 
hearts to it, and an enemy if we offer it our hearts, a friend if we borrow from it 
what suits us and an enemy if we place ourselves in situations that suit it.111 
 
This passage should be read in its proper historical context, that of colonialism. Gibran, 
as a colonial subject, however remote or cut off he might be from his roots, advocates a 
critical version of nationalism and a poetics of language whose “power of invention” 
should come exclusively from within the sources of the Arab self. Translation without 
innovation is undesirable and must be avoided; cautious and critical borrowing, 
however, is preferable –indeed recommended – because “the Western civilization,” 
being at “the forefront of [life’s] procession,” is by necessity the one that would exert 
influence on “the nations that walk last in the procession,” the imitators.112 Is not this 
cautious borrowing – borrowing “what suits us” – an instrumentalization? Since the 
Arabs are no longer at the forefront of the civilizational procession, since, in other 
words, they have no agential and civilizational capacity to influence the other, the sole 
horizon for their language and literature to thrive is to carry out an “inventive” 
borrowing that would not eclipse their particularity. Otherwise, the “enemy” would 
simply “vanquish” them. 
The bilingual Gibran who, in the same year published The Forerunner in 
English, is a staunch defender of the Arabic language. Its survival, as he sees it, depends 
on “the power of invention” from within the (re)-sources of the Arab, Eastern self. 
Imitation, of the past or the West, would cause the regression and death of the language, 
 
111 Gibran, “The Future of the Arabic Language,” 8. 
112 In his one-act play Assilbān, published in al-ʿAwāṣif (1916), the preservation of the supposed “purity” 
of Arabic literatures – according to one of the characters, Yusuf Masarra, a writer and litterateur – would 
bring about the death of the language and its literatures. “The old nations which do not benefit from what 
the new nations produce run the risk of literary death and spiritual extinction,” Yusuf responds to Khalil 
Bik (a government employee), who believes that “the influence of the Western literatures on our language 
is a pernicious thing.” CWs in Arabic, 270. 
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and, for that matter, of its speakers. This would be understandable if Gibran were a 
monolingual writer. His bilingualism, however, means that English for him – the second 
acquired language – is necessarily and unsurprisingly secondary in its cultural and 
civilizational importance. But if it holds this secondary importance – which does not 
mean it is unimportant – this is because it is simply not “the language of the mother.” 
So, what happens to the latter when one writes in the second language? Does writing in 
the second language necessarily entail or presuppose the forgetting of the first? Gibran 
writes in the second language, the language of the civilization that “adopted” him,113 
only by remembering the mother, defending the mother, perpetuating the mother. The 
language of the mother must be maintained, and this maintenance is the condition of 
writing in the second language. In other words, writing in the adopted language depends 
on the active remembrance and maintenance of the first. Thus, to write as a poet in 
English, for Gibran, requires the active preservation of Arabic, the tongue that lost its 
universal force but that nevertheless still retains, and is able to enact, its potential for 
universality, which hinges upon the innovative, poetic spirit of its speakers.     
Yet, to write as an Arab writer in English, to enact the universality of the 
prophetic in a Western language as an Arab writer, entails both an assiduous effort of 
self-translation – translation in the sense of carrying oneself across from one language 
to another,114 a transformation whose outcomes would go beyond the “intentions” of the 
self-translated writer – and a struggle for recognition in the cultural space that 
“adopted” him. This recognition would assuage the anxiety and affliction of living in a 
country which is not his own and writing in a language which is not his native, and 
would further mitigate those adverse aspects of exile that are deliberately marginalized 
 
113 See the first epigraph of this chapter. 
114 I am drawing on the Latin root translatio, which combines trans (across) and the past participle of 
ferre, latio, meaning “to carry” or “to bring.” Translat, that is, “carried across,” is the past participle of 
transferre.  
146 
 
in the liberal cosmopolitan imagination of the metropolis,115 but only at the cost of 
cultural translation. As an Arab, Oriental immigrant in that linguistic and cultural 
territory, Gibran faces the double challenge of writing well in the adopted language and 
gaining the cosmopolitan recognition of the culture that adopted him. To adopt, 
therefore, a language whose “civilization” is leading the procession of history, is to be 
willy-nilly adopted by its culture. How would this culture adopt him then, he who writes 
as a post-religious, prophetic poet – the madman, the forerunner and the prophet – who 
sets out to demolish the new gods of modernity and announce an impossible, poetic 
dwelling in the world? I will address this question in detail in Chapter Four, but suffice 
it to point out for now that this culture would essentially adopt him as an Oriental, as an 
outsider who speaks in the name of, who speaks, as it were, the Orient, in an Occidental 
cultural sphere. I am here speaking of the Orient as fashioned in the imperial 
imagination of the Occident: essentially mystical, mysterious and strange, the 
simultaneously threatening and desirable Outside that is constitutive, by virtue of its 
domesticated distance, of the self-definition of the Occident itself.  
Thus, by writing in the adopted language Gibran is not so much seen as 
linguistically and culturally different as ontologically distinct, because “Oriental,” from 
the Occidental culture. Filtered through discursive prism of the host(ile) culture, he 
becomes the incarnation of the Oriental as a culturally constructed other. In other words, 
far from being the universally equal other whose essence remains inaccessible and 
unamenable to the appropriation of the same, he is automatically categorized as an 
appropriated other, which necessarily entails that his text would be culturally mis-
 
115
 “Conceiving of exile solely as an engine for the production of cosmopolitan attitudes can, and often 
does, leave out its other essential aspects: the need to circumscribe one’s experience in the constraints of 
a new cultural framework, the imperative to begin to translate that experience in languages that are often 
not yet one’s own, and to grope one’s way through the loss and trauma intrinsic in this process of 
transition.” See Galin Tihanov, “Narratives of Exile: Cosmopolitanism Beyond the Liberal Imagination,” 
in Whose Cosmopolitanism? Critical Perspectives, Relationalities and Discontents, ed. N. Glick Schiller 
and A. Irving (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2015), 141-59 
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translated, that is, understood and interpreted in culturalist and reductionist terms, as I 
show in detail in Chapter Four. Yet his text, as a self-translated text, as a bilingual 
offspring, cannot be reduced to an Oriental, identitarian designation. The Orient, here, 
functions as an identitarian entity that veils the text itself and haunts it, so to speak, that 
pre-determines the understanding and interpretation of the text by reducing it to an 
imagined essence and genealogy: the Orient; while the latter remains one discursive 
element, among others, in the multi-layered act of reading, understanding and 
interpretation. This means that, in a (Euro)-American cultural context, both his post-
religious, anti-identitarian vision and the Orient as identitarian veil simultaneously and 
paradoxically inhabit his English text, two elements that should not be confused with 
one another but that ought to be hermeneutically exposed and critically unveiled, 
respectively.  
I wish to finish this section by discussing one of Gibran’s powerful prose poems 
in English, “My Friend,” published in The Madman. This is a text that offers us the 
possibility of closely reading it in relation to what I have been discussing so far, namely 
the questions of the text, identity as a mask or veil and what lies beneath or beyond any 
bilingual or bicultural chasm. Who is this friend that the anglophone Gibran is 
addressing in the prose poem? And why friendship? We should, perhaps, not so much 
inquire about “who” the friend is – that is, his “identity” – as about what the madman is 
saying to this hypothetical friend: 
My friend, I am not what I seem. Seeming is but a garment I wear – a care-
woven garment that protects me from thy questionings and three from my 
negligence. 
 
The “I” in me, my friend, dwells in the house of silence, and therein it shall 
remain for ever more, unperceived, unapproachable.116 
 
 
116 CWs, 7.  
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Seeming and being, the madman is saying, are two different things. We may conjecture 
that this friend has mistaken the madman’s “garment” for his being. The madman 
therefore responds by revealing in a prose poem addressed to this friend, that his being, 
his “I,” remains “unperceived” and “unapproachable,” irrespective of his “garment.” 
But the garment protects the madman from the friend’s questionings and protects the 
friend from the madman’s negligence. Does this mean that without the garment the 
madman would neglect the curiosity of the friend, that the “care-woven” garment – 
identity – is a necessary tool of protecting the self from the other and the other from the 
self? The madman goes as far as telling the friend that he would not have him 
understand his “seafaring thoughts,” visit him in his Hell, “hear the songs of [his] 
darkness nor see [his] wings beating against the stars”117 at night. The prose poem, 
paradoxically, discloses all this to the friend. It informs him that not only is he not able 
to perceive and approach the essence of the madman, but that he is everything the 
madman is not, though even when the friend calls him “across the unbridgeable gulf, 
“My companion, my comrade,” the madman would call back “My friend, my 
comrade”.”118 We may infer that the friend is the hypothetical other, perhaps his 
American reader – since the poem is written in English and published in the U.S. – but 
also the other in general. What Gibran is saying is that the “I” remains essentially 
inaccessible to the other, irrespective of the cultural and social garments that we wear, 
irrespective of the language that we use or inhabit. In other words, ipseity precedes 
identity and remains “unperceived” and “unapproachable,” regardless of the identity of 
the friend and whether one shares it with her or not. Identity, nevertheless, is a 
necessary protective “garment,” but nothing more than a garment. But why would the 
madman reveal that which he does not want the friend to see, hear, visit or understand? 
 
117 Ibid., 7. 
118 Ibid. 
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Why would he say to his friend, “thou art good and cautious and wise; thou art perfect – 
and I too, speak with thee wisely and cautiously. And yet I am mad. But I mask my 
madness. I would be mad alone.”119? Can we reveal, in writing, that which we mask 
because, paradoxically, we do not want it to be seen? The mask, thus, does not mask the 
“I” but the “madness” of the “I,” that is, its different mode of reason. After all, the 
madman is he who lost his masks, who belongs to himself without pre-fashioned masks, 
but when he is with his friend, he has to mask his madness again and announce, 
paradoxically, that he would mask it, that is, that he “would be mad alone”120 in order to 
protect the friend from his negligence. The madman, however, does not seem to care 
about the way the friend perceives and approaches, not his “I,” but his garment. Is this 
because “seeming” is inessential, secondary and only necessary because protective? If 
“seeming” is inessential but necessary, does this also apply to the identity of Gibran as 
an Arab, “Oriental” writer in English? 
What I wish to emphasize, before I address this question, is that writing becomes 
both the mask and that which the mask is masking. In other words, writing reveals, not 
the madness behind the mask, but the mask in its masking of the madness: “I am not 
what I seem,” but I mask it nonetheless! It is the text that reveals what it simultaneously 
conceals, that which cannot be, in its essence, revealed: the inaccessibility of the “I.” 
But this text is written in English, in Gibran’s adopted language, which masks both his 
native language and his individual style in that native language. The point is that the 
language in which the text is written is not reducible to the “culture” that appropriates it 
as its “own,” that adopts the foreign writer who adopts this language as a language of 
writing, and that a close attention to the text and what it reveals and conceals would 
“protect” it from being reduced to its own “garment,” from the reader who would 
 
119 Ibid., 8. [emphasis added] 
120 Ibid.  
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mistake seeming for being. And because we cannot approach and perceive being as 
such, we can nevertheless approach that which lies between seeming and being – across 
one language and another, one culture and another – both of which, like form and 
content, or identity and ipseity, remain indissociable. Thus, the chasm would become 
interpretative, not culturalist or identitarian. The chasm would cease to be an essentially 
bilingual one: “My friend, thou are not my friend, but how shall I make thee 
understand? My path is not thy path, yet together we walk, hand in hand.”121  
Gibran’s “path,” as a versatile bilingual writer, is thus necessarily multiplied. 
And this multiplication, attendant on the simultaneously creative and problematic 
bilingual chasm, is one that I have attempted to explore in this chapter. In the creative 
multiplicity of Gibran’s path, I have ferried from the aesthetics of his early Arabic text 
to its poetics of the universal, from the uneasy decision to write in English to the 
challenging double enterprise of being a poet in English – at once pursuing the poetic, 
universal vision of some of his early Arabic works and effacing their aesthetic 
particularity – and committing to the national and civilizational cause of Syria and the 
Arab East, respectively, in Arabic. The latter, as a crucial facet of his literary and 
intellectual enterprise, will attract my focused attention in the next chapter as entailed 
by, but also beyond, the question of bilingualism. What this chapter has meant to show 
is that the universal and the particular in Gibran’s bilingual enterprise coexist and 
depend on one another in ways that are not readily perceptible, albeit not without 
inevitable tensions. What I have been calling the bilingual chasm is that space between 
one language and another that simultaneously allows for the creativity of the guest and 
subjects him or her to the identitarian reason of the host(ile) culture. Gibran’s case is 
illustrative of this tension, yet this text, as a literary text, betrays that what is at stake 
here is as much about bilingualism – dwelling in two linguistic and cultural spheres – as 
 
121 CWs, 8.  
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it is about hermeneutics: that is, the subtle hostility of culture can be countered with a 
subtle hospitality of reading.
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Chapter Three: 
Gibran as a Nationalist and (Post)-Nahḍawī 
 
He who empties his heart from the illusions and false dreams of the Ottoman 
state only to fill it with the promises and ambitions of the foreign states 
resembles one who runs from fire to hell. The Syrian has only his self-reliance 
and his talents, intelligence and excellence to rely on.   
Kahlil Gibran.1 
 
I am a Lebanese and I’m proud of that, 
And I’m not an Ottoman and I’m also proud of that. 
I have a beautiful homeland of which I’m proud,  
And I have a nation with a past –  
But there is no state which protects me. 
No matter how many days I stay away 
I shall remain an Easterner – Easterner in my manners, 
Syrian in my desires, Lebanese in my feelings –  
No matter how much I admire Western progress. 
  Kahlil Gibran, “To the Muslims from a Christian Poet.”2 
 
By the end of World War One, the Ottoman Empire had fallen and the map of 
what we call today “the Middle East” was fundamentally reshaped in accordance with 
the colonial interests of the then Great Powers, Britain and France. The victory of the 
Allies left its indelible stamp in the modern history of the area, of which my interest in 
this chapter, in relation to Gibran, lies in “Syria,” in the strict sense of “geographical 
Syria,” “Greater Syria” or “natural Syria,” many names of what has been historically 
recognized, especially after the dawn of Islam, as bilād al-Shām.3 This is the 
geographical space “stretching from the Taurus Mountains in the north to the Sinai 
 
1 This is from a speech that Gibran gave at a gathering in 1911 of Jamʿiyyat al-Ḥalaqāt al-Dhahabiyya 
(the Society of Golden Circles, whose aim was social and political reform in Syria) in Boston. See Hani J. 
Bawardi, The Making of Arab Americans (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014), 67. For a historical 
account of the society and Gibran’s role in it, see Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 21-33. 
2 This is taken from an open letter to Islam that Gibran published in al-Funūn in 1913. This translation is 
cited in Jean and G Gibran, Kahlil Gibran: His Life and World, 290. [emphasis added] 
3 “Gibran’s Syria is equivalent to Bilad al-Sham, a name devised by the Arabs after the Muslim Rashidun 
victory over the byzantine Empire at the Battle of Yarmouk (AD 636). Meaning left or north, Bilad al-
Sham is so called because it is left of the holy Kaaba in Mecca.” See Adel Beshara, “A Rebel Syrian: 
Gibran Kahlil Gibran,” in The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, Pioneers, Identity, ed. Adel 
Beshara (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 149-50.  
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Peninsula in the south, and from the Mediterranean in the west to the Syrian desert in 
the east.”4 It should not be construed, nevertheless, that Syria as a nation has always 
existed, in a Primordialist or Perennialist sense,5 though the usage of the name “Syria,” 
Greek in its form and etymology, can be traced back to the late fifth and early sixth 
century BC.6 The emergence of a Syrian national, self-conscious discourse can be 
discerned in the writings of the Nahḍa’s intellectuals, reformers and literati in the latter 
half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, chief among whom, to name but 
two towering and influential figures, are Butrus al-Bustani and Jurji Zaydan, whose 
work was paramount in constructing notions of Arab historical consciousness,7 Arabism 
and Syrianness.8 This discourse of Awakening emerged against the background of a 
political contentious and turbulent period marked by European colonial interest and 
imperial, capitalist expansion, initiated by Napoleon’s 1798 invasion of Egypt, and the 
Ottoman struggle to maintain its political and economic control over the area – by 
introducing and enacting reforms – in the face of a medley of local and foreign 
challenges. It is this Nahḍa discourse that, consciously or not, occasions, informs and 
allows for the emergence of Gibran’s national(ist) writings. His nationalist engagement, 
therefore, cannot be probed in isolation from the discursive field that enables its 
emergence.  
This chapter examines Gibran as a nationalist and (post)-Nahḍawī writer by 
looking, mostly but not exclusively, at some of the essays, articles and plays that he 
 
4 Leila Tarazi Fawaz, A Land of Aching Hearts: The Middle East in the Great War (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014), x.  
5 For a short account of the paradigms of Perennialism and Primordialism in relation to the ideology of 
nationalism, see Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 
53-60. 
6 For an account of the history of the word Syria, see Lamia Rustum Shehadeh, “The Name of Syria in 
Ancient and Modern Usage” in The Origins of Syrian Nationhood, 17-29. 
7 Zaydan’s historical novels are a case in point. 
8 See Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 
especially in the chapter “Arab Nationalism,” 275-277; Hisham Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West 
(Baltimore MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 64-65; and Thomas Phillip, “Jurji Zaydan’s role in the 
Syro-Arab Nahda” in The Origins of Syrian Nationhood, 79-90. 
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published in the active early twentieth century Mahjar press in the United States.9 These 
pieces, written in Arabic, display and testify to Gibran’s relentless commitment to the 
Syrian national cause and to the Arab East as a “civilizational” horizon. I demonstrate 
that Nationalism, for Gibran, is imagined and defined territorially, in that it is the 
territory of geographical Syria as a pre-national, pre-state waṭan – homeland or dwelling 
in the spiritual sense of belonging10 – that grounds this nationalism, not sect, religion or 
what Anthony Smith calls “ethnie.”11 The question of Syria – its formation as a nation – 
is entwined with the question of the Nahḍa in Gibran. This formation is inextricably 
linked with liberation – from the Ottoman Empire until its collapse, from Western 
colonialism, but also from what Gibran refers to as the “maladies of taqālid [old 
customs and traditions] and taqlīd [imitation, of the past or the West]”12 that, for him, 
plagued Syria and the Arab East. While I highlight the textual intricacies, the recurrent 
motifs and the significatory paradoxes that mark this discourse, I situate it within its 
historical and discursive context. The specificity of Gibran, in this Nahḍa context, lies 
in his wariness of assimilationism into Europe or the West as the civilizational telos of 
history, while clinging to an Eastern originality13 of ibtikār (innovation/creation) seen as 
the pre-requisite of a true Nahḍa, as yet lacking or “dormant” in the Syrian/Eastern 
subject, hence the post in the (post)-Nahḍawī.  
 
9 For an account of the Syrian Mahjar Press in the U.S., see Bawardi, “The Syrian Nationalism of the 
Mahjar Press” in The Making of Arab Americans, 54-80.  
10 This is indeed one of the essential connotations of the word waṭan before the advent of Arabism, Arab 
nationalism and the modern nation-state. In Gibran’s nationalist discourse, the nation, to draw in Anthony 
Smith, becomes “a felt and lived community, a category of behaviour as much as imagination, and one 
that requires of the members certain kind of action.” Smith, Nationalism, 11. [emphasis mine]. 
11 Ibid., 13-15. 
12 This is quoted from a letter that Gibran wrote to Al-Khoury al-Kufuri in 1913, in which he calls for “an 
enormous intellectual tornado” as the sole remedy to those maladies. See Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 367. 
13 Here, I deliberately avoid the term “authenticity,” used mostly to translate the word and concept of 
aṣāla, which Gibran never used in its modern and contemporary predominant sense in Arab intellectual 
discourse, that of clinging to a supposedly uncontaminated and continuous notion of the same. As my 
discussion in section three of this chapter shows, what is at stake here is an Eastern originality of 
invention or innovation, albeit not without essentialist overtones, and not a culturalist identitarian 
authenticity that the term aṣāla has come to designate.   
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The essays and plays with which this chapter is concerned span the period 
before, during and after World War One. In section one “‘Mother Syria’ and The 
Emergent ‘Syrian Idea’,” I place my analytical focus on Badʾ Thawra [The Beginning 
of a Revolution], a short play published in 1914, in which the yet-to-be-crystallized 
“Syrian idea” is the centre around which the dialogue initially revolves. The Syrian idea 
is subsumed under an East-West civilizational discussion set in religious – 
Muslim/Christian – terms. I focus, moreover, on Gibran’s nationalist posture during the 
War by highlighting his espousal of a cautious nationalism, one that is fuelled and 
sometimes justified by the catastrophic, the famine tragedy in Syria. In section two, 
“The End of the War: Nationalism and the Unfulfilled Quest for Nationhood,” I turn my 
analytical focus to a short play, Bayna Layl wa Ṣabāḥ [Between Night and Morn] 
(1919) and a long essay, “Sūria ʿalā Fajr al-Mustaqbal [Syria on the Dawn of the 
Future]” (1919), both of which capture the dilemma into which Greater Syria had 
plunged following the decline of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the War and prior to 
the official partition of the area by Britain and France. In the essay, Gibran manifestly 
deploys nationalism as a requisite ethical and ideological force for the formation of the 
nation on the one hand, a formation that hinges on individual “will to work” and 
collective (national) creative output and unity, and as the foundation, on the other, upon 
which a critique of the factors that deter its formation is premised. To understand the 
identification of Syrians as Easterners, or the complementarity of nation-building and 
civilizational Awakening, I move to section three: “Syria within the East: Civilizational 
Anxiety and Gibran’s Vision of the Nahḍa.” I start this section by looking at a 
posthumously published short essay entitled “Ilā al-Sharqiyyīn [To the Easterners],” 
whose significance lies in the way in which Gibran addresses his fellow Syrians, 
appealing at once to their “Eastern conscience” and to their “alienated souls in every 
place.” This discussion will lead to me to revisit Gibran’s stance towards “civilization” 
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in his fiction, particularly in his short story “The Tempest.” Here, I argue against the 
contention that he was an anti-urban Romantic who saw no worth in modern 
civilization, that is, as a Romantic who is at odds with “civilization as urbanity.” I will 
end my discussion with an interview, turned later into an essay, on “the Awakening of 
the Arab East,” where Gibran spells out his critical position and vision vis-à-vis the 
Nahḍa. Over the course of my discussion I also refer, when necessary, to other works 
from Gibran’s oeuvre. In laying bare and discussing this crucial facet of Gibran’s work 
as intellectual, this chapter has the double aim of highlighting that the nation, in the 
wider sense of Syria and the Arab East, was a fundamental concern for the bilingual 
writer – as indicated in the previous chapter – and that this concern, insofar as it is 
essentially ethical, is reconcilable with the universal vision that animates his poetic 
writings. And this is best demonstrated, as my overall argument in this thesis insists, by 
paying a close attention to his texts as they intervene in their political, cultural and 
social context without, crucially, reducing them to it.   
A caveat should be stressed here. Gibran firmly and consistently believed in the 
geographical unity of Greater Syria, while remaining sceptical and suspicious of appeals 
and endeavours aiming to divide the area, even after the colonial partition. His well-
known essay “Lakum Lubnānukum wa lia Lubnāni” [You Have Your Lebanon and I 
Have Mine], published in 1923 (under the French mandate) reflects his acute dismay 
and disappointment at the kind of politics in which Lebanon was mired in the aftermath 
of the Mandate and the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920.14 The demonstrable 
idealization of Lebanon in that essay, rather than being a mere sentimentalizing of 
homeland as is mostly claimed, testifies to his disposition that consists in regarding 
Lebanon as a mawṭin, a homeland in the ideal sense of the term, the attachment to 
 
14 For an account of the historical circumstances leading to the partition, see T.G. Frazer, The First World 
War and Its Aftermath: The Reshaping of the Middle East (London: Gingo Library, 2015), 10-11. 
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which is spiritual and apolitical, rather than a patrie or a nation in the modern, European 
sense of the term.15 The potentiality of nation-state realization for Gibran had been 
envisioned in Greater Syria before the partition, of which Lebanon was part.16 This 
position is pronounced in most of the essays and plays analysed or referred to in this 
chapter. Any discussion, therefore, of his “Lebanonization” or “Syrianization” by 
referring to Lebanon or Syria as the nation-states existing today, that is, by forgetting 
the specific historical context in which Gibran was situated, is off the point.  
1.  ‘Mother Syria’ and the Emergent ‘Syrian Idea’   
I focus in this section on the emergent articulation of “the Syrian idea” and 
Gibran’s sense of nationalism before and specifically during the War. “The Syrian idea” 
emerges in Gibran’s writings in 1914, particularly in his short play Badʾ Thawra [The 
Beginning of a Revolution],17 edited and published by John Daye18 in 1988. The year 
1914 marks the beginning of World War One, and the title reflects that the War was 
considered an opportunity to liberate Syria from the Ottoman Empire. The two 
characters of the play, one identified as a Muslim, Ahmad, the other as a Christian, 
Farid, are engaged in an intense conversation, on a rainy day in February 1914 at the 
Café of the Sea in Beirut, over the present and future of Syria as a nation. Farid 
 
15 The first half of the essay creates and invokes a Romantic and idyllic version of Lebanon, hence my 
contention that Lebanon for Gibran is more of a mawṭin (in the spiritual or spatial sense) than a waṭan (in 
the politicised sense that impregnated the term in the Nahḍa discourse). The post-Partition Lebanon, 
which for Gibran is “your Lebanon” or the bad Lebanon, is the subject of his scathing criticism in the 
essay (levelled over the “westernization” of the area and the lack of ethical, national commitment). He 
writes, for instance, “Your Lebanon is at times attached to Syria and at times detached from it. Then it 
contrives against both positions to become at once knotted and unfastened. While my Lebanon is neither 
attached nor detached; nor does it magnify or belittle itself.” See CWs in Arabic, 305.  
16 This is, it must be stressed, the stance of Gibran, who was not, of course, alone in his political 
orientation. The idea of an autonomous state in the whole of ‘geographical Syria’ dates back to the second 
half of the nineteenth century, with its roots in Butrus al-Bustani’s periodical al-Jinān, in which he speaks 
of the Ottoman Empire as our waṭan and Syria as our country or bilād. It is important to remember that 
there were calls for an autonomous state in Mount Lebanon during the same period. See Hoorani, Arabic 
Thought, 274-76.  
17 It is significant to stress that Gibran was not pleased with the Syrian Arab Congress that was held in 
Paris in 1913, to which he declined an invitation to give a speech on the grounds that it did not reflect his 
own disposition. Mary Haskell notes in her journal that “Gibran wants revolution … It need not be 
planned. Revolution even failing will be met with Home Rule, succeeding, will free Syria and Arabia.” 
MH Journal. June 22, 1913.  
18 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 249.  
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contends that “the Syrian idea” has been crystallizing for two years, “expanding against 
the backdrop of freedom, reform and the noble principles that produced Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Voltaire, Patrick Henry, Garibaldi and many others who lifted freedom as 
monuments in the heart of the Westerners,” only to be thwarted by the “magical 
anaesthetic that was concocted by the brains of the Ottoman politicians since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.”19 He goes on to maintain that it is the cunning of 
the Turks and their acute knowledge of “the Syrians’ acumen and the Arab character” 
that enables them “to determine the spot in the Syrian body where the ailment exists, 
spilling their extracts of deception over it.”20 Ahmad, however, repudiating this 
argument, vents his criticism at the Syrians’ idiocy, lostness and blindness, because of 
which the Turks appear to the Syrians in the guise of cunning. That Farid is using the 
phrase “the Syrian idea,” and not nationalism (which Gibran elaborately invokes in a 
later essay), is not surprising: the emergent idea denotes the first stage of national 
consciousness, not identity,21 necessary for the liberation of Syria from the Ottoman 
empire. The idea is still taking shape because Syria was still part of the Empire and 
because those who advocated liberation from the Ottomans were a minority in 
comparison with the majority, who were either hesitant or in favour of staying under the 
protection of the Ottomans given the burgeoning threat posed by the Western colonial 
powers at the time.22  
 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 National consciousness precedes and grounds – although it does not necessarily lead to – a nationalist 
movement or ideology necessary for the formation of a national state, which consolidates this sentiment 
in terms of national identity. On the distinction between national consciousness and nationalism, see 
Smith, Nationalism, 6.  
22 It is important to draw a distinction between Arabism as a potent notion that emerged in the intellectual 
discourse of the Nahḍa and Arab nationalism as a political movement with clear ideological goals, which, 
as Ernest Dawn points out, was not a palpable political force until after 1914. Arab Nationalism, however, 
is premised on and indissociable from Arabism. Syrian nationalists who opposed Ottoman governance 
and Ottomanism remained a minority until 1918, Dawn notes. Of the émigré nationalists, Dawn only 
mentions Ameen Rihani. See Dawn, “The Origins of Arab Nationalism,” in The Origins of Arab 
Nationalism, ed. Rachid Khalidi et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 11-12. 
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What is furthermore interesting in the dialogue is that Ahmad’s diagnosis of the 
status quo – in which he ascribes idiocy to both sides – lays importance on “Islam” to 
the extent that it constitutes the “body” in which the “heart” of “the Arab powers” 
reside.23 Castigating and ridiculing both the Turks and the Arabs in bestial terms – he 
uses the pejorative word “baghlana” which, derived from “mule” or “donkey,” connotes 
idiocy, mindlessness and stupidity – he asserts that he knew “the greatness of Islam” 
when he lived in “Europe,” yet upon returning to his homeland he found himself a 
stranger amongst his own people. That, he goes on, has not blinded him, being amongst 
“blind Muslims” notwithstanding, to what he describes as “the glory of Islam.”24 Islam, 
for Ahmad, in agreement with his friend Farid, is “an absolute, abstract reality,” that is, 
one “that should remain abstracted [mujarrad] of the excrescences [al-zawāʾid] that 
purge it of determination and life,”25 in the words of the Christian character. Ahmad 
proceeds to proclaim that if these “excrescences” preoccupy the contemporary Muslims, 
it should not follow that the malady resides in Islam, “as some Westerners wrongly 
assume,” but precisely in the Muslims:  
Do not forget that Islam is not solely a religion, as English Orientalists like to 
think, but a religion and a civic law [sharīʿa madaniyya] or way of life whose 
enormous wings encompass all the needs of humankind in every age. The true 
Muslim, albeit following a spiritual emotion [ʿāṭifa rūḥiyya], is an individual in 
and member of a civic collectivity and a grand civilization.26  
 
I construe this discourse as a performative one, that is, as an attempt to perform or 
produce a Syrian, Muslim subject, in agreement with a Syrian, Christian one, on the 
nature of religion beyond the Orientalist, colonial outlook on Islam as merely a 
“religion,” and therefore as “un-culture.”27 Yet in the play, Islam is simultaneously 
 
23 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 250.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. [emphasis mine]. 
27 Here, I am relying on Reinhard Schulze who argues that since “decadence” was attributed to Islam at 
the birth of the colonial mission civilisatrice, Islam acquired the status of “un-culture” for “the Europeans 
spectators of the Orient,” because “culture was used as a synonym of humanity, reason and freedom,” 
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posited as ahistorical – that is, abstracted as a metaphysical essence – and civilizational 
– that is, grounded in and manifesting itself in history –, with Muslims, not Islam, as the 
sole cause of their own “decadence.” This metaphysical binary of a- or trans-historical 
essence and historical manifestation permeates Gibran’s nationalist and civilizational 
discourse,28 partly because it was prevalent at the time.29 What is more pertinent to my 
discussion is the attempt to enact a Syrian sceptical subject who is not only suspicious 
of the association between Islam and Muslim “decadence,” but also of that established 
between “Western civilization” (al-madaniyya30 al-gharbiyya) and Christianity. When 
Farid deems Christianity “a basis for the European and American civilization,”31 
Ahmed demurs, invoking the irreconcilability between the moral teachings of 
Christianity and the actions of the modern Christians: “The Christian loves his enemies 
in the Church, yet outside the Church he is preoccupied with the effective means that 
would annihilate his enemies,” something that stands in stark opposition to “Islam” that 
“teaches and acts in accordance to its teachings.”32 This should not be read at face 
value, that is, as a preference for Islam over Christianity, because it is not religion per se 
that is at stake here. The moral domain was central in pre-modern Islam (as a historical 
and civilizational reality), whereas in modernity, a historical transformation that 
 
only to obtain, after the colonial encounter, a “traditional” sense of culture deemed the antithesis of 
“modernity.” See Schulze, “Mass Culture and Islamic Cultural Production in the Nineteenth Century 
Middle East,” in Mass Culture, Popular Culture and Social Life in the Middle East, ed. George Stauth 
and Sami Zubaida (Frankfurt; Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 190. 
28 In his essay “al-Umam wa Dhawātuha [Nations and the Selves of Nations],” he postulates that “every 
people [shaʿb] has a Collective Self [dhāt], analogous in its essence and nature to the individual self. 
Although this Collective Self derives its being from the individuals of a nation… it is nevertheless 
independent from the people in that it possesses a particular life and a unique will.” CWs in Arabic, 251-
53. This postulation is reminiscent of the notion of the nation’s spirit or Volksgeist prevalent in post-
Enlightenment Romanticism, especially that of Herder or Renan.  
29 This notion of an essence that defines the historical subject in terms of “an alternance in a continuity of 
decadence and health” was pervasive in many revivalist projects in modernity, of which the Nahḍa is one 
example. See Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London; New York: Verso, 2009), 97-100.  
30 Gibran, interestingly, seldom uses the word ḥaḍāra, which is equivalent for civilization, but 
madaniyya, which also translates as civilization, but whose etymology demotes civilization qua urbanity. 
When Gibran speaks of al-madaniyya al-gharbiya in the context of the Arab Nahḍa, he most often means 
the material aspects of Western civilization, of whose appropriation as a sign of an Arab Eastern Nahḍa 
he is very suspicious and critical, as I show in the last section of this chapter.  
31 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 250. 
32 Ibid., 251. 
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witnessed the secularizing of Christianity, the moral domain was marginalized, 
particularly with the rise of the nation-state, the capitalist system and the modern 
interdependence of knowledge and power.33 This backdrop helps us understand 
Ahmad’s distinction between Euro-America as a civilizational power that separates the 
moral and the political on the one hand, and Islam in its ideal version to which that 
separation is not constitutive, on the other. In other words, his criticism is an ethical 
one, however uncritical his invocation of an ideal Islam. He stresses towards the end of 
the dialogue, however, his respect for Christianity insofar as it is divorced from the 
actions of the Western Christians. For “there was only one Christian [here he 
intriguingly invokes Nietzsche] and he died on the cross,” adding, “If Jesus of Nazarene 
was back to this world [referencing, interestingly, “Gibran Khalil Gibran”], he would 
die a stranger, in hunger and solitude.”34  
Christianity, deemed not solely the basis but the equivalent of the Euro-
American civilization by Farid, is put into question through the lens of a Muslim 
character, himself very critical of Muslims, yet not of Islam as such, which is abstracted 
as a force that precedes, exceeds and transcends Muslim decadence. In other words, if 
Islam is severed from the “decadence” that European Orientalism has “discovered” in 
it,35 it is nevertheless abstracted as an “essence” irreducible to the “dormant” Muslims 
who are unaware of its enormity. Similarly, Ahmad’s anger is vented less on 
Christianity per se than on the colonial wars and looting done in the name of “the 
Christian West,” on the double standards of this Western Christianity. It is useful to 
note, in this regard, that the early Gibran considers al-kulliya or universality to be “a 
 
33 I am drawing on Wael Hallaq who, relying on Carl Schmitt, Thomas Kuhn and Michel Foucault in his 
use of such concepts as “paradigms” and central of peripheral “domains,” argues that the moral was the 
central domain in pre-modern Islamic governance or Sharia, while in modernity, the moral has become a 
peripheral domain, subject to the legal mechanisms of the modern nation-state. For more on this see 
Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics and Modernity’s Moral Predicament (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2012), 6-13. 
34 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 251 
35 See Schulze, “Mass Culture,” 189.  
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general Christianity,”36 a term – al-kulliya – he uses to denote cosmopolitanism in the 
sense of citizens of the earth, and which he defines as “the preservation of the just rights 
of the self as well as the sacred rights of the other.”37 This might explain why Ahmed is 
averse to the Christian West that does not preserve these “sacred rights of the other,” 
this other who became an object over which European sovereignty presided in colonial 
modernity. What we observe in the play, thus, is a discursive endeavour to rescue Islam 
from (Eastern) Muslims and Christianity from (Western) Christians, and to sever 
“religion” from, indeed to (re)-imagine an “essence” of religion beyond, Orientalism 
and imperialism. In other words, the version of religion proposed here is one that seeks 
to transcend its historical and political configuration or “deformation” in modernity. It is 
one that aims to rescue what it takes to be the nature of religion, whose essence is 
irreducible to its manifestation in history, but whose civilizational worldliness, in the 
case of Islam, is yet to be (re)actualized.38  
The occasional essentialism of this discourse aside, what is intriguing in the play 
is that twice do the characters refer to Gibran in the text. Ahmad regards him as an 
exaggerator who “gazes at the Eastern condition from behind a black cloud,”39 while 
appealing to Farid who, in turn, declares that he used to deem him a pessimist. The self-
referentiality of the play is not coincidental. The play serves as a platform in which 
ideas of reform, channelled through critique and debate between Syrian “Muslims” and 
“Christians,” take shape. It is a space that allows for reform ideas and scepticism to 
emerge in conversational or dialogical terms across confessional boundaries, where the 
 
36 This is taken from a short essay that Gibran wrote in response to Jamil Maalouf’s criticism of his essay 
“Ṣawt al-Shāʿir [The Voice of the Poet]” which I analysed in the previous chapter, where Gibran posits 
al-kulliya against al-ʿaṣabiyya. See Daye, Lakum Jubrānukum, 274. 
37 Ibid., 274. 
38 Gibran, in an interview conducted with him in 1915 (al-Sāʾiḥ, issue 240), maintains that “reclaiming 
the glory of Islam is a beautiful dream, yet the power of Islam has waned, and almost nothing has 
remained of the Islam that various nations in the past, different in their religious and worldly aspects, had 
adopted, except for withered emotions which are unable to unify these divided nations today.” Daye, 
ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 330. 
39 Ibid., 249. 
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Muslim and Christian characters, both Syrians, are represented in a way that disrupts 
and invalidates any religious divisions inside Syria. These characters are the ideal 
subjects that Gibran’s national discourse seeks to produce, that is, the Syrian subjects 
whose agency manifests itself in a spirit of interrogation and (self)-criticism across and 
beyond religious differences, contesting and/or affirming Gibran’s own dispositions – 
these characters are, unlike Gibran, optimistic about the “future of the East.”40 In other 
words, the play as a form is deployed to create an atmosphere of conversation and 
debate across religious boundaries in Syria, where certain identifications and 
associations such as “Christianity” and “the West” or “Islam” and “the Turks” are 
destabilized, albeit by occasionally resorting to abstraction and essentialization, and 
where self-referentiality serves as a tool of self-reflexivity that interrupts or contests the 
authority of “the author” that lurks behind his text, foregrounding his “Syrian,” indeed 
“Eastern,” not religious or confessional, identification. Ultimately, “the Syrian idea,” as 
this play demonstrates, is inextricably linked with the wider East-West civilizational 
context such that its potential realization is indissociable from “the Eastern question.”41 
It should be remembered that the above-discussed play, published 
posthumously, was written in 1914, at least as far as the setting suggests, and the year, 
as we know, marks the beginning of World War One, which some Arab nationalists, 
particularly those who advocated independence from the Ottoman Empire, saw as the 
event that would bring the Ottomans down and grant Syria its longed-for independence. 
Hence the title of the play, “A beginning of a Revolution,” a revolution of thought that 
 
40 Ahmad declares, “I am not, albeit living amongst idle [moqʿadīn] Easterners, desperate about the future 
of the East.” Ibid., 250.  
41 Ahmad’s views are not so different from Gibran’s. An article in al-Sāʾiḥ periodical, “Gibran and Islam” 
(25 May 1916), reports a speech that Gibran gave at a ceremony organized by the American Association 
of Religions, where he stressed the influence that the Arabs of Andalusia had exerted on European art and 
science, while attributing the modern degradation and decadence [inḥiṭāt] in the Muslim countries mainly 
to the conquests of the Ottomans and their lack of the elements of creativity and innovation. The writer of 
the article goes on to foreground, in a laudatory manner, that Gibran talks about the merits of Islam in the 
West as a Christian Arab, quoting his words, “Jesus resides in half of my heart and Mohammad resides in 
the other,” and pointing out, following Gibran, that if Islam does not triumph over the Ottoman state, the 
East will fall into hands of the West. See Daye, Lakum Jubrānukum, 296-98.  
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would bring about a revolution of action.42 The War, however, was not conducive to the 
Syrians. In addition to the terrible famine tragedy during the War, the complex web of 
colonial interests in the area put the victorious Allied and Associated Powers in a 
position of unprecedented dominance and control over the region in 1919, and the map 
of the modern Middle East, and particularly that of Greater Syria, had been reshaped 
mostly by France and Britain. The (in)famous Sykes Picot Agreement, the results of 
secret negotiations between the French and the British in 1916, had been instrumental in 
foreshadowing the partition of the region amongst France and Britain after the War.43 
By the time the War broke out, however, the Syrian nationalist activists, especially 
those in the Mahjar, placed some of their hopes in France and, much less, in Britain, 
while aware of the colonial interests driving the actions of those Powers, interests that 
would jeopardize any sovereignty of a state to be potentially liberated from the Ottoman 
Empire. The situation was indeed very complex, and it is not my concern in this chapter 
to go into it in detail (politically and historically speaking). What I am rather concerned 
with here is how Gibran’s writings at the time reflect and approach this complexity of 
events and interests in light of the horizons of actions and expectations permitting or 
hampering the realization of Syrian nationhood.  
One should be aware, therefore, of the intricacy of this situation, the paucity of 
options available as well as the risk that accompanied the decisions that he or the 
committees and organizations under which he worked were to take, especially during 
the War. Twists and shifts in perspective, expectation and direction of the struggle for 
 
42 Mary Haskell records in her journals that for Gibran, neither the diplomatic appeal to the Powers of 
Europe nor Turkey’s diplomatic consent would give the Syrians Home Rule. Only a revolution could 
make it possible. MH Journal, June 22, 1913.  
43 The title of the Agreement refers to the two men who carried out the secret deliberations, Charles 
Francois Georges-Picot, the French consul-general in Beirut before the War, and Sir Mark Sykes, a 
British conservative member of Parliament, who authored two books on the Ottoman Empire. The French 
had their eyes on Syria, while the British were seeking to control Mesopotamia, and the Agreement was 
crucial to the partition of the Arab territories by the end of the War. “This projected division of these 
territories,” writes T.G Frazer, “as yet theoretical and negotiated away from the public eye [in 1916], took 
no account whatsoever of the possible wishes of the people who lived there, but simply reflected the 
priorities which London and Paris had at the time.” Frazer, The First World War, 6.  
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the national cause should not surprise us, the persistence of the commitment to the cause 
notwithstanding. John Daye has delineated three phases in Gibran’s political activism: 
the first starts in 1910 and ends by mid-World War One, where Gibran’s disposition is 
revolutionary but less “practical” than “theoretical”; the second, characterized by 
reformism and partisan activism begins with the foundation of the Syria Mount 
Lebanon Liberation Committee (1917) and terminates with the end of the War; the third 
and the last, marked by “revolutionary theorizing,” begins in the early 1920s and 
gradually wanes in the years approaching Gibran’s demise (1931).44 This delineation, 
carefully outlined and chronicled by Daye, is useful to understand the proper historical 
and discursive context that informs and occasions what he calls Gibran’s “political 
literature,” though I insist that the latter, as literature explicitly engaging in political 
matters, should not be probed in isolation from his other work, which is not explicitly 
political. 
In an article published in 1916 in al-Mirʾāt periodical, entitled “Haffār al-Qubūr 
wa al-Mubakhirūn” [The Grave Digger and the Vaporizers] Gibran performs and 
vehemently defends his “grave-digging” enterprise – laying bare, and burying, all the 
forms, illusions and relics of servitude and blind submission to religious, political and 
social authorities, all of which are deterrents of a true Nahḍa – which is central to his 
call for reform and Awakening. While “The Grave Digger,” the short story published in 
al-Awāsif [The Tempests] (1916), is poetically and philosophically oriented, as 
discussed in Chapter One, this one is straightforwardly addressed to the Syrian people 
with a markedly critical and satirical tone and style (the Syrians are addressed in the 
plural ‘you’) and much less abstract and allegorical in its content. “What did the Syrian 
people achieve in the last millennia?”45 wonders Gibran, the first of several rhetorical 
 
44 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 15-16.  
45 Ibid., 252. 
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questions that concern Syria’s political, social and cultural situation, whose deplorable 
conditions he flagrantly lays bare. He goes on to ridicule the Syrian – and, by 
implication, the Arab – Awakening [al-yaqaẓa], deeming it no more than “dull 
translations of European books [kutub al-ifranj] and some volumes of sterile, ancient 
poetry that do not exceed, in form and content, the boundaries of salutation, praise and 
eulogy.”46 “Do you take pride in your patriotism,” he continues, “and if the Turks 
confer a medal upon one of you, he becomes a Turk?” Unapologetically polemical, the 
article illustrates the primacy that Gibran, particularly in the second half of 1910s and 
the first half 1920s, accords to collective self-criticism as a stance of civilizational 
survival and cultural and social revival by means of “grave-digging.” The Syrians, for 
whom this particular article is addressed, are subject to reproach, scorn and derision, the 
aim of whose rhetorical deployment is none other than what Gibran conceives of as a 
“true Awakening,” and not “a faint echo of modern Western civilization,” as he declares 
in a later essay.47 “There are those amongst you who know that the deepest sense in my 
being is the embodiment of saying ‘my country has the right and capacity to exist’ 
[bilādi muḥiqa wa maḥqūqa], but I have realized that the emotions attendant on 
patriotism [al-‘aṣabiyya48] have blinded our literati and thinkers and halted our 
advancement and progress,”49 Gibran asserts towards the end of the article.  
This sense of critical and cautious nationalism is voiced in another article 
published later in the same year under the title “I love my country,” where Gibran is 
adamant to assert that one should only love one’s country with insight, that is, without 
falling prey to the “blindness” that patriotism (in the sense of al-ʿaṣabiyya) induces. 
 
46 Ibid., 253. 
47 Ibid., 345.  
48 ʿAṣabiyya, in Ibn Khaldun’s sense, means “mutual affection and willingness to fight and die for each 
other.” In the educational discourse of the Nahḍa, however, and especially in regard to Rifaʿa Rafiʿ al-
Tahtawi, Hoorani points out that the term takes up the meaning of ḥubb al-waṭan (love of homeland or 
country), that is, that “of solidarity which binds together those who live in the same community and is the 
basis of social strength.” See Hoorani, Arabic Thought, 23, 78-79.  
49 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 255. 
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Loving one’s country and the people of one’s country “thoughtfully,” “insightfully” and 
“wakefully”50 stands in opposition to lame “praise” and “infatuation,” he avers, for this 
love – one that takes precedence over, and assumes a more important status than the 
country, the object of love – is “an agreeable, simple force that neither undergoes 
change or transformation nor does it ask anything for itself.”51 But, interestingly, what 
propels and lends ethical justification and weight to his national commitment, and what 
furthermore profoundly binds him to his fellow Syrians and compels him to engage, at 
times reluctantly, in the Syrian nationalist cause, is the catastrophic. That is to say, the 
catastrophic is that which entails and amplifies the ethical necessity, urgency and 
immediacy of the national and the political. Before the War, it was the subjugation of 
Syria by the Ottomans and the ensuing suffering of the Syrians that, he asserts, forced 
him to commit himself to the Syrian cause, because  
I am an Absolutist, Mary, and Absolutism has no country – but my heart burns 
for Syria. Fate has been cruel to her – much more than cruel. Her gods are dead, 
her children abandoned her to seek bread in faraway lands, her daughters are 
dumb and blind, and yet she is still alive – alive – and that is the most painful 
thing. She is alive in the midst of her miseries.52 
 
By the catastrophic, I am more specifically referring to the famine tragedy in Greater 
Syria during the War. This tragedy, which is often overlooked in modern world history, 
is one of the reasons that led historian Leyla Fawaz to describe the area that witnessed it 
as “a land of aching hearts.”53 This tragedy deeply affected the Syrian and Lebanese 
émigré writers in the U.S. Their humanitarian activism during the War – the foundation 
 
50 Ibid., 260. 
51 Ibid. 
52 KG to MH, 22 Oct 1912. [emphasis mine]. For Gibran, the universal, or what he considered “world-
consciousness” or “life-thinking,” should be the locus of aesthetic and ethical engagement, not the 
national, which for him stands for parochialism. But because it is precisely the ethical that calls for the 
national – the aching and suffering of Syria – he had no choice but to be nationally committed, as 
revealed in many of his letters to Mary Haskell and her journals. See Tawfiq Sayigh, Aḍwāʾ Jadīda ʿalā 
Jubrān [Gibran Under New Spotlights] (London: Riad el-Rayyes, 1990), 141-43.  
53 For more on the social history of the great famine and its unspeakable consequences (over half a 
million people died in Great Syria alone during the War), see Fawaz, A Land of Aching Hearts, 99-110, 
277.  
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and activity of The Syria Mount Lebanon Relief Committee,54 to which Gibran’s efforts 
and time were devoted – testifies to the fact that their homeland, as émigrés and exiles 
in the U.S., remained a foremost priority for them. Of notable importance here is 
Gibran’s piece of poetic prose “Māta Ahlī” (Dead are my People) which, despite its 
prevailing mood of bitterness and powerlessness – the War as experienced by a Syrian 
émigré in America – places faith in, and draws optimism from, the generosity and 
solidarity that is required from the Syrians to build a new future.55 He writes,  
The tempest that compels you, my Syrian brother, to give something of your life 
to those who are on the verge of losing theirs is the only thing that makes you 
worthy of the day’s light and the night’s quietude.  
And the penny that you put into the empty hand stretching towards you is the 
golden link in a chain that binds what is human in you to that which is over-
human.56 
 
2. The End of the War: Nationalism and the Unfulfilled Quest for 
Nationhood  
 
After discussing “the Syrian idea” and the East-West civilizational context under 
which it is subsumed, as well as Gibran’s critical or cautious nationalism before and 
during the War, I now look at his post-War writings that concern the present and future 
of Syria, which would be decided upon by the Great Powers, France and Britain, not by 
the Syrians. By the end of the War, however, and before the official partition of the 
area, Gibran published a short play, Between Night and Morn, and an essay, “Syria on 
the Dawn of the Future,” in al-Sāʾiḥ periodical, both of which highlight, denounce and 
lament, among other things, the divisions of the Syrians into religious or ethnic sects, 
each of which loyal to an external Power. In this interregnum, so to speak, there was a 
sense of hope in Gibran, bespoken at least in the afore-mentioned titles, of establishing 
 
54 For more on this see Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 69-80. 
55 Fawaz, A Land of Aching Hearts, 284.  
56 This is my own translation from Arabic, which differs from the one translated by Anthony Ferris. 
Ferris, apart from adopting the form of free verse in the target language, translates the last sentence, mā 
fawqa al-bachariyya – which I rendered as “over-human” – as “the loving heart of God.” I tried to be 
more “faithful” to the Arabic text by capturing the extension of the giving self to that which is beyond or 
over it. For the Arabic text, see CWs in Arabic, 249-51. For the translated text, see A Treasury of Kahlil 
Gibran, trans. Anthony Rizcallah Ferris, ed. Martin L. Wolf (London: Heinemann, 1974), 339-45.  
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a Syrian national state57 that is liberated from the Ottoman Empire and self-dependent in 
its formation, “a Syria for Syrians only.”58  
The play’s tenor is less ideological and subtler than the essay, whose form does 
not permit the literary subtlety of the play in capturing this moment, namely, the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire and the end of the War. Set in a dark prison on the outskirts of 
Beirut at the midnight of 9 January (in 1919 presumably –  it was published on 16 
January of the same year), the play’s characterization and dialogue reflect the disunion 
of the Syrians, each sect or confession of which – a Muslim, a Christian, a Durzi, a Jew 
and a poet (the adjectives used to identify the characters’ backgrounds) – pledges 
loyalty to and places faith in an external Power in the hope of erecting a new future for 
Syria. This is the case for the all characters in the play, except for the poet, Yusuf 
Karama, whose allegiance is vowed to Syria alone.  
“O Syria! Mother without children!” Yusuf cries out, addressing his fellow 
Syrians in the prison during a heated conversation marked by sectarian divisions over 
Syria’s future:  
O Syria, how great is your affliction! The souls of your children do not pulsate 
in your fragile and wasted body, but, alas, they pulsate in the bodies of foreign 
countries. For their hearts have forgotten you and their thoughts have abandoned 
you … O Syria, O nation of tragedies! While in your arms the bodies of your 
children dwell, their souls have run away from you, one strolling in the Arab 
peninsula [The Muslin Ali Rahman], another sauntering in the streets of London 
[The Durzi Sharaf al-Din al-Hoorani], another soaring above the palaces of Paris 
[The Christian Salim Balan] and yet another counting money while asleep [The 
Jewish Musa Haim]. O Syria, my childless mother!59  
 
In response to this long lamentation, Ali and Sharaf dismissingly describe Yusuf as a 
poet who adorns his imagination with beautiful words, that is, as someone who is cut off 
from realpolitik, a view against which Yusuf defensively retorts, “Yes I am a poet and 
not a politician. I love my country and the people of my country, and this is all I wish to 
 
57 For the use of “national state” instead of “nation-state,” see Smith, Nationalism, 17.   
58 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 294. 
59 Ibid. 
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know about politics.”60 He proceeds to declare that it is his country’s powerlessness and 
the injustice to which it has been subjected, as well as the fragmentation and confusion 
of its people, that drove him to devote his love to it; a disposition that Gibran proclaims, 
as discussed in the previous section, elsewhere. The dialogue continues with each 
character insistently clinging to a foreign Power, under whose leadership and 
guardianship each envision the future of Syria to be, except for Musa, who is portrayed 
as a money-worshipper (mumbling of money while asleep), a stereotypical depiction 
that Gibran astonishingly employs in the play. The mere presence of a Jewish character, 
however, suggests that Arab (Syrian) Jews for Gibran were regarded as an integral part 
of the future national state by virtue of their dwelling in the Syrian territory for centuries 
before the War. The heated discussion ends up with another long lamentation of Yusuf, 
whose anguish leads him to discern the predicament of Syria as one identical to, or 
analogous with, the fall of Babel, an evocation that is at once metaphorical and 
historical or mythological 
O Babel, O city of dispersion! Has God’s shadow abandoned you like ruins 
standing alone in the desert? O Babel, O nation of conflicts and grudges! Did 
you, in your dreams, build a tower whose head reaches out to the sky, outraging 
the Lord and driving Him to confuse your tongues and scatter your people upon 
the face of the earth? O Babel, O city of no inhabitants! Will your people return 
to construct your walls and temples? Will God visit you a second time to lift you 
out of disgrace? O Babel, O city whose houses are pain, whose streets are 
wounds and whose rivers are tears! O Babel, city of my heart!61 
 
This metaphorical and mythological reference to Babel in this context should be 
understood as an evocation of the past that not only seeks to reconnect or construct a 
connection with it. It is also one that aims to reckon with the chattered present in the 
light of this evocated reconnection. In other words, the (nascent) nation is imagined in 
the present by reconnecting it with a past whose mythological evocation serves as a 
validation of its presence in the present, as a way of coming to terms with the 
 
60 Ibid., 295. 
61 Ibid., 295-96. 
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fragmentation and disunion of the Syrians, and as one possibility of reconstructing 
Syria in the future (“Will your people return to construct your walls and temples?”). 
That is, in the mythological destruction of Babel lies its potential historical re-
emergence in the present, in that the destruction of the homogenous One should entail 
the construction of a unified multiplicity: Syria as an idea and a nation to which the 
different ethnic and religious groups who inhabit its land are faithful, without negating 
their differences. The evocation of a mythological past, thus, enables the horizon of a 
future nation the material construction of which is, in one sense, a reconstruction of a 
past with which it is (imagined to be) territorially connected.   
Later in the play, a woman is heard talking to her son, who is very hungry and 
wants some bread. “Sleep, my child, sleep until morning,” his mother tells him, “God 
will send us bread tomorrow and we shall all eat.”62 But her son dies of hunger 
moments later, whereupon someone is heard saying, “Your son has died, and you are 
still calling unto God?! I told you that God Himself has died of hunger!”63 This is, of 
course, a scene that alludes to the great famine that swept over Syria during the War, an 
event that poignantly affects Yusuf who, in a moment of desperation that epitomizes 
Syria’s predicament at the time, cries out: 
O Syria, crossroad of conquerors, will I live to see a new conqueror? Let it be 
should the pockets of its troops are full of bread. Let it be should there remain a 
brother to shield me and a sister whose voice I could hear… But, alas, how 
selfish I am, pleading to remain alive to see the faces of my brothers and sisters, 
while my life, had it been of any value, would have been taken by now.64 
 
The play closes with the liberation of the prisoners and the entrance of the Allied troops 
to the city of Beirut in the following morning, announcing the defeat of the Ottomans. 
Yet Yusuf, unlike the other jubilant prisoners, remains sober and sceptical, albeit not 
without an inevitable sense of hope for a “true freedom” outside the prison.  
 
62 Ibid., 296. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
172 
 
The significance of the play lies in its capacity, its shortness notwithstanding, to 
register the disunited and conflicting voices and political interests of Syrians from 
divergent backgrounds over the best future they each envision for their country. The 
appeal of these groups to external Powers to intervene in Syria is premised on the 
politicized ethnic or religious proximity/affinity that they believe to exist between them 
and those Powers (Islam in the case of the Arab Ali, and Catholicism in the case of the 
Maronite Salim, for instance). Equally important here is the setting of the play, the 
prison, for it is precisely inside the prison, simultaneously real and figural, that those 
“prisoners” place their hope in countries other than Syria to liberate it from the 
Ottomans, who are thought to have imprisoned them in their own country. That is, the 
intimation here is that the moral prison into which the Syrians are willingly caught – 
their faith in, and the loyalty they pledge to, political entities whose (economic, political 
or symbolic) strength is believed to be of advantage to Syria should they resort to them 
– is as pernicious as the Ottoman oppression to which they were subjected. “Listen to 
me,” cries out Yusuf angrily, “you who are imprisoned in a prison within a prison 
within a prison [ayyuhā al-masjūnūna fi sijn ḍimna sijn ḍimna sijn]: Syria belongs 
neither to the Arabs, nor to the British, the French or the Jews. Syria is yours and mine 
alone.”65 The ending of play confirms and sustains this double signification – at once 
real and metaphorical – of the prison, as “true freedom” is all that Yusuf pines for, albeit 
without enthusiasm. Therein lies the power of the play as it captures the historical and 
political dilemma into which Syria was thrown by the end of the War, a conundrum 
from which Gibran envisioned no other way out but the realization of a Syrian 
nationhood whose legitimacy is grounded in the sense of a shared and unified Syrian 
waṭan, not in religion, sect or ethnicity.  
 
65 Ibid., 294. 
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In this context, it should be remembered that Gibran reiterates that since 
antiquity, Syria had been invariably susceptible and subjected to foreign conquests, and 
that it has survived despite being repeatedly invaded by Others, a sign of its eligibility 
for nationhood in the age of national states.66 One can discern the social and historical 
Darwinism that renders Syria as waṭan eligible, because it has survived, to join the 
modern order of national states. This social Darwinism was part of the Zeitgeist of the 
period, and Gibran was no exception. What remains essential here is that the 
geographical unity of Greater Syria stands as that which grounds and justifies this 
nationalism, a discourse upon which hinges the formation and realization of the nation, 
as I shall now demonstrate in an essay published shortly after the play.  
This essay, given the context, is unsurprisingly entitled “Syria on the Dawn of 
the Future.” Explicitly ideological and political in its content and message, it sets out to 
analyse the factors that are believed to have deterred national unity in Syria. Gibran 
begins the essay by invoking, once again, the metaphor of “the prisoner,” writing: “Like 
a prisoner going out of his dark prison, vacillating between certainty and doubt as to his 
salvation, stands Syria today on the dawn of the future to proceed with the living 
nations in the procession of Life that is teeming with walkers and spectators.”67 He then 
goes on to foreground that “the spirit of the age into which Syria is entering will 
despatch the Muslim Syria, the Christian Syria and the Durzi Syria. Religious 
fanaticism will be erased out of its heart, and the long-awaited tolerance will supersede 
it.”68 “The age” in this context does not connote a strictly temporal dimension, a new 
phase in the history of Syria. It is an age to whose “spirit” Syria is entering or is hoped 
 
66 See “al-Hijra wa Futūḥ Sūria” [Migration and Syria’s Subjection to Foreign Conquests] in Gibran, Iqlib 
al-Safḥa, 119-120. As for Syria’s nationhood, in an interview conducted with Gibran in 1915 for the al-
Sāʾiḥ periodical, he asserts that “the glorious future that [he] envision[s] for Syria is for it to become a 
republic,” going on to maintain that all the pre-modern kingdoms should now turn into republics, for “the 
republic is the sole track upon which a country proceeds towards prosperity.” Daye, Lakum Jubrānukum, 
300.  
67 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 298. 
68 Ibid. 
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to enter, that is, one that has already taken place – modernity in its political and civic 
configuration – whose mode of existence is nothing else but “time,” as Meskini 
postulates. Time here is not understood from the perspective of “what,” that is, not as an 
object of inquiry, but insofar as it denotes the “the mode of existence of the ‘we’, that 
which is ours every time (…) We are “our” time every time, that is, we are our mode of 
existence in a certain age as being the ultimate sense of the dwelling [al-waṭan] that 
concerns us.”69 Beyond any religious delimitation of waṭan (from an Arab point of view 
or position), that is, beyond the positing of the question of Arab identity in terms 
informed by the exhausted self-other binary of Islam and/vs. the West, waṭan takes up 
the ontological sense of home or dwelling, deriving from the age (al-ʿaṣr) – “the modern 
times” – its own emergence and existence, its own ontology, one whose “Western” 
premise is nevertheless de-Westernized in the non-Western world by virtue of the 
latter’s radical “contemporaneity” (muʿāṣara, derived from ʿaṣr) to “the West.”70 I 
should stress that this is the main dimension of the age – modernity’s political 
transformation and the emergence of the national state as the sole horizon of a “people” 
to exist in the form of a recognizable entity in the nineteenth century – to which Gibran 
subscribes in his own Nahḍa discourse (anti-Ottoman and anti-colonial nationalism). 
“The spirit of the age,” thus, is hoped to provide a new home – that is, a new mode of 
existence in which religious tolerance as a supposedly modern civic achievement is 
actualized within the secular nation – to which Syria, as a potential national state, will 
 
69 See Meskini, al-Huwiyya wa al-Zamān, 36. I added emphasis on “us” and “we” because Meskini is 
speaking from a certain position, that of “an inhabitant of the south of modernity” as he once put it, in 
which the dilemma of Arab, Muslim identity is entrapped in the Turāth-Ḥadātha (tradition-modernity) 
debate, where the West is both the cultural and anthropological “other” and the epistemological model to 
follow (being equated with “modernity”). In his endeavour to move away from this conundrum, Meskini 
posits the “contemporaneity” (muʿāṣara) of the Arabs to the modern, “Western” age (al-ʿaṣr) as the 
efficient, non-identitarian mode of resistance against the metaphysical dominance of the West over the 
rest of the world (the objectification of non-European humanity). 
70 For more in this, see Ibid., especially in the chapter, “Man Huwa al-Zamān? [Who is Time?],” 27-43.  
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enter, optimistically precipitating the end of any definition of Syria in religious or 
confessional terms.  
Gibran, however, admits the optimism of this prospect in which “Syria is 
portrayed as it should be, not as it is,” and addresses his “Syrian brother” only insofar as 
he is a “patriot”:  
My Syrian brother, whether you are a Muslim, a Christian, a Durzi or an Israeli, 
whether you are aligned with the Ottoman state, France, Britain or Russia, 
whether you are in agreement with me as to our eligibility for self-rule or not, 
there is an essential point at which we should stop: it is patriotism [al-
waṭaniyya].71 
 
Only those who are identified as “patriots,” in the sense of longing for and having the 
readiness to sacrifice oneself for the Syrian nation, are concerned with what Gibran has 
to say in the article. He then proceeds to reflect on what he deems the four factors – 
religious fanaticism, ignorance, lack of self-reliance and despotism – that have torn 
asunder the “national collectivity” of the Syrians. What is remarkable about the article is 
its lucid and down-to-earth (albeit at times problematic) analysis of the social and 
political conditions that have impeded the realization – that is, the liberation and 
formation – of the Syrian national state. This is an analysis whose impetus lies in the 
force of nationalism as an ideology capable of directing intellectual and activist energies 
towards the aim of realizing that which the ideology attempts to articulate and 
precipitate, namely, the construction of the nation as a realizable idea and the 
embodiment of the idea in the establishment of an autonomous and unified national 
state.  
To that end, Gibran conceives of what he calls “national life” [al-ḥayāt al-
qawmiyya] as a natural, inherent human property. The naturalization of nationalism, in 
the Arab context, should be comprehended in relation to the notion of ḥubb al-waṭan72 
 
71 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 298. 
72 Hoorani points out that the term has acquired in the Nahḍa “the specific meaning of territorial 
patriotism in the modern sense.” Hoorani, Arabic Thought, 79.  
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(love of homeland) that found articulation in the revival of Arabism and the 
construction of modern Arab subjectivity – occasioned by the domestication of 
nationalism in the Arab world – in the Nahḍa’s nineteenth century discourse,73 leading 
to a confusion that is often made between homeland (place of birth and up-bringing) 
and nation (in the modern sense of the word), both of which the sense of term waṭan 
readily lends itself. This is evinced in the following passage towards the end of the 
essay:  
National life [al-hayāt al-qawmiyya] is a powerful spirit that emerges from the 
general interest of the nation and propels it toward a single Aim regardless of the 
preferences and inclinations of its individual members. It is a genuine and 
deeply penetrating psychological sentiment of love for the land in which man 
was born and reared, for the people to whom he belongs, for the customs to 
which he had become adapted, and for the language that he speaks. It is a 
patriotic sentiment in the path of which [or, for the sake of which] man sacrifices 
his wealth and life.74 
 
I must note, first, that Gibran, speaking of “national life,” uses the term qawmiyya not 
waṭaniyya, with the former usually translated as “nationalism” and the latter as 
“patriotism,” though the confusion at times arises. Qawmiyya is derived from qawm, 
meaning kinsfolk, tribe or clan in the strict sense of the word, and, in its general and 
frequently invoked sense, a community with which one identifies. It is this fact of being 
born in and raised within the circle of a certain qawm (people) with shared language, 
customs and traditions, that leads Gibran – in addition, of course, to the ethical and 
ideological drive of his message (the realization of the Syrian national state) – to 
perceive nationalism in natural or organic terms. For Gibran, love of one’s country 
(maḥabbat al-waṭan) necessarily connotes love of one’s birthplace. This love of 
homeland, the land into which one is rooted, is perceived by Gibran as an inherent 
human sentiment whose goodness is realizable only if this sentiment “is engulfed and 
 
73 Sheehi, Foundations, 9-10. 
74 This passage is cited in translation by Adel Beshara in “Gibran Kahlil Gibran: A Rebel from Syria,” in 
The Origins of Syrian Nationhood, 151.  
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propelled by wisdom”75; for it readily lapses into a “vice,” pernicious and detrimental 
individually and collectively, if it is infused with “pretence” and “vanity.”76 This 
sentiment, in its insightful embodiment, is thus transformed into a driving force in the 
nationalist quest for nationhood.  
One discerns, furthermore, that nationalism has a specific “aim” in this 
discourse, rendering it at once an intrinsic human sentiment and an instrument for the 
formation of a national education necessary, as I shall later demonstrate, for the 
independence of the nation. The “general interest of the nation,” moreover, is taken as 
that which “generates” this nationalism, identified here, unsurprisingly, as “national 
life.” In other words, love of homeland, which precedes and exceeds nationalism as an 
ideology, becomes that which naturalizes nationalism itself – the use of the word “life” 
is not arbitrary. Thus, the nation (al-umma) in the modern sense emerges out of the 
deeply rooted love (literal translation of hub mutaʾaṣṣil) for the homeland. What 
emerges as problematic – which often passes as unproblematic in the modern Arab 
context – is the use of the word “al-umma” as an equivalent of “the nation.” It is the 
(enduring) religious connotation of al-umma as a community of people who share a 
common religious belief (Islam) that allows for the domestication of the (Western) 
category of “the nation” or “le patrie” in the Arab context. This domestication has 
confused its meaning by at once aligning it with Islam and the modern nation in the 
Arab discursive landscape to which it has “travelled.”77   
 
75 He maintains this in his short article “Uḥibbu Bilādī [I Love my Country].” Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 260-
61.  
76 Ibid., 260. 
77 The point here is not to foreground the “origin” of the concept and therefore (de)-legitimate its 
appropriation, but to account for the conditions and consequences of its appropriation, universalization 
and naturalization – which nonetheless should be questioned – as it travels and embodies itself in non-
Western forms of life.  
Talal Asad, relying on Benedict Anderson’s concept of the nation as inherently limited and sovereign, has 
maintained that the term umma, being used today to denote the Arab nation (umma ‘arabiyya), “is cut off 
from the theological predicates that gave it its universalizing power, and is made to stand for an imagined 
community that is equivalent to a total political society […] in a secular (social) world.” Asad, 
Formations of the Secular, 197-98. My point, however, is that the entrenched religious sense of the word 
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It is the ideological force of this nationalism, which takes as its premise the 
natural love of waṭan, that conditions and frames Gibran’s scrutiny of that which 
hampers the concrete realization of what he calls “national life.” It is crucial to 
remember that Gibran does not posit a coherent theory or vision of nationalism; rather, 
his nationalist reflections are fragmentarily sketched out, warranted by specific 
historical moments or events within a certain field of discourse. A pattern, however, can 
be discerned: Gibran posits the inter-relatedness of national independence, self-reliance 
and Awakening, held together in a causal relationship. While national independence is 
dependent on the self-reliance of the Syrians in their quest for nationhood, self-reliance 
is predicated on “moral independence,” a notion upon which Gibran lays a huge 
emphasis. And without moral independence neither is the enactment of an original 
Eastern Awakening possible, nor is self-reliance – and by necessity, national 
independence – realizable. In other words, the Awakening, which is premised on moral 
independence and self-reliance, needs to take place for the nation to emerge, and the 
national state is the logical (institutional) result of the Awakening of Syria as an Arab, 
Eastern entity. Yet this “moral independence” should not preclude the Syrians, as 
revealed in his letters to Emile Zaydan between 1919 and 1922, from seeking out 
foreign (Western) “tutelage” in “scientific, economic and agricultural” matters, 
provided that the Syrian “national character” [al-ṣibgha al-sūriyya] is upheld.78 
Following the passage quoted earlier (on national life), Gibran identifies the necessary, 
lacking elements for Syria to become a recognizable nation: 
Tolerance, knowledge, independence and courage [al-iqdām] are the elements 
we lack to become a significant nation whose word is recognized in the 
international arena. Creating a scientific Awakening (nahḍa ʿilmiyya) that 
 
umma is that which had occasioned the domestication of the modern concept of the nation, a 
domestication that has nevertheless regionalized and de-universalized its original sense (that is, one that 
has confined it to the Arab and, in this case, Syrian nation), all the while retaining its religious 
connotation, making it readily prone to a (Derridean) “undecidability.” 
78 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 369-70. 
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educates our men79 in every science and art is the foremost of our priorities. For 
when these educated men are present amongst us, having created a national 
literature, a national philosophy, a national music and a national industry and 
commerce, once we realize this aim in the course of progress, there will be no 
power under the sun that would forestall our independence. And to the Syrian 
people, who are known for their intelligence and adaptability, this aim is not 
unrealizable.80  
 
This is a discourse on national independence that is predicated on the formation of “a 
national literature, a national philosophy, a national music, and national industry and 
commerce,” all of which are requisite for the establishment of an independent national 
state; an independence that is dependent on the self-dependence of the Syrian people, on 
whom Gibran’s faith and hope for Awakening are placed despite, or because of, his 
critical account of the conditions which he thinks are deterrent to national unity inside 
Syria. This is a healthy move, in my view, for it takes as its point of departure collective 
self-criticism, an agential self-affirmation that must not be confused with collective self-
loathing, before highlighting the essential ingredients necessary for collective unity and 
self-transformation – for which nationalism acts as a robust ethical and ideological 
impetus and guarantor. I emphasize Gibran’s concern for collectivity and collective 
action because it constitutes that which he deemed lamentably and gravely wanting in 
the Syrians, that which would affirm and sustain their entity as a recognizable nation, 
hence nationalism as an ideology that manifests itself in the form of collective 
identification and solidarity.81  
What is striking, however, is that Gibran’s discourse reveals (or conceals) an 
incognizance – one might say an underestimation – of the British and French colonial 
interest in the area, addressing the issue as though Syria had been immune from foreign, 
 
79 It is astonishing, one must remark, that Gibran speaks only of “men” when it comes to education and 
Awakening, all the more so because he was a staunch advocator of women’s rights in Syria, as many of 
his early short stories attest. 
80 Ibid., 303. [emphasis added] 
81 In “Ḥaffār al-Qubūr wa al-Aḥyāʾ [Grave Digger and the Living],” he foregrounds the existence of 
“living seeds” suitable for growth in the Syrian as an individual and the absence thereof in the Syrians as 
a collective whole, hence his emphasis on al-ḥayāt al-qawmiyya, national or collective life. Ibid., 256-57. 
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colonial intervention. This may boil down to the fact that the region had not been 
officially parcelled out until 1920, that is, one year following the publication of the 
essay, and that the results of the Sykes-Picot Agreement had remained secret until 
1919.82 Also, the manifesto of The Syria and Mount Lebanon Liberation Committee, of 
which Gibran was a Secretary of Foreign Correspondence, published in 14 June 1917 in 
al-Sāʾiḥ, reflects the Committee’s unawareness of the true motives of the Allies. The 
manifesto announces that the Committee’s strategy for the liberation and independence 
of Syria from the Ottoman Empire, advocated by Gibran, consists in the enlisting of 
Syrians of all backgrounds (but especially those in America) in an Eastern military 
campaign to fight with the Allies, France in particular, against the Ottoman Empire. 
This agenda mirrors the military orientation of the Committee, which, as John Daye 
points out, saw the War as an opportunity to gain military and political victories for 
Syria.83 This is despite its caution and awareness, in the words of Amin Rihani, another 
influential Mahjari writer and nationalist, that “the salvation of one nation by another is 
one that necessarily entails foreign sovereignty over one’s nation, and [that] any foreign 
sovereignty, however just and beneficial it could be, is an option that we would never be 
content with.”84 We should not forget, furthermore, the wide appeal to Woodrow 
Wilson’s endorsement of the right of “national self-determination” that was announced 
in 1918, which was regarded by the Committee (based in the U.S.) as an immense 
political support to their cause.85 Yet this strategy – fighting with the side of the Allies – 
was neither effective on the ground, not did it bear political fruits for Syria after the 
War. It was, in short, miscalculated, but understandable given the scarcity of options 
 
82 Frazer, The First World War, 10. 
83 For a short historical account of the committee’s foundation and activity, see Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 81-
90. 
84 Ibid., 82.  
85 “Wilson was talking in the context of Europe, and national self-determination came to be a major 
feature of how the continent emerged from the Paris Peace conference, but the idea was understandably 
taken up with alacrity in other parts of the world, including the Middle East.” Frazer, The First World 
War, 8. 
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conducive to their struggle at that juncture in history, and not as simply naïve as some 
have argued from today’s privileged standpoint.86     
Apart from this crucial political context, Gibran insists that the realization of 
national collectivity is predicated on the Syrians’ (awakening of their) “moral 
independence,” hence his essential reconfiguration of independence as an intrinsic 
property of being whose actualization warrants one’s self-consciousness of its existence 
within (oneself). This self-consciousness, that is, must precede and predicate an 
independence from (any encroaching or colonizing Other). “The Westerners,” he wrote 
to Emile Zaydan after World War One, “might be able to help us scientifically, 
economically and agriculturally, but they cannot grant us moral independence, [al-
istiqlāl al-maʿnawī], without which we cannot emerge as a living nation.”87 This 
independence is moral insofar as it is radically and universally human, but it can solely 
take the form of a unique “national character” by virtue of which one’s difference is 
articulated and preserved. In other words, Gibran is positing moral independence as a 
universal category whose embodiment manifests itself (only) within the spectrum of 
national difference, with each nation having its own distinct character but within a 
similar spectrum of difference (the modern, universalized category of the nation). The 
“Syrian character,” the adherence to which is necessary for moral independence to 
crystallize, is that which would preclude the Syrians from being “shewn, ingested and 
 
86 Adel Beshara contends that Gibran was not unaware of “international diplomacy and Western colonial 
interest in Syria,” but he “never imagined the Allies, brought up in the spirit of democracy and liberal 
morality, would allow their imperial interests to completely eclipse their war-time pledges to the newly-
liberated people of the world and trample all over them as though they had no intrinsic human value.” 
Beshara, “A Rebel Syrian: Gibran Kahlil Gibran,” 154. The point is indeed well-taken, but the situation 
was far more complex than Beshara put it. Gibran was cognizant of the dangers and repercussions of 
colonialism, voiced before and after the War in his 1916 article “Grave-digger and the Living, ” in his 
letters to Emile Zaydan (1919-1922) and in his recently published manuscripts, but saw foreign “tutelage” 
as inevitable and necessary. This is due to his firm belief in a (national) social, cultural and economic 
Awakening as a precondition for the foundation of the nation. What is intriguing here is that Gibran, 
before the official partition of the area, considered foreign “tutelage” to be separable from colonialism. 
Whether this was naïve or strategic is hard to tell.  
87 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 370, [Emphasis mine].  
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digested” by the “tutelage” of a foreign, “developed” country.88 It is this emphatic and 
adamant concern for Awakening (incumbent upon the “slumberous” Syrian subject) that 
blinded Gibran to the logic of realpolitik, to the gulf between Enlightenment ideals and 
colonialist politics. His cautious belief in France or Britain as a “tutor” for the Syrians – 
a transitory tutelage – is nevertheless revoked in his recently published manuscripts.89 In 
one of them, unfortunately undated, he writes that “the Westerner” is an “enemy” who 
is driven by his own interests when he turns his face to the East, and that “his virtue 
resides only in the West.”90 In another, he avers that there is no distinction between a 
mandate and an occupation, urging the Syrians to ground any action they set out to 
undertake for Syria or in their struggle against France on wisdom, caution and 
thoughtfulness91 (and one can readily infer that the French Mandate was the context in 
which this statement was written).  
These manuscripts reveal a profound disappointment with the post-War turn of 
events in the region, namely, the partition of Greater Syria and the demonstrably 
colonialist nature of the French Mandate. For Gibran’s vigorous commitment to 
“maintenance of the unity of geographical Syria and the independence of the country 
under a national, representative system”92 was not fulfilled, neither was his (somewhat 
far-fetched) call for the provisional and conditional placement of Syria under foreign 
“tutelage” after the War.93 Notwithstanding the failure of this political activism and 
vision, which he shared with other notable Syrian writers, activists and reformers in the 
 
88 Ibid.  
89 Some of these manuscripts have been published by John Daye (1988) and others transcribed and 
assembled in an edited collection published in Lebanon in 2010, available in Gibran’s Museum (Bsharri, 
north Lebanon).  
90 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 374.  
91 Ibid., 375. 
92 Ibid., 369-70. For a translation of one of the letters he sent to Emile Zaydan, see Beshara, “A Rebel 
Syrian: Gibran Kahlil Gibran,” 154. 
93 Gibran asserts that “If Syria is placed under the tutelage of America, France or England – or all of them 
as some Syrians are calling for – there are fundamental things that we must insistently and persistently 
cling to, namely, the geographical unity of Syria, national, participatory governance, compulsory 
education and the permanent priority and official status that should be accorded to the Arabic language.” 
Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 370. [emphasis added] 
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U.S., what is remarkable and worthy of critical attention is his unwavering belief in the 
dire necessity and potentiality of enacting an original Syrian – and, by extension, Arab 
Eastern – Nahḍa, and in the urgent need for a collective Syrian unity that was hoped to 
ward off any Western colonial infringement.   
In “Syria on the Dawn of the Future,” he warns against the dangers of falling 
prey to “religious fanaticism,” one deterrent to national unity and Awakening, ridiculing 
any reduction of nationalism to it. Addressing the leaders of the Syrian parties towards 
the end of the essay, Gibran reiterates his demand for national collective unity:  
If you your patriotism does not triumph over every emotion of zealotry in your 
being, and if you do not unite your demands before it is too late, there will come 
the day where you look at the map of Syria being tinged with different colours 
as is the case in black Africa, colours indicative of its division into spheres of 
influence and foreign colonies.94 
 
Syria was indeed divided as Gibran had anticipated, yet the main cause of its division 
was not the disunion of its political parties, but the decision of the victorious Allies, 
France and Britain in particular, to partition the region that was formerly part of the 
Ottoman Empire in line with their colonial interests and in complete indifference to the 
people who inhabited it.95 As far as Gibran is concerned, it is the position from which 
he spoke, that of the Syrian, Eastern subject concerned as a committed writer and 
reformer to Syria and the Arab East, that led him to overemphasize the role and 
responsibility incumbent upon the Syrians in the making of their own history, especially 
after what became known as centuries of “decadence [inḥiṭāt]”96 under the Ottoman 
 
94 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 303.  
95 An Allied commission, proposed by President Woodrow Wilson, was sent to the Syria “to ascertain the 
views of the population” as to their future following the War. The findings of the “shelved” report 
reflected that “the overwhelming opinion in Syria was against a French Mandate and that nine tenths of 
the population was opposed to Zionism.” See Frazer, The First World War, 10-12.    
96 Recent scholarship has moved away from the “decadence paradigm” in their approach to the Nahḍa’s 
intellectual enterprise. See, for instance, Stephen Sheehi, “Towards a Critical Theory of al-Nahḍah: 
Epistemology, Ideology and Capital,” Journal of Arabic Literature 43, no 2/3: 269-298. That this cultural 
“decadence” is an Orientalist discovery does not negate the fact that Greater Syria and the Ottoman 
provinces in “the Orient” were not as advanced, materially, economically and militarily speaking, as 
Euro-America at the time. As Sadiq Jalal al-Azm writes in his well-known critique of Said’s Orientalism, 
“That 19th century Europe was superior to Asia and much of the rest of the world in terms of productive 
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governance, and to regard as secondary any foreign, colonial role in the potential 
reshaping and remaking of the area.  
In the same the essay Gibran attributes the deplorable political and social 
conditions in Syria, among other factors, to “Eastern despotism,” a gesture that seems to 
attest, at face value, to the extent to which Orientalist epistemology went often 
unquestioned in the Nahḍa and post-Nahḍa intellectual enterprises that sought to 
comprehend and provide a panacea for the dilemma of “progress” in the Arab world.97 
Gibran proclaims that the “Syrian” lacks, “as an Easterner,”98 an awareness of his own 
“rights” and “duties”: the right to social welfare and the right to criticize the governor or 
the clerk on the one hand, and the duty of the individual, on the other hand, vis-à-vis the 
community [al-jamāʿa] as a collectivity within which the individual exists and operates 
as a social agent. Here, it is not clear, initially, whether Gibran considers docility, lack 
of individual autonomy and susceptibility to despotism inherent to the “the Easterner,” 
or whether these elements are merely historical, and therefore changing or changeable. 
However, if the aim of his critical engagement in the national cause lies in contributing 
to the construction of a democratic national state to which notions of individual 
autonomy and collective good are central to its functioning, then it becomes clear that 
this so-called Eastern despotism is eradicable, and therefore not a stable, ahistorical 
element that is intrinsic to the Syrian qua Easterner. “When the social collectivity 
neglects its duties towards the individual,” he writes, “the latter will absolve himself of 
 
capacities, social organization, historical ascendency, military might and scientific and technological 
development is indisputable as a contingent historical fact. Orientalism, with its ahistorical bourgeois bent 
of mind, did its best to eternalize this mutable fact, to turn it into a permanent reality past, present and 
future. Hence Orientalism’s essentialistic ontology of East and West.” See Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, 
“Orientalism and Orientalism in reverse,” in Orientalism: A Reader, ed. A. L. Macfie (New York: New 
York University Press, 200), 227-28. 
97 See Massad, Desiring Arabs, 4-6, 14-15.  
98 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 302. 
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his responsibilities towards it, and therein lies the defect that would take the form of 
disorder and despotism.”99 
In the same passage, he abruptly shifts attention to “the massive gulf that exists 
between us and the nations that are civilizationally advanced,” and endeavours to bridge 
it – a bridging that aims to invalidate the dichotomy of inherent backwardness or 
advancement – by suggesting that “progress” is a project that could be carried out in a 
short temporal span, citing the U.S. as an evidence of its realizability within a period of 
fifty years.100 His premise consists in the fact that “it was science [in the last fifty years] 
that made possible all these astonishing miracles [all the material and technological 
advancements of modern life in the U.S.],” and science, he avers, is a universal “light” 
that shines not on one part but on the whole of the Earth: “Do we remain asleep, then,” 
he wonders rhetorically, “or shall we awaken to move in its light?”101 Thus, what 
emerges as “lacking” in the Syrian subject is not a modern scientific backdrop against 
which “progress” is actualized a la Europe, but “a will to work” and “a persistence in 
work,”102 a diagnosis that locates the civilizational slumber within the Syrian subject as 
a historical agent – albeit one that cannot be dissociated from the Euro-American 
civilizational challenge. In other words, the lack is not a lack of “civilization and 
progress” materially realized in the Western other (one that defines the self as 
“backward” vis-à-vis the “civilized” other), but a lack of the will to work and the 
persistence in work within the subject itself at that historical juncture, having once led 
the (historical) “procession of Life” as he puts it. This way, Gibran inscribes the 
collective self in a historical universalism in which history is divided into chapters, with 
one distinct civilization as the protagonist of a chapter, as it were, leading the 
 
99 Ibid. 
100 “If you contrast the massive gulf that exists between us and the nations that are civilizationally 
advanced,” he asserts, “you would readily assume that our nature [ṭīna] is inferior to theirs.” He then goes 
on to refute this surface observation as I explain above. Ibid., 302. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid., 303. 
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procession of Life at a specific epoch in history, yet with no clear teleology. Euro-
America is a not the civilizational telos for Gibran, but the one leading the procession of 
Life in the modern times. This will lead me to touch more closely on the Eastern 
civilizational question and the way Gibran approaches the predicament of the Syrian 
Nahḍa, insofar as he deems it an essentially Eastern one. 
3. Syria within the East: Civilizational Anxiety and Gibran’s Vision of the 
Nahḍa 
 
In the previous section, I discussed a play and an essay published by the end of 
War, in which the predicament of Syria, torn between the colonial threat and the 
disunity of its people, is theatrically displayed and critically analysed by Gibran. His 
commitment to the national cause, as I have shown, is indissociable from the question 
of the Nahḍa: the establishment of a Syrian national state presupposes a social, cultural 
and economic Awakening, both of which are premised on, and constitute the fruitful 
embodiment of, moral independence. In this section, I pursue this discussion by 
highlighting this issue of the Nahḍa in relation to the wider civilizational sphere: the 
Arab East.  
In an undated short text entitled “To the Easterners,” found in the manuscripts 
that John Daye published in 1988, Gibran draws an important distinction between “his 
Eastern conscience [wujdān],” which he invokes to address those to whom the short 
article is written, and his “alienated soul in every place”: “I address you now as a man 
and not as a poet, and I appeal to your Eastern conscience with my own Eastern 
conscience, not with my soul that is alienated in every place from your souls that are 
alienated in every place.”103 Of notable significance here is Gibran’s statement at the 
outset, “I now address you as a man and not as a poet,” which echoes his self-
consciousness of a certain poetic identity, voiced in his play Between Night and Morn 
 
103 Ibid., 374 [emphasis mine].  
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and elsewhere,104 that is purportedly at odds with “politics” as a practise of power and 
vying interests, yet inevitably entrenched in “the political,” or, as Jacques Rancière puts 
it, literature “doing” politics as literature (albeit in another context).105 Thus, Gibran 
provisionally suspends his being a poet in his endeavour to engender and revive the 
Syrian will to work necessary for the realization of the Nahḍa, the intimation here being 
that poetry addresses the universal, the soul that is everywhere alienated. In other words, 
poetry as such cannot be national or identitarian. Rather, it speaks to the human as such, 
even if it is articulated in a certain language and within a certain tradition or culture, as 
also indicated in Chapter One. Yet, why the “Eastern conscience” in this context? 
“Eastern” here, as a label of “imaginative geography,”106 to use Said’s phrase, at once 
stands for and encompasses the Syrian. The use of this qualifier should not be readily 
construed as an instance of essentialization, precisely because of the above-mentioned 
distinction. Gibran is addressing his fellow Syrians as Easterners insofar as they are 
aware, or made aware, of their own cultural and imaginative identity – in the 
anthropological sense – in a specific historical moment (the Near East is not, after all, 
the West). That they are Easterners or how they became so, however, is taken for 
granted.  
Addressing the Eastern conscience of the Syrians with his, Gibran writes,   
 
You are seeking freedom and yearning for independence; you are aspiring for an 
Eastern civilization that rivals the Western one; and you wish to dispense with 
the foreigners, nay you want the foreigners to come to you asking for your 
friendship instead of you asking for theirs. I address now as a man and not as a 
poet, and I appeal to your alienated souls in every place, so listen….107  
 
Gibran, in other words, is addressing the identitarian layer of their being, insofar as 
“identitarian” denotes the cultural and anthropological identification of the self,108 
 
104 In his manuscripts Gibran reiterates that he is not a politician and he does not to be a politician (in the 
context of nationalism). See, Gibran, Iqlib al-Ṣafḥa, 102. 
105 See Jacques Rancière, “The Politics of Literature,” SubStance 103 vol. 33, no. 1 (2004): 10. 
106 Said, Orientalism, 49-73. 
107 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 374. 
108 See Meskini, al-Huwiyya wa al-Zamān, 7-8. 
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located in a specific geographical and symbolic space demarcated – imagined, 
constructed and entrenched – as the East. Yet he is invoking this layer in the specific 
context of “civilizational” rivalry and survival, where “the West” as the civilizational, 
identitarian other is not solely a challenge and a threat, but that which instigates, 
occasions and sets the terms of an “Eastern” quest for a “civilization” of its own. 
Interestingly enough, however, one discerns that Gibran, towards the end of the above-
cited passage, is not addressing this layer but appealing, “as a man and not as a poet,” to 
the Syrians’ “alienated souls in every place.” This should not be taken for granted. For 
in this discursive shift, Gibran is addressing what he takes to be the human as such in 
his fellow Easterners/Syrians, that is, the originary ontological structure of being human 
in the world as he understands it. For the self as “soul alienated in every place,” if one 
apprehends it in the light of Gibran’s thought, is the existentially alienated self by dint 
of being in the world, anywhere in the world – that is, its alienation, not conditioned by 
lack, is constitutive.109 More specifically, he is addressing the originary layer of the self 
that lurks behind the “veils” of national, cultural and imaginative identity. No wonder 
that he is using the word “alienated” here [gharīb, meaning “estranged,” takes up the 
connotation of “alienation” in the existential sense that the word ghurba denotes], which 
designates the primordial, displaced sense of the self that comes before any cultural, 
social, national, in short, identitarian veiling. I should note that I am not so much 
concerned with alienation per se in my analysis here as with this “universal” underlying 
structure – for Gibran – at the core of being human in the world irrespective of, or in 
tandem with, its identitarian layer. By appealing to this radical pre- or non-identitarian 
self, Gibran attempts to (re)invigorate the will to work requisite for the Awakening of 
women, the plantation of the fields (on which a great emphasis is placed) and the 
education of the youth, all of which the Syrians are keen on realizing yet only, as he 
 
109 See my discussion of his play Iram Dhāt al-ʿImād in the last section of Chapter One.  
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asserts, “with [their] silent will.”110 The ambivalence of the Syrians, as he diagnoses it – 
willing to work but working in words, to paraphrase him – is a sign of a double, 
conflicting personality: “one liberating itself [tataḥarrar] in secret, the other submitting 
(itself) [tamtathil] in public.”111 This is an Awakening that is solely possible if the self 
is understood and addressed – the addressing and addressed self – beyond or beneath its 
identitarian surface, albeit an Awakening that manifests itself, paradoxically and 
inevitably, in identitarian terms, that is, as an Eastern one. This is why “the identitarian” 
(al-hawawī) is a veiling: it conceals that which enables its manifestation.  
Along with his emphasis on the will to work and the embodiment of the will to 
work or lack thereof in the Syrian/Eastern subject, it is crucial to accentuate the weight 
that Gibran lends to the force of ibtikār (innovation or inventiveness) and ibdāʿ 
(creativity) to foster an independent Arab Eastern Nahḍa. This is not only manifested in 
his concern for the future of the Arabic language, which is contingent upon the “power 
of invention” in the collective body of its speakers as discussed in Chapter Two, but 
also in his scepticism vis-à-vis the Arab Nahḍa itself, one that tormented him a great 
deal as revealed in his manuscripts. “Is it a Nahḍa,” he wonders, “or a short wakefulness 
that precedes death? Are we assiduous to recover a lost glory, or are these dreams so 
embodied in the remembrance of the past that we’ve taken them for facts?”112 This 
scepticism arises out of certain diagnosis that attributes imitation of the past 
(“traditionalism”113) or the West (“westernization”) to the shrinking “capacity to 
innovate and create in the nation’s spirit [nafs al-umma],” which leads to an inevitable 
imitation of “what other nations innovate”114 or, in case one is not an imitator of the 
 
110 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 374. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Gibran, Iqlib al- Ṣafḥa, 115.  
113 I use this word in the sense that Abdallah Laroui lends to it, that is, as an ideological deployment of 
“tradition,” wrongly posited as “the anti-thesis of progressive change,” which usually intensifies when 
there is foreign pressure or threat. Laroui, The Crisis of Arab Intellectuals: Traditionalism or 
Historicism? trans. Diarmid Cammell (Berkley; London: University of California Press, 1976), 33, 42-43. 
114 Gibran, Iqlib al-Ṣafḥa, 105. 
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West, to an “enchantment” with ancient, glorified “effects,” a sign of “slavery” to the 
past to the extent that it denotes submission to the “power of continuity” [quwwat al-
istimrār], of which he speaks so robustly and elaborately in his poetic essay 
“Slavery.”115  
In “Nahḍat al-Sharq al-ʿArabī [The Awakening of the Arab East],” an interview 
conducted with Gibran in al-Hilāl periodical in 1923, later turned into an essay, he 
spells out his take on the Arab Nahḍa, which he deems “no more than a faint echo of 
modern Western civilization [al-madaniyya al-gharbiyya al-ḥadītha].”116 This is 
because “this blessed Nahḍa,” according to him, “has created nothing out of itself, and 
what it has hitherto produced lacks the stamp of its unique character, the colour of its 
own imprint.”117 He then goes on to lament, after asserting that “the East, in its entirety 
(…) has become a huge Western colony,” the fact that “the Easterners, those who take 
pride in their past and boast of their traditions and their ancestors’ achievements, have 
become slaves, with their thoughts, preferences and leanings, to the Western idea [al-
fikra al-gharbiyya].”118 He is quick to maintain, however, that what concerns him is not 
“whether the Western civilization is, in itself, good or not” – it is still alive after and 
despite World War One, he asserts, a sign of its survival and persistence. He is rather 
dwelling on the question of whether the Arab nations are wakeful (nāhiḍa) or not, and 
to that end, he suggests looking into the various connotations of the word nuhūḍ 
[Awakening], and what each connotation entails in the (then) Arab context. Thus, 
should we take the word in the sense of “apprenticeship,” that is, importing, adopting, 
appropriating and superficially imitating the (material) manifestations of Western 
civilization [madaniyya] in order to “amend” the ruinous and dilapidated social, 
economic and cultural reality of the Arab nations, then the latter, asserts Gibran with 
 
115 CWs in Arabic, 213-215. The translated version is available in Gibran, The Storm, 39-44.  
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irony, “have awakened to the point of reaching out to the galaxy.”119 Gibran’s use of the 
word madaniyya is not arbitrary, it seems to me, for unlike ḥaḍāra, madaniyya in this 
context connotes that which is materially visible in the modern West, embodied in its 
metropolitan centres (the word shares its root with madīna, city; it can be also 
understood, therefore, as urbanity), hence the ridiculing of any unquestioned imitation 
or appropriation of it. “If Awakening, however, manifests itself by way of inventing and 
innovating, then the Arab nations are still in slumber,” he states. Yet, interestingly, “this 
is indeed the case if we look at invention and innovation with eyes captivated by 
Western civilization and its mechanical novelties.”120 What Gibran is staunchly at odds 
with here is any instrumentalist appropriation of Western modernity in its technological 
facet and, more precisely, its re-appropriation as an Arab Nahḍa. Any technological 
infatuation with the West, therefore, is scorned and dismissed as a mere imitation that 
results from a dwindling and dying capacity to innovate in the Arab, Eastern subject. 
This stance is not simply a Romantic backlash against the epistemological nomenclature 
of the Nahḍa’s “reform-rationalist paradigms,” as Sheehi points out.121 It is also a 
position that seeks to dispense with both traditionalism and westernization by carving 
out an original Awakening that is almost exclusively predicated upon the force of 
invention insofar as it invests in the “Eastern” yet-to-be excavated “treasures,” the 
unstirred (re)sources of the Arab Eastern self, so to speak.122 Paying attention to 
Gibran’s fiction alone is what prompted Sheehi to conceive of Gibran’s ideal subject (in 
his fiction) as a Romantic one who does away with “civilization as urbanity.”  
 
119 Ibid., 346. 
120 Ibid. 
121 “The romantic subject,” argues Sheehi, “distinguishes himself from the previously seen reform subject 
by finding his ontology in a criterion exterior to civilization understood as urbanity.” Sheehi, 
Foundations, 98-100.  
122 Towards the end of the same essay, he asserts, “In the East, our old house, there are countless 
treasures, riches and wonderful things, yet they are all confused, amassed and veiled by a layer of dust. It 
is commonly known that the West has mastered the art of organization [tartīb] to an extreme degree… If 
imitation is ineluctable, let us imitate this art provided that we imitate none other than it.” ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 
350. 
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Gibran, I argue, is wrongly understood as being averse to civilization per se, a 
reputation he acquired based on his early fiction and especially his long poem al-
Mawākib [The Processions] (1919), in which he contrasts the idyllic, innocent world of 
al-ghāb (the forest) with the corrupt, materialistic world of the modern city. In his short 
story “The Tempest” (1916), one is bewildered by the renunciation and isolation –  not 
the asceticism, as it first appeared to the narrator123 – of Yusuf Fakhri, the principal 
character of the short story who has decided to live in a hut away from the city, the 
emblem of “civilization as urbanity,” and who delights in walking amidst “the storms” 
in the mountains of north Lebanon. The narrator, trying to find a safe refuge from a 
howling storm that has taken him aback, tells us that he chanced upon Yusuf’s hut, 
where he was indeed admitted and hosted. The long dialogue that unfolds between the 
narrator and Yusuf is an intriguing case of discussing and contesting the worth of 
modern civilization. Yusuf, to the narrator’s surprise and admiration, evinces a critical 
awareness of all the “maladies” that have swept over society, as he explains why he 
forsook the city, having chosen to distance himself altogether from what he deems the 
very source of those maladies, “the city” itself. This is to the dismay and bafflement of 
the narrator who finds in him, having diagnosed those “ills,” a “physician” who would 
have contributed to the “healing” of society. What is notable is that Yusuf, his cynicism 
notwithstanding, regards the “wretchedness of the East” as “the wretchedness of the 
whole Earth,” because “human nature is the same and people differ from each other 
only in extraneous features, which should not be taken seriously.”124 He goes on to 
express his profound scepticism vis-à-vis the advancement of the West in that “slavery 
– slavery to life, slavery to the past, slavery to teachings, customs and fashions, and 
 
123 The narrator is surprised to have found “wine, tobacco, and coffee in his [Yusuf’s] cell.” “I do not 
blame you,” Yusuf said, “for you, like many, imagine that isolation from men means isolation from life 
and from the natural pleasures and the simple delights of life.” Gibran, The Storm, 15. 
124 CWs in Arabic, 260. I rely, in part, on John Walbridge’s brilliant translation, which is nevertheless not 
without inaccuracies. 
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slavery to the dead – remains slavery even if its face is painted and its dress is changed, 
even if it calls itself freedom.”125 This is how he shuns the idea of a “backward East” 
and an “advanced West,” ending up by dismissing civilization altogether as “a vanity.” 
All that he yearns for and venerates now is a “wakefulness [yaqaẓa] in the depths of the 
self; he who has witnessed it cannot disclose it in words, whereas he who has not does 
not and will not attain its secrets,”126 a vision drawn, unsurprisingly, from Sufism. 
While this can be readily construed as a Gibranian Romantic aversion to “civilization” – 
a reading that fails to be attentive to the dialogic nature of the short story and the 
intricacies of the exchange between Yusuf and the narrator – the narrator’s reflection 
reveals not so much a concurrence with Yusuf but a contesting rumination. He does not 
dismiss civilization/urbanity in favour of a “spiritual wakefulness,” which is 
nevertheless hailed as “the aim of Being,” but sees the former, “with all its obscurities 
and ambiguities,” as being “one of the causes” of the latter. “How is it possible to deny 
an existent thing when its very existence is evidence for the truth of its right?” he 
wonders.127 Even if “modern civilization is a passing accident,” the narrator believes 
that “eternal Law” will have made of it a step in the “staircase … that reaches to the 
absolute substance.”128 The metaphysics that informs the narrator’s judgement aside, his 
contestation suggests that Gibran is not against civilization as such, that “modern 
civilization” for him is a cause of ambivalence and perplexity as much as it is a 
phenomenon that should not serve as a yardstick to gauge “progress” and 
“backwardness.”    
As for his non-fictional later work, exemplified by his essay “The Awakening of 
the Arab East,” it discloses an understanding of a Nahḍa whose trajectory must be 
radically different from the one taken by Western civilization. This is because it must 
 
125 Ibid., 261. See also my reading of Almustafa’s passage on Freedom in The Prophet in Chapter One. 
126 Ibid., 262. 
127 Ibid., 262; The Storm, 26. 
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derive its urge and “moral wakefulness” [yaqaẓa maʿnawiyya] as well as its 
independence from the “essence” and “spirit” of the Arab East, holding on to the belief 
that a true, original Nahḍa is one that embraces an Eastern spirit of ibtikār unmediated 
by the West. This stance is held by Miss Warda, one of the main characters of his short 
play al-Wujūh al-Mulawwana [The Chameleonic Faces], published in 1916 in al-Sāʾiḥ. 
Miss Warda hopes for the awakening in the young Syrians of “those elements that 
brought about the awakening of the Western nations,” by which she means a “moral 
awakening that made of their lives a continuous ceremony on the stage of Being.”129 
This is why in a polemical essay, published posthumously, Gibran heaps his criticism 
on Kamel Ataturk for failing to realize that reform should not be enacted by “importing 
the modern glittering shells” of Western civilization [qushūriha al-barrāqa al-ḥadītha] 
while oblivious to its “essence” or “kernel” [lubāb], where its true meaning (for him) 
resides.130 Gibran, however, is not unaware of the inevitability of influence, as revealed 
in his play Assilbān for instance,131 yet his suspicion of “borrowing” and “emulation” 
lies in their potential transformation into a “lethal venom” and a “grave” for the 
borrowing Easterner132: the extent to which what is borrowed could erase “the 
character” of the borrower and efface his or her particularity. Hence the metaphor of 
“digestion”: transforming that which is borrowed from “the West” into “the Eastern 
being,” in other words, to domesticate it in fear of becoming “quasi-Western,” a state 
about which Gibran is deeply anxious.133 What is the ontological underpinning, one 
wonders, of Gibran’s line of thinking here? “The creative nature [fiṭra] of the Eastern 
self is akin to a harp’s strings whose notes are,” he maintains, “divergent by their nature 
from every note of every string in a Western harp. The Easterner cannot bring together 
 
129 CWs in Arabic, 266. [emphasis mine] 
130 See “‘Amān Allah’, The Afghan King” in Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 379-80.  
131 This is mainly in relation to literature. See CWs in Arabic, 270. 
132 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 349.  
133 Ibid. 
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the tones and silences of two distinct notes without corrupting one or both.”134 It is not 
difficult to discern the essentialism underlying this statement, which Gibran at times 
acquiesces to and at times disrupts or complicates as my discussion has shown. It is 
nevertheless an essentialism that is not based on a hierarchical opposition between the 
East and the West, but on an imagined notion of cultural difference that, in that specific 
civilizational and imperial context, is articulated in identitarian yet non-hierarchical 
terms. 
Thus, while alert to the perils of an uncritical appropriation of Western 
civilization qua urbanity, of espousing “westernization” as a means to generate progress 
in the East, of glorifying and unquestioningly submitting to the past (“traditionalism”) 
as a way of confronting the urgencies of the present, Gibran nevertheless relies on the 
metaphysical binary of essence/appearance in his rather Eastern-oriented approach to 
the question of the Nahḍa. Furthermore, Gibran never paid attention to the role of 
modernity and colonial capitalism in the reshaping and destabilization of the region 
since Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798,135 that is, to the extent to which Western 
imperialism was instrumental in the restructuring of the area despite local resistance (the 
asymmetrical power relation need not be overstated here). He was, however, as 
displayed in the essay, mindful of what he deemed the Western colonialist logic of 
power, driven by imperial, economic interest, that would hamper any possibility of Arab 
unity.136At any rate, his concern was the not the past but the future of Syria and the 
Arab East, which for him required a radical transformative and practical vision that 
cannot do away with identitarian reason as a strategic choice for civilizational survival 
and Awakening. This vision is at odds with the ways in which Arab intellectuals tackled 
the conundrum of the Nahḍa by espousing either westernization or traditionalism. 
 
134 Ibid., 350. 
135 Fawaz, A Land of Aching Hearts, 10, 11, 25, 33, 34. 
136 Daye, ʿAqīdat Jubrān, 374.  
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Instead, it sought to lend legitimacy to originality, the appeal to which arises in 
moments of civilizational survival against imperialist hegemony, by infusing it with a 
Geist of ibtikār indispensable for it very enaction.     
In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that Gibran’s intellectual 
commitment to the Syrian national cause is concomitant with his concern for the Nahḍa; 
the one presupposes the other. Gibran’s nationalism, although inevitably ideological, is 
fundamentally ethical. This is not only attested by the idea that the Syrian waṭan or 
homeland is the sole unifier of its inhabitants. It is also evinced in the vision that the 
liberation/formation of a national state in Syria hinges on the Syrians’ “moral 
independence,” which is the primary condition for any original Awakening to emerge 
on the one hand, and for the persistence of the Syrian “will to work” that this desired 
Awakening requires on the other. Also, while embedded in the discursive universe of 
the Nahḍa, Gibran’s discourse disrupts and interrogates some of its identitarian and 
teleological premises. Sceptical of the Nahḍa’s alternance between traditionalism and 
westernization, he envisions an alternative Nahḍa that derives its spiritual and moral 
(re)sources from the (Arab) Eastern self, an enterprise whose validation would solely lie 
in embracing a Geist of ibtikār (innovation/invention) that would legitimate this agentic 
but defensive appeal to identitarian and cultural particularity. Ultimately, however, the 
modern/colonial logic of power reigned supreme. The colonial partition of Greater Syria 
by the end of the War meant the impossibility of realizing the quest for nationhood and 
the Nahḍa. Yet Gibran’s diasporic voice and its persistent echoes attest to an early “de-
colonial” intellectual vision whose realizability was impeded by the colonial conditions 
of impossibility. This intellectual, national commitment notwithstanding, Gibran never 
ceased conceiving of himself as essentially a poet, poetry being that which, however 
linguistically and culturally situated, is concerned with the universal as such. Thus, the 
national and the universal are, as I have argued throughout, complementary or, at least, 
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contextually different in Gibran. Yet this singular versatility has been lost on the mixed 
reception that his anglophone work has elicited in its linguistic and cultural travelling 
beyond the nation and back to it, which is the subject of my next and final chapter.  
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Chapter Four: 
Multiple Horizons of Expectations, Multiple Gibrans:  
Or, Gibran as World Literature 
   
Je ne connais pas d’autre exemple, dans l’histoire de la littérature, d’un livre 
[The Prophet] qui ait acquit une telle notoriété, qui soit devenu une petite bible 
pour d’innombrables lecteurs, et qui continue cependant à circuler en marge, 
comme sous le manteau, sous dizaines de millions de manteaux, faudrait-il dire, 
mais sous le manteau quand même, comme si Gibran était toujours écrivain 
sacré, un écrivain honteux, un écrivain maudit. 
[I am not aware of any other example, in the history of literature, of so renowned 
a book [The Prophet], which has become a small bible for countless readers, and 
which continues nevertheless to circulate on the margins, as if under the coat, 
under tens of millions of coats, one must say, but under the coat all the same, as 
if Gibran was always a sacred writer, a shameful writer, an accursed writer.] 
              Amin Maalouf.1 
The East is not a simple (dialectical, speculative, culturalist) movement toward 
the West. They are for themselves the beginning and the end. And we are trying 
to go toward a planetary and plural thought, this other-thought, that is built step 
by step and without a certain end. 
 Abdelkebir Khatibi.2 
 
Where and how do we locate Gibran in the world today? To locate a bilingual 
immigrant writer such as Gibran somewhere is, of course, to place him in more than one 
geography. The question of location in this sense goes beyond geography in the 
territorial sense. It is cultural, imaginary and epistemic. And to tackle this question is to 
locate oneself in, and carry oneself across, these different geographies. In the case of 
Gibran, this would entail the encounter of many problems, not the least of which is the 
fact that Gibran is seen as a popular sage prophet in one location (the United States), 
and as a rebellious modernizing poet and writer in another (the Arab world). To view 
Gibran in this manner, however, is to locate oneself in two different languages and 
cultures separately. Yet Gibran’s bilingual chasm, upon which I dwelt in Chapter Two, 
 
1 This is from a preface to a new translation of The Prophet into French: Khalil Gibran, Le Prophet, trans. 
Janine Levy. Preface by Amin Maalouf (Paris: Editions de la Loupe, 2003), 10. 
2 Abdelkebir Khatibi, Plural Maghreb, trans. P. Burcu Yalim (London; New York: Bloomsbury, 2019), 
21-22. 
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is a chasm that separates and connects at the same time. This chasm has produced 
different incarnations of Gibran that are sometimes irreconcilable, due mainly to what is 
masked and unmasked, what is lost and gained, in (cultural) translation. No wonder that 
this chasm is most apparent in the divergent modes of receiving his English work in the 
U.S. and the Arab world, where it is “Arabized.” Tracing this chasm and the worldly 
conditions of its emergence and persistence, that is, tracing and interrogating specific 
modes of reception that vary in their influence on the perception of that which is 
received, is my concern in this chapter. 
Gibran, I argue, is a writer whose English work is bilingual, because it belongs 
at once to Arabic and American literatures, despite the lack of critical recognition in the 
American literary field.3 As such, it is an instance of “world literature” par excellence, 
not only in the sense that his work, following David Damrosch,4 travels in translation 
beyond the culture of origin, but insofar as it inhabits two literary systems to neither of 
which it fully belongs. Hence, any appraisal of it should simultaneously consider its 
reception in these two literary spheres. I demonstrate that Gibran’s English text has 
been often received as essentially and monolithically “Oriental” and “spiritual” in the 
U.S., designations that saturate and flatten this text within that specific cultural and 
normative location. When the same text travels to the Arab world, it is given another 
hermeneutic life in that context, compelling us to approach it as world literature beyond 
English, as world literature, that is, in Arabic. The American reception will occupy most 
of my analytical attention in this chapter. This is because Gibran’s presence in 
American literature is vague and perplexing: on the one hand, The Prophet has enjoyed 
a massive popular appeal since its publication in 1923; on the other, Gibran sits outside 
the canon of American literature. What is more, his other English works and Arabic 
 
3 Insofar as it is enunciated, situated and received in the U.S., Gibran’s anglophone work belongs to 
American literature, or at least it is “Arab-American” (even if uncanonized), without losing its 
fundamental status as Arabic literature in English, which is the condition of its becoming “American.”  
4 Damrosch, What is World Literature?, 4-5. 
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writings have been eclipsed by the phenomenon of The Prophet. This problem, 
therefore, warrants a focused attention to the way(s) in which his books have been 
received in the U.S., to the American conditions of reading and horizons of 
expectations, more specifically, that have shaped specific modes of reading, 
(e)valuation and categorization (section one and two). Yet, the American reception 
remains one side of the picture. Of no less importance is the re-contextualization and 
“Arabization” of the anglophone Gibran in the Arab cultural geography, where he is 
subject to another regime of value5 and other conditions of reading and interpretation 
(section three).      
In section one, I focus on the initial reception of Gibran’s English books in the 
U.S. For reasons of space, I highlight the reception of The Madman (1918), The 
Forerunner (1920), The Prophet (1923) and Jesus the Son of Man (1928), arguably the 
most important of Gibran’s English oeuvre.6 It is not possible to study all the reviews, 
but those discussed in this section are the most frequently cited in biographies of 
Gibran. As such, they are illustrative of the early reception of his English-language 
books. The pattern that emerges in this reception is the emphasis on Gibran’s Oriental 
identity in a way that precedes his text and predetermines its meaning, value and 
categorization. Nevertheless, it is a pattern that is disrupted by some instances which I 
refer to and discuss. As I highlight this reception, I interrogate the underlying 
presuppositions behind various value-judgements. This interrogation will be 
supplemented by an intervention, a close reading of a parable in The Forerunner, 
“God’s fool.” Such an intervention is not only supplementary but inevitable, as its very 
enaction has the aim of circumventing the kind of totalizing judgments we often 
 
5 A regime of value could be described as “a semiotic institution generating evaluative irregularities under 
certain conditions of use, and in which particular empirical audiences or communities may be more or 
less fully imbricated.” John Frow, Cultural Studies and Cultural Value (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
144.  
6 Sand and Foam (1926) is a short book of aphorisms and has not attracted much attention. The Earth 
Gods (1930) is a late work of Gibran and is not very different from his early works in Arabic and English.  
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encounter in culturalist or spiritualist readings of his work, a reminder of his text’s 
singularity that necessarily exceeds those kinds of judgements. In section two, I 
underscore the problem of The Prophet in American literature. While hitherto 
uncanonized, its huge popularity has turned Gibran into a phenomenon in the U.S. I 
demonstrate that the popular appropriation of the book as an Eastern “spiritual guide” 
has thwarted the certification of Gibran as “high literature” worthy of joining “the 
canon.” Here, I foreground the ways in which cultural translation and exoticism bear on 
the production of the symbolic value of Gibran’s text in America, and how this value-
coding has de-contextualized it, obscuring both its polysemy and the visibility of works 
other than The Prophet. Since my argument is that Gibran’s anglophone work is 
bilingual, I turn, in section three, to its “Arabization” in the Arab cultural geography. 
This is by discussing, first, what this Arabization presupposes and produces, with the 
multiple translations of The Prophet into Arabic as evidence, and, second, by focusing 
on two different engagements with his work: Mansur Rahbani’s play Jubrān wa al-
Nabiyy [Gibran and the Prophet] (2010), performed as an operetta in 2005, and Fethi 
Meskini’s philosophical essay in Arabic, “The Veils of Reason, or Gibran and the Mad 
I.”7 I discuss these two examples because they are illustrative of the re-contextualization 
of Gibran’s anglophone text in the Arab world. My discussion will not only emphasize 
their content but will attempt to reveal the strategies of re-contextualization and the 
conditions of reading that occasion their enunciation. What emerges is another Gibran, 
de-exoticized and re-appropriated in Arabic, reminding us that this movement is one 
that disrupts the putative correlation between “English” and “world literature” in the 
recent emergence and consolidation of the concept in the Anglo-Saxon academy. By 
“forgetting English,” so to speak, one remembers “the varieties of one-world thinking” 
 
7 The essay’s title in Arabic is “Barāqiʿ al-ʿAql, aw Jubrān wa al-Anā al-Majnūn” in Fethi Meskini, al-
Kujīto al-Majrūḥ: Asʾilat al-Hawiyya fī al-Falsafa al-Muʿāsira [The Wounded Cogito: Questions of 
Identity in Contemporary Philosophy] (Algiers: Editions el-ikhtilef; Riyadh, Beirut: Dhifāf Publishing, 
2013), 191-96.  
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to use Aamir Mufti’s phrase,8 the cultural, normative and imaginative plurality of the 
world. This last section is a reminder of that.      
Theoretically, I draw on Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological approach because it has 
the capacity to elucidate some of the issues that pertain to Gibran’s American reception. 
For Bourdieu, the cultural/symbolic and the economic are interrelated but irreducible to 
one another, both of which are ultimately crucial in the social process of valuation and 
“consecration” of a literary work within a particular literary/cultural field. Despite its 
silence on essential elements such as race and gender,9 Bourdieu’s sociology of art and 
literature is helpful to illuminate some of the conditions that left Gibran outside the 
canon of American literature. Along with Bourdieu, I use Hans Robert Jauss’ concept of 
the “horizon of expectations.”10 Jauss’ “aesthetics of reception” does not pay attention 
to literary works that are constituted by and received in two different linguistic and 
cultural spheres. Nevertheless, I use his concept, expanding it beyond his model (as a 
criterion of a literary work’s aesthetic worth), to designate the discursive conditions and 
backgrounds against which specific modalities of reading or (re)-appropriating Gibran 
are produced, cemented and/or disrupted, in both the U.S. and the Arab contexts. I 
understand that Bourdieu’s approach may not be reconcilable with hermeneutics, but I 
am not combining and using them uncritically. My approach is rather pragmatic. Both 
are useful to my analysis because my discussion includes several elements which 
demand eclectic and careful theoretical attention. Crucially, the (after)life of literary 
texts resides in a world of multiple social, cultural and hermeneutic spaces across 
imagined or real geographies; and this multiplicity commands a worldly critical 
 
8 Aamir Mufti, Forget English! Orientalisms and the Institution of World Literatures (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2016), 5. 
9 Frow, Cultural Studies, 5.  
10 Hans Robert Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, trans. Timothy Bahti, intro. Paul de Man 
(Brighton: Harvester, 1982), 22-28.  
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attention that is aware of the dialectics of text(s) and context(s), without one subsuming 
the other, as this chapter aims to show.   
1. Initial Reception of Gibran’s English Works in the U.S. 
The importance of tracing this initial reception of Gibran’s English works lies 
not only in revealing whether his works were positively or negatively received. It 
resides, most importantly, in exposing the historical as well as the normative and 
evaluative framework within which his works were placed and according to which they 
were assessed. Critics have so far only pointed out that The Madman and The Jesus the 
Son of Man are the two books of Gibran that received a positive critical reception in the 
U.S. – two books that remain relatively unknown compared to The Prophet. But, who 
and how and in which historical and cultural context is this judgment made, what 
Bourdieu would call “the symbolic production of the work” and its value11? What is the 
regime of value that informs these evaluative judgments? What was highlighted in the 
reviews and what was absent and why? These are the fundamental questions that my 
discussion in this section endeavours to address.  
To speak about this reception is to situate Gibran within the American literary 
field at the time. There were crucial changes in terms of literary and aesthetic taste in 
the aftermath of World War One.12 “American literature” had not yet acquired, before 
the War, an institutional status that demarcates its boundaries and history, but the 
formation of its canon began in 1910s and 1920s.13 Tradition had to be invented, and 
T.S. Eliot’s well-known essay, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” has altered the 
 
11 Bourdieu calls for “a sociology of art and literature [that] has to take as its object not only the material 
production but also the symbolic production of the work, i.e. the production of the value of the work or, 
which amounts to the same thing, of belief in the value of the work.” Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of 
Cultural Production, trans. and ed. Randal Johnson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 37.  
12 This change – which devalued writers such as Benjamin Franklin, Washington Irving and William 
Dean Howells, to name but a few, while valuing others like Henry Melville, Mark Twin and Henry James 
– was reinforced by an institutional configuration that consisted in “the professionalization of the teaching 
of literature, the development of an aesthetic theory that privileged certain texts [New Criticism], and the 
historiographic organization of the body of literature into conventional “periods” and “themes.”” Paul 
Lauter, Canons and Contexts (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 24-27.  
13 This formation excluded black, female and working-class writers. Ibid., 27-32. 
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perception of tradition from something inherited to something that is obtained by 
assiduous labour. Eliot speaks about novelty in relation to an existing order of 
“European, English literature,”14 in relation, that is, to “the mind of Europe.”15 The 
implicit and “natural” assumption here is that to write poetry in English is to belong to a 
European tradition of writing, to be conscious of this tradition as it inhabits the present. 
Moreover, Eliot’s concept of novelty, embodied in his impersonal theory of poetry, 
posits the depersonalization of the poet in a way that transforms emotion into palpable 
feelings manifesting themselves detachedly and creatively in form.16 Eliot attacks the 
“metaphysics of mysticism”17 and “the metaphysical theory of the substantial unity of 
the soul.”18 He leaves no place for a variety of mystical experiences in poetry, or for 
poetry that is ethically engaged. Thus, “the generation of literary critics who, following 
T.S. Eliot, began to come to prominence in the 1920s, were doubtful – if not altogether 
suspicious – of the power of art to shape behaviour at all.”19 The “New Critics” diverted 
attention to a literary work’s language and form, seen as that which represents human 
creativity, by bracketing, if not dismissing, its subject matter or the values it promotes.20 
They were suspicious of “mass society” and keen on protecting culture by stressing the 
value of art per se, not the way it shapes conduct. As Paul Lauter puts it, this “formalist 
aesthetic played an implicit role in the narrowing of the canon,” as these “arbiters of 
taste” often excluded black and female writers whose mode of writing did not invite the 
then predominant approach of New Criticism. Instead,  
 
14 T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays (London: Faber and Faber, 1932), 15. 
15 Ibid., 16 
16 Eliot talks about the “perfected medium in which special, or very varied, feelings are at liberty to enter 
into new combinations.” Ibid., 18 
17 Ibid., 21. 
18 Ibid., 22.  
19 Lauter, Canons and Contexts, 34. 
20 “Formalist criteria of excellence developed in the 1920s by critics like John Crowe Ransom, Cleanth 
Brooks, R.P. Blackmur, and Tate, have emphasized complexity, ambiguity, tension, irony, and similar 
phenomena; such standards are by no means casual. They place a premium on the skills of the literary 
interpreter: He shall unpack the ambiguities and tensions to the uninitiated students, the products of a 
degraded “mass education.”” Ibid., 35. [emphasis in the original]  
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upper-class white Americans in the twenties acknowledged the lives of black 
people, and the work of black writers, only in “their place” – as “exotic,” like a 
taste for Pernod or jazz, a quaint expression of the “folk.” It was very well to 
visit Harlem, but decidedly inappropriate to include blacks in the anthology or 
the classroom, much less in the Modern Language Association.21 
 
This account is of course schematic, but it illustrates the general literary and aesthetic 
climate of the post-World War One America, which was crucial to the formation and 
consolidation of the American literary canon until 1960s and 1970s. Locating Gibran –  
a writer of an invisible “ethnic minority” in the U.S. –  within this context will help us 
understand the American reception of his work. Gibran’s English writings, whose 
concern is mostly ethical, cannot be appreciated by looking at them through the lens of 
Eliot’s impersonal theory of poetry or New Criticism, nor by casting them as “exotic” in 
relation to the dominant European, white male norms of writing and thinking. That was, 
however, explicitly or implicitly the case.  
Gibran’s first book in English, The Madman, was generally well-received, yet, 
as two of his biographers observed, he “often was portrayed as a mysterious hero, 
ready-made genius, and Near Eastern counterpart of Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore. 
His impoverished origins in Bsharri, adolescent days in the South End, and cultural 
apprenticeship in Boston were overlooked.”22 This comparison to Tagore – who was 
well-known in America at the time – placed Gibran in the vague category of “Oriental” 
poetry, with the Orient as an essential, over-arching civilizational identity that precedes 
the text itself and determines, a priori, its value. This judgment was not without (weak) 
foundation, though, as Gibran adopts the parable form in his English writings, despite 
his own realization, as I noted in Chapter Two, that “English is not the language for 
parables,”23 that is, for his own parables which were first imagined or even written in 
 
21 Ibid., 36. 
22 Jean and G Gibran, Kahlil Gibran: Beyond Borders, 304.  
23 “English is not the language for parables, but one is apt to find faults with his tools when he cannot use 
them well. The fault lies within me. But I will learn how write in English.” [emphasis in the original] KG 
to MH, May 16, 1916.  
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Arabic. The parable, however, is not necessarily an Oriental form. What is at stake here 
is not the parable as such but the identity of the writer in question, and how this identity 
informs the act of (e)valuation itself. 
Joseph Gallomb, in his interview with Gibran for the Evening Post in 1919, 
following the publication of The Madman, observes that a formal similarity between 
Tagore and Gibran exists, but quickly stresses the contrast between the two: 
Roughly speaking, what Tagore is to the East, Kahlil Gibran is to the Near East 
… Both employ largely the parable. Both have written in English with as fine a 
command of the Western tongue as of their own. And each is an artist in other 
forms besides poetry. But there the resemblances end and the differences appear, 
the most striking being their physical appearance. Tagore, with his long, 
picturesque hair and beard and his flowing robe, is a figure from some canvas 
Sir Frederic Leighton might have painted of a religious mystic. Gibran is 
Broadway or Copley Square or the Strand, or the Avenue de l’Opera – a 
correctly dressed cosmopolitan of the Western World.24 
 
Wail Hassan is sceptical about this portrayal in his assessment of “the Gibran 
phenomenon,”25 because for Gallomb there seemed to be “a chameleon-like ease of 
adaptiveness about [Gibran],” an Oriental who is “a correctly dressed cosmopolitan of 
the Western World.”26 At issue here, however, is not Gibran but Gallomb’s appraisal, 
because for the latter Gibran could either be an Oriental a la Tagore or an 
Occidentalized Oriental – that is, seeming is mistaken for being here, to invoke Gibran’s 
poem “My Friend” which was closely read in Chapter Two. The Evening Post’s review, 
for its part, highlighted the Near Eastern creative source of Gibran’s The Madman, 
especially in its capacity to accommodate diverse cultural sources, “a blend of Tagore, 
La Fontaine, Nietzsche, and Dr. Sigmund Freud – a blend which, in The Madman, is 
surprisingly successful.”27 It is precisely this blend that makes The Madman irreducible 
to Orientalist and culturalist readings. By contrast, The Nation’s review considered the 
 
24 Gallomb, “An Arabian Poet in New York,” N.Y. Evening Post, 29 March 1919, book sect., 1, 10.  
25  Hassan, “The Gibran Phenomenon,” 67-68.  
26 This is one of the essential elements upon which hinges Hassan’s argument that Gibran acquiesced to 
Orientalist representation in the U.S. Ibid, 59-77. 
27 Jean and G Gibran, Kahlil Gibran: Beyond Borders, 304.  
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book appealing only to “disciples of the modern cult of things Eastern,” because “most 
Westerners will find the work repellent in its exotic perversity, and will lay it aside with 
an uncomprehending shake of hand, for East is East and West is still West.”28 Note here 
that “West is still West,” meaning that what is deemed exterior to the West, “the East,” 
has not been able to change what it takes to be “the West ,” particularly if those 
“Easterners” are culturally active inside this “West.” For “Tagore has not really 
succeeded in bridging the chasm between them, nor do we think Gibran will do.”29 The 
Orientalist ontological distinction between – and the potential “bridging” of – “Orient” 
and “Occident” is clearly at work here. In other words, this is not so much an issue 
reducible to authorial inception – of course that remains significant as far as the 
historical and discursive conditions of writing are concerned – as it is a matter of a 
specific mode of reception informed by its Western-centeredness in an historical period 
of high imperialism where the Occident ruled territorially, epistemologically and 
imaginatively over the Orient. The fact that the U.S. was not involved in the territorial 
colonization of the Orient does not mean that its imaginary was not informed by the 
conceived superiority – racial, cultural and civilizational – of the Occident.30 
If culturalist reactions to Gibran’s work such as the above prevailed, as I 
demonstrate in this section, Marguerite Wilkinson, in her anthology New Voices: An 
Introduction to Contemporary Poetry (1919), had a different view: 
Kahlil Gibran is writing poems and parables that have an individual music, a 
naïve charm and distinction and a structural symmetry based on symbol, 
contrast, repetition and parallelism. [It] is almost entirely a poetry of symbolism. 
His poems are parables, not designs in rhyme, rhythm or imagery, although his 
rhythms are clear and pleasing. In … The Madman, we have the best parables 
that can be found in contemporary poetry.31 
 
 
28 Ibid., 305; The Nation 107. Dec 28, 1918: 510.  
29 Ibid. 
30 The genocides inflicted upon the indigenous people of the land and the doctrine of “Manifest Destiny” 
attest to this imaginary.  
31 Wilkinson, New Voices: An Introduction to Contemporary Poetry (New York: Macmillan, 1919), 27, 
95.  
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Wilkinson did not ground her brief examination on an East-West outlook on poetry and 
literature. What mattered for her was, first and foremost, the poetry itself, and she did 
not refer to the parables as “Eastern.” Albeit brief, an interpretation of Gibran’s text of 
this sort has been rarely registered. Although Wilkinson’s approach detaches the text 
from its “worldliness” and “circumstantiality,” to use Said’s words,32 her focus on the 
aesthetic as such is not without significance. An incorporation of Gibran in an 
anthology of American literature such as Wilkinson’s is significant precisely because it 
abstains from evaluative judgements based on an Occident-Orient cultural dichotomy, 
which informs so much of the reviews and criticisms of Gibran’s texts.33  
Another point to accentuate here is that this incorporation occurred before the 
publication of The Prophet, that is, before the instant and spontaneous popular appeal 
that “overshadow[ed] literary approval from postwar elite intellectual circles.”34 I shall 
return to the problem of The Prophet and how its reception eclipsed Gibran’s other 
important works later, but it is important to note that aesthetic considerations are never 
divorced from, but are not reducible to, the social and cultural circumstances of 
reception. A horizon of expectations, therefore, cannot be solely understood in aesthetic 
terms, because what is at stake here is a bilingual writer whose shift from one language 
to another (and from one culture to another), whose mode of writing adopted in English 
(considered Romantic, belated, anachronistic, aphoristic and so on) and whose 
perceived cultural distance or foreignness at that specific historical juncture complicate 
any appraisal of his anglophone writings. Formally, Gibran did not create a horizontal 
change in English the way he did in Arabic, but his English texts are, as it were, 
 
32 Said, The World, 39. 
33 To the best of my knowledge, this remains, along with Grape Leaves: A Century of Arab-American 
Literature (Utah, University of Utah Press, 1988), the only two serious anthologies of American literature 
to include Gibran’s work.  
34 Jean and G Gibran, Kahlil Gibran: Beyond Borders, 353.  
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constituted by translation,35 which is to say that they are bilingual texts even if they do 
not exhibit that on the surface.36What should be emphasized in this context is not 
aesthetic innovation but his work’s “response to questions of meaning such as they 
could have posed themselves within the historical life-world of its first readers.”37 
Tracing this response, following Gadamer and Jauss, should be complemented by a 
hermeneutic “application,” that is, by highlighting the work’s relevance to the horizon 
of the present.38 The Madman critically engages with many aspects of life in modernity, 
and not only with perennial human concerns such as God39 and friendship,40 for 
instance, albeit Gibran does that against the backdrop of a specific historical and 
worldly context as discussed in Chapter One. Some of those modern aspects include 
calculative reason and the quest for “perfection” in (post)modernity, and his powerful 
poem ““The Perfect World””41 is a case in point: 
I dwell in the midst of a perfect race, I the most imperfect. 
I, a human chaos, a nebula of confused elements, I move amongst finished 
worlds – peoples of complete laws and pure order, whose thoughts are assorted, 
whose dreams are arranged, and whose vision are enrolled and registered.  
Their virtues, O God, are measured, their sins are weighed, and even the 
countless things that pass in the dim twilight of neither sin nor virtue are 
recorded and catalogued. 
… 
It is a perfect world, a world of consummate excellence, a world of supreme 
wonders, the ripest fruit in God’s garden, the master-thought of the universe.  
But why should I be here, O God, I a green seed of unfulfilled passion, a mad 
tempest that seeketh neither east not west, a bewildered fragment from a burnt 
planet?  
Why am I here, O God of lost souls, thou who are lost among the gods?42 
 
 
35 I use the present tense here because the text itself – the way we understand, reconstruct and interpret it 
– is still an open process, but that process is one that should be critically accounted for. What is 
unchangeable is the actual materiality of the text, not the text itself.  
36 Hence, their trajectory into the repressed/displaced language (see Chapter Two) should be taken 
seriously as part of the history of the reception, or the construction, of the text itself. 
37 Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, 146. [Emphasis mine]. Jauss takes account of both form and 
meaning in “the interpretation of a literary work as a response.” Since formal innovation was relatively 
lacking in Gibran’s case, I foreground the question of meaning.   
38 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Masrhall (New 
York: Continuum, 2004), 306-07. 
39 See my reading of his poem “God” in section one of Chapter One.  
40 See my reading of his poem “My Friend” in the last section of Chapter Two. 
41 The inverted commas were deliberately included in the title.  
42 CWs, 47-48.  
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The poem, written in the second decade of the twentieth century, is an acute reflection 
on the maddening regulation of human life that turned bodies into commensurable and 
surveyed entities in the modern – and the post-modern – age. Its prescience, therefore, 
must be appreciated. The point here is that a close attention to his texts, however 
rarefied they seem, with a simultaneous cognizance of their historical situatedness and 
their relevance to the contemporary situation, eo ipso nullifies the kind of judgements 
that prevail in most accounts of his work, be they laudatory or derogatory – is there, for 
instance, anything intrinsically Oriental or mystical in the poem I cited? 
The Forerunner, Gibran’s second book in English, published in 1920, received 
less critical attention than The Madman. Most of the reviews were unkind,43 but it is 
crucial to note that the East-West cultural identitarianism was the primary, if not the 
sole, prism through which the book was assessed and valued. In his response to The 
Bookman’s review (December 1920) of the book, which found in it “the exotic fancy 
and mysticism of the East,” Robin Waterfield writes that “this had become already a 
meaningless cliché from reviewers of Gibran’s books: there is nothing peculiarly 
Eastern about The Forerunner,” going on to stress that “Gibran’s models might just as 
well have been Aesop’s or some of the short allegorical prose pieces in Stephen Crane’s 
The Black Riders and Other Lines.”44 Again, the East as Gibran’s civilizational or 
cultural genealogy predetermines and therefore produces the symbolic value of his own 
English text in the U.S. No wonder that the exotic – and there is nothing intrinsically 
exotic about The Forerunner – serves as a “symbolic system”45 that operates in the 
host(ile) culture by conferring a specific value on objects, in this case texts, deemed 
strange, culturally different, in short, non-Western, thereby assimilating and evaluating 
them in accordance to that system. Exoticism, by bridging the imagined distance of the 
 
43 Waterfield, Prophet, 216.  
44 Ibid. 
45 See Stephen Willian Forster, “The Exotic as a Symbolic System.” Dialectical Anthropology 7, no. 1 
(September 1982): 21-30. 
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East, obscures the text itself by subsuming it in its representational and assimilationist 
potency. There is no attempt, that is, at attending to the difference of the other without 
falling prey to an exoticizing that eradicates its inexhaustible alterity. Other reviews, 
such as the one by Isidor Schneider in Poetry, did not welcome the didacticism of the 
book as well as its form, “which a world grown sceptical is tempted to snub,” judging it 
to be lacking “the authenticity of prophecy” and leaving us only with “a pompous 
dramatization of only half-individualised platitudes.”46  
What is at stake here is not simply a “highbrow contempt”47 that Gibran’s non-
elitist poetry evokes, but a certain implicit expectation of what a work of poetry should 
exhibit – in form and content – in an age which is increasingly becoming “sceptical” 
from an American point of view, which is to say, in a Western age. The Forerunner, 
because it is written in a form, style and lexicon that collide with the general backdrop 
against which a literary horizon of expectation is met or not, or even created, did not 
initiate a horizontal change. Its use of the parable and of an English reminiscent of 
Victorianism is quickly deemed archaic, Eastern and (therefore) not in keeping with the 
“spirit of the age,” although the book, a collection of prose poems and parables, is not as 
didactic and prophetic as The Prophet. Such a judgement misses the power of the 
parable in its subtle reflection on the subject it ponders. The book, furthermore, neither 
satisfied nor broke an aesthetic horizon of expectation, because its own horizon of 
meaning demands an interpretative effort that does not shed its form a priori, but that 
rather engages closely with the text without losing sight of its worldly context and 
cultural situatedness and polyvocality, irreducible to the East or, for that matter, to 
Eastern mysticism. It is important to remember that the first poem in the collection, for 
instance, invokes Nietzsche in a strikingly obvious way: “You are your own forerunner, 
 
46 Waterfield, Prophet, 216. 
47 Ibid. 
212 
 
and the towers you have builded [sic] are but the foundation of your giant-self. And that 
self too shall be a foundation,” and goes on to underline the idea of continuous 
“beginning” as opposed to “origin.”48 What is neglected here is the text’s own plane of 
meaning, a neglect that is not only prompted by the text’s lack of formal innovation if 
judged within the Western poetic tradition, but, also, by the imagined cultural distance 
or strangeness attributed to its author. This strangeness, imaginarily constructed, is one 
that obfuscates what lies beyond, beneath or before strangeness itself. The essential 
question therefore is not strangeness per se but to/for whom one is a stranger. 
To speak to The Forerunner, as it were, from our own inescapable present 
horizon of meaning, to (try to) enact, that is, its singularity, let us look closely at one 
parable in the book, “God’s Fool,” precisely because it touches on this question of the 
stranger. We are told that a man, “a dreamer from the desert” went to the city of Sharia 
the language of whose inhabitants he cannot speak nor they his own language. He was 
served dinner at a vast inn, which he initially thought to be a shrine. Upon entering the 
inn, he reckoned a feast was given “by the prince to the people, in celebration of a great 
event.”49 When asked to pay for the dinner by a large man whom he thought was the 
prince himself, he “did not understand and thanked the man heartily.”50 The large man 
called four watchmen from the city, which “the stranger” thought to be “men of 
distinction” due to “the ceremoniousness of their dress and of their manner.”51 The 
watchmen took him to the House of Judgment. There, he mistook the judge for the king, 
who appointed two advocates, “one to present the charge and the other to defend it,” but 
“the dreamer thought himself to be listening to addresses of welcome.”52 Unbeknownst 
 
48 “And we, sun and earth, are but the beginning of a greater sun and a greater earth. And always shall we 
be the beginning.” CWs, 53. See, also, Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen, American Nietzsche (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), 164.  
49 CWs, 54. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., 55.  
52 Ibid. 
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to him, a sentence was passed, “that upon a tablet hung about his neck his crime should 
be written, and that he should ride through the city on a naked horse, with a trumpeter 
and drummer before him.”53 As the sentence was being carried out, people were running 
after the noise and laughing at him, and he became ecstatic, deeming the tablet the 
king’s blessing and the procession an honour. Suddenly, he sees a man from the desert 
and cries out, “Friend! Friend! Where are we? What city of the heart’s desire is this? 
What race of lavish hosts? – who feast the chance guest in their palaces, whose princes 
companion him, whose king hangs a token upon his breast and opens to him the 
hospitality of a city descended from heaven.”54 The man did not reply, but smiled and 
nodded, and the procession went on. 
How does one read and engage with such a text now? There is, primarily, the 
question of language in relation to the foreigner, to the xenos as an absolute stranger, of 
hostility and/as hospitality or vice versa.55 Which is to say that the parable is an 
occasion for a philosophical reflection that should be nonetheless contextualized, for 
Gibran himself was a Syrian immigrant in the U.S. (he spent his childhood in the poor 
South End district of Boston) at a time where racialist discourse determined 
immigration policy in the U.S. – the immigrant Syrians were generically classified as 
Turks.56 This context, however, does not subsume the text, but it remains important so 
far as the social, cultural and political circumstances surrounding the text are concerned. 
This absolute stranger is a dreamer, and it is no coincidence that he is described as 
dreamer, one for whom every gesture from a hostile host is a gesture of lavish 
 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 55-56.  
55 Derrida’s well-known reflections on hospitality instantly come to mind, as he ponders the question of 
absolute hospitality, which, in its absoluteness, is not offered as a “right” or “duty” to a known foreigner 
(conditional hospitality), but to the foreigner who is unnamed, anonymous and, therefore, an absolute 
other. See Derrida, Of Hospitality, 24-26.  
56 The first wave of Syrian (from Greater Syria) immigrants to the U.S. (1880-1924) were classified as 
Turks, not as Syrians, as the area was still part of the Ottoman Empire then. The immigrants, however, 
identified themselves as Syrians and loathed the Ottoman repression of the Syrians. See Tanyss 
Ludescher, “From Nostalgia to Critique: An Overview of Arab American Literature,” MELUS 31, no. 4 
(Winter 2006): 39.  
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hospitality, not without a hint of irony though, captured in the smile of the other man 
from the desert who does not reply but merely watches and shakes his head. By 
highlighting the stranger’s attitude and the way he perceives the (for him) strange city, 
the city of Sharia, Gibran underscores the psychology of particular kind of stranger, 
“God’s fool,” who unwittingly subverts, in his absolute distance from the host – that is, 
in his dwelling in a language which is absolutely other – the very hostility of the host, 
who can only recognize this surface strangeness. One can only be “God’s fool” by not 
knowing, not knowing the host’s language – the host who does not know the stranger’s 
language either – thereby radically misrecognizing the signs of the host’s culture and 
the host’s law. That the city is called “Sharia” is not coincidental either: transgressing 
the law is punishable, be the transgressor an insider or an outsider. In other words, the 
law in this city is applicable to everyone. But the stranger does not recognize the law or 
the language of the law. Thus, he exposes and pushes the law to its own limits. He 
misrecognizes, unbeknownst to him and to his host, the law and the language of the law. 
This mutual misrecognition, occasioned by the absolute strangeness of both the stranger 
and the host (to each other), obscures the line between hospitality and hostility: the host 
becomes at once hostile and hospitable.57 This is why “the dreamer’s face was uplifted 
and his eyes were overflowing with light”: the irony is unmistakable, and the parable 
resists any reading that eliminates this inherent paradox of the situation – by invoking, 
as does Bushrui for instance, the Sufi figure of the fool and the dreamer’s “purity of 
vision.”58 This dreamer is a stranger to the city, and his naiveté as dreamer is 
conditioned by his absolute linguistic otherness. The primary issue here, therefore, is 
not one of vision, but of the figure of the absolute stranger who could solely be God’s 
fool by being and remaining absolutely foreign, thereby drastically misreading the 
 
57 Derrida refers to a chain of signification that links the hostis to the hospis when reflecting on the 
etymology of ipseity, the “I can,” rather than “the capacity to say I,” that precedes any identity of the 
subject. See Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, 14.  
58 Bushrui and Jenkins, Kahlil Gibran, 203.  
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cultural codes and the law of the host’s city. And the host is also a stranger – perhaps 
even a fool – to the extent that he does not know the stranger’s language and does not 
recognize the stranger’s misrecognition of his hostility, to the extent that his law is 
recognizable as law only if inscribed in language, in his own language. Only a “God’s 
fool” can show and transgress, albeit unwittingly, the limits of the law. 
It bears repeating that this brief close reading of the parable is a reminder of the 
hermeneutic carefulness that should be adopted when engaging with Gibran’s texts. 
This carefulness serves to avoid homogenizing readings that veil its polysemic 
textuality. Exoticism here remains a para-textual and relational element. As such, it 
should not pre-define the text but must be rather demarcated within a specific cultural 
field in which it operates. Otherwise we run the risk of collapsing a potentially 
multivocal textuality into a culturalist notion of a text defined, approached and flattened 
by exoticism. Laying bare the discursive and cultural tools of exoticism is necessary but 
limited. What is critically needed is a hermeneutic movement that pays close attention 
to the text, that makes it visible, by inscribing rather than forgetting its worldliness: a 
care for the text – and its singularity – that is not preceded by the identity of its writer 
but that nonetheless takes it – as a linguistic, cultural and discursive factor rather than a 
rigid identitarian element – into account as part of the hermeneutic movement itself.59 
I should now turn my attention to The Prophet. The “strange little book”60 
received far less critical attention than The Madman and The Forerunner.61 Upon 
publication, however, the book generated a “spontaneous popular appeal,”62 even 
though it was never advertised, let alone “exoticized” so far as the book cover of its first 
 
59 And this was the aim of the kind of reading I perform in Chapter One and, partly, in Chapter Two.  
60 This is how Gibran described the book to his friend Mikhail Naimy. Naimy, ““A Strange Little Book”,” 
Aramco World 15, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 1964). 
https://archive.aramcoworld.com/issue/196406/a.strange.little.book.htm 
 
61 Waterfield, Prophet, 260-61.  
62 Jean and G Gibran, Kahlil Gibran: Beyond Borders, 358. 
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edition is concerned.63 It is this very popularity, coupled with its non-European mystical 
aesthetics, that thwarted serious critical engagement with the book since its publication, 
exceptions aside. The Prophet was not aimed at the high literary circles of the time – in 
Bourdieu’s terms, it was not produced for other producers – but was self-consciously 
written in a simple style64 in such a way that the optimistic message of the book merges 
perfectly with its biblical, incantational rhythm. The issue here is not solely aesthetic. It 
is one of cultural and racial difference insofar as they relate to aesthetics. To 
demonstrate this, let us look at a review in Poetry by poet Marjorie Allen Seiffert, as it 
shows and exemplifies the lukewarm interest in Gibran within the New Work literary 
circles at the time. This tepidness towards his work is prompted, primarily, by the 
foreign, “mystical” element it represents, one that does not fall within the space of “our” 
culture: 
Kahlil Gibran has written a third book, The Prophet, following two others of the 
same genre, a book that will have a deep appeal for some readers and leave 
many others cold. It is a bit of Syrian philosophy, a mode alien to our culture 
and yet one in which many restless and unsatisfied spirits of our race and 
generation find a curious release…. 
The discourse on beauty ends with the following lines: 
 Beauty is eternity gazing at itself in the mirror. 
 But you are eternity, and you are mirror. 
This seems to relapse into the sheerly mystical, and as the poem curves on to its 
end, one feels that it could never be a satisfying interpretation of our world. 
Moreover, the book lacks vigor… One feels that the poem could be a sort of 
decoration for us, like a faded Buddhist painting, that it could hang on our walls, 
but it would never be part and parcel of our house… Doubtless this book will 
awake response in many readers, for it is not without beauty, and the essence of 
the book, which is its spiritual significance, cannot satisfy the robust hunger of 
the occidental spirit.65 
 
 
63 The cover of the first edition was a very simple one: dark brown with a small circle below the title that 
apparently contains one of Gibran’s drawings – an open hand from which bodies are floating upwards. In 
other words, there was no marketing that supposedly capitalized on the imagined identity of Gibran as an 
exotic Easterner. Joan Acocella notes that “[a]part from a brief effort during the twenties, “The Prophet” 
has never been advertised.” “Prophet Motive: The Kahlil Gibran Phenomenon,” The New Yorker, 30 Dec 
2007. 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/01/07/prophet-motive  
64 “I have just one rule in writing – to say it in the simplest way I can.” MH Journal, 20 Aug 1920. 
65 Seiffert, “Foreign Food,” Poetry 24, no. 4 (January 1924): 216-218. [Emphasis mine]  
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Note the references to “our culture” and “our race” as the grid through which to judge 
the book. Again, the work’s perceived foreignness and civilizational distance – that is, 
its different normative and imaginative source, which is imagined rather than grasped – 
preceded it and determined its literary and aesthetic value. Of course, one can dislike the 
book or may find it too vague and mystical, as she did, but what I am concerned with 
here is how and on what grounds an evaluation such as this one is made, not the 
aesthetic judgment itself. Therefore her comment that “the book lacks vigour” remains a 
subjective, and valid, aesthetic judgment. What is rather problematic here is a 
demarcation of “our” culture in opposition to what is “alien” to it, not the aesthetics and 
mysticism of the book as such. And since The Prophet “is a bit of Syrian philosophy” – 
how so we are not told – an alien mode of thinking, its aesthetic worth could not escape 
this pigeonholing; it is rather deemed a “curious release” for certain “restless and 
unsatisfied souls of our race.”66 Nor could it be approached in its own terms, which is to 
say taking seriously, aesthetically and hermeneutically speaking, this foreign element 
that makes it a “mode alien to our culture.”67 The end of the passage sums up Seiffert’s 
point: the spiritual significance of the book “cannot satisfy the robust hunger of the 
occidental spirit.” There is no room here for what Chaouki Zine calls ḍiyāfa 
(hospitality) as iḍāfa (addition) or, even more importantly, for evaluating this addition 
by going towards the other in the attempt to understand what it has to say, not by falling 
back to the sphere of the same as the sole arbiter, the “occidental spirit” whose others 
 
66 Waterfield also notes, contrastingly, the favourable review of the Chicago Evening Post, in which the 
book was hailed as a “little bible,” praising Gibran for daring to be idealist in a cynical age. I am referring 
to Waterfield because I could not, unfortunately, get hold of the review. See Waterfield, Prophet, 261. 
Mary Haskell notes that Gibran informed her about this review, “in which all of his “Work” was quoted.” 
MH Journal, Nov 26, 1923. 
67 This totalizing contrast of Orient and Occident in relation to the Prophet can be also discerned in the 
brief review of The Bookman (1923): “Oriental philosophy holds a strange fascination for occidental 
minds. And doubly attractive is this philosophy when couched in the beautifully simple poetic prose of 
Kahlil Gibran’s “The Prophet” (Knopf). A modern, mystic touch is imparted to the book by the twelve 
drawings with which the author ornaments his text – highly artistic drawings of graceful nudes rising 
from chaos, as if to illustrate the striving toward clarity of more or less complicated ideas.” “Recent 
Books in Brief Review,” The Bookman (Feb 1924 Issue): 673-74. 
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can speak only to satisfy its “robust hunger.” But, ironically, the increasing sales of the 
book since its publication and the global “afterlife” of the book, to use Walter 
Benjamin’s well-known description of translation,68 indicate that it speaks to something 
in the human spirit beyond the Orient-Occident divide. 
The Irish poet George William Russell has praised the book for the same 
mystical element that Seiffert found alien and undeserving of (“high”) literary and 
aesthetic worth. “I do not think the East has spoken with so beautiful a voice since the 
Gitanjali of Rabindranath Tagore as in The Prophet of Kahlil Gibran, who is artist as 
well as poet,”69 writes Russell. Although Gibran here is still seen through the prism of 
the civilizational category of the East, that is, as a representative voice of the East in the 
West, the essential poetic character of The Prophet is nevertheless underscored: “I have 
not seen for years a book more beautiful in its thought, and when reading it I understand 
better than ever before what Socrates meant in the Banquet when he spoke of the beauty 
of thought, which exercises a deeper enchantment that the beauty of form,”70 declares 
Russell, going on to quote the well-known passage on children in The Prophet and 
another on dwelling. What we see here is not merely an appreciation inspired by the 
Eastern spirit of the book, but an understanding of it that locates its aesthetic innovation 
and the “enchantment” it engenders in “the beauty of thought” rather than that of form. 
This brief appraisal should be read in the context of modernism, where so many formal 
transformations radically changed English poetic conventions – with the seminal work 
of T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, Gertrude Stein and others. In the U.S, this transformation was 
institutionally reinforced by the New Critics whose approach excluded other forms of 
writing that did not fit within this new aesthetic norm, as I explained earlier. Russell’s 
emphasis on The Prophet’s beauty of thought, thus, betrays his awareness of its 
 
68 Walter Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator,” in Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (London: 
Collins/Fontana Books, 1973), 71. 
69 George William Russell, The Living Torch (New York: Macmillan, 1937), 169.  
70 Ibid.  
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difference from contemporaneous English poetry. This appreciation can be also 
understood in light of Russell’s life-long interest in Celtic mysticism and theosophy in 
general, as his acclaimed The Candle of Vision (1918) testifies. Beyond this element of 
mysticism, however, or maybe because of it, one can discern a genuine interest in the 
book and a cultural openness exemplified in the following passage: 
How profound is that irony of Gibran’s about the lovers of freedom “who wear 
their freedom as a yoke and a handcuff”. Have we not seen here souls more 
chained to their idea of freedom than a prisoner is limited in his cell? The most 
terrible chains are those that gnaw at the soul. I wonder has the East many more 
poets to reveal to us? If Europe is to have a new renaissance comparable with 
that which came from the wedding of Christianity with the Greek and Latin 
culture it must, I think, come from a second wedding of Christianity with the 
culture of the East. Our own words to each other bring us no surprise. It is only 
when a voice comes from India or China or Arabia that we get the thrill of 
strangeness from the beauty, and we feel that it might inspire another of the 
great cultural passions of humanity.71 
 
Russell’s reference to a “new renaissance” that weds “Christianity with the culture of 
the East” is reminiscent of Raymond Schwab’s La renaissance orientale (1950), in 
which he argues, in contrast to Russell who thinks that Europe is yet to have such a 
renaissance, that Europe had actually witnessed a second renaissance with the massive 
Orientalist discovery in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the languages, 
literatures and philosophies of the East, whose huge impact can be discerned in 
European thought itself.72 Russell’s comments, however, speak more of Gibran who 
actually weds Christianity – Gibran’s Christianity73 – with Sufism and Nietzscheism, a 
blend that resists, as I have argued throughout, a categorization of the book as Eastern 
spirituality. Russell does not so much accentuate Gibran’s mysticism here as he draws 
attention to important passages in The Prophet that reveal what he considers the “beauty 
 
71 Ibid., 170.  
72 See Raymond Schwab, The Oriental Renaissance, trans. Gene Patterson-Black and Victor Reinking 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), and especially Edward’s Said’s remarkable forward to the 
book.  
73 By which is meant a de-institutionalized Christianity that conceives of Jesus in Nietzschean terms, that 
is, as a man who champions power rather than weakness, and as a poet who embodies Gibran’s “Greater 
Self.” This Christianity manifests itself, formally, in Gibran’s own fascination with the biblical style in 
English, which for him resonates with its old Syriac version, as discussed in Chapter Two. 
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of thought.” Allowing difference to speak, thus, Russell listens to the East as it 
manifests itself in poets such as Gibran, an openness that nevertheless runs the risk of 
not recognizing how the East itself received Western ideas and domesticated them (in 
the Arab Nahḍa); for “The East,” as Abdelkebir Khatibi reminds us, “is not a simple 
(dialectical, speculative, culturalist) movement toward the West. They are for 
themselves the beginning and the end.”74 
It remains a fact, however, that The Prophet is one of the least reviewed books 
of Gibran upon publication.75 It was privately well-received, nevertheless, as recorded 
by Gibran himself in Mary Haskell’s journals: “Yes – The Prophet has been more than 
well received. I have been overwhelmed by letters.”76 Mary Haskell herself, in a 
prescient remark about the book’s success, writes in a letter dating back to October 
1923: 
The book will be held as one the treasures of English literature. And in our 
darkness we will open it to find ourselves again and the heaven and earth within 
ourselves. Generations will not exhaust it, but instead, generation after 
generation will find in the book what they would fain be – and it will be better 
loved as men grow riper and riper.77 
 
It is no coincidence, to reiterate, that the book’s appeal since its publication would 
hinder serious critical evaluation of it. Its perceived Eastern source, its “spiritual” tenor 
and soft didactic tone, as well as its Romantic simplicity of style and captivating beauty 
of rhythm, have contributed to make the book the popular phenomenon that it has 
become. All these elements, however, cannot exhaust the singularity of the text. Albeit 
simplicity runs the risk of falling into platitude,78 the above-mentioned elements are 
essential to the message Gibran wished to convey, but his vision in the book cannot be 
reduced to them.79 This is an important point to underline. And I insist on it by way of 
 
74 Khatibi, Plural Maghreb, 21.  
75 Waterfield, Prophet, 260.  
76 MH Journal, 26 Nov. 1923.  
77 Letter to MH, 2 Oct. 1923.  
78 Waterfield, Prophet, 224. 
79 See my reading of some passages from the book in Chapter One.  
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resisting “a formidable mechanism of omnipotent definitions [that] would present itself 
as the only one having suitable validity for your discussion [about the Orient].”80 In 
other words, this is an insistence on the need to avoid systemic analyses whereby 
discursive overdeterminations and homogenizing entities like the Orient and the 
Occident are employed in a way that erases the multi-faceted nature of that which is 
analysed. This way one also avoids the rigid distinction between high and low literature, 
to neither of which a text as such The Prophet can be said to belong, precisely because 
it destabilizes the dichotomy and shows – in the contested way in which it has been 
received since its publication and in its travelling beyond the U.S. where it is 
accommodated and valued in a fundamentally different way – that its worldliness resists 
the specific symbolic production of its value in the American cultural geography. The 
paucity of reviews of The Prophet, therefore, has less to do with the work itself than 
with the dynamics of the American literary and cultural field within which it initially 
emerged, where the work could not escape its imagined Oriental genealogy that 
determined and produced, for self-imagined Occidental readers, its aesthetic, cultural 
and symbolic value. In other words, it fell outside “the mind of Europe” within whose 
contours T.S. Eliot posits his conception of poetic novelty and tradition, for The 
Prophet embodies the very mysticism that Eliot, and the New Critics after him, 
discarded. This symbolic value was also determined by the increasing sales of the book 
since its publication, and particularly in the New Age movement.81 
Before tackling the problem of The Prophet in its later reception, I should draw 
attention to Gibran’s longest book in English and the most important after The Prophet, 
Jesus the Son of Man (1928). In the years between the publication of these two books, 
 
80 Said, Orientalism, 156. [emphasis added] 
81 “In 1957, the millionth copy [of The Prophet] was sold and by 1965 the book had passed the 2.5 
million mark. By the 1970 The Prophet was continuing to sell at a rate of approximately 7000 a week, its 
total sales having grown to more than 4 million copies in America alone.” Bushrui and Jenkins, Kahlil 
Gibran, 330 (note 107). 
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Gibran published Sand and Foam (1926), a book of sayings and aphorisms that was not 
well-received.82 For reasons of space, I briefly focus on Jesus the Son of Man, which 
embodies Gibran’s fascination with Jesus in a remarkably poetic manner. It is the book 
that received the most favourable critical attention amongst his English works.83 In it, 
Gibran recasts Jesus as an essentially powerful man and poet, “the Master Poet”84 who 
represents the ideal of the Greater Self, that is, one who realizes the divinity within as a 
man and a poet. The book, written in a charming biblical style, is an imaginative 
collection of how certain historical and fictitious contemporaneous figures of Jesus 
thought of him. What is interesting about the book is that it gives an unconventionally 
diverse and rounded portrait of Jesus as reflected in the minds of those who speak about 
him, favourably or not. As such, it is a literary, not a historical, book, concerned with 
the humanness of Jesus and the potency of the symbolic prototype he incarnates. This is 
what Gibran had to say about his vision of Jesus to his friend Naimy: 
Jesus has been haunting my heart and imagination for some time past. I am sick 
and tired … of people who profess to believe in him, yet always speak of him 
and paint him as if he were but a sweet lady with a beard. To them he is 
beautiful, but lowly, humble, weak and poor. I’m also weary of those that deny 
him, yet present him as a sorcerer or an imposter. Still more weary I am of ‘the 
scholars’ who are ever digging into antiquity to produce lengthy and stupid 
arguments either for or against the historicity of his personality which is the 
greatest and most real personality in human history. What shall I say of the 
senile juggleries of theologians which make of Jesus a sort of hybrid, half-God 
and half-man? My Jesus is human like you and me … To me he was a man of 
might and will as he was a man of charity and pity. Lowliness is something I 
detest; while meekness to me is but a phase of weakness.85 
 
 
82 The Transcript review of the book (Boston, Dec 1926) described it as “a mixture of pungent 
observations, absurdities and meaningless mysticism.” In another Gibran was praised as a “Syrian 
Humanist.” See Hawi, Kahlil Gibran, 233. Gibran himself described the book as a “stop-gap between The 
Prophet and the next book,” though it reflects many of the themes and concerns of his other works and is 
useful if looked at in the larger context of his thought. See Naimy, Kahlil Gibran, 207. 
83 Waterfield, Prophet, 264-65.  
84 “Aye, He was a poet whose heart dwelt in a bower beyond the height, and His songs though sung for 
our ears, were sung for other ears also, to men in another land where life is for ever young and time is 
always dawn … the Poet who is the sovereign of all poets”; “Master, Master Poet, Master of our silent 
desires, The heart of the world quivers with the throbbing of your heart. But it burns not with your 
songs.” CWs, 304-05; 411. 
85 Naimy, Kahlil Gibran, 207-08. [emphasis mine] 
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Indeed, Gibran’s Jesus was born naturally in Nazareth, not miraculously in 
Bethlehem,86 and he is described as “the Mighty hunter” and “the mountainous spirit 
unconquerable,”87 a “stranger,” “a madman”88 and “a man of Joy,”89 to mention but a 
few unorthodox descriptions the most recurrent of which is that of the mighty. The book 
was praised in The New York Times as a “certainly unusual, possibly unique” adoption 
of this “immortal theme,” and Gibran was credited for “his aptitude for simile.”90 The 
different views about Jesus, writes P.W. Wilson in the same review, “are often brilliant 
in phrase and accurate in perception.”91 The book, furthermore, was critically acclaimed 
in The Springfield Union, Manchester Guardian and Herald Tribune.92 This positive 
critical reception boils down to the nature of the topic itself and Gibran’s mastery of the 
English biblical style – his anxieties over English as a second language could be said to 
be have been overcome at this stage – together with his capacity for reinventing Jesus 
in/for the twentieth century. This is a post-religious Jesus to the extent that he represents 
a rupture with the orthodox conception of Christ in Christianity, transcending such rigid 
binaries as secular and religious. That the book is both literary (imaginary and fictitious) 
and religious, insofar as both reflect one another for Gibran, is therefore a response to a 
horizon of expectation silently waiting to be fulfilled, as it were. For what we have here 
is a hermeneutic of reinvention that breaks with what is perceived as tired religious – or, 
for that matter, anti-religious – narratives (whether scholarly or not) only to put forward 
its own. To transcend these narratives, it relies not so much on the historicity of Jesus or 
 
86 For an account of the differences between Gibran’s Jesus and Jesus of the Gospel, see Ibid, 210-12. 
87 CWs, 287. 
88 Ibid., 271 
89 Ibid., 294. 
90 The book was reviewed together with Walter Russell Bowie’s The Master: A Life of Jesus Christ, 
published in the same year. See “Jesus Was the Supreme Poet: That Is the Conception Animating These 
Two Books About Him.” New York Times, December 23, 1928. 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/98/12/13/specials/gibran-jesus.html 
 
91 Ibid. 
92 Jean and G Gibran, Khalil Gibran: Beyond Borders, 294-97. Claude Bragdon went as far as talking 
about “Gibranism.” See Bragdon, Merely Players (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1929), 141.  
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lack thereof – that is, its concern is not historicist, positivist or rationalist – as on the 
imaginative and interpretative force of reinvention to rejuvenate the figure for the 
twentieth century. Which is to say that a modern discursive field lays the ground for 
such a poetic reinvention to take place: the epistemological retreat of Christianity in 
modernity and the persistence of a certain imaginary of Christ led Gibran to adopt a 
poetic hermeneutic of reinvention that dislodges the figure from both traditionalist, lazy 
understandings of Jesus and modernist endeavours to rescue or deny his existence, 
because the figure lives on irrespective of such attempts. This reinvention derives its 
poetic force from the biblical style that Gibran consciously and beautifully deploys. 
What is important here, as far as the book’s reception is concerned, is that because what 
Gibran embarked on is a reinvention of such a central figure in human history and not 
an invention of a post-religious poet-prophet as is the case of Almustafa in The Prophet, 
Jesus the Son Man did not provoke the culturalist, sceptical responses93 that The 
Prophet sometimes induced, nor did it generate the same popular appeal. Yet the book, 
despite the critical attention it initially enjoyed, has been eclipsed by the phenomenon of 
The Prophet, whose Almustafa is nevertheless not so dissimilar from Gibran’s 
Jesus.94Hence, I return to the problem of The Prophet. 
2. The Problem of The Prophet in the American Cultural and Literary 
Field 
 
As I stated earlier, The Prophet is a problem insofar as its popularity and 
idiomaticity – its Romantic, mystical and abstract lexicon – are at once embraced and 
rejected in the American cultural and literary field: embraced by millions of readers and 
rejected by the mainstream institution of criticism, to put it somewhat schematically. Its 
 
93 Gibran’s Syrian origin was deemed an element crucial to the uniqueness of the book, given that the 
“holiness” of Lebanon and beauty of its cedars – which Gibran invokes – are well-known in the Bible. 
For this reason, Gibran was not perceived in this case as an Oriental whose mode of thought and writing 
is radically different, exotic or incomprehensible. In other words, his Christianity, however unorthodox or 
subversive, and not exoticism, has bridged the gap of his Oriental distance. 
94 Hence the importance of paying attention to it – and, for that matter, to the other works of Gibran – in 
reading The Prophet itself. 
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initial reception in the U.S., as discussed earlier, encapsulates this tension, one that 
would continue and intensify with the increasing sales of the book, which rocketed in 
the New Age movement, up until today. Moreover, The Prophet has been translated into 
104 languages, according to a recent research.95 This is indeed a phenomenon, and it 
can be understood in the U.S. by situating it within the dynamics of the American 
literary and cultural field.  
The uncanonical status of Gibran in American literature, I argue, is due to the 
massive and continuous popular appeal of The Prophet, not despite it. This popularity, 
furthermore, boils down in part to Gibran’s Romantic and biblical style and optimistic, 
post-religious message, which in the context of English poetic modernism would be 
shunned by critics, if not ridiculed. Irfan Shahid, in defending the case for the 
canonization of Gibran, underlines his particularly Romantic idiom, the overlooked 
importance of his Arabic works and the Arab heritage – inaccessible to the American 
critic – that shaped both his Arabic and English writings.96 He even contends that The 
Prophet, if judged by applying the American philosophy of pragmatism on it, is a 
success. Shahid’s contextualization of the problem is remarkable, yet his argument 
misses a crucial point: the American literary field does not abide by a pragmatist logic. 
It is the popular spiritual appropriation of The Prophet in American culture, which 
turned it into a quotable text in weddings and social occasions, a sort of “secular 
Bible”97 or a spiritual fetish, that entailed the categorization of the book as “Eastern 
spirituality” or, more specifically, as “mind, body, spirit” in Western bookstores,98 and 
 
95 Galen Kalem, “Translations of The Prophet,” in Gibran in the 21st Century: Lebanon’s Message to the 
World (Papers of the 3rd Kahlil Gibran International Conference) (Beirut: Lebanese American University, 
2018), 105. 
96 Irfan Shahid, “Gibran and the American Literary Canon: The Problem of The Prophet,” 321-334. 
97 This is how the early review of the Chicago Evening Post described the book. See Waterfield, Prophet, 
261. 
98 This is the section in which I found Kahlil Gibran’s The Collected Works at the Waterstones bookshop, 
for instance. Poet D. H. Melhem tells us that The Prophet is categorized as “Eastern religions” at Barnes 
& Noble bookstore in the U.S. See footnote 105.  
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left it therefore uncanonized. This is a mode of reception that has produced and 
reproduced the symbolic value of The Prophet as a religious work, not a literary one. 
Mediated by an exoticist discourse in terms of which cultural difference is approached 
and domesticated, this mechanism of value-coding has been one deterrent to The 
Prophet’s literary legitimation. In other words, the book, and by extension Gibran’s 
English works, has not acquired enough symbolic capital in the U.S. to be consecrated 
as high literature, which is a condition of canonicity.  
This is all the more complicated by the imagined Eastern genealogy of Gibran 
and his work: “entirely of the East, with no shading of Western thought and content,” as 
mentioned in the blurb of the 2011 penguin edition of The Madman for instance.99 This 
Eastern spirit is seen as essentially constitutive of his work, believed100 to be an 
emanation of a cultural difference whose value and meaning are produced, in part, by 
“an exotic system that domesticat[es] the foreign while retaining its otherness.”101 These 
social and cultural conditions of reading are essential not only to the shaping of the 
literary, cultural and symbolic value of The Prophet, but, subsequently, to the manner in 
which it is read and hermeneutically approached. What is more, this has 
disadvantageously affected the way in which Gibran’s other English works, 
overshadowed by The Prophet, are read, appraised and valued. 
Another important point to underscore here is the vision that Gibran puts 
forward in The Prophet and its relation to the book’s celebration in the New Age 
movement. As I argued in Chapter One, Gibran’s post-religious vision, not solely in The 
Prophet but in his Arabic and English writings generally, is predicated on an 
 
99 This is quoted from Barbara Young, a late friend of Gibran, in her biography (or hagiography) This 
Man from Lebanon: A Study of Kahlil Gibran. It is indeed a strange comment, for how could the whole 
book “be entirely of the East”? What does the East stand for here and where do we hermeneutically locate 
it in the text? Comments such as these have done a big disservice to Gibran’s English works. 
100 I am using “belief,” following Bourdieu, in the context of value, which is symbolically produced 
insofar as we believe in it. Bourdieu, The Field, 35-37.  
101 Graham Huggan, The Postcolonial Exotic: Marking the Margins (New York: Routledge, 2001), 20.  
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evolutionist reinvention of religion that de-theologizes it. Occasioned by Sufism, 
evolutionism – domesticated in the Nahḍa and embraced by Gibran as a biological, 
social and metaphysical law – and Nietzscheism, this de-theologized religious vision as 
articulated in The Prophet dovetails with many intellectual and religious currents of 
New Age thought.102 This affinity made the book prone to spiritual(ist) appropriations 
which, in the American context, are inseparable from commodification. This American 
spiritual consumption, furthermore, is conditioned by an “aesthetics of de-
contextualization”103 essential to dynamics of the postmodern, late-capitalist market, 
hence the exponential increase of The Prophet’s sales in the 1960s and 1970s and the 
concurrent inattention to Gibran’s other English and Arabic works. The book has indeed 
become a kind of post-religious manifesto for an alternative spirituality the need for 
which is specific to Euro-American socio-cultural conditions. 
This brings us to the difficulty of categorizing The Prophet. The book is first and 
foremost a work of prose poetry, however religious, philosophical or spiritual it can be 
understood.104 One essential distinction to be made here, drawing on John Guillory, is 
that between the function and the use of a literary work, between its aesthetic function 
as a work of art/literature and the uses to which it is or can be put.105 I emphasize this 
 
102 Motifs such as “I am God,” “Higher Self,” “holism,” “reincarnation” and “universal 
interconnectedness” prevalent in the New Age movement dovetail with Gibran’s notion of the Greater 
Self and the evolutionary religious vision that underpins it. The vision, however, remains essentially 
Abrahamic, if unorthodox, evolutionist and non-eschatological, as I showed in Chapter One. For a 
remarkable scholarly account of the New Age thought, see Wouter J. Hanegraaff, New Age Religion and 
Western Culture: Esoterism in the Mirror of Secular Thought (Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht, 1995), 
especially 176-90, 222-31.  
103 Huggan, The Postcolonial Exotic, 16-17.  
104 Irfan Shahid argues that “The Prophet, whatever its limitations, is a work of literary art in the strictest 
sense of the belles-lettres,” its religious character notwithstanding (op. ci., 325). Poet D. H. Melhem 
makes a similar point but calls for an invention of a category in the absence of one. As one possibility, 
she mentions “holistic poetry,” as opposed to “Eastern religions,” which is its category at Barnes & Noble 
bookstore. D.H. Melhem, “Gibran’s ‘The Prophet’ Outside the Canon of American Literature,” Al Jadid 
8, no. 40 (Summer 2002).   
https://www.aljadid.com/content/gibran%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98-prophet%E2%80%99-outside-
canon-american-literature 
 
105 “[T]he aesthetic “function” is not just one of many possible elective uses of an object but something 
that is socially determined as the condition of an object’s production or reception. It is thus no refutation 
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distinction because it is as a work of prose poetry – its function – that The Prophet 
could be put to different uses by multiple readers or reading communities. This is a not 
negation of its post-religious impulse. Rather, it is precisely as post-religious poetry that 
its use as a popular inspirational or spiritual guide exceeds its aesthetic function in the 
U.S., considering the role of the institution of criticism in forming a relative or imagined 
unanimity about what counts as high aesthetics in a specific literary field. And since The 
Prophet in the U.S. has come to be seen as a “pioneer of the New Age,”106 it is 
essentially and readily regarded as a spiritual, not a literary, book. In other words, its 
perceived non-aesthetic use – again, from an institutional point of view – has 
undermined its aesthetic value, as popular use here is conflated with, overshadows and 
denigrates its function.  
The aesthetic and literary value of the book, however, is still a site of a 
continuous and profound contestation.107 Robin Waterfield, for instance, writes, “[T]hat 
The Prophet came into the world with a whimper, not a bang, must stand as one of the 
greatest ever underestimations by the literary community of the importance of a book to 
the reading public.”108 The peculiarity of Gibran’s status in American literature is a 
reminder of the contested and disputed nature of value itself, and of the role of different 
valuing communities – imagined rather than real, whether we are speaking of an 
“interpretative community”109 or a general reading community – in shaping literary and 
 
of the specificity of the aesthetic that a work of art might be used in some nonaesthetic context; or that an 
object not produced as a work of art can be so regarded in a later social context than the context of its 
production. The relevant consideration is the specific social function of objects produced or received in a 
given context as works of art, since it is only as works so classified that they can have certain other social 
functions.” John Guillory, Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation (Chicago; 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 294-95. [emphasis in the original] 
106 Liesl Schillinger, “Pioneer of the New Age,” New York Times, 13 Dec. 1999. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/13/books/pioneer-of-the-new-age.html 
107 Scholar Irfan Shahid and poet D. H. Melhem have called for the canonization of Gibran in American 
literature.  
108 Waterfield, Prophet, 261.  
109 Fish, Is there a Text in This Class?, 11. Edward Said argues, after invoking Fish’s argument that 
“every act of interpretation is made possible and given force by an interpretative community,” that “we 
must go a great deal further in showing what situation, what historical and social configuration, what 
political interests are concretely entailed by the very existence of interpretative communities.” Said, The 
World, 26.  
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aesthetic value relationally. There is no pure value that transcends its social and cultural 
situatedness. Yet this does not mean that there is no aesthetic experience, nor does it 
suggest that aesthetic value is the same as economic value, that is, equally 
commensurable, nor, further, does it intimate that the aesthetic is only extrinsically 
imputed to a work of literature/art. Aesthetic experience, it must be emphasized, is 
mixed rather than pure,110 and the aesthetic itself is experienced and valued differently 
across different cultural geographies and interpretative communities, as the last section 
of this chapter also demonstrates. 
In this context, it would be illuminating to look at the appeal of Gibran in 
conjunction with the popular reception of Rumi in the U.S. Known in the West as Rumi, 
Jalal ad-Din Muhammad al-Rumi was a Persian poet, mystic and theologian who lived 
in the thirteenth century, deemed sometimes the foremost Islamic Sufi poet of all time. 
Rumi’s poems in the U.S. have made quite a massive success over the last four or five 
decades. But this commercial success boils down, primarily, to the domesticating 
translations and adaptations of Rumi’s poetry by Coleman Barks in the spirit of the New 
Age movement.111 This appropriation of Rumi reveals the role of a certain modality of 
reception that refashions and reconfigures the value and cultural relevance of foreign 
literary works such that their perceived difference is assimilated in ways that de-
contextualize their history and genealogy. Rumi’s poetry is both Islamic and universal – 
that is, it articulates an Islamic universal vision – yet the New Age translations of his 
poems highlight the universal and forget the Islamic, assimilating and de-Islamizing 
Rumi in the process.112 The Rumi phenomenon is underlined here because it sheds an 
 
110 Guillory, Cultural Capital, 336.  
111 These adaptations are mostly re-workings of the classical Orientalist translations of Rumi by Arthur 
John Arberry and Reynold Allen Nicholson. See Ziad Elmarsafy, “User-friendly Islams: Translating 
Rumi in France and the United States,” in Between the Middle East and the Americas: The Cultural 
Politics of Diaspora, ed. Ella Shohat and Evelyn Alsultany (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2013), 264-67.   
112 Ibid., 265, 272.  
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illuminating light on the Gibran phenomenon, in that the poetry of both has been 
spiritually consumed in the U.S. As the condition of a specific kind of reading, this 
spiritual consumption is the horizon of expectation that both Gibran and Rumi’s poetry 
has served or, perhaps more accurately, has been used to fulfil.113Gibran, however, was 
not a Sufi poet whose Islamic background is obfuscated in favour of a “syncretic” one 
as is the case with Rumi. Yet both poets, because their universal visions bear an affinity 
with New Age thought, have been almost completely de-contextualized in the American 
cultural sphere. Gibran’s bilingualism, his background as immigrant and the Arab and 
Sufi heritage in which he is steeped, not to mention his other English and Arabic works, 
have often gone unnoticed in the domestication of his work as essentially Eastern, 
spiritual and universalist in the U.S. For rather than being a mere emanation of an exotic 
cultural difference essentially consumed as re-enchanting spirituality, a “mystical” text 
such as The Prophet is one that accommodates difference, that is, different linguistic, 
cultural, religious and philosophical components. And this is conditioned, as discussed 
in Chapter One, by the specific worldly circumstances of immigration or exile,114 the 
discursive (trans)formations of the Arab Nahḍa and the larger context of modernity and 
imperialism as a whole – the movement and (re)configurations of ideas and concepts 
over time and across different (real and imagined) cultural geographies. 
This spiritual appropriation and specific mode of valuation should be 
understood, therefore, within the larger context of translation and travelling ideas. 
Gibran’s is a travelling vision that has been subject to translational re-configurations, 
 
113 See also, Amira El-Zein, “Spiritual Consumption in the United States: The Rumi Phenomenon,” 
Islamic and Christian-Muslim Relations 11, no, 1 (2000): 71-85.  
114 Almustafa, the principle character of the book, speaks before leaving the city of Orphalese in which he 
stayed for twelve years to return to his isle of birth. In other words, he speaks as an exile, a restless 
wanderer. The invented characters, the setting as well as the language of The Prophet could themselves 
be understood as essentially exilic, to the extent that they represent an imaginary world that does not 
“mimic” but stands “outside” the world as we know it, even outside, if on the surface, the linguistic world 
of Arabic. In other words, what we have here is a metamorphosis of an immigrant experience into an 
exilic literary and metaphysical expression, one that exile would even mark its “genre,” as attested in the 
difficulty of dealing with The Prophet in terms of categorization. 
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which is to say that translation, in the sense of self-translation and cultural translation 
(overlapping but not identical), has structured and accompanied this bilingual 
movement from Arabic into English, altering in the process the translated and the 
manner in which it is read, interpreted, evaluated, valued and appropriated. For that 
which travels is necessarily subject(ed) to new regimes of value and socio-cultural 
conditions of reading and consumption. This travelling, moreover, is not necessarily 
from one location to another, but from one point in time to another within the same 
location or beyond, which is to say that regimes of value are obviously not static but 
historically contingent, albeit with some elements or forces being more potent, 
persistent and impactful than others, and with some regimes evidently more influential, 
due to their imperial nature, than others. Translation in the case of Gibran acts as both a 
hermeneutic and epistemic mediator. More specifically, cultural translation, that is, “the 
superimposition of dominant ways of seeing, speaking and thinking onto the 
marginalized peoples and the cultural artefacts they produce,”115 has been the most 
influential force in the production of the value and meaning of Gibran’s work in the 
U.S. The production of a literary work, it is crucial to remember, involves many “agents 
of legitimation” – writers/artists, publishers, reviewers, critics and institutions or, 
generally speaking, producers of meaning – who produce certain modes of reading and 
consumption entangled with certain practices of value-coding.116 It would be erroneous, 
therefore, to project a specific history of reception onto the author-as-cause, since the 
author is the initial producer of meaning but by no means the determinant one. 
Following this logic, self-translation overlaps – because it takes place within a specific 
worldly context – with cultural translation, but is not identical with or reducible to it, 
simply because the text survives its author and is configured by practices of cultural 
 
115 Huggan, The Postcolonial Exotic, 24.  
116 Bourdieu, The Field, 37.  
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translation that go beyond the initial historical moment of the text’s emergence. This 
perspective allows us to understand exoticization itself as a process that operates with 
varying degrees of intensity and influence at specific historical junctures and in 
particular geo-epistemic and cultural locations.117 This also means that the text itself 
becomes a process rather than a given, subject to the reconstructive nature of open 
readings and appropriations, themselves socially mediated and culturally situated. 
The issue, however, resides in the fact that the textuality of Gibran’s English 
texts has been almost erased in the process, as his work becomes a phenomenon rather 
than a text. Of course, one does not negate the other, but in this case the former has 
eclipsed and flattened the latter, with The Prophet as phenomenon overshadowing not 
only The Prophet as text but other significant works of Gibran in English and in Arabic 
as well. Which is to say that an instance of “symbolic violence”118is at work here, 
functioning implicitly but potently, evidenced in the institutional inattention to which 
Gibran’s English works have been subjected in the American academy. The symbolic 
nature of this violence, which has rendered invisible Gibran’s texts, is precisely what 
renders it invisible. This should be understood as a necessary outcome, rather than an 
intentional act, of the dynamics of the American literary and cultural field. The 
conditions of canonicity and canon-formation within this field remain often ignored or 
unquestioned, and it is these historical, social and institutional conditions, rather than 
 
117 Another cultural geography to which Gibran’s work has travelled in translation – without being 
“exoticized” – in the Chinese one. Ma Zheng notes that all of Gibran’s writings have been translated into 
Chinese between 1920s and 1999s, and a burgeoning scholarly interest in his work from a cross-cultural 
perspective since the 1990s has been flourishing. For a detailed account of the study of Gibran in China 
see Ma Zheng, “The Study of Kahlil Gibran in Contemporary China: New Developments and 
Influences,” in The Enduring Legacy of Kahlil Gibran (Papers delivered at the Second International 
Conference on Kahlil Gibran “Reading Gibran in the Age of Globalisation and Conflict” May 3-6, 2012), 
ed. Suheil Bushrui and James Malarkey (Maryland: University of Maryland, 2012), 227-34. Also see Gan 
Lijuan, “Dissemination of Kahlil Gibran’s Poems in China,” Chinese Social Sciences Today, 2 August 
2013.  
http://www.csstoday.com/Item/324.aspx  
 
118 Bourdieu, The Field, 20.   
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the canon itself and what it (unfairly) represents and should (therefore) represent or 
include, that must be the object of critique.119 As Pierre Bourdieu reminds us, 
To denounce hierarchy does not get us anywhere. What must be changed are the 
conditions that make the hierarchy exist, both in reality and in minds. We must – 
I have never stopped repeating it – work to universalize in reality the conditions 
of access to what the present offers us that is most universal.120 
 
In this context, contending that Gibran’s universalist message precluded it from 
being admitted to the American “multicultural” canon of literature121 is a questionable 
gesture, to the extent that it does not question its conditions of canonicity. This 
contention presupposes that an Arab writer can only speak an ethnic, particularist idiom 
in America, that the Arab writer cannot speak universally, and if s/he does so in the 
manner of Gibran, s/he would not be heard by the academic institution of criticism but 
would be instead assimilated by – or seen as assimilating to – Orientalist discourse. Put 
differently, a preference for a literary expression that foregrounds the ethnic 
particularity of immigrants or people of non-white ethnicities and their social 
experiences in America becomes the norm rather than an option or a strategy. If an Arab 
writer such as Gibran speaks universally and mystically in English, the judgement of 
self-Orientalizing is quickly summoned, and the complex texture of the text122 itself and 
 
119 This is manifest in the absence of Gibran from anthologies and especially from syllabi of American 
literature. As Guillory points outs, “The canonicity of works is … another name for their institutional 
mode of reception and reproduction, but it is the name by which the concrete instrumentality of the 
syllabus in the formation of the transhistorical canon is typically misrecognized.” Guillory, Cultural 
Capital, 269. 
120 Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J.D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 85. [emphasis in the original] 
121 Jacob Berman argues that “[b]ecause of its abstract representation of Oriental identity, Gibran’s 
writings do not adequately comply with the paradigm of inclusion required for entrance into the 
pluralistic pantheon masquerading as American’s multicultural canon. The sacrifice of vernacular 
specificity and ethnic consciousness in Gibran’s writings has resulted in sacrificing a place in American 
literature’s ethnic canon” (73). Berman does not tell us how the text exhibits or represents this “Oriental 
identity,” but rather refers to Gibran’s articulation of “abstract universals” and one review that “highlights 
Gibran’s reception as an “Eastern” mystic who appealed to Bohemian artistic sensibilities” (72). Berman, 
moreover, does not quote anything from Gibran’s English texts. Jacob Berman, “Mahjar Legacies: A 
Reinterpretation,” in Between the Middle East and the Americas, 65-79.  
122 Compare with Naimy’s ““A Strange Little Book,”” where he discusses the arduous personal labour 
and literary and intellectual trajectory of Gibran, which for him peaks with the writing of The Prophet.  
https://archive.aramcoworld.com/issue/196406/a.strange.little.book.htm 
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the history of its discursive production and reception are brushed aside by dint of its 
massive popular appeal. This reduction of mysticism to Orientalism in the case of 
Gibran, which finds its justification in the essentialist attribution of mysticism and 
irrationality to the Orient in classical Orientalist discourse, has obscured the complexity 
of his text in its specific lexicon and discursive context of enunciation. This specificity 
does not necessarily or solely elicit criticism whose main concern is the nexus of 
Orientalism, colonialism and capitalism, nor is it reducible to culturalist analyses of 
self-representation and identity politics. It rather demands a hermeneutical attention to 
the text that locates it, but does not subsume it, within a certain discursive context. 
Reducing the Gibranian English text to a cultural object that exhibits an Oriental(ist) 
spirit is a gesture that runs the risk of falling into an Orientalism-in-reverse in its 
reliance on systemic and culturalist analyses that do not pay attention to details and 
polysemia123 – as attested by the generalized comments on his work without quoting it 
and the persistent invisibility of works other than The Prophet. This gesture is also 
implicitly inclined to now-canonical genres such as the novel or secular literary 
expressions of the non-Western self that can be readily categorizable and decipherable 
in Euro-America. To highlight a different worldly trajectory of Gibran’s anglophone 
text that would bring to light what is (rendered) invisible in the American context, I now 
turn to the translation of this text into Arabic and its re-contextualization in the Arab 
discursive field. This is a crucial element that is completely forgotten in critical 
appraisals of Gibran in the Euro-American academy. 
 
123 Shu-Mei Shih has expressed her exasperation of what she calls “the return of the systemic” in theories 
of world literature (Moretti in particular) and the lack of close attention to which the Third-World text is 
condemned when it travels to the West and, more specifically, when its polysemic reality is filtered 
through Western systemic theories: “The gap between the ideal of polysemia and the practice of 
monosemia is, perhaps, an allegory of the relation between the First World theorist and the Third World 
text.” Shih, “Global Literature and the Technologies of Recognition,” PMLA 119, no. 1 (Jan 2004): 22. 
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3. The Translational Movement of Gibran’s English Work into Arabic, or 
its “Arabization” 
 
Highlighting the role of the exotic as a symbolic system that mediates the 
assimilation of non-Western cultural artefacts in Euro-America is essential to the 
understanding of how exoticism confers value on the object exoticized. That was my 
concern with regard to The Prophet in the last section, in which I discussed how the 
book was subject(ed) to practices of valuation that are tied to specific forms of cultural 
translation and domestication (of the exotically different), which impeded its 
canonization. The phenomenon of The Prophet, as I have shown, has overshadowed 
both The Prophet as text as well as other works by Gibran in the U.S. In this section, I 
foreground the translational trajectory of Gibran’s English work (“back”) to the Arab 
world, where it is subject to re-appropriative forces, de-exoticized in the process and 
situated within the Arabic literary context and its philosophical and spiritual heritage. I 
take his double translational movement as an illustrative example of “world 
literature”124 beyond English, in that Gibran’s anglophone text moves back and forth 
between different worlds, that is, between different literary systems and regimes of 
value that are otherwise imperially and translationally related. This movement has 
produced different reading experiences that simultaneously veil and unveil its 
bilingualism, its situatedness, that is, in two linguistic and cultural worlds. Translation, 
in this respect, is not only constitutive of the work itself, but of how it is perceived, 
domesticated and valued, in short, of how it is experienced as a literary work in a certain 
language. Attending to the Arab literary and cultural world is not meant as a gesture that 
 
124 To look at Gibran’s anglophone work in its Arabic translation as world literature is to activate, 
following Emily Apter and Ayman El-Desouky, the untranslatable as a hermeneutic tool that allows us to 
see what is rendered invisible by specific modes of cultural translation and appropriation to which 
Gibran’s work have been subject(ed) in Euro-America.  
For more on untranslatability as a theoretical and critical method in comparative and world literature, see 
Emily Apter, Against World Literature: On the Politics of Untranslatability (London: Verso, 2013), 
especially the introduction; and, more pertinent to my concern here, see Ayman A. El-Desouky, 
“Theorizing the Local and Untranslatability as Comparative Critical Method,” 59-86. 
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celebrates “the authentic” or the same; it is an ethical stance that derives from the 
necessity of de-privileging certain epistemic geographies and evaluative regimes 
without falling prey to privileging others. In other words, the Arab “world” to which 
Gibran’s English work has travelled by way of translation is just unforgotten – and this 
gesture reveals difference within the Arab discursive and cultural universe itself. In so 
doing, I highlight the specificity of a different (e)valuation of Gibran’s anglophone 
work from the vantage point of this “significant geography”125 that has been, over the 
last two centuries, deeply affected by the West’s imperial and cultural infringement and 
domination and, at the same time, in constant interaction with it. As world literature in 
Arabic, Gibran’s anglophone work resists certain Euro-American modes of reading 
rooted in the hegemonic epistemic location within which they operate, that is, rooted in 
one particular imagining of the world. 
Before discussing two creative engagements with Gibran in Arabic, it is crucial 
to remember that his English works, and particularly The Prophet, have been translated 
many times into Arabic, and this creative translational process is often described as 
“Arabization.” The latter does not only designate the translation of his English books 
into Arabic; it also implies a process of domestication or, more accurately, of re-
appropriation. If Gibran were not Arab in the first place, there would be no need to refer 
to this translational process as Arabization.126 Even in interpretative engagements with 
Gibran in Arabic, this Arabization is taken for granted, as these engagements often 
underscore the determining role of immigration in his literary and intellectual enterprise 
as an Arab writer, but not the fact that he also wrote in English as an Arab immigrant. 
 
125 “By “significant geographies” we mean the conceptual, imaginative, and real geographies that texts, 
authors, and language communities inhabit, produce, and reach, which typically extend outwards without 
(ever?) having a truly global reach.” This notion is “a way of ensuring sensitivity to the richness and 
plurality of spatial imaginings that animate texts, authors, and publics in the world.” Karima Laachir, Sara 
Marzagora and Francesca Orsini, “Significant Geographies in Lieu of World Literature,” Journal of 
World Literature, no. 3 (2018): 293-94 [emphasis in the original]. 
126 This does not mean that non-Arabs or non-Arabic works cannot be Arabized. I use the term in relation 
to Gibran to designate a re-appropriative gesture.  
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In other words, the Mahjari element becomes important only insofar as Arabic literature 
is concerned, in Arabic or in English. This entrenched orientation has foreclosed the 
question of Gibran’s status in the U.S. from an Arab scholarly and critical perspective. 
It has, however, produced a Gibran whose cultural and literary value is markedly 
different from the American one. Highlighting this side of the picture would help us 
illuminate what the other – the American – obfuscates, providing us with a more 
rounded picture of Gibran as a bilingual writer. 
The multiple translations of The Prophet into Arabic were carried out by such 
acclaimed literary figures as Mikhail Naimy (1956), Lebanese-Syrian poet and 
translator Yusuf al-Khal (1968) and Iraqi poet and translator Sargon Boulus (2008), in 
addition to writer and former minister of culture in Egypt Tharwat Okasha (1959), the 
Orthodox priest, translator and writer Antony Bashir (1923), Lebanese writer and 
scholar Yuhanna Qomeir (1997) and Syrian translator Jamil al-Abed (2008).127 Also, a 
new translation into Arabic of Gibran’s English works by Nadeem Naimy was 
published in 2015.128 This persistent translational interest bespeaks the enduring 
significance of Gibran for Arab poets, readers and critics. As such, it invalidates the 
misleading suggestion that his embrace of the role of the prophet as a literary trope is 
either offensive to Arab Muslim readers or would make little sense to them, found in 
 
127 A comparative study of The Prophet’s translations into Arabic and French has been recently published 
by Najwa Salim Nassir, under the title, The Prophet, Arabic and French Translations: A Comparative 
and Linguistic Analysis (Beirut: Librairie de Liban, 2018). French translations of Gibran’s English and 
Arabic works are also numerous.  
https://gibranchair.umd.edu/news/new-analysis-arabic-and-french-translations-prophet 
 
128 Jubrān Khalil Jubrān, The Compete Collected Works Arabized (in Arabic), trans. Nadim Naimy 
(Beirut: Nawfal, 2015). 
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“post-modernist”129 and “post-colonialist”130 appraisals of Gibran in Euro-American 
scholarship. The number of translations alone is proof enough that the book has never 
been perceived as “offensive” by Arab Muslim readers. On the contrary, it is an 
indication of the heterogeneity and difference within the modern space of Arab society 
and culture. 
The several translations are also important because they suggest, beyond the 
implication of Arabization, that his English work is neither strictly American nor strictly 
Arab. As bilingual, émigré literature, it is both Arab and American. Hence its reception 
in these two literary worlds must be at once taken into account. Crucially, this Arab 
reception invites a different set of questions and concerns specific to that geography but 
ultimately central in any appraisal of Gibran’s literary legacy: why, one wonders, is 
there a host of Arabizations of Gibran’s English work? Is this insistence on differently, 
and presumably better, translating Gibran into Arabic a sign that he has not been 
properly translated, or is it an endeavour to capture something elusively Arab in his 
English writings? How does this reception bear on the status of Gibran from the 
perspective of world literature? While translation has constituted and (re)-configured 
Gibran’s English writings in the U.S. in specific ways, as I discussed earlier, it has also 
transformed these writings insofar as they were subject to Arabization. The proliferation 
of these translations is emblematic of the symbolic and literary status of Gibran for the 
 
129 Geoffrey Nash makes the generalized claim that “Muslim Arabs might find the title of his most 
celebrated work [The Prophet] offensive from the beginning.” Nash, The Arab Writer in English: Arab 
Themes in a Metropolitan Language, 1908-1958 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998), 13. Such 
assumptions, which betray unawareness of the reception of Gibran’s English work in the Arab world, run 
the risk of essentializing the “Muslim Arabs” – a gesture that echoes old Orientalist clichés about Arabs 
and Muslims as static and intolerant – while engaging in a “postmodernist” critique of Gibran’s English 
works by “applying” Western theories (Jameson and Eagleton) on them. 
130 Wail Hassan makes a similar contention: “A title such as The Prophet would have been offensive to 
Arab readers,” he writes, going as far as contending that “even though the book was later translated into 
Arabic, it remains, together with his other books translated from English, far less known than his earlier, 
Arabic work.” Hassan, “The Gibran Phenomenon,” 70. There are at least four elements to which Hassan’s 
account fails to attend: Gibran’s Arab Christian origins, the literary and fictional nature of his embrace of 
the poet-prophetic trope, the Arabic scholarship on his work as well as the dynamics and heterogeneity of 
modern Arab culture and society. Generalized comments about Arab Muslim readers and the intimation 
of their intolerance towards the different may paradoxically reproduce the very Orientalist stereotypes 
that such critical engagements set out to unravel. 
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Arab interpretative community and Arab readers in general. This status has been 
consolidated by Gibran’s huge influence on the course of modern Arabic literature on 
the one hand,131 and by the world literary space he is seen to have successfully entered 
on the other, both of which have laid the ground for these translations to emerge and 
multiply. These conditions of reading and translation – that is, of interpretation in the 
broad sense of the term132 – are rooted in a specific evaluative and normative framework 
that alters the translated text in that it produces a particular reading experience which, 
because translation here is Arabization, is steeped in Arabic literary and cultural 
memory, a prism through which the text itself is read, evaluated and ultimately valued. 
Thus, the Arabization of Gibran’s English work is a recontextualization in a double 
sense: an insertion of the translated text into the Arabic literary and philosophical 
context and a subsequent recuperation of the text in that specific context. 
Neither the scope nor the focus of his chapter allows for an extended reflection 
on the translations of The Prophet into Arabic, yet the sheer number of them requires 
some attention. Suffice it to look at Naimy’s and Okasha’s translations to understand 
why a text such as The Prophet has been translated eight times into Arabic. Naimy’s 
translation reads like a faithful rendition of the source text that often undermines its 
poetic character in Arabic, albeit the poet in him does sometimes surface in the text. 
This hyper-faithfulness, so to speak, comes at the cost of idiomatic domestication and 
poetic creativity, which any translation of The Prophet, as a book of prose poetry by an 
Arab writer, necessarily demands. It is Naimy’s approach to translating Gibran, which 
does not permit flexibility,133 that restricted the creative potential of translating the text 
 
131 See Adunis, al-Thābit wa al-Mutaḥawwil, 210. 
132 Gadamer points out that “[i]nterpretation is not an occasional, post facto supplement to understanding; 
rather, understanding is always interpretation, and hence interpretation is the explicit form of 
understanding,” Gadamer, Truth and Method, 306. 
133 Naimy states in the introduction to the book that “unless one is bound to, it is not appropriate to add or 
cut out anything when translating a writer such as Gibran.” Jubrān, al-Nabiyy, trans. Mikhail Naimy 
(Beirut: Nawfal, 2013), 34-35. 
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poetically. In contrast, Okasha’s remarkable translation, being unfaithful to the 
literalness of the English text, has created an Arabic version whose rhetorical force and 
poetic energy attest to a poetics of translation that not only carries the text from one 
language to another, but that gives it a new life in the target language. More specifically, 
Okasha’s translation allows for the rich idiomaticity of the Arabic language to translate 
into itself the source text without sacrificing its meaning, as it were. What emerges is a 
translation that is faithful to the poetic heritage of the target language, without at the 
same time being unfaithful to the meaning of the source text, reminding us at times of 
the powerful and allusive terseness of classical Arabic poetry and prose.134 The Arabic 
after-life of The Prophet, thus, attests to its bilingual status, to the fact that it 
simultaneously belongs to American and Arabic literatures. As such, it necessarily 
relativizes the American (e)valuation of it.  
If the translations of The Prophet and Gibran’s anglophone works into Arabic 
are numerous and different, so are the interpretative and creative engagements with it. 
The first example I wish to highlight here is Mansur Rahbani’s play Jubrān wa al-
Nabiyy [Gibran and the Prophet], initially performed as an operetta in 2005 and 
published in 2010. Mansur Rhabani was a well-known composer-dramatist and poet, 
who with his brother Assi Rahbani (famously known as the Rahbani Brothers) and the 
iconic singer Fairuz revolutionized the Arab musical scene in the second half of the 
twentieth century. The work of the Rahbani Brothers has been critically acclaimed, seen 
 
134 It is not possible to discuss the Arabic translations in English, as this would require an (impossible) 
double translational effort in which literalness is all that matters. But perhaps one example would evince 
the difference between these two translations. “A fragment of Life’s heart” is translated by Naimy as 
“baʿḍ min qalb al- ḥayāt,” which is a literal translation except for “baʿḍ,” which means ‘some’ or ‘a bit 
of’ but could be used to translate ‘fragment’. Okasha, in contrast, translates the phrase as “fildha min qalb 
al-wujūd.” “Fildha,” in my view, is a word that translates ‘fragment’ more poetically that “baʿḍ” (it also 
means fraction, shatter, a part broken off and so on). What is more, Okasha translates Life as existence or 
Being [al-wujūd], which is also, in my opinion, more appealing that the literal translation of Life, as the 
latter, especially when capitalized, was often synonymous with Being for Gibran (see my discussion in 
Chapter One).  
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as arguably the most influential in the Middle East in the twentieth century.135 
Rahbani’s operettas, include, among others, The Last Days of Socrates (1998) and The 
Last Day (2004), an Arabic adaptation of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet.136 Gibran 
and The Prophet is the last of his operettas. It is based partly on Gibran’s life and partly 
on The Prophet. It brings together, in an intriguing and imaginative manner, real 
characters including Gibran, Mary Haskell, Mikhail Naimy, Abdelmassih Haddad137 
and Gibran’s publisher Alfred Knopf on the one hand, and The Prophet’s fictional 
characters like Almustafa, Almitra and the people of Orphalese on the other. All these 
characters are engaged in an intense dialogue that animates the main ideas and concerns 
of Gibran in The Prophet, at once revealing their insightfulness and limitations. In other 
words, Gibran’s vision in the book meets its necessary worldly limitations as a human 
vision. What emerges is a theatrical rejuvenation of Gibran that mixes life and fiction, 
biography and oeuvre, idealism and realism, present and future, in a manner that shows 
or re-imagines the dialectical and arduous process of writing concealed by the text 
itself: “the struggle, at once theatrical and dialectical, between Gibran and Almustafa, 
between the real personality and the fictional one, between Orphalese the age and 
Orphalese the dream.”138 In other words, this is the afterlife of the text as experienced 
and imagined in the lifeworld of some of its creative readers. 
In his preface to the written edition, Usama Rahbani states that by writing and 
performing this operetta, the aim was to infuse the Gibranian life with a new pulse, 
where Orphalese, Almustafa and Gibran are animated with the living spirit of the age, 
not losing sight, all the while, of the struggle that the Mahjari poet had undergone in 
 
135 Yvette K. Khoury, “Akhir Yom (The Last Day): A localized Arabic adaptation of Shakespeare’s 
Romeo and Juliet,” Theatre Research International 33, no. 1 (2008): 52-53. 
136 Yvette K. Khoury, “Mansour Rahbani: Dramatist and Writer of the Classic songs of a Lebanese 
Golden Age,” The Guardian, 17 April 2009.  
https://www.theguardian.com/music/2009/apr/17/obituary-mansour-rahbani 
 
137 Another Mahjari writer who was a member of Arrabitah.  
138 Rahbani, Jubrān wa al-Nabiyy, 13.  
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writing The Prophet, “until he submitted it to the publisher, in a moment that no one 
had guessed would be immortal in the history of Gibran and world literature.”139 There 
are specific conditions of reading that paved the way for this theatrical engagement. 
Already part of the modern Lebanese heritage, Gibran is inherited, therefore available 
(for Mansur Rahbani), as Lebanese cultural, literary and symbolic capital, which is its 
social function in Lebanon. One should also mention the broader Arabic literary 
heritage to which Gibran is seen as an influential and canonical modern contributor. 
Thanks to these conditions, the Arab-American Gibran returns from exile in Rahbani’s 
operetta: he returns to speak Arabic, to perform and be performed in an Arabic tinged 
with a Lebanese dialect, thereby consolidating his identity as Arab Lebanese. This 
fictional return derives its discursive force from the exilic status of Gibran, for without 
his immigration to the U.S., which amounted to a territorial and metaphysical exile, a 
text such as The Prophet would have never seen the light of day. Gibran’s exilic status, 
further testified by the numerous translations of The Prophet and some of his other 
works into many languages on a global scale, has cemented his symbolic and cultural 
significance inside Lebanon and the Arab world. That is, Gibran is seen to have made it 
to world literature, understood as a network of texts that circulate globally, as an Arab 
Lebanese writer. It is this exilic Arabness that serves as an implicit but essential 
mediator between his anglophone writings and a theatrical resuscitation of his life and 
chef d’oeuvre such as Rahbani’s.  
In this specific context, the fact that Gibran wrote in English remains something 
marginal but important, to the extent that it is a sign of his departure towards the 
foreign language/culture that necessarily entails – for the Arab interpretative community 
– a return to his native language. This innovative instance of receiving the anglophone 
Gibran in Arabic is unknown in the Euro-American world, where only by way of 
 
139 Ibid., 14.  
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translation into English can it draw attention and recognition.140 But since it is an Arabic 
engagement with Gibran’s English work, it is itself an instance of world literature that, 
however provincial, eo ipso provincializes his reception in the U.S. In other words, as 
an example of world literature in Arabic, it serves to disrupt the implicit correlation 
between “world” and “English” in the academic discourse of “world literature.” 
Gibran’s text moves from English into Arabic creatively, and this movement forces us 
to think beyond English, even as we do, paradoxically, write in it. Yet this is precisely 
the task: moving beyond English while writing in it, activating the plurality of the world 
in this imperial language in order to contain its cultural imperialism.   
If Rahbani resuscitates Gibran’s English text theatrically, Fethi Meskini 
rejuvenates it philosophically. This philosophical engagement is significant in that it 
attests, on the one hand, to the multiple readings that Gibran’s work lends itself and, on 
the other, to its capacity to generate alternative perspectives on local and universal 
concerns from an Arab vantage point. Before delving into Meskini’s essay, it would be 
helpful to contextualize my discussion of it by sketching out his philosophical 
enterprise. For the Tunisian philosopher and translator,141 the horizon of contemporary 
Arab thought should be at once local and universal. It is local in that it derives from 
what he calls “the sources of our old selves”: al-Muʿallaqāt (the famous suspended odes 
or the hanging poems of pre-Islamic Arabia), the Qur’an and the rich philosophical, 
Sufi, poetic, theological and jurisprudent repertoire of texts now referred to as “turāth” 
(heritage), which Meskini takes as an “a priori hermeneutical situation”142 that belongs 
to the modern Arabs. And it is universal in that philosophy, however locally situated, 
 
140 Shu-Meh Shih reminds us of “an obvious and often displaced statement: what precedes recognition, 
and is more devastating than the politics of recognition, is sheer ignorance or feigned negligence. 
Negligence and ignorance are fundamental to the neo-colonial production of knowledge and the global 
division of intellectual labour.” Shih, “Global Literature and the Technologies of Recognition,” 17 
[emphasis added]. 
141 Meskini has translated into Arabic German philosophical works such as Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
Nietzsche’s The Genealogy of Morals and Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. 
142 Meskini, al-Īmān al-Ḥurr, 385.  
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should be concerned with the universal that finds its meaning in “the shared” – which is 
normative, therefore multiple – not in “the one” of science as the Greeks conceived of 
it.143 This movement from the local to the universal begins with re-claiming, in a 
liberated and liberating manner,144 those sources of the self from the inside in a way that 
reinvents them beyond turāth, a critical orientation that must be firmly distinguished 
from the so-called “return of the religious.”145Such a re-inventive movement has the aim 
of simultaneously dislodging those sources from Islamist and turāthist monopoly on the 
one side, and from Euro-oriented dogmatic dismissal in the name of Western modernity 
on the other. Philosophizing this way, for Meskini, is the necessary trajectory that 
contemporary Arab thought should follow in order to go beyond local debates about 
modernity and tradition and offer a universal, de-colonized contribution to 
contemporary philosophy within its own post-secular and post-religious horizon. This 
crude summary of Meskini’s philosophical enterprise is important to understand his 
hermeneutical movement from the local to the universal in his essay “The Veils of 
Reason, Or Gibran and the Mad I.”146 
Gibran’s The Madman is seen by Meskini “to revolve around the liberation of 
the [Arab] Eastern self from its maladies,”147 yet with no claims to Awakening (Nahḍa) 
qua Enlightenment. In so doing, Meskini implicitly and strategically “Arabizes” 
Gibran’s English text by inserting it within a tradition of Arab self-critique, in the sense 
of exposing and attempting to transcend the normative structures governing a priori the 
Arab Eastern self. Meskini deploys the East as a discursively convenient category, not 
 
143 Meskini, al-Hawiyya wa al-Ḥurriya, 167-68.  
144 Liberated, on the one hand, from Islamist reclamations of “tradition” (or a certain version of it) and, on 
other hand, from the dismissal of this long and rich tradition in the name of a Eurocentric understanding 
of modernity, of which Orientalism was a potent epistemological force. In other words, this is an enaction 
of a liberating “epistemic de-linking,” to invoke Walter Mignolo whom Meskini draws upon, in order to 
go beyond this bifurcated mode of thinking that shackles contemporary Arab thought. See Meskini, al-
Īmān al-Ḥurr, 20-25.    
145 Ibid., 25.   
146 Meskini, al-Kujīto al-Majrūḥ, 191-96. 
147 Ibid., 191. 
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as an ontologically stable one. This (self)-critique, enacted in the Arab geo-epistemic 
and imaginary location, bespeaks an agential affirmation of the self that is aware of the 
capacity of its own hermeneutical situation to foster, from the inside, “a new ethics of 
belonging.”148 What is perplexing in Meskini’s reclamation of the “I” as Arab Eastern, 
however, is that while he reminds us at the outset of the essay that The Madman is 
published in English, he pays no attention to the fact that it was initially addressed to an 
American or Anglo-Saxon audience in the aftermath of World War One. This strategy 
of Arabizing and re-contextualizing Gibran and his English work, however, is 
occasioned by a certain horizon of expectation that transforms the reading experience of 
the Arab anglophone text, as this horizon dictates certain “norms, questions, values, and 
problems”149 pertinent to the Arab cultural geography. Thus, Gibran’s English text in 
the Arab discursive universe remains Arab in essence; that it is originally written in 
English is an unimportant element for an Arab philosopher such as Meskini. But should 
this constitute a certain blindness vis-à-vis the text’s initial context and linguistic 
choice, this blindness has nevertheless enabled the possibility of insight, to invoke Paul 
de Man, attested by the interpretative rigour and depth that Meskini’s essay displays. 
Put differently, this re-contextualization has recuperated the text’s visibility, which the 
Euro-American context, for reasons to do with its own conditions of reading and 
reception, has veiled. The “I” in Gibran’s parable, furthermore, is not an essentially 
Eastern one; that was a discursive strategy of reclamation conditioned by local 
questions of Arab modernity and heritage. Meskini’s reading, as I discuss below, 
becomes a phenomenological reflection on the human face as such as elicited by 
Gibran’s parable, that is, a universal philosophical thinking that is nevertheless 
culturally situated in its application. 
 
148 Ibid. 
149 Petr Zima, “Problems of Reading-Response Criticism: From Hermeneutics to Phenomenology,” in The 
Philosophy of Contemporary Literary Theory (London: Athlone Press, 1999), 59. 
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In this parable, the speaker tells us how he became a madman: waking up one 
day from a “deep sleep,” he discovers that all his masks, “the seven masks [he] [has] 
fashioned and worn in seven lives,” were stolen. Running masklessly and loudly cursing 
the thieves, a youth on the top of a house cries out, “he is a madman,” whereupon he 
looks up and “the sun kiss[es] [his] own naked face for the first time,” and “[his] soul is 
enflamed with love for the sun.” He does not want his masks anymore; instead he 
blesses his thieves. In his madness, thus, he finds the “freedom of loneliness and the 
safety from being understood, for those who understand us enslave something in us.”150 
The parable, however, ends with a sceptical note: “But let me not be proud of my safety. 
Even a thief in a jail is safe from another thief.”151 For Meskini, the stolen masks are the 
veils of reason, for to become a madman is to be and think outside “the dominant 
institution of reason.”152 But madness here is not the antithesis of reason, Meskini 
argues, but “the capacity of reason itself to be liberated by way of its own madness,”153 
that is, by doing away with its own “masks.” The madman is a reasonable man narrating 
his own story of madness. Although the theft here is “an event” that has befallen him, it 
is “an outside” that nevertheless compels him to tell his own story from within, an 
outside that radically alters his mode of reason and being in the world: the mask-
lessness, that is, the nakedness of the face entails breaking away with the past insofar as 
it designates “the seven masks I have fashioned and worn in seven lives.”154 It becomes 
clear at this point that what is at stake here is “Awakening” – and this is why Meskini 
reads the parable by initially situating it within the Arab Eastern context – a concept he 
considers, insofar as it entails the violent enlightening of the dark minds [al-īqāẓ], to be 
vertical and authoritarian,155 because it presupposes a laziness – or, for that matter, a 
 
150 CWs, 5. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Meskini, al-Kujīto al-Majrūḥ, 194. 
153 Ibid., 192. 
154 CWs, 5; Meskini, al-Kujīto al-Majrūḥ, 193.  
155 Ibid., 193.  
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“decadence” – in the self, while Gibran’s insight, for him, is that madness, that is, 
Awakening, occurs to the self as an event by virtue of which it embraces its own 
nakedness, its radical being outside pre-destined or pre-fashioned identitarian veils.156 
One might add that the theft becomes emblematic of an age – the modern times – from 
which we cannot run. Contemporaneity turns out to be a condition of resistance rather 
than a sign of defeat or deficiency: by blessing the thieves one reveals their 
incognizance of what their very theft has enabled, rather than disabled. This mask-less 
face is the mode of being that resists the interference and enslaving understanding of 
others, those who stole the masks included – since they mistook the masks for the face. 
“Madness becomes in effect a mode of adjoined ‘freedom and safety’”: the freedom of 
subjectification and the safety from being appropriated by the other.157 Unlike the 
masks, therefore, the face cannot be stolen – “we do not owe our faces or faciality to 
any other”158; the theft is, so to speak, a blessing in disguise. 
Meskini picks up on this element and transforms it philosophically; he writes, 
The other is, above all, visual. S/he appears, at face value, in the guise of a thief 
or an inquisitive, robbing our veils and stripping our masks. Otherness is a kind 
of anger induced by the initial theft of our boundaries and sanctities. 
Nevertheless, without this originary thievery of the other, the inquisitive, and 
without the abrupt theft of our old masks, we would never experience the sense 
of nakedness in front of some mirror, a mirror that – invisible to us – contains 
us; and there would be no “faces,” that is, distinctive or personal modes of 
subjectification, which we often call our “selves,” and to which we attribute 
vague but necessary names such as “I,” “you,” …etc., without any other specific 
demarcation.159 
 
What is interesting in this reflective interpretation is that the Gibranian text becomes not 
only a source for an alternative outlook on Awakening in the Arab context, one that 
conceives of it as an inevitable event rather than a “violent enlightenment” seeking to 
reform the “decadent” minds. It also becomes an occasion for a phenomenological 
 
156 Ibid., 192-93. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid.  
159 Ibid., 195. 
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reflection on faciality (al-wajhiyya) that posits the originary thievery of the other as a 
necessary double event: one that strips us of our self-fashioned sanctity, but that 
nevertheless awakens the face that lies beneath a history of masking, that is, beneath a 
history of a particular kind of reason that forms and narrates who we are. To reside 
outside these masking narratives of the institution of reason is therefore to become or, 
rather, to be seen by others as a madman. The latter becomes a condition of possibility 
for a subjectification that the other, as a thief or a veil, is not be able to comprehend. 
This hermeneutical application of the Gibranian text should not be regarded as 
an over-interpretation. What we see here, to invoke Gadamer, is a “fusion of 
horizons,”160 one that does not nevertheless aspire for an “aesthetic truth.” This fusion 
has rather enabled a movement towards a horizon that lies beyond this re-
contextualization. Meskini’s engagement indicates the capacity of the Gibranian text to 
invite new ways of thinking in the Arab world and beyond. However problematic the 
notion of “the Eastern self,” what matters most here is not “East” or “West” but the 
possibility of being and thinking around and beyond them: 
The face [al-wajh] is the space of being specific to each one of us, yet we do not 
owe our faces nor our faciality [wajhiyya] to any other. The being of the other 
itself is possible only insofar as it acquires a “face” or a faciality. And the other 
must look for a mirror in order to look at me. Yet what hangs over mirrors, their 
beauty notwithstanding, is to metamorphose into veils, that is, into visual 
hurdles that forestall our faces … But my face is not my doing. It is trace of a 
sun’s kiss, a sun that “enflamed my soul with love,” that is, with a truthful 
estrangement that consists in belonging to my own self without veils.161 
 
The encounter with the face of the other, contra Levinas, can only take place by virtue 
of a mask-less faciality, but not without a mirror, an invisible mirror that contains the 
self and the other, where the other is seen by the self and the self is seen by the other – 
that is, no immediate encounter is possible without this mutual representation. It is the 
susceptibility of this mirror to turn into a fixed identitarian veil simultaneously masking 
 
160 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 306-07. 
161 Meskini, al-Kujīto al-Majrūḥ, 195-96.  
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one to oneself and to the other that Meskini’s phenomenological hermeneutics of the 
face warns against. Only by virtue of a radical Outside or a wholly Other – the metaphor 
of the sun – can one recognize one’s own naked face.  
Gibran’s mask-less madman is thus unmasked hermeneutically only by masking 
the original language of the text, and this is possible because the text itself was “born-
translated.”162 This is an indication of the extent to which translation bears on how texts 
are constituted, imagined, categorized, configured, re-configured and open or limited in 
terms of the interpretative capacity they can generate. Translation can simultaneously 
mask and unmask. It can either exoticize or de-exoticize, depending on the normative, 
cultural and epistemic framework in which translation takes place, the language that 
enunciates the text and the language re-enunciates it, as it were, the conditions of 
reading and the horizons of expectations that shape the value and pertinence of what is 
read, as well as the identity of the enunciator. This identitarian element is inescapable, 
yet the way it is deployed in multiple discursive and (e)valuative practices across 
different but inter-related cultural geographies is something we should always expose, 
reflect upon, interrogate and learn from, and Gibran’s case as a bilingual writer is an 
illustrative one in that regard.  
As discussed in the two first sections of this chapter, Gibran’s Oriental identity, 
understood monolithically, often precedes and pre-defines his texts and the way they are 
received, read and appropriated in the American cultural and literary field. That The 
Prophet is (still) popular in the U.S. is not an issue – it is also popular elsewhere. The 
issue, rather, resides in the conditions and mechanisms of value-coding and legitimation 
that assign a particular value and meaning to it – and to his other works – without 
paying close attention to its own textual difference. In an American literary field 
 
162 I borrow this elegant phrase from Rebecca L. Walkowitz’s Born-Translated: The Contemporary Novel 
in an Age of World Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).  
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dominated by the modernist poetics of T.S. Eliot and New Criticism, this difference was 
either unacknowledged as such or regarded as essentially Eastern, mystical and 
(therefore) exotic. Even after attempts to revise the canon in 1970s and 1980s, the 
continuous popularity of The Prophet since its publication and its appropriation as an 
essentially spiritual and Oriental book, especially in the New Age movement, has left 
Gibran uncanonized and de-contextualized in the U.S. Yet the (Euro)-American 
conditions of reading and reception – in Bourdieu’s sense – form one side of the 
bilingual picture. Because a new hermeneutic life is given to Gibran’s anglophone text 
when translated into Arabic, this translational movement is equally significant in any 
appraisal of it, precisely because it renders visible what is veiled by its American 
reception. Highlighting the bilingual trajectory of this text, therefore, means that 
another world to which it culturally belongs is unforgotten. That Gibran’s work is 
spiritually appropriated and institutionally neglected in one field, while creatively, 
philosophically and discursively163 re-appropriated in another, is a paradox that reflects 
what is lost and gained in (cultural) translation in an irreducibly heterogeneous world. 
Remembering and re-activating that irreducible heterogeneity – while exposing and 
critiquing what mystifies it – is an ethical imperative in the age of “world literatures.”   
 
163 See Meskini, “Fikrat al-Nabiyy fī al-Fikr al-ʿArabī al-Muʿāṣir [The Notion of the Prophet in 
Contemporary Arab Thought],” Taʾwīliyyāt [Hermeneutics], ed. Mohamed Mahjoub 1 (Winter 2018): 44-
55. Here, Gibran’s The Prophet and Naimy’s The Book of Mirdad (1948) - both originally written in 
English – are re-contextualized as part of contemporary Arab thought that stretches back to the Nahḍa. 
They are seen, thus, as Arab Romantic restatements of the notion of the prophet – which, under the 
secularizing conditions of modernity, has become available as an icon for public use in the modern 
nation-state – in contrast to its re-deployment as a political, military and moral icon in some strands of 
Islamist thought in the twentieth century (Sayyid Qutb and al-Maududi). Both deployments – the 
Romantic and the Islamist – are “post-religious” for Meskini, in that “the prophet” would not be available 
as an icon/symbol of public use were it not for the profound normative transformation of this notion in 
modernity.    
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Conclusion 
 
I began this thesis with Halim’s Barkat’s critical comments regarding a 
memorial of Gibran, set in an empty, isolated quarter of D.C., which is emblematic of 
the exilic alienation of the modern Arab writer. For me, the memorial is also suggestive 
of the static understanding that reduces the dynamics and manifoldness of the Gibranian 
text – as an Arab (anglophone) text – into a monolithic and monosemic notion of its 
writer as an Eastern, spiritual poet in the United States. My reading in this thesis has 
been precisely concerned with rendering visible the dynamics and manifoldness of this 
text. Fundamental to my reading was a concern with enacting its bilingual singularity or 
alterity, understood as that irreducible polysemic texture that makes this text different 
from, albeit inevitably echoing, other texts, due largely to its imperial, bicultural 
situatedness.  
Gibran’s specificity as a modern Arab writer lies not only in the fact that he 
wrote in two languages and across many genres – with the poetic as the stamp that 
essentially defines his literary enterprise. It also resides in the multi-dimensional nature 
of this enterprise, that is, in its national and universal dimensions, which are 
interdependent and at times complementary in ways that are not readily discernible, as I 
have shown throughout. This movement between different registers is one that marked 
the Gibranian text in its early Arabic emergence, as discussed in Chapter Two, with his 
prophetic imagination as the overarching motif that cuts across his writings in both 
languages. This prophetic imagination is best articulated by his post-religious poets – 
the madman, the forerunner, Almustafa and Āmina al-ʿAlawiyya, in particular – who 
simultaneously reclaim and reinvent, in post-Nietzschean and evolutionist terms, the 
Abrahamic force of religion in its pre-institutional sense of disruption, migration and 
event. This reinvention was at once occasioned by modernity – the travelling and 
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reconfigurations of different ideas, concepts and ideologies on a global scale in the 
nineteenth century – and posited against its identitarian and calculative reason. Hence 
the prophetic: that which announces the impossible – the unattainable but necessary 
Greater Self – as the condition of being and dwelling anew in the world.  
Underscoring the religious that animates the Gibranian literary vision is meant 
as a gesture that appreciates the religious as such, being a particular and varied way of 
believing, imagining and sensing that has a claim to universality, without locating it, 
however, in a hermetic sphere of lofty ideas that transcends history. The religious, of 
course, has always been a universal, transcendental force. This particular mode of 
transcendence, in its Abrahamic version, is still with us today. And that space of 
transcendence, unknown to the Greeks, has mobilized the philosophical, literary and 
existential imagination of so many creative minds throughout history. In other words, it 
has manifested itself in history, in this world – where else? – and it is from this worldly 
perspective that the literary reinvention of the religious in Gibran’s text was read in 
Chapter One. This approach allows us to disentangle the literary and creative aspect of 
Gibran’s oeuvre from the subjectively embodied experience of the religious, which, 
even if it is available biographically, does not, and should not, concern us here. After 
all, the poetic is that which stages and hosts the religious in Gibran, and not the other 
way around.  
It is Gibran’s bilingual movement, however, that has eclipsed the singularity of 
his text in its journeying between the nation and the world. This is mainly because his 
English work – The Prophet in particular – has been mostly and monolithically 
understood, valued and categorized as “Oriental” in the American landscape that 
witnessed its immigrant birth and longevity as we saw in Chapter Two and, in 
particular, Chapter Four. Hence my critique of this mode of reception – and its 
discursive conditions and mechanisms of value-coding – which approach Gibran’s text 
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from a culturalist, identitarian presupposition that simultaneously veils his text and pre-
determines its (e)valuation, thereby obscuring its alterity and polyvocality. The 
travelling of this anglophone text to the Arab world, in which it is differently and 
creatively read, testifies to its enduring singularity, which is nevertheless fissured by the 
same bilingual movement that made it possible, hence the bilingual chasm discussed in 
Chapter Two.  
This chasm has generated different and seemingly contradictory functions of 
Gibran: a poet of the universal in English on the one hand, and a critical essayist and 
playwright in Arabic, on the other. Yet this movement from one language to another 
bears and extends a universal orientation latent in his early Arabic work. His later 
adoption of English as language of writing poetry would therefore depend on the 
preservation and maintenance of the mother tongue, as his late critical essays attest. 
There is no movement towards the universal, in other words, that does not begin with 
and depend on the particular. Yet this movement is fissured in Gibran’s case because he 
is adopted, in the discourse of the host(ile) culture, in essentialist terms. This chasm can 
be best addressed, I have therefore argued, by attending to the alterity of his text which 
resists and exceeds the identitarian and exoticist designations to which it has been 
reduced. It is this creative and problematic bilingual movement that makes Gibran’s 
literary enterprise a particularly singular one in modern Arabic literature.    
Gibran is also a staunch, albeit reluctant, nationalist. His national commitment to 
Syria and the Arab East, mostly articulated in the form of numerous essays and plays 
most of which were given their due attention here, testifies to an ethics of belonging that 
conceives of the Syrian waṭan or homeland (in Ottoman Greater Syria) as the sole 
unifier of its diverse inhabitants. The national in Gibran is essentially ethical in its 
emphasis, on the one hand, on the insightful and strenuous effort and dedication that 
love for the nation necessarily requires, and, on the other, on the preservation and 
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activation of the “moral independence” that both the formation of the nation and the 
actualization of the Nahḍa entail. Thus, this political and civilizational commitment, 
enabled by the Nahḍa while breaking from some of its intellectual and teleological 
premises – traditionalism and westernization –, can be cautiously described as de-
colonial, in the sense that it radically questioned any unquestioned dependence on “the 
West” or the past in the quest for nation-building or civilizational ascendency. Yet, this 
critical stance could not do away with the social Darwinism, identitarianism and 
essentialism prevalent at the time, which were nonetheless embraced in strategic and 
non- or anti-imperialist terms – the aim was the foundation of an autonomous national 
state in Greater Syria and the enaction of an original Nahḍa in the Arab East.  
Drawing attention to this facet of Gibran was essential to my argument for two 
reasons. The first has to do with laying bare the manifoldness of Gibran’s literary 
enterprise, of which this national facet is an essential element. The second lies in the 
fact that Gibran, despite this national commitment, thought of himself as essentially a 
poet. This would not have any importance here were it not for the fact the poetic for the 
Gibran is synonymous with the universal – implied, unsurprisingly, in his short essay 
“Ilā al-Sharqiyyīn” [To the Easterners], which I analysed in Chapter Three, not to 
mention his explicit reference to this disposition elsewhere. Which is to say that it is as 
a poet that Gibran moves between the nation and the world, between Arabic and 
English, between the Arab East and the U.S. (and the rest of the world). That this 
universal vocation of the poet – what he calls “life-thinking” – is expressed in his early 
Arabic writings and reaches its zenith in his later English work means that the poetic – 
which bears the mark of the prophetic or the Abrahamic in Gibran – remains irreducible 
to readings that begin and end with the political. Not that the politics of writing or 
reception do not matter. On the contrary, the last chapter has exposed and interrogated 
the culturalist presuppositions that inform various modes of reading and domestication 
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in the U.S., which are enmeshed in practices of cultural (mis)translation according to 
which Gibran’s literary texts – as texts written by an Oriental – are filtered through the 
discursive and evaluative prism of exoticism. My point is that as poetry, this text invites 
a hermeneutic of alterity whose concern is, first and foremost, the text itself, one that 
attempts to approach it hospitably but responsibly. As I have emphasized throughout, 
this hermeneutic movement locates this text in its context of enunciation and reception 
without reducing it to this context, especially because this text, in Gibran’s case, is 
bilingual, one which is directly or indirectly constituted by self- and cultural translation.  
This ethics of reading, therefore, is not averse to the politics of culture. It rather 
attempts to be more conscious of the inter-relatedness of aesthetics and politics without 
confusing one with the other, especially when we talk about literature or, in particular, 
Arabic literature (in the Mahjar). In Gibran’s case, the fact that his anglophone text, 
particularly The Prophet, is read, cherished or even consumed as “spiritual” in the U.S., 
for instance, does not negate or undermine the spiritual or religious tenor of the book, 
because it is only as poetry that it can be spiritual or religious, nor is this phenomenon 
explainable by resorting to the author-as-cause. As a literary text, its value emerges in 
creative acts of reading that set out to pay close attention to its singular textuality. This 
is by taking into account the identity of its author not as a static and a priori element 
that informs the act of reading, but as a discursive indicator of the particular worldly 
conditions which made the emergence and longevity of the text possible, and to which 
its necessarily polysemic nature is not, I insist, reducible. This is why I delineated, in 
the introduction, two distinct but inter-related planes of analysis that oriented my 
discussion in this thesis; the first has to do what the text enunciates and how it does so 
as it intervenes in its general context of emergence and reception, and the second 
pertains to the location(s) of and the degree to which this context affects the way the 
text has been read and (e)valuated. While my reading, insofar as it attempted to enact 
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the alterity of Gibran’s text, was logically located in the first plane of analysis, the 
second was important insofar as it showed how this alterity has been exhausted – or not 
– by specific modes of reception. My point is that the alterity/singularity of this text lies 
in its inexhaustibility, the tendency to exhaust it notwithstanding. This ethics of reading 
is one that I have tried to embody and perform consistently throughout the thesis, to 
what degree of success – or failure – it is not for me to tell.  
As Arabic literature (in English), Gibran’s work is not only important because of 
its singularity. In its travelling beyond the Arab trans-national scene, it carries the mark 
of Arabic literature even if it is articulated in English or translated into other languages. 
As world literature, in other words, it retains the indelible trace of Arabic as language, 
literature and culture. To appreciate such a text, therefore, is to be at once aware of its 
worldly genealogy and movement, of its bi- or multi-lingual making and re-making. 
Which is to say that this awareness is vital in approaching and evaluating the different in 
the trans-national literary scene in which world literatures are not evenly visible and 
equally influential in their appeal beyond the national. The power relations that underlie 
the circulation and (in)visibility of literature on a global scale cannot be overstated in 
this respect. That English is the imperial language that directly or tacitly bears on what 
kind of literature we read today and, mostly importantly, how we do so, is an 
indisputable fact that cannot be challenged by foregrounding intractable 
particularism(s). The very question of difference requires, instead, a critical negotiation 
that makes visible the particular in its irreducible multiplicity without falling prey to 
exoticism in its implicit but powerful forms – for to assume that the other is culturally 
intractable or impenetrable presupposes a radical, incommensurable difference that 
simultaneously absolves the other from criticism and exoticizes it. On the other hand, it 
entails a relentless ethical effort that lies in bracketing, to the extent that it is possible, 
the normative and imaginative sphere of the same in the encounter with the culturally 
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different other, without negating the same in its potential transformation by this 
encounter. This attitude is one that foregrounds the shared – always subject to change 
and critique – despite, or because of, the irreducible difference of the human. It is here 
where translation is both impossible and necessary,1 precisely because the shared is both 
fragile and infinitely necessary.2  
Gibran’s enterprise – and its legacy – is one that illustrates this inevitable but 
creative tension between the particular and the universal, between the linguistic and 
cultural particularity of the Arabic language and its rich cultural memory on the one 
hand, and the universal horizon towards which this particularity in its Gibranian 
instantiation aesthetically and translationally orients itself. This thesis, in its emphasis 
on the ethics of reading that this bilingual movement requires, is a contribution, 
however small and limited, to contemporary debates about “world literature” in its 
inevitable inter-connection with Arabic literature and, more precisely, to debates about 
the way(s) we can better understand and approach the latter in our postcolonial world. 
How to read, appreciate and critique Arab literary works that emerged in historical 
situations different from our own – and particularly in or before the modern, colonial 
period – and lasted nevertheless, is of the utmost importance here. I hope that this 
contribution will elicit or inspire further debates around or related to this critical 
concern, which is ultimately and simultaneously about aesthetics, ethics and politics as 
inter-related realms that are nevertheless irreducible to one another. 
 
  
     
 
 
1 Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, 57. 
2 The shared [al-mushtarak] is understood as that which is opposed, not to the private, but to the 
identitarian [al-ḥawawī]. See Meskini, al-Hawiyya wa al-Ḥurriya, 174.  
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